EVERYDAY VIOLENCE AND THE PRODUCTION OF COLONIAL ORDER: THE POLICE IN GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA, 1905-1915

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EVERYDAY VIOLENCE AND THE PRODUCTION OF COLONIAL ORDER:
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This dissertation is a social and cultural history of the *Landespolizei für Südwestafrika*, the colonial police force in German Southwest Africa, and of its daily practices at the beginning of the twentieth century. Drawing on previously unexplored archival sources in Berlin and Windhoek, and using a variety of methods, including especially historical anthropology, this research project offers insight into the constitution of colonial state power/violence through social practice.

The main argument puts forward a new way of thinking of the colonial state. Namely, this dissertation proposes the idea of an "improvised" colonial state that was built through the everyday (violent) activities of low-level state actors. In German Southwest Africa, the most efficacious and socially present agents of the state were the police. Indeed, in many ways the police *were* the colonial state. The police force was effective partly because of its two-fold hybrid composition – it was racially mixed, two thirds German and one third African, as well as semi-civilian and semi-military – a compound that was enabled by a peculiar overlap of values and attitudes. But, more significantly, the policemen of the *Landespolizei* were successful in building a powerful "improvised" state because of the way they deployed and organized violence in the everyday: their practices of accepted, normalized violence produced social order.

In order to make its broader argument, this dissertation suggests a reconceptualization of violence – notably in its everyday, unspectacular forms – in relation to power. It claims

that certain forms of violence are constructive rather than destructive of social order. A careful analysis of the archival material reveals that, in the colonial realm, everyday acts of "petty" violence could be participative, shared, authorized, or ritualized in nature. This economy of everyday violence had the potential to organize alliances, dependencies, and ties – in short, to structure communal life.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Marie Muschalek was born in Stuttgart, Germany, on March 12, 1978 into a Franco-German household. In 1997 she enrolled in History, German Literature, and Political Science at the University of Hamburg, ultimately receiving her B.A. in History in 2000. A fellowship from the German Academic Exchange Service (*DAAD*) allowed her to enter an international study program at the Institut d'Études Politiques (*Sciences-Po*) in Paris where she received her M.A. in 2002, completing a thesis on the everyday administration of German military occupation in France during WWII. In 2005 she entered Cornell University's graduate program in Modern European History. In addition to her studies, she has consistently been involved in memorial work and public history. Working for the Concentration Camp Memorial Neuengamme near Hamburg as a research associate and as a contact person for French and Belgian camp-survivors and their families, she learned particularly to value individual life stories when writing history. Since 2009 she has been a member of a public-history project that has produced an audioguide on Germany's colonial past that is critical of the permanent exhibition of the German Historical Museum in Berlin.

Pour ma famille

Für meine Familie

To my family

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Academic work is a collective endeavor. And it is a very satisfying task to finally have the opportunity to thank at least some of the many people who have supported and helped me to get to where I am now. Without them, I would not have been able to write this dissertation.

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My minor-field advisors, Professors Dominick LaCapra, Sandra Greene, and Robert Travers, all contributed greatly to improve my project. Each in their own way, they have helped to make me a better historian. I thank Dominick LaCapra for welcoming me into the Cornell community and for making me feel at home in what was at the time an entirely foreign and overwhelming environment. While he was on my committee, I valued his challenging questions and the critical and theoretical perspective he taught me to bring to historical inquiry. After he left, Sandra Greene generously agreed to join my committee in the last stages of the project. I owe her many thanks for her patient guidance in giving my project a serious footing in African Studies. Finally, Robert Travers has been a wonderful advisor in so many different ways. He offered valuable counsel on how to navigate

academic life. And I benefitted enormously from our discussions, in which his eagerness and cheerfulness were contagious.

At Cornell University I encountered a stimulating environment of intellectual exchange, and I thank in particular Professors Duane Corpis and Holly Case for their continuous support and their interest in me. Moreover, I thank all faculty members and graduate students who gave their time and energy to discuss various papers and chapter drafts in the vibrant European History Colloquium and later the History Colloquium, among whom are Mark Deets, Franz Hofer, Taran Kang, Amy Kohout, Mostafa Minawi, Camille Robcis, Guillaume Ratel, Suman Seth, Peter Staudenmeier, Claudia Verhoeven, and Adelheid Voskuhl.

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Historical research can rarely do without archival research. I thank Franz Göttlicher at the German Federal Archives in Berlin who brought my attention to the collection of colonial police records that formed the basis of this entire project. At the National Archives of Namibia in Windhoek, thanks to Director Werner Hillebrecht and archivists Martha Nakanyala, Laina Shaanika, and Johanna Namulombo, my research stay was a very productive and pleasant one. I also thank George Iyambo at the the University Centre for Studies in Namibia for arranging my housing in Windhoek and for his company. Finally, Doris Kock from the library at the German Police Academy went out of her way to provide me with bibliographic references and contemporary police literature.

Scholarly work can be testing and lonesome at times. Deeply felt gratitude therefore goes also to all my friends and colleagues who offered their moral support, their comfort, and their insights, making this endeavor a gratifying life experience. Christiane Hess, Marco Kühnert, Matthias Stelte, Julia Kramer, and Andreas Strippel were there when I took my very first steps in the discipline as an undergrad in Hamburg. Our endless discussions and lively conversations – in seminars, in kitchens, and in bars – carry on until today. Through these, I am reminded that the study of history is above all a passion, and I feel very lucky to share this passion with my friends. During my time in Paris, Marianne Beck pulled me out of the isolation of the archives and libraries. I thank her for her critical mind, her challenging questions, and for all the volleyball games and dance parties we enjoyed together.

It has also been my good fortune to discover and develop friendship through shared scholarly work. I would like to thank especially Susann Lewerenz, Dörte Lerp, Manuela

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As scholar and a professional, I came of age at Cornell University through the reciprocal respect and support of the network of friends and colleagues that I developed there. Ada Kuskowski and Claudine Ang, who started the graduate program with me, were my first friends in a strange land. To them and my other "ladies" – Oiyan Liu, Yael Manes-Goode, Emma Willoughby, Emma Kuby, Abigail Fisher, Kate Horning, and Mari Crabtree – go many, many thanks for their friendship and for the many enriching and encouraging examples they give of historical study. Special thanks to Emma Kuby who proofread several chapters on very short notice.

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Finally, my family deserve my thanks for more reasons than I can enumerate here. My mother and father, Christine and Christian Muschalek, my brother Caspar and his wife Karuna, and my sister Anna, never showed anything but full support for my choice to become a historian. They have put up with me and my strange intellectual ways for as long as I can remember. Their generosity and love carried me all along the way, and I thank them from all my heart.

Ryan Plumley has been the most demanding critic of my writing, the greatest skeptic of

my theses, and a general pain in my ass. He has also made me a better writer, helped me to refine my thinking, and been the love of my life throughout. Thanks.

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List of Abbreviations

BAB	Basler Afrika Bibliographien
BA-B	Bundesarchiv Berlin
Gouv. SWA	Kaiserliches Gouvernement Deutsch Südwestafrika
IdL	Inspektion der Landespolizei
Ltn.	Leutnant
NAN	National Archives of Namibia
NCO	Non-Comissioned Officer
RKA	Reichskolonialamt
Sgt.	Sergeant
SWA	Southwest Africa

INTRODUCTION

Everyday Violence and the Colonial State

At the end of the nineteenth century the German Reich became a colonial empire. Chiefly by military force, it took possession of territories in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. German Southwest Africa, today's Namibia, became its settler colony. There, progressively more valuable land and livestock were taken by Europeans. Military outposts were built, fences erected. From the beginning, and unlike in other contemporary settler colonies, the German state took up a major role in establishing the rule of the few over the many.[1] As a consequence, Africans were less and less able to organize life in the forms that existed prior to German intrusion. Their pastoralist, semi-nomadic economy and usufruct claims to territory were displaced by a wage- and forced-labor agricultural and mining economy.[2] In 1904, the Herero and the Nama, two African groups living in the territory of Southwest Africa, took up arms against their oppressors. In a drastic attempt to maintain its "utopia of absolute rule"[3] and to fulfill the military "imperative of absolute victory,"[4] the German colonial regime committed the first genocide of the twentieth century.[5] The German

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[1] Helmut Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1914* (Hamburg: Leibniz-Verlag, 1968), 15.

[2] Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft*; Michael Bollig and Jan-Bart Gewald (eds.), *People, Cattle and Land: Transformations of a Pastoral Society in Southwestern Africa* (Köln: R. Köppe, 2000); Jan-Bart Gewald, *Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia, 1890-1923* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

[3] Jürgen Zimmerer, "Der koloniale Musterstaat? Rassentrennung, Arbeitszwang und totale Kontrolle in Deutsch-Südwestafrika," in *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904-1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen*, ed. by Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2004), 31.

[4] Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 178.

[5] Hull, *Absolute Destruction*; Susanne Kuß, *Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen: Eskalation von Gewalt zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Links, 2010); Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (eds.),

colonial army waged a ruthless war of annihilation against its opponents: it killed about eighty percent of the Herero and fifty percent of the Nama population.

This dissertation is about what happened after. It is about the everyday, unspectacular forms of violence that permeated German Southwest Africa's society between 1905 and 1915. This may seem a short period, but we should remember that, for the people living there at the time, their society extended back in time and forward into an indefinite future. That is to say, despite the traumatic break of German colonization and genocidal warfare, a peacetime society emerged with all the forms of conflict and cooperation typical of social order. It was, to be sure, an unstable order, prone to disruption, shockingly cruel to many, and unsatisfying even to its ostensible beneficiaries. But colonialism, for all its injustice and brutality, was often livable. People made do. They sought an elusive stability through the regularized ways in which they built individual lives, formed and reformed communities, and organized social life: their often improvised everyday practices.

The practice of everyday life is inevitably a negotiation over basic social factors – status, emotional legitimacy, production and distribution, access to technology and tools – and in German Southwest Africa the police were crucial intermediaries for virtually every aspect of colonial life. Symbolic of the state as its most visible representatives, workers who built up and maintained infrastructure, brokers in the wage labor system, wielders of the definitive technologies of colonial violence (the gun, the whip, and the shackle), policemen were also themselves high status members of the emergent social order. They were the sinews of the new, peacetime social body. And their improvised practices, sometimes distinctly their own and sometimes part of larger patterns, were violent.

Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904-1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen (Berlin: Links, 2003).

The Improvised Colonial State

Still during the war, but especially thereafter, the task of policing fell to a small force of about six hundred men called the *Berittene Landespolizei für Deutsch Südwestafrika*.[6] Constantly understaffed and lacking crucial resources, the policemen of the *Landespolizei* struggled to assert their authority and their "claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force."[7] My study recounts the history of these men and of their daily deeds. It evaluates the role everyday police practices played in the formation of a colonial state. Particularly, it asks what effects peacetime violent activities had on the establishment of colonial state power.

In *On Violence*, Hannah Arendt famously argued that the (excessive) use of violence reveals the limits of the power of its users. She rightly insisted that one cannot treat violence and power as synonymous. Power, in her definition, is "the human ability to act in concert."[8] Violence, she claims, "can always destroy power," and power "can never grow" out of it.[9] However, taking a close look at the micro-mechanics of colonial life, I have discovered that there were forms of violence which can be characterized as productive and transformative rather than outright destructive. These everyday violent practices helped

[6] There are three existing monographs on the *Landespolizei*: one by a former member of the force written during the Nazi-era; one which presents valuable private source material, but has a celebratory presentation of the police; and one dissertation interested particularly in the rule of law. Hans Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland zum Ordnungsstaat: Geschichte der ehemaligen Kaiserlichen Landespolizei für Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Emil Wernitz, 1930); Sven Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens: Auf Spuren der Kaiserlichen Landespolizei von Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2009); Jakob Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen: Die Kolonialpolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1915* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010).
[7] Max Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf* (München: Duncker , 1919), 29.
[8] Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), 44.
[9] Ibid., 53.

organize colonial life for they brought different actors in the colonial theatre together and constituted an order. Herein lay their power.

Violence was constructive specifically when it was participative, shared, authorized, or ritualized in nature. The men of the *Landespolizei* were pivotal in bringing such mechanisms about. They invited European settlers to go on armed raids with them, thus allowing them to participate in (and at the same time legitimate) violent state action. They asked African workers to assist them too, thus involving them as well in the state's disciplining machinery. Moreover, police violence underwent a specialization along racial lines. Some violent tasks were performed by African, others by German policemen.[10] Violence was shared – both in the sense of being apportioned out to different actors and in the sense of being collectively undertaken by those actors. This dynamic of collectively experienced violence made the colonial project an interracial enterprise apt to strengthen intra-institutional bonds and to affect a wide public. Finally, policemen meted out and condoned various forms of ritualized violence like the frequent slaps in the face between social unequals or the minor brawls among equals. Replacing verbal communication, these recurrent "petty" acts demonstrated and reaffirmed in a forcefully physical way the hierarchical racial and social order. I claim that, in German Southwest Africa, the police were the major organizers of the different types of "everyday functional violence" I have outlined here, forms of violence that ultimately abetted colonial state power.[11]

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[10] Acknowledging that both actors categories and ascriptive identity categories are always problematic, throughout the dissertation, in my own voice, I generally use the terms "African" and "German" rather than "black", "mixed-race," and "white."

[11] Historian of medieval Iberia, David Nirenberg, suggests in his study on "communities of violence" that "violence was a central and systemic aspect of the coexistence of majority and minorities in medieval Spain, and […] that coexistence was in part predicated on such violence." With this argument he furthermore aims to "narrow[ing] […] the distance between 'abnormal' and 'normal,' between cataclysmic violence and everyday

Through their quotidian undertakings – their patrols, their workplace inspections, their office work, and so forth – the men of the *Landespolizei* interacted with almost everybody in the colonial theatre. Despite their small number, they were probably the most socially present state actors. This police force was racially mixed, two thirds German and one third African, until the end of German colonial rule. Its hybrid composition, though perpetually a sore point, allowed for its effectiveness. I have found that there was an overlap – a sometimes uncanny synchronicity – in the values and attitudes among the German and African policemen. Both were deeply invested in honor, and the martial, masculine, professional identities attached to that concept. All of them valued their clientage relationship to the state. In the process of the everyday, their different notions of what honor and status implied mapped to a certain degree onto each other and became amalgamated into an organizational culture. The fact that honor is a code reliant on public reaffirmation helped this process. Policemen had to build their honor every day anew. Striving for status, they partook in a fluid "play" that situated them toward the public, generating an organizational culture based on improvisation and on-the-spot experience. The relationship between African and German policemen was not mutual understanding, nor was it cultural exchange. Rather, policemen worked together on a kind of "middle ground," a field of "creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings," which enabled them, on the one hand, to pull the colonial project in their direction, and, on the other hand, to relate to both the colonizer and the colonized populations.[12] However, the collegial

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functional violence of a relatively stable society." David Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 9, 231.

[12] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), x.

relationships between German and African policemen were by no means equal. Instead, they can best be characterized as asymmetrical reciprocity.

Working from these smaller claims about violence and its agents, the larger claim of my dissertation is a new conceptualization of the colonial state. It is the idea of an "improvised" colonial state that was built through everyday violent activities of African and German low-level state actors. This semi-official, informal, loosely organized state was neither orderly nor stable. But it was in many ways quite effective, for it structured communal life at the level of social practices in a flexible system of everyday arrangements and negotiations evolving around violence and bureaucracy.[13] The men of the *Landespolizei* were men of guns and paper. In their function they combined the state's reliance on physical force and rationalized administration. But their relationship to the official state was an ambivalent one. By now, scholarship has established that colonial rule "was marked by a striking discrepancy between colonial claim to rule [*Herrschaftsanspruch*] and the means at the disposal of the colonial state's representatives for the realization of their ideas."[14] Both overwhelmed and overconfident in view of the endless range of responsibilities entrusted to them, policemen found ways of appropriating their work and creating procedures of their own. They took liberties while at the same time fulfilling their mission – they made do. One could say that the improvised state grew out of the inability to establish and enforce the colonial elite's ideal of a formal state.

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[13] Historians Lindenberger and Lüdtke speak of a "Nebeneinander und Gegeneinander verschiedener Verwendungsweisen öffentlicher Gewalt." Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke, "Physische Gewalt – eine Kontinuität der Moderne," in *Physische Gewalt. Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit,* ed. by idem (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1995), 34.

[14] Jürgen Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2001), 13.

The distinction between formal and improvised state need not be drawn too sharply. The unofficial practices of low-level officials were often tacitly or retroactively incorporated into official state policy. But out of a position of weakness, policemen generated – consciously and unconsciously – a form of power which resided in everyday micro-mechanisms. Colonial policemen engaged in violent practices that developed and reinforced state power on this level, for they represented a form of humans acting in concert, to refer back to Arendt. My more expansive definition of the colonial state helps explain how an obviously weak government administration nonetheless wrought drastic and often devastating transformations on the colony.

In short, my dissertation traces three main lines of argument. First, I propose re-examining current discourses about the relationship between power and violence, notably "unexceptional" or "accepted" violence. In this sense, my analysis is an empirical contribution to ongoing theoretical debates within violence studies. Second, I suggest re-assessing the nature of the colonial encounter. The "matching up" of African and German values within the *Landespolizei* forces us to reorient characterizations of the colonial encounter, moving away from notions of exchange or negotiation toward notions of coincidence or concurrence. And third, I defend the idea of a powerful (improvised) state at the ground level of colonial society that was abetted, if not constituted, by violent interactions. Thus, I hope to offer a new perspective on the history of the colonial state.

What is Violence?

In this dissertation I limit my attention to physical violence, that is to those acts of forceful transgression that are done with the intention to inflict injury and pain on another person.[15] The ability to do violence is an anthropological constant. As sociologist Heinrich Popitz observes,

> man never must, but always can act violently, he never must, but always can kill – individually or collectively – together or in division of labor – in all situations, fighting and celebrating – in different states of mind, in anger, without anger, with pleasure, without pleasure, screaming or silently […] – for all imaginable purposes – everyone.[16]

The situational openness of violence demands that violence be always contextualized in a given historical setting. In context, simple attributions and distinctions, for instance between perpetrator or victim, between experiences of domination or subjection, of pleasure or pain, become less obvious.[17] It is in its historicity and in relation to historical actors that the meaning or meaninglessness, the motive or lack thereof, the rationality and emotionality of a violent act can be assessed.

The study of violence is currently in high demand. Scholars in various disciplines strive to investigate and make sense of a phenomenon which, since the Enlightenment, we regard more and more as a negative, deplorable part of the human condition, as something that should not exist, or should at least be limited as much as possible in modern societies; which, however, since the Holocaust, we have come to perceive as an inherent part of

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[15] For an interesting reevaluation of the concept of structural or social violence, see Arthur Kleinman, "The Violence of Everyday Life: The Multiple Forms and Dynamics of Social Violence," in *Violence and Subjectivity*, ed. by Veena Das et. al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 226-241.

[16] "Der Mensch muß nie, kann aber immer gewaltsam handeln, er muß nie, kann aber immer töten - einzeln oder kollektiv - gemeinsam oder arbeitsteilig - in allen Situationen, kämpfend und Feste feiernd - in verschiedenen Gemützuständen, im Zorn, ohne Zorn, mit Lust, ohne Lust, schreiend oder schweigend (in Todesstille) - für alle denkbaren Zwecke - jedermann." Heinrich Popitz, *Phänomene der Macht: Autorität, Herrschaft, Gewalt, Technik* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992), 76. All translations from German and French into English are mine unless noted otherwise.

[17] Lindenberger and Lüdtke, "Physische Gewalt," 7.

modernity and not as a temporary "accident" in an otherwise progressive story. In fact, it is our sensitivity towards violence more than anything that has significantly changed in the last decades, as historian Richard Bessel suggests.[18]

Recently, scholars of violence have shifted their focus onto the violent act itself rather than its causes.[19] Realizing that an etiologic approach to violence was partly based on the idea that violence could somehow be entirely separated from processes of social organization and power – and therefore eliminated from modern, democratic societies – this recent reorientation claims that only by carefully looking at the internal dynamics of violence, at its various forms and logics, can we fully understand the phenomenon. Many recent scholars accept that violence is "a fixture of modernity," forcing them to situate violence at the center of analyses from which one can draw conclusions regarding both its effects and its conditions of emergence.[20] As anthropologists Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman note, the task at hand is to "examine[s] the processes through which violence is actualized – in the sense that it is both produced and consumed." In their view, doing so

[18] Richard Bessel, "Gewalt und Gewaltrezeption im 20. Jahrhundert: Thesen und Fragen," talk given at the *Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies*, April 26, 2012.
[19] Recent examples in history: Lindenberger and Lüdtke, *Physische Gewalt. Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit*; Alf Lüdtke and Michael Wildt (eds.), *Staats-Gewalt: Ausnahmezustand und Sicherheitsregimes: Historische Perspektiven* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008). In anthropology: Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele, and Pamela Reynolds (eds.), *Violence and Subjectivity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Jan Koehler and Sonja Heyer (eds.), *Anthropologie der Gewalt: Chancen und Grenzen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung* (Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 1998); Peter Burschel, Götz Distelrath, and Sven Lembke (eds.), *Das Quälen des Körpers: eine historische Anthropologie der Folter* (Köln: Böhlau, 2000). In sociology: Sofsky, Wolfgang. *Traktat über die Gewalt*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl., 2005); Collins, Randall. *Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Peter Imbusch, "Gewalt – Stochern in unübersichtlichem Gelände," *Mittelweg 36* (2/2000): 24-40; Trutz von Trotha (ed.), *Soziologie der Gewalt* [special issue of *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie,* vol. 37] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997).
[20] Lindenberger and Lüdtke, "Physische Gewalt," 7.

will "provide […] accounts of the manner in which everyday life is transformed in the engagement with violence."[21]

Accordingly, my dissertation is a phenomenological study of the logics of violence. It interrogates the politics of violent acts. It follows in the steps of those traditions of thought that try to (re-)connect violence and power, or violence and rule (*Herrschaft*), elucidating their complex relationship to one another. Power is not the same as violence, violence not the same as power, as Hannah Arendt cogently established. And, as Jan Philipp Reemtsma notes, "no power relation […] is […] simply a violence relation."[22] But contrary to Arendt, other theorists of violence, like Reemtsma and Popitz for instance, stress that the two are intrinsically linked. Popitz defines violence as "the directest form of power." According to him, violence is a "sheer power of action: the power to cause harm to others in an action aimed against them – to 'do something' to others."[23] Hence, violence's power is volatile. It rests in the moment of its happening. "Violence is a power in the here and now. Violence is a situational power," sociologist Trutz von Trotha notes.[24]

Furthermore, violence is inextricably linked to the body. It is an emotionally charged, bodily experience and a physical act. Violence cannot be studied separately from the bodies and psyches of humans beings who bring it about and endure it. Because it is embodied, violence "inhabits" people; it does something to them. In his psychoanalytical approach to violence in *The Wretched of the Earth*, Franz Fanon emphasizes that violence is not just a

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[21] Das and Kleinman, Introduction to *Violence and Subjectivity,* 2.
[22] "Keine Machtbeziehung […] ist […] nur eine Gewaltbeziehung." Jan Philipp Reemtsma, "Die Gewalt spricht nicht," *Mittelweg 36* 2 (2000): 9. Reemtsma's article offers a convincing critique of "misreadings" of Weber's concept of power and rule as synonymous with violence.
[23] "Die direkteste Form von Macht ist die schiere Aktionsmacht: die Macht, anderen in einer gegen sie gerichteten Aktion Schaden zuzufügen, – anderen 'etwas anzutun'." Popitz, *Phänomene der Macht*, 65.
[24] Trutz von Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft. Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des "Schutzgebietes Togo"* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994), 62.

form of doing but also a form of *being*.[25] Thus, the ways in which historical actors were used to doing violence, lived with everyday violence, and defined themselves through violence, need to be taken into account.

Moreover, as anthropologists Ingo Schröder and Bettina Schmidt point out, violence has a performative dimension. "Violence without an audience […] is socially meaningless," they observe. And: "violent acts are efficient because of their staging of power and legitimacy[26] […]." But precisely because it also symbolically represents an order, violence is "contestable on a discursive level" at least.[27] Perpetrators, victims, and bystanders do not necessarily, or even regularly, interpret the meaning of a violent event in the same way. This ambiguity thus opens up possibilities for all actors to maintain or assert individual agency through their own attribution of meaning to violent acts.

However, the discursive appropriation of violence is itself constrained by other forms of power. In order to assess whether violent acts have an impact beyond physical harm, one needs to situate them within broader relations of power: within discursive fields and material structures. Were the wielders of violence "backed" by an institution, by the law, by the state, by their social status? Were violent deeds embedded in a cultural logic that promoted them as acceptable, maybe even inescapable or imperative? In this dissertation, I claim that violent acts unfold their power in their social situated-ness, in their ability to involve and create order. Consequently their community-constituting connection to other

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[25] Frantz Fanon, "On Violence," in *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 1-62. See also Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, "On Politics and Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon." *Contemporary Political Theory* 7 (2008): 90-108.
[26] Ingo Schröder and Bettina Schmidt, "Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices," introduction to *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*, ed. by Ingo Schröder and Bettina Schmidt (London: Routledge, 2001), 5-6.
[27] Ibid., 6.

forms of power (legal, institutional, bureaucratic, ideological, economic, spiritual) equally needs to be kept in mind.

To phrase it differently, I am most interested in violence's organizing, ordering capacity. "The core of understanding violence lies in what violence itself conveys, what it enables, and especially what it sets in motion," Trotha claims.[28] This dissertation scrutinizes the micro-mechanisms, the various modalities, and the internal logics of violent practices. It asks how historical actors used violence, lived with violence, and embodied violence in the everyday. It examines how violence was neither just a means to an end, nor an arbitrary force of nature.

In their fruitful juxtaposition of the works of Fanon and Arendt, political theorists Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberley Hutchings offer a compelling discussion of the relationship between violence and politics. They argue that the two thinkers' concepts of violence

> are in some sense complementary. Arendt's argument gives us a useful corrective to Fanon's instrumental and psychoanalytic claims. Fanon, on the other hand, gives us an equally useful corrective to the abstract and disembodied way in which Arendt thinks about violence as a tool. […] Fanon […] fails to explain how the vicious circle between doing and 'being' of violence can be broken through the doing of further violence. Meanwhile, Arendt banishes violence from politics conceptually, but fails to engage with the problem how violence might both be, on occasion, constitutive for politics, and not contaminate it.[29]

Without aligning myself with either Arendt's or Fanon's normative political views I would like to engage nevertheless with their theoretical insights. The constitution of colonial state politics through violent acts, to paraphrase Frazer and Hutchings, is at the center of this dissertation. It investigates the ways in which violence was entrenched in the individual

[28] Trutz von Trotha, "Zur Soziologie der Gewalt," in *Soziologie der Gewalt*, ed. by Trutz von Trotha (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), 20-21.
[29] Frazer and Hutchings, "On Politics and Violence," 106.

and collective lives of low-level colonial state actors and how their everyday violent practices related to state policy and rule in general.

To talk or write about violence is difficult. It is "simultaneously a historical form of experiencing and a historical form of acting."[30] It is about bodies clashing, injury, pain, suffering, feelings of domination, elation, and internal experiences almost impossible to describe. In this dissertation, I focus mostly on violent acts as forms of doing rather than forms of experiencing.[31] Moreover, especially with the sources at my disposal and the questions I am asking, the perspective of the perpetrators comes unavoidably to the fore, and the victims remain silent. What is more, detailed descriptions of violent practices demand a high tolerance for ambivalence and contradiction, a willingness to be unsettled in one's own comfortable distance from these events. For a close look at violence

> rarely makes clear distinctions between perpetrators, victims, and bystanders, allows for the constructive potential of violence to stand side-by-side its destructive effects, shows euphoria along with suffering and despair, and, if necessary, can even bring about empathy with perpetrators.[32]

When writing about the everyday of violence, identification with its victims or perpetrators, that is to say, getting too close to one's subject, is not easy to avoid. The scholar examining violence should be aware of this identification, and regularly question her or his own projections onto a violent situation.

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[30] Lindenberger and Lüdtke, "Physische Gewalt," 7.
[31] With the important exception of the experience of emotions I have tried to account for throughout the dissertation.
[32] Jan Koehler and Sonja Heyer, "Soziologisches Sprechen und empirisches Erfassen – Explaining Violence," in *Anthropologie der Gewalt: Chancen und Grenzen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung*, ed. by Jan Koehler and Sonja Heyer (Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 1998) 17.

My work can be situated in relation to three distinct bodies of literature. First, it inserts itself into the ever growing historiographical scholarship on the political, social, and cultural history of the colonial state – both in European and African history. Second, it intervenes in the scholarly debate about the role of war and violence in modern history, especially in twentieth-century German history. Third, it is a contribution to the study of police, its institutional history, and its organizational culture.

The Colonial State

Recently, Kathleen Wilson observed that "studies of the colonial state may seem to be characterized more by plentitude than by lack."[33] Yet scholars are far from agreed about what the colonial state was and how it worked.[34] A decade ago, in their influential "rethinking [of] a research agenda," Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper called for a return to the state as a site of inquiry, away from a fixation on questions of discourse, knowledge production, or representations in colonial history.[35] Diagnosing a persistent ignorance about the exact workings of the colonial state, they suggested putting "contradiction at the center of the colonial state's operative mode," and abandoning assumptions about "the

[33] Kathleen Wilson, "Rethinking the Colonial State: Family, Gender, and Governmentality in Eighteenth-Century British Frontiers," *American Historical Review* 116, 5 (2011): 1294.
[34] The debate is not new. For earlier discussions of the colonial state, see John Lonsdale, "States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey," *African Studies Review* 24, 2/3 (1981): 139-225; Bruce Berman, "Structure and Process in the Bureaucratic States of Colonial Africa," *Development & Change* 15, 2 (1984): 161-202.
[35] Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. by idem (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). A recent republication of the article in Claudia Kraft, Alf Lüdtke, and Jürgen Martschukat (eds.), *Kolonialgeschichten: regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010) testifies to the significance of the article.

colonial state's hegemonic operation, its unity and coherence."[36] Moreover, they advocated looking beyond "colonial dichotomies of ruler and ruled, white and black, colonizer and colonized" which "reflected only part of the reality in which people lived."[37] Historiographical scholarship has since supplied a range of complicating narratives.

Recent scholarly work draws attention to antagonisms between different factions of the colonial state: between local colonial administrations and their respective offices in the metropole; between bureaucratic and military branches; between the elected body of settler communities and the administrational apparatus sent by a homeland's government. George Steinmetz's study of the colonial state as culturally constituted, for example, claims that state policy was driven particularly by the competition between different functionaries with differing ethnographic knowledge about the colonized.[38] Regarding the history of German Southwest Africa, Jürgen Zimmerer rightly observes that a further differentiation within the colonial bureaucracy is necessary to fully grasp the pretensions and realizations of the so-called "native policy" of the German colonial state. My work has similar ambitions. Since its main object of research is yet another part of the colonial administrative apparatus, this study differentiates further the heterogeneous group of officials and their internal logics.

Another set of literature that tackles the internal contradictions of the colonial state stresses the importance of colonial intermediaries who acted as brokers for the colonial

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[36] Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 20. See alsoearlier historiographical essay by Cooper which comments on the "partial and contradictory" nature of colonial power. Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *The American Historical Review* 99, 5 (1994): 1531.
[37] Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 34. See also Nicholas B. Dirks (ed.) *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Frederick Cooper, "States, Empires, and Political Imagination," in *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 153-203.
[38] George Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

state.[39] This scholarship builds on older studies which underscored the importance of local "collaborators."[40] Influenced by the school of subaltern studies, it shows how middle-men transformed the colonial enterprise, appropriating it to their own needs and cultural and social orders.[41] As historian Emily Osborn notes, colonial employees "adapted to the [colonial] presence by filtering colonial policy and procedures and building unofficial networks that linked the colonial bureaucracy to indigenous hierarchies."[42] A related initiative focuses on class in order to fill out our picture of colonial life. These studies aim at exploring "the underbelly of […] empire," that is, those men and women from the lower classes who were agents of colonial power while also its subjects.[43] Given the comparatively unusual racially mixed composition of the *Landespolizei*, my study is at the same time a history of intermediaries and a history of lower class colonizers.[44]

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[39] Programmatic in this approach was the collection by Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts (eds.), *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). See also Albert Wirz, Andreas Eckert, and Katrin Bromber (eds.), *Alles unter Kontrolle: Disziplinierungsprozesse im kolonialen Tansania (1850-1960)* (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2003). Neither of these publications include policemen or soldiers in their analysis. For that, see Michelle Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, forthcoming); Joël Glasman, "Penser les intermédiaires coloniaux: Note sur les dossiers de carrière de la police du Togo," *History in Africa* 37 (2010): 51-81; idem, "Les *Corps habillés*: Genèse des métiers de police au Togo (1885-1963)" (PhD Diss., Université Paris 7, 2011). Cf. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 13-14 forintegration of the concept into world history, and Peter Limb, Norman Etherington, and Peter Midgley (eds.), *Grappling with the Beast: Indigenous Southern African Responses to Colonialism, 1840-1930* (Leiden: Brill, 2010) forintroduction of the concept into the history of African responses to colonialism.

[40] Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,'" in *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, ed. by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972). See also Charles Van Onselen, "The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining Industry 1900-1935," *African Affairs* 72, 289 (1973): 401-418.

[41] Introductory texts are Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (eds.), *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," *American Historical Review* 99, 5 (1994): 1475-90.

[42] Emily Lynn Osborn, "'Circle of Iron': African Colonial Employees and the Interpretation of Colonial Rule in French West Africa," *The Journal of African History* 44,1 (2003): 31.

[43] Linda Colley, *Captives. Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850* (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 4. Philippa Levine, *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset* (Harlow: Longman, 2007).

[44] Only German Southwest Africa, British Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and pre-WW I French Maghreb had primarily white police forces or *gendarmeries* supplemented by African auxiliary police. In all other

The attempt to overcome simple binaries has produced a further set of scholarship on the colonial state which can be subsumed under the headings of connected or entangled history.[45] Under the influence of postcolonial studies which introduced Foucault's concept of "governmentality" to the inquiry of colonial power, these studies put the colonial encounter at the core of their analysis and stress "that Europe and its others were co-produced in and through their unequal interactions."[46] In these analyses, structures, ideas, and practices, rather than the actors come to the fore.[47] They complicate narratives of the historical relationship between the nation-state and the "empire-state" and characterize

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African colonies, African, sometimes Asian men were recruited into the rank and file and led by small groups of European police officers.

[45] Connected history has been dubbed by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia," in *Beyond Binary Histories: Re-Imagining Eurasia to C.1830*, ed. by Victor B. Lieberman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 289-316. The term "entangled" was introduced by Sidney Mintz in his *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Viking, 1985), and taken up by Shalini Randeria, "Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne," in *Zukunftsentwürfe: Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung*, ed. by Jörn Rüsen, Hanna Leitgeb, and Norbert Jegelka (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2000), 87-96. See also Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, "Geteilte Geschichten – Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt," in *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. by idem (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2002), 9-49; Angelika Epple, Olaf Kaltmeier, and Ulrike Lindner, (eds.), "Entangled Histories: Reflecting on Concepts of Coloniality and Postcoloniality," special issue of *Comparativ* 21, 1 (2011).

[46] Patrick Wolfe, "History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism," *The American Historical Review* 102, 2 (1997): 413. On governmentality, see David Scott, "Colonial Governmentality," *Social Text* 43 (1995): 191-220; cf. Michael Pesek, "Foucault Hardly Came to Africa: Some Notes on Colonial and Post-Colonial Governmentality," *Comparativ* 21, 1 (2011): 41-59.

[47] These approaches are often difficult to separate from global or transnational histories. See the following examples, with an emphasis on German colonialism: Alain Chatriot and Dieter Gosewinkel (eds.), *Koloniale Politik und Praktiken Deutschlands und Frankreichs 1880-1962/ Politiques et pratiques coloniales dans les empires allemands et français 1880-1962* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010); Clifton C. Crais (ed.), *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and the Political Imagination* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003); Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Jan-Georg Deutsch, Peter Probst, and Heike Schmidt (eds.) *African Modernities: Entangled Meanings in Current Debate* (Oxford: James Currey, 2002); Catherine Hall (ed.), *Race, Nation and Empire: Making Histories, 1750 to the Present* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010); Claudia Kraft, Alf Lüdtke, and Jürgen Martschukat (eds.), *Kolonialgeschichten: Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen*. (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2010); Dirk van Laak, *Über alles in der Welt: Deutscher Imperialismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (München: C.H. Beck, 2005); Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen (eds.), *Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Ulrike Lindner, *Koloniale Begegnungen: Deutschland und Grossbritannien als Imperialmächte in Afrika 1880-1914*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2011); Ulrike Lindner, Maren Möhring, Mark Stein, and Silke Stroh (eds.), *Hybrid Cultures - Nervous States: Britain and Germany in a (Post)Colonial World* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010); Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue (eds.), *Imperial Formations* (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press , 2007).

the nature of colonial states as "more capillary than instrumental."[48] Moreover, they often approach the colonial state "from below" and draw attention to the heterogeneity of its political rationalities.[49]

Looking at the history of the colonial police force in Togo, Joël Glasman notes that, if one wanted a succinct statement about how their profession developed, it would be: "not as planned."[50] In fact, in underlining cross-cultural transfers and the "bricolage" of ideas and practices, many histories of intermediaries as well as entangled histories implicitly suggest that the colonial state must have operated in an improvised, piecemeal manner.[51] My dissertation tries to make more explicit what improvisation exactly looked like and how it shaped the colonial encounter.

Finally, this study joins the conversation of scholarship that re-examines the symbolic, representational dimension of the colonial state. Whereas an older scholarship argued that the display of power – in police parades, for instance – concealed the lack of actual strength, and thus was evidence of the "statelessness of the colonial state,"[52] more recent

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[48] "Empire-states": Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 8-17. Definition of state power as "capillary" based on Foucault: John Comaroff, "Governmentality, Materiality, Legality, Modernity: On the Colonial State in Africa," in *African Modernities: Entangled Meanings in Current Debate*, ed. by Jan-Georg Deutsch, Peter Probst, and Heike Schmidt (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 114f.

[49] For instance Deborah Durham, "Passports and Persons. The Insurrection of Subjugated Knowledges in Southern Africa," in *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and the Political Imagination*, ed. by Clifton Crais (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 151-181. Her analysis draws from François Bayart's concept of "the 'rhizome state' as one organized in networks, with politics formulated from below and not the top." Jean-François Bayart, *L'Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre* (Paris: Fayard, 1989). On heterogenous political rationalities, see Pesek, "Foucault Hardly Came to Africa."

[50] Glasmann, "Les Corps habillée," 61.

[51] "Bricolage": Jean Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 227. Interestingly, although the concept of improvisation does not play a prominent role in the main texts, Sanjay Subrahmanyam entitled a collection of his essays on how settlers and traders, soldiers and renegades operated on the ground between formal and informal, military and commercial networks, *Improvising Empire: Portuguese Trade and Settlement in the Bay of Bengal 1500-1700* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[52] The phrase "statelessness of the colonial state" has been attributed alternatively to John Lonsdale or Bruce Berman. Cf. John Lonsdale, "State and Peasantry in Colonial Africa," in *People's History and Socialist Theory*, ed. by Raphael Samuel (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 113; Bruce Berman, "The Perils of Bula Matari:

studies claim that such displays were not a facade but part and parcel of the "real thing" of state formation.[53] Wilson notes that this line of inquiry is still in its infancy, however: "What remains striking is that the performative nature of state power, and the cultural intimations and practices of state-building, tend to escape sustained attention[54] […]." In underscoring the importance that colonial policemen attributed to honorable appearance when practicing state violence, I aim to overcome a simple dichotomy between powerful state action on the one side, and superficial state performance on the other.

Nevertheless, today's ongoing debate about the nature of the colonial state sometimes remains locked in a dispute over its one defining attribute, with the consequence that the state tends to be understood as a monolithic "actor" with little internal ambivalence.[55] Despite wide acceptance of entangled histories and the multilateral complexity of colonial rule, the "modern Western state" (however idealized or even illusory) remains an absolute standard against which to measure political life all over the world. As Wilson observes,

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Constraint and Power in the Colonial State," review of *The African State in Comparative Perspective*, by Crawford Young, *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* 31, 3 (1997): 563; David Killingray, "The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa," *African Affairs* 85, no. 340 (July 1986): 422.

[53] For a theory of state formation as culturally constituted, see George Steinmetz, "Culture and the State," in *State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn*, ed. by George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 1-49. For an analysis of the relationship between the abstract and the material dimension of the state, see Timothy Mitchell, "Society, Economy, and the State Effect," in ibid., 76-97. For an empirical study of performance, disciplining practices, and the "symbolic economy of colonial rule," see Michael Pesek, *Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Expeditionen, Militär und Verwaltung seit 1880* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), esp. 207-265.

[54] Wilson, "Rethinking the Colonial State," 1295.

[55] Crawford Young, for instance, calls the state the "lead actor" of his study. Crawford Young, *The African State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 13. But the fixation on an idealized version of the modern Western state is not limited to the debates on the African (post)colonial state. Regarding the modern state in general, historians Susanne Krasmann and Jürgen Martschukat observe: "In den Debatten zu gegenwärtigen Transformationen moderner Staatlichkeit erscheint der Staat häufig wie ein fixierbares Ideal oder wie ein Akteur, der gegenwärtig einen Verlust an Homogenität und Autonomie erleidet und sich mit Mechanismen konfrontiert sieht, die seine eigene Auflösung vorantreiben." Susanne Krasmann and Jürgen Martschukat, "Rationalitäten der Gewalt. Staatliche Neuordnungen vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert," introduction to *Rationalitäten der Gewalt: Staatliche Neuordnungen vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Susanne Krasmann and Jürgen Martschukat (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2007), 10.

> scholars have been assiduous in suggesting theories of [the colonial state's] nature and its relationship to the legal and political structures of Western imperial modernity. […] Imperial historians […] have been less interested in thinking about 'a colonial state' as such, which has been conceptualized by default either as un état manqué of weak institutional forms and limited coercive powers, or as the unfinished product of negotiation between metropolitan and colonial authorities[56] [...].

European colonialism, then, is construed as the endeavor to export that "world historical exception" and "European invention" – the modern state – into the non-Western world.[57] Inevitably, such narratives emphasize the limited success or failure of such an endeavor and list the various "deficits" of the colonial state.[58] In these narratives, the Western state becomes the template against which all other forms of statehoood have to be measured. But Mahmood Mamdani cautions students of the African colonial state against "writing history by analogy" and encourages them instead to write African history in its own right.[59] In a somewhat different vein, yet also advising against the European nation-state as measure of all things, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper propose that

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[56] Wilson, "Rethinking the Colonial State," 1294-1295.
[57] Wolfgang Reinhard, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (München: Beck, 1999), 15.
[58] Wolfgang Reinhard, "Europäische Staatsmodelle in kolonialen und postkolonialen Machtprozessen," in *Weltgeschichte: Basistexte*, ed. by Jürgen Osterhammel (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008), 239. For this tendency, see the historiography on German colonialism relevant to this dissertation, in Andreas Eckert, "Vom Segen der (Staats-)Gewalt? Staat, Verwaltung und koloniale Herrschaftspraxis in Afrika," in *Staats-Gewalt: Ausnahmezustand und Sicherheitsregimes. Historische Perspektiven*, ed. by Alf Lüdtke and Michael Wildt (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008), 145-165; idem, "Nation, Staat und Ethnizität in Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, ed. by Arno Sonderegger, Ingeborg Grau, and Birgit Englert (Wien: Promedia, 2011), 40-59; Peter Schröder, *Gesetzgebung und 'Arbeiterfrage' in den Kolonien: Das Arbeitsrecht in den Schutzgebieten des Deutschen Reiches* (Berlin: LIT-Verl., 2006); Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*; Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*. See also the varying views on this matter collected in Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.), *Verstaatlichung der Welt? Europäische Staatsmodelle und außereuropäische Machtprozesse* (München: Oldenbourg, 1999).
[59] Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 8-11. On the rhetorical figure of analogy in nineteenth-century ethnographic discourse, see Eva Bischoff, *Kannibale-Werden: Eine postkoloniale Geschichte deutscher Männlichkeit um 1900* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2011), 61-70.

> a story of European state development and other people's 'responses' would misrepresent the long-term dynamics of state power in both Europe and the rest of the world. To the extent that [European] states became more powerful [...], these transformations were a consequence of empire, rather than the other way around.[60]

Moreover, and closely linked to the problematic sketched out so far, historiography of the colonial state is overshadowed by the present day debate – one might say polemic – on the contemporary post-colonial African state. Attempts to understand the European-African encounter are perpetually plagued by the bogeyman of the "failed state."[61] Bruce Berman commented already two decades ago on the problematic deterministic narratives one produces when "starting with an account of the current conditions of the post-colonial state in Africa and then searching retrospectively into the past."[62] Rather than seeing some inherent telos of colonialism play out, this study focuses on historical specificities and internal dynamics when describing the colonial state.

Colonial War and Violence

Too often students of colonialism have entrenched themselves in disputes over the question whether "the systematic employment of violence was essential for the colonial

[60] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 7-8.
[61] Especially in political science, the idea of the African state as a "failed state" has been used ad nauseam. Programmatic in this respect is Robert Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). On the theme of "failure" in colonial history see Maurus Reinkowski and Gregor Thum (eds.), *Helpless Imperialists: Imperial Failure, Fear and Radicalization* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013).
[62] Berman, "The Perils of Bula Matari," 568. Cf. Glasman who extends the problem by a second element: the ostensible cultural incompatibility of Africans to the modern Western state. "Deux penchants sont ici à l'œuvre, l'un culturaliste, situant le problème dans une incompatibilité culturelle, l'autre, moderniste, fondé sur une téléologie de l'Etat africain – en route vers un Etat de type occidental." Glasman, "Les *Corps habillés*," 15.

state's survival," or whether "violence was conspicuous by its absence."[63] Often, discussions about colonial violence remain on the level of assessing quantity, whether there was "a lot" or "a little."[64] Our understanding of colonial violence lacks differentiation and specification, especially when it cannot easily be subsumed under the heading of warfare. I will shortly address the literature that deals with colonial wars and derive from there a discussion of possible approaches to colonial violence outside of the warfare framework.

Scholarship on colonial warfare and on colonial militaries is growing rapidly. Scholars have examined how colonial armies were constituted and how they operated. They have paid close attention to the dynamics within these armed forces and to the ways in which their racial and social composition influenced identity formation and notions of professionalism. In this context, they have also looked at how cultural transfer, everyday practice, and adaptive learning affected their ways of waging imperial wars.[65]

More importantly for the question of violence, scholarly work has analyzed what led colonial militaries to go to violent extremes. Historian Susanne Kuss, for instance,

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[63] John McCracken, "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police Force," *The Journal of African History* 27, 1 (1986): 146.

[64] Frederick Cooper notes that "colonial violence – the most obvious feature of colonial rule – is inadequately studied, largely because anticolonial intellectuals portrayed it as ubiquitous while apologists saw it as incidental." Cooper, "Conflict and Connection," 1530, fn49.

[65] Tanja Bührer, *Die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Deutsch-Ostafrika: koloniale Sicherheitspolitik und transkulturelle Kriegführung, 1885 bis 1918* (München: Oldenbourg, 2011); Tanja Bührer, Christian Stachelbeck, and Dierk Walter (eds.), *Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute: Strukturen, Akteure, Lernprozesse*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2011); Clayton and Killingray, *Khaki and Blue*; Myron J. Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991); David Killingray and David E. Omissi (eds.), *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Thomas Morlang, *Askari und Fitafita: 'farbige' Söldner in den deutschen Kolonien* (Berlin: Links, 2008); Michelle Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries*; idem, "'All People were Barbarians to the *Askari*…': *Askari* Identity and Honor in the Maji Maji War, 1905-1907," in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, ed. by James Giblin and Jamie Monson (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 146-179; idem, "Making the Household, Making the State: Colonial Military Communities and Labor in German East Africa," *International Labor and Working-Class History* no. 80 (1 October 2011): 53-76; Parsons, Timothy. *The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964*. Portsmouth NH: Heinemann, 1999; Dierk Walter and Birthe Kundrus (eds.), *Waffen Wissen Wandel: Anpassung und Lernen in transkulturellen Erstkonflikten* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS, 2012).

emphasizes the colonial theatre of war as the decisive category for explaining the "escalation of violence." The individual conditions on site, she claims, had an impact on how German colonial troops fought.[66] Others have stressed the role racialized ideologies and military strategies of "unconventional," "punitive," or "pacifying" warfare played in shaping colonial confrontations.[67] With the broadening of the scope of genocide studies, the question of colonial warfare has been increasingly analyzed in terms of (legally or politically defined) military crimes and mass murder. Specifically, the war in German Southwest Africa and the "international history of concentration camps" have been situated in this field.[68] In her detailed study of German military culture, historian Isabel Hull situates the war within the wider context of a military institution prone to extremism:

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[66] Susanne Kuß, *Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen: Eskalation von Gewalt zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Links, 2010). For a similar approach that stresses the importance of the military men on-the-spot, see Kirsten Zirkel, "Military Power in German Colonial Policy: The *Schutztruppe* and Their Leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918," in *Guardians of Empire*, 91-113.

[67] Gregor Cuthbertson, A. M. Grundlingh, and Mary-Lynn Cuthbertson (eds.), *Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2002); Thoralf Klein and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Kolonialkriege: militärische Gewalt im Zeichen des Imperialismus* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006); Trutz von Trotha, "'The Fellows Can Just Starve': On Wars of 'Pacification' in the African Colonies of Imperial Germany and the Concept of 'Total War'," in *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914*, ed. by Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 415-435; Jaap de Moor and H. L. Wesseling (eds.), *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989).

[68] Medardus Brehl, "'Diese Schwarzen haben vor Gott und Menschen den Tod verdient': Der Völkermord an den Herero 1904 und seine zeitgenössische Legitimation," in *Völkermord und Kriegsverbrechen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by Irmtrud Wojak and Susanne Meinl (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2004), 77–97; Isabel V. Hull, "The Military Campaign in German Southwest Africa, 1904-1907 and the Genocide of the Herero and Nama," *Journal of Namibian Studies* 4 (2008): 7-24; Jonas Kreienbaum, "Koloniale Gewaltexzesse - Kolonialkriege um 1900," in *Koloniale Politik und Praktiken Deutschlands und Frankreichs 1880-1962/ Politiques et pratiques coloniales dans les Empires Allemands et Français 1880-1962*, ed. by Alain Chatriot and Dieter Gosewinkel (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010),155–172; idem, "'Vernichtungslager' in Deutsch-Südwestafrika? Zur Funktion der Konzentrationslager im Herero- und Namakrieg (1904-1908)," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 12 (2010): 1014-1026; A. Dirk Moses (ed.), *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Dominik Schaller, "'Ich glaube, dass die Nation als solche vernichtet werden muss': Kolonialkrieg und Völkermord in 'Deutsch-Südwestafrika' 1904-1907," *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, 3 (2004): 395-430; Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (eds.), *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904-1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen* (Berlin: Links, 2003); Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? : Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Berlin: Lit, 2011). See also, Dominik Schaller's report on a conference held in Berlin in 2004: *Genocides: Forms, Causes and Consequences. The Namibian War (1904-08) in Historical Perspective* online: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=724. And the

> Extremism occurs when the means overwhelms the end, when violence is pursued because the institution keeps on generating violence according to quasi-automatic mechanisms. Following necessary-seeming routines, military extremism gravitates toward final, or total, solutions.[69]

This dissertation tries to address how the situation after the war in German Southwest Africa differed from the colonial warfare dynamics studied by the scholarship just outlined. Mark Mazower points out that it is worth thinking about how different "*contexts* [were organized] in which violence could be generated."[70] In order to understand the social function of violence, it is therefore crucial to account for the circumstances in which they occur. Colonial warfare was about producing victories, decisive ruptures in the balance of power. My claim is that, after the war, violence was socially organized to produce continuity. In the transitional years after the battle at the Waterberg had annihilated the Herero, and after the main leaders of the Nama guerilla had been arrested or killed, there was a critical shift from belligerent violence to community-building violence. The colonial situation was not a permanent state of exception.[71] The representatives of the colonial state who are the subjects of my study worked toward building a lasting society through regularized practices.

Scholars who tackle the question of colonial state violence more explicitly often frame it in historical narratives of successions or stages. Historian Albert Wirz, for instance, states with reference to Max Weber who saw "real rule" lying "in the hands of bureaucrats,

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research project "International History of Concentration Camps," at the Centre for War Studies, Trinity College, Dublin.

[69] Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 1.

[70] Mark Mazower, "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century," *The American Historical Review* 107, 4 (2002): 1164. Emphasis in the original.

[71] Cf. Arjun Chowdhury, "The Colony as Exception (Or, Why Do I Have to Kill You More Than Once?)" *Borderlands* 6, 3 (2007).

military as well as civil," that "in the colonial context, over long years, the men with whips and rifles had more weight than the men with books."[72] And Wirz is right when he continues that, eventually, "the administration gained […] in importance as the colonial state began to collect taxes and tolls, to compile statistics, and to administer law[73] […]." He omits, however, that policemen were men both of the gun and of the book, and that they continued to do their violent, bureaucratic work throughout the different stages of colonization. Violence did not gradually disappear with the expansion of the administrational apparatus, but changed in nature.

Sociologist Trutz von Trotha's study of state-building and colonial rule in Togo provides an alternative that does not suggest a coherent narrative at all.[74] He differentiates between the "sporadic power" of arbitrarily violent, terrorizing "despotism", the independent, uncontrollable (*"eigenmächtig"*) power of intermediary "chiefs," and bureaucratic administrational power. Seeking to avoid a simple causal relationship among these forms of power, he claims that these different forms were complexly interrelated.[75] But in his attempt to deduce from their interplay the "process of consolidating power into state rule," his analysis becomes reductionist and schematic, by not allowing for historical

[72] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte,* vol. 4, *Herrschaft*, ed. by Edith Hanke (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 2005), 825; Albert Wirz, "Körper, Raum und Zeit der Herrschaft," introduction to *Alles unter Kontrolle: Disziplinierungsprozesse im kolonialen Tansania (1850-1960)*, ed. by Albert Wirz, Andreas Eckert, and Katrin Bromber (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2003), 12.
[73] Wirz, "Körper, Raum und Zeit der Herrschaft," 12.
[74] "Die Untersuchung ist in diesem Sinne keine historische Arbeit. Mein Anliegen ist ein theoretisch-soziologisches." Trutz von Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft: Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des "Schutzgebietes Togo"* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1994), 25.
[75] Ibid., 443.

contingency.[76] My study merges despotic, intermediary, and bureaucratic forms of rule in focusing on the practices of violence inherent in all of them.[77]

European (Colonial) Policing

The history of colonial policing has received relatively little scholarly attention.[78] This remains true even though a first initiative at remedying this situation was made over two decades ago by David Anderson and David Killingray.[79] At the time, they stated that

> the neglect is both surprising and puzzling. It is true that archival sources on the history of policing are fragmented and incomplete for many colonies. On the other hand, study of the exercise of power and the establishment and maintenance of authority lie at the very heart of the historiography of empire: as the visible public symbol of colonial rule, in daily contact with the population and enforcing the codes of law that upheld colonial authority, the colonial policeman [...] stood at the cutting edge of colonial rule.[80]

[76] Ibid., 21.
[77] Susanne Krasmann and Jürgen Martschukat argue similarly for the European state: "Soziale Ordnung erscheint als eine Voraussetzung für die Zähmung von Gewalt, zugleich greift jede Ordnung auf Gewalt zurück, um sich aufrechtzuerhalten. Gewalt wirkt keineswegs nur destruktiv, aber jede soziale Ordnung ist eine Ordnung der Gewalt, die der permanenten Erneuerung bedarf, will sie Stabilität erfahren. Dabei korrelieren bestimmte Gewaltpraktiken mit dem Konzept moderner Staatlichkeit, während andere dieser offensichtlich widersprechen." Susanne Krasmann and Jürgen Martschukat, introduction to *Rationalitäten der Gewalt: Staatliche Neuordnungen vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert*, edited by Susanne Krasmann, and Jürgen Martschukat (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2007), 8.
[78] McCracken noted in 1986: "Only rarely have historians examined the means of coercion employed in maintaining authority (...) Soldiers and policemen have been much less studied than 'the new men' – migrants, clerks and communicants, but it would be rash to assume that they were less important." McCracken, "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland," 127. Glasman comes to the same conclusion. Glasman, "Les *Corps habillés*," 22.
[79] See the two volumes of collected essays edited by David Anderson and David Killingray, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991) and *Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police, 1917-65* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). An earlier, yet quite limited attempt can be found in Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989); see also David Killingray, "The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa," *African Affairs* 85, 340 (1986): 411-437.
[80] David Anderson and David Killingray, "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940*, ed. by David Anderson and David Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 1.

Even after more than twenty years, there remain severe limitations to the existing literature on colonial policing. First of all, the existing literature on colonial policing is predominantly British.[81] There is significantly less work on other European empires.[82] The dominance of the field by the British case makes it difficult to draw conclusions about

[81] The "Empire" in Anderson and Killingray's title is actually the *British* Empire. Sir Charles Joseph Jeffries, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies offered in 1952 a comprehensive and apologetic history of all British colonial police forces from which, later on, many historians have drawn valuable factual information. Charles Jeffries, *The Colonial Police* (London: M. Parrish, 1952). Another source of insight for historians of the British case have been the testimonies of colonial officials, police officers included, collected in the *Oxford Development Records Project (ODRP).* Cf. Patricia M. Pugh, "The Oxford Colonial Records Project and the Oxford Development Records Project," *Journal of the Society of Archivists* 6, 2 (October 1978): 76-86. In addition to the numerous articles in the volumes cited in fn. 79, the following works study British policing in Colonial Africa: Philip Terdoo Ahire, *Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria, 1860-1960* (Milton Keynes, UK; Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1991); idem, "Re-Writing the Distorted History of Policing in Colonial Nigeria," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 18, 1 (1990): 45-60; David M. Anderson, "Policing the Settler State: Colonial Hegemony in Kenya, 1900-1952," in *Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India*, ed. by Dagmar Engels and Shula Marks (London; New York: British Academic Press; St. Martin's Press, 1994), 248-264; Silvester Kwadwo Ankama, *Police History: Some Aspects in England and Ghana* (Ilford, Essex: Silkan Books, 1983); Mathieu Deflem, "Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya," *Police Studies: The International Review of Police Development* 17, 1 (1994): 45-68; William Gutteridge, "Military and Police Forces in Colonial Africa," in *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960*, vol. 2, ed. by Peter Duignan and L. Gann (London: Cambridge U.P, 1970), 286-319; David Killingray, "Securing the British Empire: Policing and Colonial Order, 1920-1960," in *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, ed. by Mark Mazower (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997), 167-190; John Mbaku and Mwangi Kimenyi, "Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa," in *The Dark Webs: Perspectives on Colonialism in Africa*, ed. by Toyin Falola (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 161-188; McCracken, "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland;" Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Harold Tollefson, *Policing Islam: The British Occupation of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Struggle Over Control of the Police, 1882-1914* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999).

[82] Glasman's dissertation on the German and later French colonial police force in Togo, and Zollmann's study on the *Landespolizei* are recent exceptions. Glasman, "Les *Corps habillés*;" Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*. The small historiography of French colonial policing is mostly limited to the *Gendarmerie* in Algeria. See Henri Brunschwig, "French Expansion and Local Reactions in Black Africa in the Time of Imperialism (1880-1914)," in *Expansion and Reaction: Essays on European Expansion and Reaction in Asia and Africa*, ed. by H. L. Wesseling (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1978), 116-140; André-Paul Comor, "Implantation et missions de la gendarmerie en Algérie, de la conquête à la colonisation (1830-1914)," in *Gendarmerie, état et société au XIXe siècle*, ed. by Jean Noël Luc (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002); Jacques Frémeaux, "La gendarmerie et la guerre d'Algérie," in *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Algérie*, ed. by Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïsse (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe 2001), 73-90; Benoît Haberbusch, *La gendarmerie en Algérie (1939-1945)* (Maison Alfort: SHGN, 2004); Emmanuel Jaulin, *La Gendarmerie dans la Guerre d'Algérie*, (Paris: Lavauzelle, 2009); The following literature touches tangentially on colonial police forces: Kathleen A. Keller, "Colonial Suspects: Suspicious Persons and Police Surveillance in French West Africa, 1914-1945" (PhD Diss., Rutgers University, 2007); idem, "On the Fringes of the 'Civilizing Mission': 'Suspicious' Frenchmen and Unofficial Discourses of French Colonialism in AOF (1918–1939)," *French Colonial History* 9 (2008): 103-129. Gutteridge dedicates only one short paragraph to the police in French colonial Africa: Gutteridge, "Military and Police Forces in Colonial Africa," 315.

colonial police in general. On the one hand, the field has constructed its main inquiries based on the rather peculiar model of nineteenth-century British policing, which is quite different from other models of policing from the same period. The British model was a decentralized, community-grown, mostly unarmed, civilian style of policing, whereas other colonial police forces came from a tradition of centralized, state-controlled, mostly armed, militarily organized police.[83] As a consequence, many dissociate the European from the colonial context and concentrate on the specific historical dynamics of the latter. On the other hand, and probably largely due to the availability of sources, these British histories work mainly on the periods after the World Wars and of decolonization.[84] Too often, this interest in later stages and in moments of transition has led scholars to project a contemporary concept of police onto the entire colonial situation. Or, they have suggested an evolutionary narrative according to which the colonial cases were developing at a slower pace than the metropole towards "modern," "professional," "civil" forms of police.[85]

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[83] See Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger's definitions of the two opposing models: "England, with its decentralised policing system, its stress on non-political, civilian style policing, stood at the opposite end of the continuum to France […] where most police posts in Paris, and probably in the provinces, were reserved for ex-soldiers, and where the largest single police force, the *gendarmerie nationale*, was answerable to the minister for war." Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, introduction to *Policing Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940*, ed. by Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), vii-ix.

[84] John D. Brewer, *Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*; Ernest W. Lefever, *Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970); N. J. Small, "The Northern Rhodesia Police and Its Legacy," *African Social Research* 27 (June 1979): 523-539; Cyprian O. Okonkwo, *The Police and the Public in Nigeria* (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966).

[85] See especially Anthony Clayton, "Law Enforcement and Colonial Police Forces," in *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa,* Anthony Clayton and David Killingray.(Athens: University of Ohio Center for International Studies, 1989); McCracken, "Coercion and Control in Nyasaland"; Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*. Cynthia Enloe makes a similar observation for the social sciences: "So much of social science research on police has focused on only English and American police development. Those two cases have been poor bases for generalizations because (1) English and American police are atypical in their late acquisition of military arms and (2) they are atypical cross-nationally in their historical decentralization." Cynthia H. Enloe, *Police, Military, and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power* (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Books, 1980). 139, fn2.

In order to understand colonial policing better we have to think about them, at least preliminarily, in connection with the histories of their national counterparts. The history of colonial police is in many respects a reiteration, continuation, adaptation, and expansion of what was going on in (continental) Europe at the same time, and not, as scholars of the British case have claimed, a clear break from the development of modern European policing. I do not wish to argue for the unilateral flow of ideas and practices from the metropoles into the colonies. On the contrary, colonial policing in Africa was primarily formed by the encounter of European notions of law enforcement and conflict resolution with African ones. Nor do I want to negate the significant particularities of the colonial system, most notably its racial and exploitive dimensions. But the (British) historiography of colonial policing stresses too much the differences between motherland and colony, a narrative to which I would like to offer a counter-balance.

Second, and closely related to my first comment, we need to re-contextualize the notion of police for the period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a period that is crucial both for the development of police institutions and for European imperialism. Historians of European police forces have come to recognize the prevalence of eighteenth-century, notably German *cameralist* concepts in policing practices of the turn of the last century.[86] Policing at the time of high imperialism was still rooted in the idea that both security and welfare, any kind of "public management," virtually all aspects of public life

[86] Richard J. Evans, "Polizei, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1700-1933," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22, 4 (1996): 611; Ralph Jessen, "Polizei, Wohlfahrt und die Anfänge des modernen Sozialstaats in Preußen während des Kaiserreichs," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 20, 2 (1994): 157-180; Alf Lüdtke, introduction to *"Sicherheit" und "Wohlfahrt": Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), 13-15; Herbert Reinke, "'... hat sich ein politischer und wirtschaftlicher Polizeistaat entwickelt': Polizei und Großstadt im Rheinland vom Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges bis zum Beginn der zwanziger Jahre," in *"Sicherheit" und "Wohlfahrt": Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 219-243.

pertained to its responsibility.[87] And although police institutions were, as many other middle-class professions, undergoing major transformations during the era of the "Second Industrial Revolution," policing – with the exception of criminology – was changing at a rather slow pace and resisted full specialization and professionalization. Police work relied on the military background of its recruits and remained engrained in generalist patterns. In short, police as we know it today was still in the making.[88]

Finally, police historians highlight the liminal class position of policemen in European societies. Their important role in supporting the state – especially in strike breaking and the suppression of lower-class upheavals – and their simultaneous proximity to the working classes, from which at the end of the nineteenth century they were increasingly recruited, has motivated many historical studies of the police. In the context of an increasingly interventionist state and an increasingly participative society, more policemen were needed than the military could sufficiently supply.[89]

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[87] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, rev. paperback ed., *Studies in Social Discontinuity* (Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1992), 119.

[88] Jean-Marc Berlière, "The Professionalisation of the Police Under the Third Republic in France, 1875-1914," in *Policing Western Europe*, 36-54; Herbert Reinke, "'Armed As If For War': The State, the Military and the Professionalization of the Prussian Police in Imperial Germany," in ibid., 55-73; Barbara Weinberger, "Are the Police Professionals? An Historical Account of the British Police Institution," in ibid., 74-89; Ralph Jessen, "Polizei im Kaiserreich - Tendenzen und Grenzen der Demilitarisierung und 'Professionalisierung'," in *Die Polizei der Gesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Inneren Sicherheit*, ed. by Hans-Jürgen Lange (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003), 19-36.

[89] The relationship between the working class and police forces is the dominant theme in the field. See, for instance, Helmut Bleiber, "Die Moabiter Unruhen 1910," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 3, 2 (1955): 173–211; Richard F. Evans (ed.), *Kneipengespräche im Kaiserreich. Stimmungsberichte der Hamburger Politischen Polizei 1892-1914* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1989); Clive Emsley, "Polizei und Arbeitskonflikte – England und die USA im Vergleich (1890-1939)," in *'Sicherheit' und 'Wohlfahrt'. Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,* ed. by Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), 187-215; Karin Hartewig, "'Eine sogenannte Neutralität der Beamten gibt es nicht' Sozialer Protest, bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Polizei im Ruhrgebiet (1918-1924)," in ibid., 297-322; Ralph Jessen, "Preußische Polizei und Arbeiterschaft im Kaiserreich," in *Die Deutsche Polizei und ihre Geschichte,* ed. by Peter Nitschke (Düsseldorf: Verlag Deutsche Polizeiliteratur, 1996) , 46-71; Thomas Lindenberger, *Strassenpolitik: Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin, 1900-1914* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1995); Reinke, "'… hat sich ein politischer und wirtschaftlicher Polizeistaat entwickelt'."

This dissertation draws on the historiographic insights that have been made about European policing and brings them to bear on the colonial context. The history of the practices of *Landespolizei* in German Southwest Africa can offer a fresh perspective to how policing unfolded in colonial Africa in general. It can draw out similarities and crucial differences between metropole and colony that so far have been overlooked.

Methodology and Sources

As pivotal actors in the everyday activity of colonialism, on the lower end of the administrative hierarchy, at the outposts of the colony, policemen provide a productive site for engaging in both a top-down and a bottom-up history of colonialism. My theoretical approach to this history draws from the disciplinary subfields of historical anthropology and *Alltagsgeschichte*.[90] Studying the everyday life of ordinary men can easily lead researchers to identify with historical actors, to believe they know the motives and states of mind of people from the past. The appeal of anthropological inquiry is that it casts the historian as a researcher of cultural differences who has the intellectual tools necessary to account for the complex relationship between researcher and object of study. My understanding of everyday history is moreover deeply indebted to Michel De Certeau's theoretical writings on *The Practice of Everyday Life*. His work provides valuable impulses for thinking through questions of historical contingency and recurring commonalities when inquiring into what people do in the day-to-day.[91] On these theoretical grounds, I thus

[90] My approach has been strongly influenced by the writings of Bernard Cohn and Alf Lüdtke. Bernard S. Cohn, *The Bernard Cohn Omnibus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Alf Lüdtke (ed.), *Alltagsgeschichte: Zur Rekonstruktion Historischer Erfahrungen und Lebensweisen* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1989).
[91] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

engage in "thick description" borrowed from cultural anthropology, in narrativizing techniques informed by literary theory, and in rigorous social data collection used by social scientists.[92] Not least, my work has been considerably influenced by sociological studies of violence and policing,[93] and by the recently emerging field of the history of emotions.[94] All of these scholarly and scientific approaches to everyday human activity have given depth and texture to my history of the improvised colonial state as it was created by the African and German men of the *Landespolizei*.

My study of the "common men"[95] of colonial rule relies on a large body of source material which has not been thoroughly examined.[96] The holdings in question are the official files of police headquarters, the '*Inspektion der Landespolizei*.' These files, held at the German Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde, comprise about 400 'subject files' and over 800 'personnel files.'[97] Specifically the latter have proven a rich source of insight into the policemen's social and cultural backgrounds (for each German policeman there are

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[92] Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture," in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30. An example for narrativized history is Natalie Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). On the application of quantitative methods in history, see Claire Lemercier and Claire Zalc, *Méthodes quantitatives pour l'historien* (Paris: Découverte, 2008).

[93] For sociologies of police, see for instance John P.Crank, *Understanding Police Culture* (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1998); Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen (eds.), *Policing: A View From the Street* (Santa Monica: Goodyear, 1978); Dominique Monjardet, *Ce que fait la Police: Sociologie de la force publique* (Paris: La Découverte, 1996). For the sociology of violence, see fn. 19.

[94] For introductions, see Ute Frevert et al. (eds.), *Gefühlswissen: Eine lexikalische Spurensuche in der Moderne* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2011); Benno Gammerl, "Emotional Styles – Concepts and Challenges," *Rethinking History* 16, 2 (2012):161-175; William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Barbara Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *The American Historical Review* 107, 3 (2002): 821-845.

[95] I borrow the notion of "common men" and the theoretical approach from the writing of military history "from below." Cf. Wolfram Wette (ed.), *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes: eine Militärgeschichte von unten* (München: Piper, 1992); Bernd Ulrich, "'Militärgeschichte von unten.' Anmerkungen zu ihren Ursprüngen, Quellen und Perspektiven im 20. Jahrhundert," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996): 473-503.

[96] Zollmann, for *Koloniale Herrschaft*, worked for the most part with sources from the National Archives of Namibia.

[97] Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BA-B), "Behörden des Schutzgebietes Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Inspektion der Landespolizei", 1905-1936. Subject files: R 1002/ 2412-2791 and 3602-3618; personnel files: R 1002/ 2804-3591, also 88-2029 and 2194-2198.

considerable biographical data) as well as their everyday experiences. Likewise, among the subject files there are extensive patrol reports in which I have discovered details about daily practices and interactions.[98] In addition to the records in Berlin, I have consulted the National Archives of Namibia in Windhoek.[99] There, the official records of local administrations, the so-called '*Bezirks*-' and '*Distriktsämter,*' offer further material with which to inquire into the micro-mechanisms of state control. Particularly the numerous depositions regarding grievances between different parties in the colonial realm have been of great use in reconstructing how policemen acted on a daily basis. Finally, in order to get a more complex notion of the contexts and conditions within which policemen operated I have examined contemporary newspaper articles, legal texts, and handbooks at the National Library in Windhoek and the National Library in Berlin.

Contrary to their white counterparts, non-white policemen had no individual personnel files. Archival records unfortunately have little to say about African policemen. Usually, they are mentioned only in passing and often their presence is not acknowledged at all. Nevertheless, it is possible to infer from the available source base who these men were and what their daily actions meant to them and to the colonial state. Working with very few and difficult sources is nothing new to Africanists. And I draw on their methodology to combine secondary literature with a careful amassing of available evidence

[98] BA-B, R 1002/ 2706-2711.
[99] Relevant files in the following holdings have been consulted: National Archives of Namibia (NAN), ZBU (Zentralbureau des kaiserlichen Gouvernements); BRE (District Office Rehoboth); DAR (District Office Aroab); BSW (District Office Swakopmund); BOM (District Office Omaruru); DMA (District Office Malta höhe); DOK (Distrikstamt Okahandja); BGR (District Office Grootfontein); BKE (District Office Keetmanshoop).

in order to extrapolate plausible scenarios. Another method consists in reading sources at hand "against the grain."[100]

Chapter Overview

In the first chapter I take a closer look at the main protagonists of the story: the men of the *Landespolizei*. I focus on how police identities were both results of previous socializations, and products of contexts and practices in the colony. This chapter establishes that honor was a crucial reference point for all policemen, African and German alike. They understood themselves within a moral economy of status. The importance of status can be explained by the policemen's liminal, intermediary position: as "new" African men who positioned themselves closely to the nodes of colonial power in order to attain standing within their own group; and as "old" German men who struggled to maintain their old corporatist standing at the lower edge of state power. Imbricated with this aspiration for social rank were two distinct but related concepts of masculinity. Thus, policemen strove for honor both as adventurous warriors as well as paternalistic householders.

The second chapter examines organizational and professional identities. It emphasizes policemen's martial backgrounds, and demonstrates that soldiering continued to have great weight on the way policemen understood themselves. However, policemen added the component of bureaucratic procedure to their identity which distinguished them from the military and created different group dynamics. This chapter returns to the significance of honor demonstrating how the concern for proper appearance and performance was the

[100] For an introduction to the writing of African history, see Bogumil Jewsiewicki and David S. Newbury, *African Historiographies: What History for Which Africa?* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986).

most decisive factor in the emergence of a *Landespolizei* organizational culture. Finally, chapters one and two both stress how being violent was part of being police, and addresses the role emotions played in shaping police identities.

Chapters three and four are the centerpiece of this dissertation. There, I describe everyday police practices in detail, I reconstruct their effects on colonial society, and I develop the idea that they founded state power. In a first step (chapter three), I reconstruct all the elements that constituted police work: the manifold tasks that needed to be carried out, the various inconsistent regulations that needed to be complied with, the taxing conditions under which duties had to be performed. The chapter gives a minute rendition of daily routines, habits, tactics, and ways of improvisation, thus providing a dense description of police organizational and occupational culture. Because of both the constraining circumstances and the expansive goals of police work, policemen relied on and came to highly value their own practice and experience. The African and German men of the *Landespolizei* accomplished tasks according to their own dispositions and needs: taking unwarranted breaks, finding ways to enliven dull routines, combining formal business with social calls, muddling through procedure. In the last section of chapter three, I consider violence itself as a kind of work. When they beat, seized, chained, shot people, policemen believed themselves to be doing good, diligent, dexterous, skilled labor. On their watch, they claimed, people were killed "by the book." Hence, alongside the valorization of their experience, policemen stressed above all their professionalism.

Chapter four shifts attention to the people being policed and to policing interactions. The focus of this chapter lies on the regulation of the labor market – arguably the single most important concern of the colonial state at that time. Based on my conclusions about

the nature of police work in the German colony, I argue in this chapter that the German colonial police created an economy of "educative" violence. This specific form of violence was integral to making the colonial economy viable by refining the interaction between employers and employees. Taking a paternalistic stance towards both settlers and colonized, policemen were in many instances the authority who distinguished "right" from "wrong" violence, who defined the "correct treatment" of African workers.

Chapter five discusses the role of technology in order to demonstrate how police practices were grounded in material realities, in bodies and tools. In my analysis of punishing and binding instruments, as well as weaponry, I discern two main socio-cultural processes: improvisation and social distinction. Policemen strove to adapt themselves to and to distinguish themselves by the range of bodily techniques, material technologies, and skills training that they received specifically as policing professionals. I argue that wanting to meet certain professionalizing goals while having to cope with physical actualities, police violence unfolded in an experimental fashion that refined ideological discourses and official procedures along the way.

CHAPTER ONE

Violent Identity Formations: Honor, Standing, Masculinity

Who were the African and German men of the *Landespolizei*? Or rather, who did they and others think they were, or were supposed to be? To answer these questions of identity formation,[101] I examine the policemen's social and cultural backgrounds as well as their mindsets, sentiments, and basic ideological concepts. I also take a first look at their working and living conditions and practices. My hypothesis is that police identities were not just the products of upbringing, but were also being made and remade on the beat, in the everyday.

I argue that the policemen of the *Landespolizei* were men of honor. While not necessarily always honorable, these policemen all understood themselves within a moral economy of status. This was so not simply because they all came from places with vestigial traditions of honor, but also because the new economy of status they produced for the colonial context enabled a dynamic negotiation of the hybridity that characterized the policing situation.

Chapter one is structured in three parts. First, I discuss honor as a crucial concept for the interpretation of police identity formations. Second, I sketch the socio-economic environments from which the policemen came and in which they lived and worked. In the third part I address their cultural upbringings and values, notably questions of religion,

[101] I use the term "identity formation" rather than "identity" or "identification" in order to indicate on the one hand the processual character of the phenomenon and, on the other hand, the fact that it is not solely a matter of a subject identifying herself with someone or something, but also being identified by others. For a discussion of the epistemological difficulties surrounding the concept, see Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, "Identity," in: Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press 2005), 59-90.

family, and masculinity. Chapter two addresses the core of what I believe made policemen's identities: the professional principles that the *Landespolizei* established in the course of its existence. In both chapters I emphasize honor, violence, and race as the main threads that ran through (as well as across and against) the different modes of identity formation.

Honor

Since my central argument evokes honor as a key concept for policemen's identity formation, some preliminary remarks regarding honor are necessary: it is a concept which has significance within both African and European history.[102] Thus, it is a useful focal point allowing me to include *all* policemen in my analysis of identity formations, and in doing so, to bridge to a certain extent the historiographical divide between Africanist and Europeanist scholarship. Codes of honor operate within a complex frame of reference relating to, among other things, culture, class, social status, lineage, gender, age, profession, race, and nationality or ethnicity. All of these connections will be addressed to some degree in the chapter. But before I delve into the particularities of *Landespolizei* identities, I would like to reflect briefly on some general anthropological and sociological explanations of how honor works.

[102] Three recent studies on the history of honor have raised my interest in the concept. For honor in Imperial Germany, although without taking into account the colonial theatre, Ann Goldberg, *Honor, Politics and the Law in Imperial Germany, 1871-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); for the British colonial context, Steven Patterson, *The Cult of Imperial Honor in British India* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and for honor in African history, John Iliffe, *Honour in African History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Other works include: Ute Frevert, *Ehrenmänner: das Duell in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (München: Beck, 1991); Robert Nye, *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Ludgera Vogt and Arnold Zingerle (eds.), *Ehre: archaische Momente in der Moderne* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1994); M. Thomas J. Desch-Obi, *Fighting for Honor: The History of African Martial Art Traditions in the Atlantic World* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008); Moyd, "*Askari* Identity and Honor in the Maji Maji War," 146-179.

Authors who have written on the subject agree across the board on the relational character of honor. Honor is a social phenomenon. Without an onlooking public honor does not exist. People establish, maintain, and defend their honor via the judgment of others. As sociologist Pierre Bourdieu notes in his compelling ethnological study of the Kabyle honor system in the mid-twentieth century, the

> point of honor is the basis of the moral code of an individual who sees himself always through the eyes of others, who has need of others for his existence, because the image he has of himself is indistinguishable from that presented to him by other people.[103]

And because it is relational, honor has to be reciprocal. All members of an honor culture have to potentially be able to act honorably. They have "to be worthy of"[104] participating in the culture. In that sense at least, honor cultures are to a certain degree equalizing and inclusive – at least for those who are allowed to play the "game of honor."

Related to the features of relational character and reciprocity is that honor is also always situational. An honorable act within one group might be considered dishonorable within another group, or in another time or circumstance. Honor is therefore not a universal code of behavior. Bourdieu observes that

> [t]he ethos of honour is fundamentally opposed to a universal and formal morality which affirms the equality in [sic] dignity of all men and consequently the equality of their rights and duties. […] the dictates of honour, directly applied to the individual case and varying according to the situation, are in no way capable of being made universal.[105]

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[103] Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honour," 211.
[104] "For a challenge to be made, the challenger must consider whoever he challenges to be worthy of it - to be, that is to say, in a position of riposte. […] Recognition of one's adversary as one's own equal in honour is therefore the basic condition of any challenge." Ibid., 197.
[105] Ibid., 228. Cf. Georg Simmel, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*, in *Collected Works*, vol. 11, ed. by Ottohein Rammstedt (1908, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), 600.

If honor applies to each individual and to each instance differently, it is rather misleading to define honor as a law or a right.[106] For ideally, at least according to a modern, natural law understanding of these two latter terms, they are supposed to apply uniformly and in an equalizing way to all members of a given society.

Accordingly, German sociologist Georg Simmel remarked in the time period which is of interest to me, that honor, rather than being a law itself, was situated *between* the law and morality [*Sittlichkeit*]. He stressed the way in which honor connected the inner, spiritual life with the outer, social life. The function of honor, he claimed, was to perpetuate a given social order, to preserve and reproduce social strata and to ensure cohesion within these. Honor was so effective in fulfilling its conservative purpose precisely because of its position between external, objective, generalized and internal, subjective, individualized means of establishing order:[107]

> If one were to bring these types of norm to their completely articulated expression, […] law brings about outer purposes through outer means, morality effects inner purposes through inner means, and honor, outer purposes through inner means. […] Honor takes a middle position: an injury to it is threatened by penalties that neither pure inwardness of moral reproach nor the corporal force of the legal sphere possesses. While society establishes the precepts of honor and secures them with partly inwardly subjective and partly social and externally perceptible consequences for violations, it creates for itself a unique form of guarantee for the proper conduct of its members in those practical areas that law cannot encompass and for which the guarantees through moral conscience alone are too unreliable. If one also examines the precepts of honor for their content, they always appear as a means

[106] See Iliffe who defines honor as "a right to respect." Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 4; also Michelle Moyd, "Becoming Askari: African Soldiers and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa, 1850-1918," (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2008), 7. Iliffe qualifies however, that this right exists subjectively (self-understanding) and objectively (public opinion).

[107] In 1851, Arthur Schopenhauer had articulated that relationship in the short formula that honor was "objectively, the opinion of others regarding our worth, and subjectively, our fear of that opinion." "… objektiv, die Meinung anderer von unserem Wert, und subjektiv, unsere Furcht vor dieser Meinung." Arthur Schopenhauer, *Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit* (1851, Frankfurt a.M.: Insel-Verlag, 1976), 68.

> for maintaining a social group's solidarity, its reputation, its regularity, and the potential to promote its life processes.[108]

The "triumph" of honor, Simmel argued, was that the individual was made to believe that the task of preserving his or her honor was "his most inner, deepest, most personal interest [*Eigeninteresse*]" when in fact it had a "sociological function [*Zweckmäßigkeit*]".[109] Simmel thus quite perceptively exposed the hidden logic behind the bourgeoisie's nineteenth-century liberalizing and democratizing effort to overcome corporate hierarchies. Namely, by connecting honor to internal qualities like virtue and personal character (presumably achievable by everyone) instead of to external markers like rank, birth, and estate, Enlightenment thinkers had produced a more surreptitious and more powerful tool to reinforce social structures than the early-modern system of honor had ever been. Honor, in this interpretation, is a forceful disciplining device that inculcates conformist behavior, even or especially in times of social transformation. Historian John Iliffe, author of *Honour in African History*, claims that the strategic shift away from outward criteria towards an internalization of honor values can also, though to a lesser degree, be observed in colonial Africa, mainly due to the introduction of world religions on the continent.[110] I will come back to the historical specificities regarding honor at the turn of the twentieth century in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

Honor, we have learned so far, is relational and situational. Because of these features, practice is crucial in establishing what it is. "The system of the values of honour is lived

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[108] Simmel, *Soziologie*, 599-600. Translation from: Georg Simmel, *Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms* ed. and trans. by Anthony J. Blasi, Anton K. Jacobs, and Mathew Kanjirathinkal (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2009), 476-477.
[109] Ibid., 602, 601.
[110] Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 6.

rather than clearly conceived," Bourdieu writes.[111] Full comprehension and awareness is not required for the system to work. Without really being able to recite the exact rules, the members of an honor culture will still know how to act properly in any given case. However, often there is not only one right course of action, but several. As a consequence, honor operates in a highly flexible and adaptable fashion: "Everyone, with the complicity of public opinion, can play on the ambiguities and equivocalities of conduct."[112] It is these qualities – the flexible and adaptable character of honor – that make it a truly powerful mechanism with which communal life can be organized. This observation can be seen as complementary to Simmel's analysis according to which the effectiveness of an honor culture rests above all in its mediating ability between internal and external means of structuring society, between the law (and its executive power, the state) and morality.

Finally, in addition to relying on everyday practices for their perpetuation, systems of honor commonly depend on a series of punctuated rituals, religious or other, structuring the lives of individual persons and groups into distinct sections like childhood, adolescence, manhood, and elderly maturity. Rituals are, in Talal Asad's words, "symbolic activity as opposed to the instrumental behavior of everyday life."[113] However, Asad immediately calls into question this opposition between a figurative and a literal realm. For, at least in its original theological sense, the term "ritual" designated the script – that is the instruction manual – which taught people how to practice religion. The tendency of modern anthropologists to surmise that "ritual is to be conceived essentially in terms of signifying behavior – a type of activity to be classified separately from practical, that is, technically

[111] Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honour," 231.
[112] Ibid., 207.
[113] Talal Asad, "Toward a Genealogy of the Concept of Ritual," in *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1993), 55.

effective, behavior," obstructs our ability to understand rituals as both representing and at the same time practicing a moral economy.[114] Yet, it is precisely the way in which the various initiation rites and oath-taking ceremonies existing in the colonial theatre were meant to symbolically represent while at the same time still upholding – at least to a certain extent – the function of effectively training or disciplining honorable selves that is of interest to me. For these were the moments in which honor had both a bodily, practiced, and immanent quality as well as a symbolic, transcendent dimension.

With these general observations on honor in mind, I now turn to the historical context and the actors within it to whom honor mattered. I begin with the socio-economic conditions from which policemen came and in which they were living at the time of their service in the *Landespolizei*.

"New" Men

First, who were the African men who worked for the German colonial state in the police force? In the small corpus of secondary literature that exists on the African colonial police as a whole, scholars have characterized them in sweeping remarks as "vagabonds and adventurers," "ex-slaves," "freebooters and brigands," or "the foreign, uprooted, oppressed, and poor," often recruited from remote areas and not from within the colonized society which they policed.[115] These denigrating depictions are both unhelpful and inaccurate. A

[114] Asad, "Toward a Genealogy," 58.
[115] David Anderson and David Killingray, "Consent, Coercion and Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940*, ed. by idem (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 7; Killingray, "The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa," *African Affairs* 85, 340 (1986): 423; Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 44. See also Henri Brunschwig, "French Expansion and Local Reactions in Black Africa in the Time of Imperialism (1880-1914)," in *Expansion and Reaction: Essays on European Expansion and Reaction in Asia and Africa*, ed. by H. L Wesseling (Leiden: Leiden

closer look at the social makeup of the non-white portion of the police force in German Southwest Africa suggests that they by no means came from the margins of society, nor from outside of it, but were rather at the core of a newly evolving social structure.[116]

Several peoples lived in Southwest Africa at the time of German intrusion. Broadly, they fall into three main categories: the Bantu-speaking (Ovambo and Herero),[117] the Khoisan-speaking (Nama, Damara, and San)[118] peoples, and the mixed-race Afrikaans-speaking Basters.[119] All of these peoples had migrated at some point into the area known today as Namibia. Very roughly speaking, first, that is before European contact, the San, Damara, and

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University Press, 1978), 136; Idem, *Noirs et blancs dans l'Afrique noire française, ou, Comment le colonisé devient colonisateur, 1870-1914*. Paris: Flammarion, 1983), 213.

[116] The *Landespolizei* was in this way different from the *Schutztruppe* in German East-Africa, for instance, where most of its African members were indeed recruited from outside the colony, or at least from regions within the colony that were far removed from their site of operation. The earliest recruits were not seldom former slaves or slave-soldiers. Cf. Michelle Moyd, "Becoming Askari: African Soldiers and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa, 1850-1918," (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2008), 32ff. In German Togo, African policemen were at first recruited from the margins of society, but the process of entry was often progressive and mediated by several steps. Glasman, "Les Corps *habillés*," 110ff. For a general assessment of the recruitment of African soldiers in the German colonies, see Thomas Morlang, *Askari und Fitafita: 'farbige' Söldner in den deutschen Kolonien* (Berlin: Links, 2008).

[117] Among Herero, one can make a further distinction: "The otjiHerero-speaking population in Namibia has been commonly divided into Herero (correctly: Ovaherero) and Mbanderu (Ovambanderu), less a cultural or linguistic division than a historical/political one." Misleadingly, the latter, that is, the Mbanderu were oftentimes called "Damara" by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writers. The group which is referred to as "Damara" today was then called "Berg Damas" or "Berg Damaras". Dag Henrichsen, "Pastoral Modernity, Territoriality and Colonial Transformations in Central Namibia, 1860s-1904," in: Peter Limb, Norman Etherington, and Peter Midgley (eds.), *Grappling with the Beast. Indigenous Southern African Responses to Colonialism, 1840-1930* (Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2010), 87, see also 95, fn.27.

[118] On the difficulty of which terms to use for the different Khoisan (used by English speakers) or Khoekhoe (used by the Nama) peoples, see Alan Barnard, *Hunters and Herders of Southern Africa. A Comparative Ethnography of Khoisan Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7-12. On the difficulty of self-identification and identification by others of the San/Bushmen, see Robert J. Gordon, *The Bushman Myth: The Making of a Namibian Underclass* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), esp. 4-8.

[119] There is little to no scholarly literature on the history of the Basters who settled in Southwest Africa. For short overviews, see Peter Carstens, "Basters," in *Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa* (Cape Town: NASOU, 1970), and idem, introduction to Maximilian Bayer, *The Rehoboth Baster Nation of Namibia*, ed. by Peter Carstens (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 1984), 1-14. For an anecdotal and stereotyped account, see Riccardo Orizio, "Namibia: How the Basters Lost the Promised Land," in *Lost White Tribes: The End of Privilege and the Last Colonials in Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Brazil, Haiti, Namibia, and Guadeloupe* (New York: Free Press, 2001); for very brief allusions to Baster history, see John D. Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa* (Cape, South Africa: David Philip , 1994), 31, 263, and Marion Wallace with John Kinahan, *A History of Namibia. From the Beginning to 1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 50 ff.; 72.

Nama settled in, although when exactly is contentious among scholars;[120] then, between the sixteenth and eighteenth century, the Herero and Ovambo arrived; in the early nineteenth century, another wave of Nama (the Oorlam) and the Basters moved into the area.[121] Only Herero, Nama, Damara, and Baster men seem to have been employed in the *Landespolizei.*[122] Those are thus the relevant groups discussed in the following.

Beginning with the establishment of German colonial rule in 1884, or at the very latest after the German war against the Herero and Nama in 1904-1907, indigenous social structures, which had already been steadily evolving and changing since the mid-nineteenth century, were radically and irreversibly altered. All colonized men and women who had survived the German genocide were forced to reposition themselves within the new post-war economic and political system. Many of the African men who were employed in the *Landespolizei* were born around the time German rule had begun. They grew up in a social constellation that was colonial. Therefore, their social backgrounds cannot be separated from the colonial situation. It is useful, however, to look briefly at pre-colonial socio-economic structures and assess to what extent these had still an impact on African policemen's identity formations.[123]

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[120] John Kinahan, "From the Beginning. The Archeological Evidence," in Marion Wallace, *A History of Namibia. From the Beginning to 1990* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2011), 15-43.
[121] Barnard, *Hunters and Herders*; Kinahan, "From the Beginning."
[122] I have not come across any Ovambo or San policemen in the Archives.
[123] The following passage on socio-economic structures in pre-colonial and colonial Namibia relies primarily on works by historians Dag Henrichsen and Jan-Bart Gewald for the Herero and Damara, by Brigitte Lau, Tilman Dedering, and Andreas Bühler for the Nama, by Peter Carstens for the Basters, by Marion Wallace for all Namibian groups, as well as on ethnographic studies by Jakob Irle (Herero), Winifred Hoernlé, Alan Barnard, Maximilian Bayer, and Eugen Fischer (Nama, Damara, Basters). Dag Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag im vorkolonialen Zentralnamibia. Das Herero- und Damaraland im 19. Jahrhundert* (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien 2011); Idem., "Pastoral Modernity,"; Jan-Bart Gewald, *Herero Heroes. A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia 1890 - 1923* (Athens: Ohio University Press 1999); Brigitte Lau, "Conflict and Power in Nineteenth-Century Namibia," *Journal of African History* 27 (1986): 29-39; Tilman Dedering, *Hate the Old and Follow the New. Khoekhoe and Missionaries in Early Nineteenth-Century Namibia* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997); Andreas Heinrich Bühler, *Der Namaaufstand gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Namibia*

Lineage, gender, and age on the one hand, and access to means of production on the other hand, were the two main factors according to which pre-colonial societies in southwestern Africa were commonly organized. First, kinship – be it through patrilinieage or matrilineage – structured significantly the way in which political power and wealth were distributed and shaped communal life in general. As anthropologist Winifred Hoernlé observed in 1925 regarding the social organization of the Nama, "a knowledge of [kinship] relationships is essential for an understanding of the whole moral regulation of the lives of the people."[124] Likewise, gender and age determined a person's position in the social hierarchy of a community. "Chief consideration," as stated by Hoernlé, was given to the

> relative ages of the people concerned. Respect for age is inculcated in every possible way, and the whole social organization of the people is an illustration of the fact. In the family deference and respect must always be paid to elders.[125]

Thus, reaching a certain age and the family and householder position that came with it was an important stage in a pre-colonial Namibian man's life. Both kinship and generational relations were symbolically represented in the spatial plan of homesteads and sanctioned

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von 1904-1913 (Frankfurt a. M.: IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 2003); Carstens, "Basters," and idem, introduction to *The Rehoboth Baster Naiton*; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*; Jacob Irle, *Die Herero. Ein Beitrag zur Landes-, Volks- & Missionskunde* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1906); Winifred Hoernlé, *The Social Organization of the Nama and Other Essays*, (reprint of essays published between 1918 and 1937), ed. by Peter Carstens (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press 1985); Barnard, *Hunters and Herders of Southern Africa*; Bayer, *The Rehoboth Baster Nation of Namibia*; Eugen Fischer, *Die Rehobother Bastards und das Bastardierungsproblem beim Menschen: Anthropologische und ethnographische Studien am Rehobother Bastardvolk in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika* (Jena: Fischer, 1913).

[124] Hoernlé, *The Social Organization of the Nama*, 24. Cf. Barnard, *Hunters and Herders*, 186-191. For questions of lineage and kinship regarding Herero, see Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 41-49; for a more critical assessment of the importance of kinship in Herero society, see Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag,* 223ff.

[125] Hoernlé, *The Social Organization of the Nama*, 21. See also John Iliffe: "Along with kinship and personal achievement, age was especially important to the social organisation and values of stateless peoples." Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 101.

through various rituals in which ancestors played a crucial role.[126] Not least, the social order based on lineage was abetted by the repertoire of numerous praise songs. "In many African societies whose social order was structured through lineage," as historian Dag Henrichsen notes, "without genealogy a person had no identity."[127] And: "Especially persons 'with cattle' were (and are still today) remembered in [Herero] society."[128] In oral tradition, cattle ownership operated as code to indicate social and cultural belonging.

Hence, secondly and more importantly, economy shaped community and identities. All African societies in the region under scrutiny were, in anthropologist Edwin Wilmsen's words, "pastoral/ pastroforaging social formation[s]."[129] Herding domestic animals and hunting were the dominant modes of production. In addition, some groups at times cultivated crops or extracted copper ore. Moreover, with the colonial expansion from South Africa all groups participated to a more or less intense degree in trade. Scholarship has shown that what characterized these economies of southwestern Africa the most was their fluidity between different modes of production and their interdependence with one another due primarily to harsh nutritional and climactic factors.[130] Cattle, and specifically the accumulation of very large herds, was in these economies not just a means of subsistence, but also "relatively 'secure' economic, social, and symbolic 'capital'," which was "particularly suited to be deployed in the organization of power and allegiance

[126] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 1-59, 223-225; Barnard, *Hunters and Herders*, 183-184.
[127] Dag Henrichsen, "'Ehi rOvaherero'. Mündliche Überlieferungen von Herero zu ihrer Geschichte im vorkolonialen Namibia," *WerkstattGeschichte* 9 (1994): 21. Cf. Paul Irwin, *Liptako Speaks. History from Oral Tradition in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
[128] Henrichsen, "'Ehi rOvaherero'," 22. On the importance of cattle ownership among Nama and Damara, see Barnard, *Hunters and Herders*, 179; Dedering, *Hate the Old and Follow the New*, 31-36.
[129] Edwin Wilmsen, *Land Filled with Flies. A Political Economy of the Kalahari* (Chicago:, 1989), 74. Quoted in Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 61.
[130] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 61-126; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 47.

relationships."[131] This mode of regulating the social can best be described as a patron-client relationship, a particularistic "relation of mutual benefit"[132] which is

> characterized by the simultaneous exchange of different types of resources, above all instrumental, economic, as well as political ones [...] on the one hand and promises of solidarity and loyalty on the other.[133]

The "status of a cattle owner [...] was a desirable one," and represented an important element of identity formation in pre-colonial Namibia for it meant not only economic wealth, but also patronage which linked socio-economic benefits and obligations with moral, political, emotional, and interpersonal ones.[134] This organizational logic was not without contradiction, as historian Tilman Dedering points out with respect to the Nama:

> An internal contradiction existed between the semi-autonomous economic status of the basic productive units with free access to land on the one hand, and those social forces on the other that struggled for control over livestock and labour, using genealogical seniority in order to exert political power.[135]

Two major socio-economic developments further marked the general setting in which we have to understand African pre-colonial identification processes in the region. In the

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[131] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 65.
[132] Michael Garfield Smith, *Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 8, cited in Colin Newbury, "Patrons, Clients, and Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies in Asia and Africa," *Journal of World History* 11, 2 (2000): 229.
[133] S. N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no. 1 (January 1980): 49-50 (emphasis added). Eisenstadt and Roniger stress moreover that "the exchange of these resources is usually effected by a 'package-deal,' i.e., neither resource can be exchanged separately but only in a combination that includes both types." And: "As a corollary, there is a strong element of solidarity in these relations, an element often couched in terms of interpersonal loyalty and attachment between patrons and clients-even though these relations may often be ambivalent. [...] Solidarity is often closely related to conceptions of personal identity, especially of personal honor and obligations, and it is also evident that some, even if ambivalent, personal 'spiritual' attachment may exist between patron and clients." Ibid., 50.
[134] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 65; Barnard, *Hunters and Herder*, 195; Bayer, *The Rehoboth Baster Nation*, 26.
[135] Dedering, *Hate the Old and Follow the New*, 36.

early nineteenth century, groups of Nama called the Oorlam-Afrikaners migrated north from South Africa into Namaland. In the mid-nineteenth century "under the dual leadership of their missionary and their captain, some eighty or ninety Baster families trekked across the Orange River."[136] Linked to the expansion of trade capitalism and missions, both of these groups brought new forms of social and political organization, notably the militarized organization in small raider units, called *komando* units.[137] According to historian Brigitte Lau, among the Nama, *komandos* "began to replace kinship groups for both economic and political purposes."[138] Despite the *komando*'s "quasi-democratic constitution," Nama society, she claims, remained "characterised by quasi-feudal forms of dependence which built upon the cattle-post system," in which other people – mainly the Herero and Damara – were incorporated serving as herdsmen and in other dependent roles.[139] However, less and less importance was given to pastoralist forms of production. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Nama people had thus shifted their emphasis from herding to foraging and raiding.[140] According to Dedering, "the internal political structures of indigenous and immigrant [Nama] groups became more rigid with the growing importance of market-related raiding and trading activities."[141] However, he argues, this did not mean that old power relations resting on kinship were entirely displaced by new *komando*-relations, but that the already very fragile political structures based on economic strength

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[136] Barnard, *Hunters and Herders*, 195; Carstens, introduction to *The Rehoboth Baster Nation*, 6; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 50 ff.; 72; Fischer, *Die Rehoboth Bastards*, 27-30.
[137] For a more detailed explanation of the *komando*, see chapter 2. On *komando* culture among Boer, Baster, and Nama societies in general, see Nigel Penn, "The Time of the Commandos," in *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 108-155.
[138] Lau, "Conflict and Power," 32.
[139] Ibid., 33.
[140] Ibid. See also Barnard, *Hunters and Herders*, 179; Henrichsen, "Pastoral Modernity," 95-105; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 51.
[141] Dedering, *Hate the Old and Follow the New*, 174.

and "descent ideology" were re-inscribed into a more centralized political system "at the expense of an economic dependence on the Cape market."[142] In any event, the two key tools in this new economy were horses and firearms.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, partly as a reaction to Oorlam-Nama incursions, the Herero invested heavily in horses and firearms while also adapting their cattle raising methods to the new situation (more directed breeding). They too organized in *komandos*. The result was a re-pastoralization of Herero society and the emergence of big cattle ownership and accumulation of wealth and political power in the hands of few.[143]

> At this stage, the identification of men with guns and horses became part and parcel of a modern Hereroness, not only of modern Herero masculinity, but also in similar ways to the identification of Herero with pastoral society in general and with cattle in particular.[144]

As a consequence of their successful competition within an economy of relatively scarce resources, other groups, particularly the Damara and the Nama, were impoverished.[145]

Finally, an essential precondition for the forms of existence described above was, of course, free mobility. Henrichsen has shown that particularly for the male members of Herero and Damara clans constant movement along a wide and complex network of wells, grazing grounds, and trading posts gave the rhythm to their everyday lives.[146] This was also true for other groups living on the territory, for "both flexibility and mobility were vital to

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[142] Ibid., 174, 176. Cf. Ibid., 19.
[143] Thus, Herero adaptation of the *komando* organization did not have a de-pastoralizing effect as it had with the Nama. It seems that they had learned their lesson, that is, not to be too dependent on the horse and gun trade. Henrichsen argues that "some, though not all, chiefs engaged in a remarkable reform-driven strategy that reflected not only the chiefs' long experience with Nama-Oorlam polities but also the necessities of life as stipulated by Cape and missionary expansion." Henrichsen, "Pastoral Modernity," 99.
[144] Ibid., 98.
[145] Ibid., and Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 23-24.
[146] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 40-47.

survival in this fragile ecology, where water was usually short, drought frequent, and pasture and other resources could quickly become exhausted."[147] Furthermore, the Basters in particular specialized in transportation, a trade they had in common with the Boer and which was based on their trek tradition.[148]

Hence, to recapitulate, the formative aspects of pre-colonial socio-economic structures, the main principles according to which Herero, Nama, and Damara societies had been arranged, were kinship and age on the one hand, and access to livestock and/or firearms and horses on the other. Following historian John Iliffe, these socio-economic principles of organizing society were embedded in an honor culture. He has argued that

> African notions of honour survived vigorously until the colonial period and then fragmented, partly surviving, partly disappearing, but chiefly transmuted and absorbed into other ethics, which themselves were most effective when drawing on traditions of honour.[149]

Historian Philipp Prein has shown how, up until the aftermath of the war of 1904-08, social relations were consistently described in pastoralist idioms – even when pastoral life was no longer possible – partially due to the way in which flexibility was inherent to the patron-client logic.[150] And I would add that this also held true for the continuation of *komando* idioms. Prein claims that pastoralists,

> continued to understand their social relations in their own idioms of paternalistic domination. Clients were still seeking better patrons and young male and female

[147] Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 47.
[148] Fischer, *Die Rehobother Bastards*, 16; Bayer, *The Rehoboth Baster Nation*, 36-38. Cf. Norman Etherington, *The Great Treks. The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815-1854* (Harlow: Longman, 2001).
[149] John Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 227.
[150] Philipp Prein, "Guns and Top Hats: African Resistance in German South West Africa, 1907-1915", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20 (1994,1): 99-121.

> dependents still challenged senior authority. Yet, at the same time they were increasingly weaving European items and idioms into their conflicts. In this process they did not feel they had to make a choice between defending a 'traditional' mode of thinking and conforming to a 'modern' one. They drew creatively from all available sources when renegotiating social relations.[151]

Some of these available sources were new, i.e. had become available through German colonialism. And anthropologist Alan Barnard notes, "it is all too easy to see Nama society in terms of a pre 1904 and post 1904 dichotomy. […] The political organization was destroyed, but elements of the ideology which generated it did remain."[152] Hence, if honor cultures and pastoralist and *komando* ways of talking and thinking about social relations continued to have validity, finding a way to obtain a horse, a weapon, to create a household, to acquire and accumulate stock, and in that manner to gain social status and honor must have remained a significant life goal for many young African men. This objective was, however, drastically curtailed by the Rinderpest of 1896/97 and, especially, by the German colonial regime, its expropriations, land seizures, fences, taxes, restrictive legislations, forced and wage labor, and so on. It seems likely that to a certain degree entry into the police force renewed access to the above described pastoralist, forager, raider, nomadic forms of social identity. In the police, African men regained the possibility of obtaining a gun, a horse, and even livestock. And their mobility was increased, too.

The question of lineage and age seems to have had a more ambivalent impact on African policemen's identities. My hypothesis is that age might have played a role in whether or not men would join the police, either to conform with pre-colonial standards or to go against them. Africanists have long since pointed out that gerontocracy and patriarchy were

[151] Ibid., 113.
[152] Barnard, *Hunters and Herders*, 183.

"systems of order and/or dynamic tension," that "formal rituals such as initiation and marriage […] endow[ed] Africans with status, control over resources, wisdom, and civic virtue," but that these were "in no way fixed or immune to internal or external pressures." Thus, "patriarchal discourse and ritual served as references and anchoring principles that were inherited, contested, and reinvented over time."[153] Young Herero Andreas Kukuri, for example, recalls entering the service of the *Schutztruppe,* because this was what men "his age" were expected to do.[154] But signing a contract with the police might have also replaced other initiation rites, providing an alternative honor source. Thus, joining the police might have amounted to a form of challenge to the preeminence and prescriptions of older generations. John Iliffe observes that "European conquest […] destroyed much of the rationale for African notions of heroic honour."[155] The result, he claims, was that African "sensitivity to issues of rank and vertical honour"[156] increased. As power relations were reconfigured, conservative movements to defend old elite structures, patriarchy, and the precedence of age emerged. Yet, at the same time,

> European control offered the enterprising new avenues to distinction and the young new opportunities for respect. The only certainty was that defeat brought great confusion in which the pursuit of honour remained a guiding principle."[157]

Thus, by becoming soldiers or policemen in the German colonial administration and entering the wage economy, "many young men defied their elders by seeking 'accelerated seniority'."[158]

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[153] G. Thomas Burgess and Andrew Burton, introduction to *Generations Past: Youth in East African History,* ed. by Andrew Burton and Hélène Charton-Bigot (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 1.
[154] Andreas Kukuri, *Herero-Texte*, ed. by Ernst Dammann (Berlin: Reimer 1983), 52.
[155] Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 202.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.

Finally, onto these older influences of identity formation we have to add more immediate social facts: African police recruitment was organized on the local level. Each police station disposed of a budget dedicated to remunerating, equipping, and feeding African policemen.[159] Men were approached by German police sergeants on the beat, or the men presented themselves at the nearest police station. Often, they had been in contact with colonial institutions for quite a while. A lot of men came from the *Schutztruppe* and from missionary schools at first. Yet, by and by, African police assistants, *Polizeidiener* as they were depreciatingly called, were increasingly recruited from within the police force.[160] The sons and nephews of policemen and all the young boys and adolescents who lived in the vicinity of the police stations made themselves indispensable. Almost every German and quite often the African policemen as well had at least one if not many young batmen – so-called *Bambusen* – who would carry out everyday chores such as collecting wood, making fire, cleaning, and attending to the horses.[161] Once grown up, these young men frequently signed up for police service.[162] Often German policemen took their subordinates with them when they were transferred to another post.[163] From the perspective of the recruiters, it was only commonsensical and practical to employ men they already knew or

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[158] Ibid., 222.
[159] Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (Inspektion der Landespolizei, IdL) to District Office Omaruru, 10.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2508, 23-24. See also Magistrate Vietsch (District Office Rehoboth) to Police Station Hornkranz, 09.10.1913, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 33 [new series].
[160] Interestingly, the rank of "Polizeidiener" – literally, "police servant" – had also existed in the German states of the early and mid-nineteenth century. Alf Lüdtke, *'Gemeinwohl', Polizei und 'Festungspraxis'. Staatliche Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preußen, 1815-1850* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 149.
[161] On the term Bambuse, see Dag Henrichsen, "Ozombambuse and Ovasolondate: Everyday Military Life and African Service Personnel in German South West Africa," in *Hues Between Black and White: Historical Photography from Colonial Namibia, 1860s to 1915*, ed. by Wolfram Hartmann (Windhoek: Out of Africa Publishers, 2004), 163, fn. 11, 12.
[162] Hans Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland zum Ordnungsstaat: Geschichte der ehemaligen Kaiserlichen Landespolizei für Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Emil Wernitz, 1930), 105.
[163] See, for instance, request regarding Police Assistant Franz Boy by Sgt. Karl Eckel (Police Station Holoog) to District Office Keetmanshoop, 15.06.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 16.

those who had been recommended by a colleague, already knew the German language, and were familiar with military discipline. From the perspective of the recruits, entering the police force meant above all a stable and relatively high income provided by an employer they often already knew and whose reliability they thus had had time to assess.

Another incentive to join the police force was the prospect of further material advantages such as bribes or booty, or, conversely, simply the lack of material alternatives. Thus, the police force harbored on the one hand longterm African members with career paths such as sketched out above, and on the other hand those drifting men who took what they could get to get by, including on-and-off service in the police force. An African man called Seemann, for instance, was police assistant at station Bühlsport when he was sent to the hospital to be treated for an STD. This ended his service for the Bühlsport station. After his recovery he traveled to Rehoboth where he was employed by a Baster to make bricks. During a visit to his parents' hometown a Sergeant Lahmeyer recruited him as a construction worker for the police station in Hornkranz. After a while, he again became a policeman at station Gosorobis.[164] Employment in the police force could also provide easier access to cash. Evidence suggests that African policemen borrowing money from their German superiors was a common practice. This pecuniary dependency must have fostered the existing patron-client relationship between African and German policemen even further.[165] What is important for my overall argument regarding policemen identity formations is that reaching a certain level of revenue meant also achieving a position of

[164] Report regarding Police Assistant Seemann by Sgt. Paul Ebermann (Police Station Gosorobis) to District Office Rehoboth, 22.01.1914, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 48 [new series].
[165] See the example of a treasurer at District Office Rehoboth who refused to act as bookkeeper for German policemen who were lending money to their African subordinates. Note by treasurer Widemann (District Office Rehoboth) to policemen Dietrich, Maywald, Hagen, Bülow, Hellwig, 31.03.1914, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 47 [new series].

social influence in one's own community and thereby securing honor. As historian Michelle Moyd observed for the so-called *Askari*, African soldiers in the German East African military,

> The economic impetus [...] related directly to the need to prove oneself respectable. *Askari* created a particular kind of respectability from their relative wealth as salaried employees of the colonial government and their display of a set of socio-cultural characteristics marking them as powerful men.[166]

Equally important for my general argument is that this socially grounded form of honor was tightly linked to the African policeman's access to violence: to his possessing weapons and to his overt or covert exploitation of the policed population.

To sum up, African policemen can best be described in terms of their relative proximity to localized power nodes. The main criterion for recruiting the men was their degree of immersion in the colonial system, as substantiated by their qualifications, experiences, and prior employment. This factor made up a great part of their identity formation. Moreover, complying with pre-colonial social standards of cattle, horse, and gun ownership, they nevertheless overcame to a certain extent older social ideals (which had lost almost all material base) as soon as they entered the colonial socio-economic web. Africanist Dag Henrichsen has called them appropriately the "lost generation": young men whose entire social organization and their place in it had collapsed with the German war against the Herero and Nama.[167] But in the process, these men became the African "new men", those men who seized the opportunity to insert themselves within the new social structures rather than trying to evade them.

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[166] Moyd, "Becoming *Askari*," 9.
[167] Personal conversation with Dag Henrichsen in Basel, May 14, 2013.

The colonial regime as well as the colonizers, especially the German policemen, depended heavily on them. These latter men's social backgrounds shall be addressed now.

"Old" Men

The sample data I collected from the personnel files of the *Landespolizei* show that a significant majority of its German men were artisans or artisans' sons, followed by agricultural and domestic workers.[168] There were few industrial workers. Almost all of them were born in the late 1870s and early 1880s.[169] With a small variation, this occupational and demographic makeup of the German police body corresponds very much with that of non-commissioned officers (NCO) in the *Kaiserreich*, the group from which virtually all German policemen in SWA were recruited – a fact to which I will return when I discuss the military as a crucial site of socialization.[170] Therefore, I would like to elaborate a little further on NCOs' socio-economic place in the German Empire.

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[168] This subchapter is based on the results of my quantitative study of the approximately 900 existing personnel files of the *Landespolizei* stored at the German National Archive. I have surveyed all of them. A sample of these I have analyzed in depth. BA-B, Gouvernement in Windhuk SWA, Personalakten, R 1002/ 91-1957 and BA-B, R 1002/ 2804-3591. For an excellent introduction to quantitative methods in history, see Claire Lemercier and Claire Zalk, *Méthodes quantitatives pour l'historien* (Paris: La Découverte 2008).

[169] Generally, the German policemen were from cohorts 1876 through 1883, that is they were usually between 25 and 30 when they entered the police force. The oldest policeman I could find was constable Karl Dietrich who was born in 1870. The youngest, police sergeant Gustav Manson, was born in 1887. IdL: Beamtenverzeichnis der Landespolizei, no date (ca. 1916), BA-B, R 1002/ 2790, no page numbers; Personnel file police sergeant Manson: BA-B, R 1002/ 3245. For some useful insight into the political mentality of the *Gründerzeit* generation of German men, see Detlef Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik. Krisenjahre der Klassischen Moderne.* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 26-31.

[170] There is little to no secondary literature on the social composition of lower-rank soldiers in the German Imperial military. This passage on the social backgrounds of NCOs in the *Kaiserreich* is based on an analysis of statistical records from the beginning of the twentieth century I undertook. The surveys had been produced in the context of the so-called *"Wehrfähigkeitsdebatte"*, a dispute among political and military elites regarding the question whether industrialized areas could still produce healthy, "apt" (fähig) young men to defend the nation. Sources: Walter Abelsdorff, *Die Wehrfähigkeit zweier Generationen mit Rücksicht auf Herkunft und Beruf* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1905); Walter Claassen, "Die abnehmende Kriegstüchtigkeit im Deutschen Reich in Stadt und Land von 1902 bis 1907," *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie einschliesslich Rassen- und Gesellschaftshygiene* 6, 1 (Jan/Feb 1909): 73-77; Georg Evert, "Die Herkunft der deutschen Unteroffiziere und

Statistical records indicate that men who became NCOs were not born in concentrated pockets but all over the Empire: in the countryside, small towns, mid-size towns, as well as large cities. The number of men from densely populated agglomerations (over 100,000 inhabitants) was slightly lower, however.[171] NCOs originated largely from small peasantry as well as from lower middle-class professions such as elementary school teachers, artisans, shopkeepers, and clerks – in brief, from what is usually called the lower middle class, or *Altmittelstand*.[172] Moreover, it is quite likely that an important percentage of the men who later chose to become NCOs moved away from their birthplace in order to find employment someplace else. Migration within the German Reich was intense at the turn of

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Soldaten am 1. Dezember 1906," *Zeitschrift des Königlich Preussischen Statistischen Landesamts*, special issue 28 (1908); Robert Rene Kuczynski, "Ist die Landwirtschaft die wichtigste Grundlage der deutschen Wehrkraft?" *Volkswirtschaftliche Zeitfragen, Vorträge und Abhandlungen* 27, 5/6 (1905); Hugo Meisner, "Rekrutierungsstatistik. Mit einem Kartogramm und einer Kurve," *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie einschliesslich Rassen- und Gesellschaftshygiene* 6, 1 (Jan/Feb 1909): 59-72; Otto von Schjerning, *Sanitätsstatistische Betrachtungen über Volk und Heer* [Nach einem am 24. Juli 1909 in dem Wissenschaftlichen Senate bei der Kaiser Wilhelms-Akademie für das militärärztliche Bildungswesen gehaltenen Vortrage] (Berlin: Verlag August Hirschwald, 1910). Secondary literature that tangentially touch on the issue: Detlef Bald, *Vom Kaiserheer zur Bundeswehr. Sozialstruktur des Militärs: Politik der Rekrutierung von Offizieren und Unteroffizieren (*Frankfurt a.M.: Peter D. Lang, 1981); Wilhelm Deist, "Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1914," in *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft: Studien zur preußisch-deutschen Militärgeschichte* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 19-41; Ibid., "Die Geschichte des preußischen Offizierkorps, 1888–1918," in *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft: Studien zur preußisch-deutschen Militärgeschichte* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 43-56; Stig Förster, "Militär und staatsbürgerliche Partizipation. Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1914," in *Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung,* ed. by Roland G. Foerster (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), 55-70; Werner Lahne, *Unteroffiziere. Gestern – heute – morgen* (Herford-Bonn: Verlag Offene Worte, 1974); Manfred Messerschmidt, "Die politische Geschichte der preußisch-deutschen Armee," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648–1939. Vol. IV.1: Militärgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert 1814–1890,* ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (München: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1975), 9-380; Ibid, "Die preußische Armee," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648–1939. Vol. IV.2: Militärgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert 1814–1890. Strukturen und Organisation,* ed. by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (München: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1976), 10-220; Klaus Saul, "Der Kampf um die Jugend zwischen Volksschule und Kaserne: Ein Beitrag zur 'Jugendpflege' im Wilhelminischen Reich 1890–1914," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1 (1971): 97-143.

[171] My findings are primarily based on Georg Evert, "Die Herkunft der deutschen Unteroffiziere und Soldaten am 1. Dezember 1906," *Zeitschrift des Königlich Preussischen Statistischen Landesamts*, special issue 28 (1908), here: XVI.

[172] Ibid., 74-133, esp. 132-3. Evert's table shows that the largest proportion of NCOs had fathers occupied in agriculture and "non-classified" occupation (i.e. liberal or service positions). Cf. Bald, *Vom Kaiserheer zur Bundeswehr,* 59, who bases his claims on the Evert study, though he cites the page numbers incorrectly.

the nineteenth century.[173] Again, this did not mean that men necessarily ended up in highly industrialized settings. Up to the First World War, despite rapid industrialization and urbanization, German society remained greatly marked by its rural constitution. In the 1870s two-thirds of all German town-dwellers lived in middle-sized communities (2000 to 20,000 inhabitants). In 1910 forty percent still lived in rural areas, that is, in communities with less than 2000 inhabitants.[174] Historian Wolfgang Mommsen has argued that the development of the German economy needs to be seen as an irregular, non-uniform process. Some branches of the economy grew faster than others, and with them the social structures surrounding these economies. He also claims that around 1880 "the full impact of industrialization on the social structure was yet to make itself felt."[175] Simultaneously, however, huge demographic changes had taken place, which *did* make themselves felt at least around the turn of the century. These changes had a powerful impact on many Germans, at least in terms of their repertoire of cultural self-representation. One can assume that speaking in very general, proportional terms, most NCOs had been born and remained living and working in rural or moderately urbanized areas. Their line of work and that of their fathers was mostly within the agricultural, artisanal, small trade, or lower public sector. Their perception of the social order was, however, saturated with images of

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[173] Gerd Hohorst, Jürgen Kocka, and Gerhard A. Ritter, eds., *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch: Materialien zur Statistik des Kaiserreichs 1870–1914* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1975), 40; cf. also Wolfram Fischer et al. (eds.), *Handbuch der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte.* Vol. V: *Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985), 44-45.

[174] On demographic change in Imperial Germany, see David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 191-205. Blackbourn: "The first point to make is that a clear majority of town-dwelling Germans still lived in modestly sized communities." Ibid., 201.

[175] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Imperial Germany 1867 – 1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an Authoritarian State,* trans. Richard Devenson (London: Arnold, 1995), 17.

heavy industry, factories, bustling metropoles, and tenements houses, and marked by the uncertainties of modern economies and by the *Gründerkrise*.

Sergeant Otto Müller, for instance, can be taken as typical. He was born in 1881 in Osterwieck, a Prussian town of about 4000 inhabitants in the Harz mountains. At that time, Osterwieck was growing rapidly due to its glove manufacturing.[176] But it could by no means be compared to industrialized centers such as the Ruhr or Rhein-Main areas, and Osterwieck's economic growth would soon slow down again. Otto Müller, the son of a miller, was himself trained as a miller before he joined the military in 1901. In 1904, as with so many of his police colleagues, he arrived in SWA having volunteered to join the war against the Herero. Then, in 1907, he transferred from the *Schutztruppe* to the *Landespolizei*.[177] Many of his German colleagues had similar life stories. They were carpenters, cobblers, or carvers, following their father's occupation. Occasionally, some policeman or other had been a waiter, a farm hand, or a miner. And, very rarely, you can find a salesman, a day laborer, or a factory worker.[178] Compared to NCOs in general, policemen came more often from artisan rather than peasant, clerk, or shop keeper families because the *Landespolizei* explicitly gave preference to artisanship: craftsmen were by far more useful to the police in the colonial environment than any other trade.[179]

So why would specifically the men from the "old" petty bourgeois strata seek employment as NCOs? The appeal can be explained with one set of reasons in particular: they were the generation which had grown up in the "long depression" which had followed

[176] Theo Gille, *Osterwieck – Geschichte und Baukunst einer Fachwerkstadt* (Braunschweig: Archiv Verlag, 1998).
[177] See Otto Müller's personnel file: BA-B, R 1002/ 3224.
[178] BA-B, R 1002/ 2804-3591.
[179] In a letter to the Colonial Office (*Reichskolonialamt*, RKA) in 1910, for instance, Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe asked specifically for blacksmiths, masons, saddlers, and carpenters. Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to the Kaiserliches Gouvernement in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Gouv. SWA), 24.10.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2502, 93.

the initial "take off into sustained growth" of the 1850s and 60s;[180] consequently, they increasingly felt the (real or imagined) pressures deriving from the demands and constraints of a newly emerging technological and economic order.[181] To pick one example among many, fewer and fewer coachmen or saddlers were needed in a transportation system that relied less on horses. There are what seems to me a disproportionally high number of coachmen and saddlers in the personnel files of the *Landespolizei*.[182] With little political organization of their own, men from the *Altmittelstand* might have entered the military as NCOs in the hope of laboring for the preservation of the old corporate order in which they had enjoyed a certain social standing.[183] Similar to the bourgeois groups who, once integrated in the officer corps, appropriated the corps's *ständisch* thinking, they took comfort in supporting the "authoritarian state" as Mommsen has characterized the *Kaiserreich's* ruling system.[184] In a rapidly changing social order, challenged by an increasingly politicized working class as well as by an equally politicizing bourgeoisie,

[180] Mommsen, *Imperial Germany 1867 – 1918*, 236.
[181] On the transformation of artisanship in the *Kaiserreich*, see Gerhard Ritter and Klaus Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871 bis 1914*, (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. 1992), 281-297. They distinguish between different branches: "Beinahe alle Handwerke sahen sich zum Teil seit Jahrzehnten dem Konkurrenzdruck der Fabrikindustrie ausgesetzt. [...] Bei den Bäckern hielt sich die Konkurrenz der Brotfabriken, bei den Fleischern die der Schlachthöfe und Dauerwarenhersteller noch in Grenzen; [...] Anders die Schuhmacher, deren Gewerbe sich recht rasch vom Produktions- zum Reparaturhandwerk, zur Flickschusterei, entwickelte. Schmiede, Schlosser oder Klempner sahen sich gleichfalls billiger hergestellten industriellen Konkurrenzprodukten ausgesetzt." Ibid., 286.
[182] BA-B, R 1002/ 2804-3591.
[183] "Ihre politischen Interessen führten die selbständigen Handwerker in den Schoß des Obrigkeitsstaats. Das war früher keineswegs so gewesen, aber die bedrängte Situation des Handwerks begünstigte protektionistische Tendenzen, auch weil die Handwerksmeister als Betriebsinhaber durch die staatliche Sozialpolitik wegen der mit ihr verbundenen Verteuerung der unselbständigen Arbeit unter Druck gerieten." Ritter and Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, 288.
[184] Mommsen, *Imperial Germany 1867 – 1918*. On the role of the military in Imperial German society, see Wilhelm Deist, "Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1914," in *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft,* 25-41. See also idem, "Die Geschichte des preußischen Offizierkorps, 1888–1918," in *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft*, 43-56.

NCOs were the "underdog" pillars of the old regime.[185] They traded the class honor (*Standesehre*) they believed they had lost for another, military caste honor. Like the African men who entered police service, they associated certain material and economic resources (importantly horses and arms) with a tradition of social standing. And, as with the African policemen, this form of procuring social rank and respectability involved violence: armed, disciplined potential to use physical force.

The decision to go into the colony might have been similarly motivated. If we were to take these men's feeling of being under pressure as given or at least likely, moving into the colony might have been another attempt to escape that strain. But little can be found about such a supposition in the police sources.[186] Scholarship has argued, however, that in the imagination of the German bourgeoisie at least, whether among those who emigrated or among those who did not, there was a strong desire to establish some sort of pseudo-feudal, pre-modern order in the settler colony of Southwest Africa in the hope that there one would be able to leave the irritations and perturbations of modernization and industrialization behind.[187] Notably, this was the image often conjured up in soldiers' and farmers' memoirs.[188]

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[185] See also Alf Lüdtke's characterization of Prussian policemen in the mid-nineteenth century. Lüdtke, *'Gemeinwohl', Polizei und 'Festungspraxis'*, 149-159.

[186] At least after surveying all the records of the subject folder 'recruitments' in the police archives, in which I have found no evidence of men expressing such feelings in writing. BA-B, R 1002/ 2493-2503.

[187] Historian Birthe Kundrus comes to a conclusion similar to mine regarding the sources and observes that one cannot empirically substantiate the notion that people wanted to leave the *Kaiserreich* out of reactionary nostalgia. Her argument is therefore that the bourgeoisie expressed dreams about a pre-modern utopian society but mostly remained in the metropole. The working class, she argues, emigrated into the colonies by economic necessity. It is possible that the policemen – men who came from somewhere in-between working class and bourgeoisie – embodied a little bit of both: they aspired to live in a corporate order and to earn a better income. On imagination in the metropole, see Birthe Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten : Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien* (Köln: Böhlau, 2003), 43-76, 129-137. For settler aspirations in the colony, see Helmut Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1914* (Hamburg: Leibniz-Verlag, 1968), 107-123, 220-239. For a combination of both, see Dörte Lerp, "Farmers to the Frontier. Settler Colonialism in the Eastern Prussian Provinces and German Southwest Africa," Conference Paper, FU Berlin,

What is clearly substantiated by evidence is that men sought to relocate to the colony in order to better their financial situation. The prospect of earning an "expatriate income" (*Auslandsgehalt)* on top of the regular civil servant salary was attractive to many. Policeman Otto Olkiewitz from a small town in Holstein, for instance, stated that "since I want to better myself it is my sole wish to get employment in the police force in Southwest Africa."[189] Police officer Max Geyer noted that he was forced to change his current permanent position because he had "only 900 M[arks per year] with which I have to provide for my wife and children."[190] These two examples are about men who were already policemen when they applied for a job in Southwest Africa. Regarding the majority of men who were soldiers when they entered the colony, however, the economic incentive was a more mediated one. Participating in a war, like the one against the Nama and Herero, usually meant expedited promotion and a higher income.[191] After the war, when large portions of the military were demobilized and sent back to the homeland, joining the *Landespolizei* was a way of securing a decent salary and one's stay in the colony.[192] Indeed, it was likely the best method to do so, since the offer of advantageous credits for soldiers of

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Sept. 2011. For the motivations of Schutztruppe officers and soldiers, see Kuß, *Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen*, 127-156.

[188] Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewusstsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1907* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 69-70.

[189] "Habe hier ein Gehalt von 1 200 Mark und ist es, da ich mich verbessern möchte, mein einzigster [sic] Wunsch, in Südwest-Afrika bei der Polizei eine Anstellung zu erhalten…" Otto Olkiewicz to IdL: Gesuch des Polizeiwachtmeisters Otto Olkiewicz, 12.03.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2501, 99.

[190] "Ich bin hier in ungekündigter Stellung, […]. Ich möchte diese Stellung nur wechseln, da ich hier nur 900 M erhalte, wovon ich Frau und Kinder erhalten muß." Staff Sgt. Max Geyer to Gouv. SWA, 03.04.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2500, 153. See also application by clerk Otto Bälk from Berlin Spandau who made 90-100 Marks a month and whose wife had already settled in SWA with help of the Frauenkolonialverband. Letter by Otto Bälk to Ltn. Winterfeld (Schutztruppe), 08.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2500, 36-39.

[191] Kuß, *Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen*, 132, 137, 143.

[192] Between 1908 and 1909 about 2000 soldiers of the *Schutztruppe* were demobilized. In the following three years, another 500 men left the military. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 117. For an example of a former NCO who had already been sent home in 1907 and had become a quarryman, see Sgt. Swoboda from Königshütte. "I would like to better my future so that I won't remain a common worker," he wrote in his recruitment request to the *Landespolizei.* Johann Swoboda to IdL, 18.02.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2501, 64-65.

the *Schutztruppe* who wished to buy a farm and settle in the colony had ended in 1906.[193] To employ former colonial soldiers was also in the interest of police headquarters and the Colonial Office in Berlin, for these men already had knowledge of the colony.[194] That the terms of employment would be as good as for those who remained within the military – these were, among other benefits, a 1000 Mark bonus after 12 years of service (*Dienstprämie*), guaranteed state employment after service (*Zivilversorgungsschein*), and an ample pension – was not clear in the initial phase after the war. Several examples document that men hesitated therefore before they agreed to transfer over to the police.[195] But the police leadership realized quickly that it was crucial to offer favorable conditions and at least moderate career possibilities in order to attract men.[196] How important a sizable, steady income and other financial benefits were to these lower middle-class men is expressed in letters Sergeant Hermann Strunck wrote to his brother. With relief he looked on the upcoming bonus and entitlement to a full pension when he rejoiced that "only one more year to bear, my brother, then I can say, it is done! […] A goal of my dreams will then be achieved." And in another letter looking forward to his home leave he reckoned that with his colonial income "one can do all sorts of things over there!"[197] That quite a few men joined the police not out of conviction but rather out of economic necessity is documented

[193] Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewusstsein*, 69.
[194] See the instruction from the Colonial Office to avoid "hasty" discharges, for men with experience and knowledge of the colony are deemed better than new recruits from the homeland. Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 17.11.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2424, 18-20.
[195] See for instance, Sgt. Paul Altscher's letter to police headquarters in which he explains his and two other men's case regarding uncertainties about general employment conditions. Sgt. Paul Altscher to IdL, 20.12.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 91, 39-41.
[196] Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL): "Aufzeichnungen zur Organisation der Landespolizei." 29.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page number. Idem to RKA Berlin, 25.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2417, 1-3.
[197] Letters by Hermann Strunck to Johann Strunck, 21.01.1912 and 29.03.1912 (Strunck family archive), quoted in: Budack, Kuno Franz Robert: *Raubmord 1912: Die "Falk- und Sommer-Morde". Ein Beitrag zur Kriminalgeschichte von Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Windhoek: Selbstverlag 1999), 8-9.

by the repeated orders issued to remind recruiters that "human wrecks who apply to the *Landespolizei* only out of momentary money trouble" had no place in the police.[198]

Material Conditions in the Colony

The pay of an African policeman was about 20 to 40 German Mark per month, or in rare cases up to 60 Mark.[199] This corresponded to about a tenth of what a German policeman usually earned (3000 to 4200 Mark per year contingent on rank and seniority),[200] and did not include all the social benefits the latter received.[201] An African police assistant or his family could be granted financial support from the colonial state in cases of disability or death, but this was not guaranteed by law.[202] In addition to their pay, police assistants were given free shelter, board, and equipment. The daily food ration for an African policeman included a pound of meat, a pound of some form of starch, coffee, sugar, salt, and some form of fat. On weekends he received a portion of tobacco.[203] The German policeman

[198] "[…] verkrachte Existenzen, die sich nur aus momentaner Geldverlegenheit in die L.P. bewerben, halte ich für Schädlinge und ersuche ich solche Bewerber mir nicht in Vorschlag zu bringen." Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe to all inspection officers, 07.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2418, 23. For another example, see the case of soldier Hirte who after his demobilization owned only 600 to 1000 Marks, and was thus denied the right to obtain a farm. Hirte therefore wished to enter the police force. District Chief Kurt Streitwolf (District Office Gobabis) to Gouv. SWA, 06.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2500, 120.
[199] See for instance, decree by Governor v. Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA), 14.09.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2605, 1-2; List of salaries for the months of January, February, and March 1908 (IdL), 24.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 25; Budget 1914 for African workers and police assistants by Senior Civil Servant Hans Hensel (IdL), 19.03.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2593, 1-4. For a case in which African policemen received 60 Marks, see Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to District Office Lüderitzbucht, 31.08.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 80-81.
[200] For a list of the remuneration of all German colonial civil servants, see Johannes Tesch (ed.), *Die Laufbahn der deutschen Kolonialbeamten, ihre Pflichten und Rechte*, 6th ed. (Berlin: Otto Salle 1912), 14-18. For an example of an income sheet, see Sgt. Albrecht's work contract, 06.11.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ /2796, 43-44.
[201] For an example of the negotiations of a German policeman regarding his income and social benefits, see request by Sgt. Paul Altscher to IdL, 30.11.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 91, 33-34.
[202] Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 141-144. See also for instance the case of Police Assistant Fritz who drowned while on duty, and whose family would have received a one-time payment as compensation, if it had asked for it. Report by Staff Sgt. Hans Franken (Police Depot Waterberg), 20.02.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2600, 25.
[203] Decree by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA), 04.03.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2605, 8.

bought his own food. However, what he could get depended largely on what was available at the local store, restaurant, or officers' mess and was usually fairly expensive.[204] Thus, the fact that policemen in German Southwest Africa made about three times as much as their peers in the metropole, has to be put into relation with the inflated living costs and deficiency of goods in that colony. Like their African colleagues, German policemen were provided with equipment and housing. Except in the few "urban" centers like Windhuk, Swakopmund, and Lüderitzbucht, housing conditions were miserable. Most of the time, policemen lived in former military buildings which had been constructed hastily during the periods of conquest and war, and which were quickly deteriorating due to the climactic conditions. But also those buildings that had been more recently erected by policemen were usually wanting and lacked basic equipment like household tools or furniture.[205]

The African policeman's right to raise small livestock was strictly regulated, but in many cases accorded. The German policeman's right to do so was much more limited, as was his right to hunt game.[206] He remained fixed in his income class with no other possibility of substantially bettering his situation. In terms of material conditions, despite the undeniably substantial difference in pay, one could argue that the African and German men of the

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[204] The "Denkschrift, betreffend die Regelung der Besoldung der Beamten in den afrikanischen und Südsee-Schutzgebieten. Beilage zum Nachtrag zum Haushalts-Etat für die Schutzgebiete auf das Rechnungsjahr 1910" notes for German Southwest Africa "high prices in many respects," and that "living costs have not become much lower since the end of the uprising." Published in Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen Kolonialbeamten*, 457. For an individual case, see the request of officer Paul Altscher who could not afford the drinks he had to pay to his informants. Request for a refund by Sgt. Paul Altscher to Gouv. SWA, 19.12.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 91, 107-108.

[205] Annual report 1909 by bureau D and IdL to Gouv. SWA, 25.05.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 45-47.

[206] Baster policemen had a special position for they had the right to own and even increase livestock without restrictions. Carstens, introduction to *The Rehoboth Baster Nation*, 2. For African police owning livestock, see patrol report by Sgt. Arthur Wegener (Police Station Altmaltahöhe), 12.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 170; deposition by Police Assistant July (Police Depot Kupferberg), 01.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 84. On restrictions for German policemen, see *Dienstvorschrift für die berittene Landespolizei*, 11. Zollmann notes that the wives of African policemen "took care of the station's livestock as well as of the livestock of their families," suggesting that African policemen privately owned flocks whereas German policemen had none. Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 73. I will come back to the question of hunting when I discuss firearms in chapter 5.

Landespolizei were quite close to one another, meeting somewhere in the middle of the social spectrum of colonial society.

How did the material conditions in which the policemen lived and worked affect their identities? When we look at pictures the policemen had made of themselves, their families, and their homes, one can observe two features which seem to reappear in all of them (see figures no. 1, 2, 4). On the one hand, the pictures betray the plain and austere circumstances in which the everyday life of most of the men unfolded. On the other hand, they seem to display a desire on behalf of the men posing in them to convey a certain lifestyle, certain material values, a certain pride in their way of living. In the case of the German men this ambition can best be described as bourgeois. In the case of the African men, it can be related to the status of "big men", that is *omunene* (in otjiHerero) or *gáo-sab* (in khoekhoe).[207] The photographs illustrate how economic necessities and constraints collided but also merged with bourgeois aspirations and other cultural paradigms.

[207] Iliffe on the African concept of "Big Men" within a patron-client economy, here of the Beti in Central Africa: "A Big Man's status rested chiefly on wealth in people. [...] The Big Man's household also commonly contained slaves (generally absorbed as poor relations), pawns taken as security for loans, and the clients whom no Big Man could neglect. To acquire and hold dependents, the Big Man had to distribute wealth: 'treasure' or cattle to pay bridewealth, food to support the poor or feast the community, and increasingly the European trade goods that nineteeth-century Benti and their neighbours pursued as avidly as they pursued women." Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 111. See also Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 48.

FIGURE 1
Family photograph of two unnamed German policemen, no date.
Source: Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 393.

FIGURE 2
Family photograph of an unnamed African policeman, no date.
Source: Selmeci and Henrichsen: *Das Schwarzkommando,* 134.

Status Anxieties

German policemen in German Southwest Africa were responsible for virtually every aspect of colonial administration: the maintenance of the legal order, the organization of the economy, the development of knowledge about the territory and population, and so on. I will elaborate on their range of practical responsibilities in chapter three. For now it suffices to note that their situation was overwhelming while at the same time instilling self-aggrandizing delusions. The inflation of one's own importance and the pressure to meet the public's as well as the command's impossible expectations generated insecurities and anxieties of failure in policemen. Sergeant Sterzenbach, for instance, "stated 'I have not

been instructed on this' […] on every occasion he was asked to do something."[208] Sergeant Uhde was "one of those, for whom duty easily becomes too much to handle."[209] And Sergeant Czarnetzki confessed that "since the duties of an enforcement officer are so manifold, I feel I am not able to fulfill these by myself."[210]

African policemen, on the other hand, were supposedly responsible for nothing. They were meant to be merely a "support" for the German policemen.[211] In fact, however, they had multiple, unacknowledged, and often crucial responsibilities.[212] This situation could be equally anxiety producing. Moreover, one has to assume that, from the perspective of the colonized, the hopes and expectations projected onto African policemen as important brokers of the colonial regime must have been quite high. There is evidence that many colonized made use of the police in a bifurcated way, addressing the official, bureaucratic German apparatus for some concerns, and seeking support or justice from the African police for other concerns.[213] Since most of these cases were not recorded, we cannot say how common they were. But we can assume that African policemen experienced worries about not being able to fulfill all that was expected from them.

Historian Roger Chickering argues in his social psychology of right-wing, reactionary middle-class men in Imperial Germany that "their self-concepts tended to be tenuous and insecure." This was due to the fact, he claims, that these were either men "with prolonged

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[208] "[…] so dass er bei jeder Gelegenheit, wenn er etwas machen sollte, sagte 'darüber bin ich nicht instruiert' […]." Magistrate Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to IdL, 10.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 3483, 47.
[209] "Einer von denen, welchen der Dienst leicht zu viel wird." Magistrate Brill (District Office Windhuk) to IdL, 05.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2492, 21.
[210] "Da der Dienst eines Zustellungs- und Vollziehungsbeamten ein sehr vielseitiger ist, fühle ich mich nicht in der Lage denselben alleine bewältigen zu können." Request for a transfer by Sgt. Wilhelm Czarnetzki (District Court Windhuk) to District Office Windhuk, 15.03.1906, BA-B, R 1002/ 325, 1.
[211] "Denkschrift Landespolizei" in *Stenographische Berichte des Reichtags*, vol. 242 (1907), annex 397, addendum I, 30.
[212] I elaborate on these in chapter 3.
[213] See, for instance, a domestic abuse case which was entirely handled by the African police: Report by Sgt. Herold (Police Station Klipdam), 29.09.1913, NAN, DAR, 4 E.4.d, no page numbers.

exposure to a foreign environment" whose identity was "insecure for having incubated in a state of tension with the cultural environment," or were men who were "recent arrivals in roles that carried high status" and whose "status and respect […] were clouded by incommensurate social background or by credentials that had yet to find unqualified acceptance."[214] Without wanting to stretch the comparison too much, one could apply these observations regarding status insecurity to the German and African policemen of the *Landespolizei*: to the former for their insertion into a foreign environment (in addition to the insecurity related to their belonging to a social class on the wane); to the latter for their arrival in a newly created, high status social group. Moreover, historian Mohamed Adhikari frames anxieties of mixed-race men in South African history also in terms of social status, claiming that "the basic dynamic behind the assertion of coloured identity […] was to defend [their] position of relative privilege," which "engendered fears that they might end up losing that position and be relegated to the status of Africans."[215] Again, without wanting to strain its explanatory value too much, I think that this form of status anxiety might also have been existent among Baster policemen of the *Landespolizei*. Across the board, then, the men of the *Landespolizei* were likely anxious about their social position as well as their excessive responsibilities.

These insecurities and concerns can also help explain certain violent behaviors with which policemen formed their identities. Fear of social disorder and of contamination dictated for instance that being touched by somebody inferior (in terms of class and of

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[214] Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 127-128. Chickering derives the second characterization of status insecurity from the sociological concepts of "status inconsistency" or "status lag." Cf. K. Hope, "Models of Status Inconsistency and Social Mobility Effects," *American Sociological Review* 38,6 (1975): 322-343.
[215] Mohamed Adhikari, "Hope, Fear, Shame, Frustration: Continuity and Change in the Expression of Coloured Identity in White Supremacist South Africa, 1910-1994," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32, 3 (2006): 478.

race) needed to be retaliated immediately. Sergeant Günther, for example, had entered an African compound by night with his colleague Sergeant Brumme when, suddenly, a woman appeared from her hut,

> and bumped into me. To see who she was I seized her by the arm. Hereupon a native came up and touched me [faßte mich an]; I dealt him several slaps in the face, whereupon Brumme approached and […] then gave him also a couple of slaps in the face.[216]

Sergeant Brumme remembered that upon seeing Sergeant Günther hit the African man,

> I asked what was going on, whereupon Günther answered: 'The insolent fellow [freche Kerl] here is touching me.' Thereupon I slapped the boy another two or three times with the flat of my hand in the face; that he bled hereupon I have not noticed.[217]

The victim's employer, Lieutenant Lehmann of the *Schutztruppe*, insisted that "my servant did not touch the policeman but his wife."[218] The fixation in all three testimonials on physical contact is telling. Potential touching appears to have been reason enough, whether it occurred or not. A feeling of indignation or disgust – the colonialist sensibility would not have called this fear – was taken as an appropriate, natural reaction to what was perceived as a transgression of social and racial bodily integrity. Boundaries needed to be retraced. And although the slaps consisted in yet another physical contact, they served as purging, cleansing gestures in these moments. Social rank was produced in the everyday by means of everyday violent acts.

To conclude this second section of my chapter, who were the African and German policemen socially speaking? There were the African "new men" who had seized the

[216] Deposition by Sgt. Wilhem Günther (District Office Grootfontein), 19.10.1906, BA-B, R 1002/ 281, 12.
[217] Deposition by Sgt. Brumme (District Office Grootfontein), 19.10.1906, BA-B, R 1002/ 281, 13.
[218] Ltn. Lehmann (Schutztruppe) to District Office Grootfontein, 09.10.1906, BA-B, R 1002/ 281, 14.

opportunity of securing social standing and consequently honor in the colonial system. They had done so by holding on to some of the economic principles of an older social order while abandoning some of the ancestral, generational principles. And then there were the German "old men" who had found refuge in the armed forces as a stable employer and as a representative of the old regime. In the military and perhaps by extension also in the colony, these men had found compensation for their perceived loss in social prestige and class honor. Thus, although the men came from two quite different social and cultural backgrounds, the similarity between the two in terms of self-understanding is striking. Both groups strove for and were anxious to attain traditional forms of social standing (honor) through association with certain economic resources (horses, guns) and a particular patron (the state). Finally, the experience of living and working together in the existing conditions in the colony made both groups of policemen, the "new" and the "old" men, come closer to one another in material and social terms.

Region and Religion

In terms of "ethnicity", German policemen came from all regions of their homeland.[219] In total numbers, the largest group represented in the police force were Prussians, a correlation with their highest number in the *Kaiserreich*. The other German "ethnic" groups made up the force in numbers comparable to their proportional numbers in German society as well. As I have mentioned before, "ethnicities" of San and Ovambo did not join or were not admitted into the *Landespolizei*. Herero, Nama, and Damara were represented in

[219] I am using the term "ethnicity" in quotation mark to signal that it is not a natural entity. For a critique of the concept and an analysis of how ethnicity is constructed and how it functions, see Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

the force in proportion to their populations. The Baster men of the *Landespolizei* seemed to have been the only ones overrepresented in relation to their overall population number.[220]

Also corresponding with the German demographic distribution was the proportion of Protestants and Catholics: according to the personnel records, a rough two to one ratio existed in the police force similar to the ratio in the *Kaiserreich*.[221] Regarding the African policemen's religious and confessional belonging, the assessment is difficult. As I already mentioned, one of the two main recruiting grounds for police assistants were the missions. One has to assume therefore that a majority of the African men who entered the police force via missionary schools must have been Christians. Whether their overall number was higher than that of men who had not converted to Christianity is hard to say. At the end of the nineteenth century, only few Herero, mostly elite, were Christian.[222] But these numbers changed significantly after the war. Historian Marion Wallace writes even of a "mass conversion of Otjiherero-speakers to Christianity."[223] Nama, on the other hand, in any case those who were Oorlam or Oorlam influenced, had already been predominantly Christian. Virtually all Basters were Protestants.[224] Altogether, the European missionary presence in Southwest Africa was primarily Protestant.[225] Thus, one can assume that if there was a Christian imprint within the African police staff, it must have been Protestant.

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[220] I base these very short observations regarding policemen's regional identities on the data I collected from the personnel files and the secondary literature. Cf. Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* and Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*. On demographics in the *Kaiserreich* and in Southwest Africa, see Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century,* 191-205, and Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 104-105, 177-178.
[221] I was unable to find evidence that would prove the existence of Jewish or Muslim members in the police force.
[222] Henrichsen, "Pastoral Modernity," 99; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 72.
[223] Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 189.
[224] Carstens, "Basters", and idem, introduction to *The Rehoboth Baster Nation*, 5.
[225] On the history of missionary presence in German Southwest Africa, see Dedering, *Hate the Old, Follow the New.*

Given this cautious evaluation of the ethnic-religious composition of the police force, one ought to suppose that diffuse Protestant – or at least Christian – attitudes pervaded police practice. However, I have not encountered religiosity or references to God in the written sources, apart from a general gesturing towards the "civilizing mission".[226] Interestingly, and maybe surprisingly, ethnic or national identification as guiding principles for police work also do not prominently occur in the archival records. None of the German policemen wrote in their applications or in their exams that they wanted to serve the (national) community or promote German-ness. Other cultural logics appear to have been more consequential. An essential one was masculinity. Policemen were above all *men*. They acted according to certain concepts of what it meant to be a man. I will therefore address now the question of gender.

Husbands and Adventurers

Ideally, all German policemen were supposed to be married to white, German women so that they would embody the colonial state's valorization of white bourgeois respectability. In summer 1907, Chief of Police Heydebreck wrote in his position paper regarding the general organization of the *Landespolizei* of the "desire and aspiration to recruit married policemen."[227] Contrary to the military whose members were organized for the state of war, the policemen were to exemplify civic life and durability. Stations manned

[226] See, for instance, the written exam by a Sergeant, name illegible, (Depot Waterberg), 28.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2538, 88-91.
[227] Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL): "Aufzeichnungen zur Organisation der Landespolizei." 29.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page number. See also the general report about the *Landespolizei* to the Colonial Office from fall 1909, in which the desire to have married men is reiterated though qualified. Governor Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, Berlin, 04.10.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 121-127.

with only one man were, "if at all possible," to be staffed with married policemen.[228] In 1910, Senior Civil Servant Hugo Blumhagen wrote:

> No doubt, the advantages of policemen's marriage outweigh by far the disadvantages. […] It certainly should not be underestimated how important it is for the development of the colony if married policemen are stationed permanently on the same outposts and thus provide a strong framework for the settlement efforts.[229]

Yet, in practice, the living conditions were such that they were not deemed fit for European women. Blumhagen deplored the situation in which stations did not meet the standards that would at least "tolerably comply with the requirements for white women."[230] He thus suggested strictly controlling marriage and, if necessary, forcing policemen to postpone indefinitely their marital plans.[231] The Colonial Office in Berlin sanctioned a directive to that effect a month later.[232] At first, it had insisted on continuing to support the marriage of policemen, pointing toward the threatening "increment in the bastard [*Mischling*] population," and reiterating that matrimony among civil servants was

[228] Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all District Offices, 22.08.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 40.
[229] "Es besteht für mich kein Zweifel, daß die Vorteile der Verheiratung der Polizeibeamten die Nachteile ganz erheblich überwiegen. […] Sicher ist es von nicht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des Schutzgebietes, wenn verheiratete Polizeibeamte dauernd auf denselben Außenstationen untergebracht bleiben, und so ein festes Gerippe für Ansiedlungsbestrebungen bilden." Blumhagen (Gouv. SWA) to RKA: Verheiratung der Polizeibeamten. 17.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 9.
[230] Ibid. See also the concern expressed by the governor a year before: "Die Zahl der verheirateten Beamten im Schutzgebiet hat in letzter Zeit eine beträchtliche Zunahme erfahren. So erfreulich diese Tatsache an sich ist, so hat sie doch häufig die unerwünschte Folge, dass die Verwaltung mit Rücksicht auf die beschränkte Zahl der zur Verfügung stehenden Verheiratetenwohnungen sich genötigt sieht, mit unverhältnismässig hohen Kosten solche Wohnungen anzumieten bezw. erhöhte Mietentschädigungen zu zahlen. Ich bestimme deshalb, dass in Zukunft die Beamten, die sich zu verheiraten gedenken, wenigstens ein halbes Jahr vorher der vorgesetzten Behörde von ihrem Vorhaben Anzeige erstattet." Governor Schuckmann to IdL, 12.06.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 1.
[231] Senior Civil Servant Blumhagen (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 17.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 9.
[232] State Secretary Lindequist (RKA) to Gouv. SWA, 23.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 11.

crucial to promote European settlement.[233] But fear of losing honor and prestige trumped even fear of miscegenation and long term settlement plans. Chief of Police Bethe stressed the connection between "worthy" housing for policemen's wives and the image the police wished to convey, when he reminded local administrators of the need to monitor marriage requests:

> I ask you to instruct the policemen thoroughly on this issue and to explain to them in particular that this directive is in their own interest, and has been decided out of consideration for the reputation of the body [*Beamtenschaft*] of policemen, which can only suffer if policemen's wives have to cope with apartments that are unworthy of a German woman. For our reputation would be severely harmed, not only in front of the white population but also in the eyes of the natives.[234]

By that time, about a third of the German police force, maybe slightly less, was married.[235] In the remaining years of German colonial rule, the numbers first increased but then

[233] "Die Gründe, die bisher dazu geführt haben, das Heiraten der Polizeibeamten möglichst zu erleichtern, bestehen noch fort, und scheinen mir immer noch schwerer ins Gewicht zu fallen, als die gewiß beachtenswerten Gründe, welche jetzt für die Heiratsbeschränkungen geltend gemacht werden. Ich verweise nur auf die Statistik über die Zunahme der Mischlingsbevölkerung. […] es vor allem auf die dauernde Ansiedlung weißer Familien ankommt. Es darf insbesondere nicht vergessen werden, daß einer der Hauptgesichtspunkte für die Schaffung einer Polizeitruppe unter entsprechender Verminderung der Schutztruppe der war, daß an die Stelle stets wechselnden Militärpersonals im Lande bleibende, tunlichst verheiratete Polizeisergeanten treten sollten." State Secretary Lindequist (RKA) to Gouv. SWA, 09.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 5-6.

[234] "Ich ersuche die Beamten eingehend hierüber zu belehren und ihnen besonders zu bedeuten, daß diese Anordnung in ihrem eigenen Interesse und mit Rücksicht auf das Ansehen der Beamtenschaft der Landespolizei getroffen ist, welches nur leiden muß, wenn Beamtenfrauen sich mit Wohnungen behelfen müssen, die einer deutschen Frau unwürdig sind. Hierdurch würde unser Ansehen nicht nur der weißen Bevölkerung gegenüber, sondern auch in den Augen der Eingeborenen empfindlich geschädigt." Circular by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all District Offices and Depots, 14.09.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 20.

[235] My estimate is based on an evaluation of the following sources and on the database I produced from the personnel files. Register of all staff members of the *Landespolizei*, 1.4.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2485, 61-82; Register of all staff members of the *Landespolizei*, 01.04.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2485, 119-140; Senior Civil Servant Blumhagen (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 17.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 9. Cf. Sven Schepp who observes for the year 1913 that about 50 per cent of the sergeants and about 70 per cent of the staff sergeants and senior staff sergeants were married. Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 105.

decreased again, for "married policemen hinder[ed] too much their deployment," and were thus less and less recruited.[236]

And not only did the "unworthy" conditions make marriage difficult. Prospective wives were also subjected to close scrutiny. Still in 1910, the Chief of Police crafted a telling decree to this effect, that I wish to quote at length:

> Much to my regret I have ascertained more and more cases in which policemen plan to enter marriages that are not compatible with their status. From the human perspective, one should not think too harshly about these failings [*Verirrungen*], which often originate in the absence, for months, of intercourse with the white woman, or in plenty of alcohol consumption [sentence struck out of the final draft; MM]. I am unable to keep a man, who is a keeper of the law, in the police force whose wife does not enjoy an impeccable reputation. […]
> If the reputation of the [German; M.M.] woman in question does not accord with the dignity of the police corps, and the policeman does not relinquish the engagement, he is to be dismissed without further ado [*rücksichtslos*], for he is no longer suitable for colonial service.
> The influence of a woman not befitting one's rank will make itself felt on the moral qualities of the husband and can only harm the individual and the collective. Also, it cannot be expected from married policemen and their wives to accept an inferior person into their closer acquaintance. […]
> The gain for the police force will be much greater if it dismisses proficient men who marry below their rank, rather than keeping only one policeman with an inferior wife in its circles.[237]

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[236] Senior Civil Servant Roebern (IdL) to District Office Swakopmund, 14.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2501, 4. "Bis auf weiteres muß […] unverheirateten Bewerbern der Vorzug gegeben werden." Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to Gouv. SWA, 24.10.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2502, 93.

[237] "Ich muß zu meinem Bedauern feststellen, daß die Fälle sich mehren, in denen Beamte der L.P. beabsichtigen Ehen einzugehen, die ihrer Stellung nicht entsprechen. Wenn man auch menschlich nicht zu scharf über diese Verirrungen denken darf, deren Anfang oft aus der monatelangen Entbehrung des Verkehrs mit der weißen Frau, oder aus reichlichem Alkoholgenuß herzuleiten ist. Ich bin nicht in der Lage einen Beamten, der als Wächter des Gesetzes dienen soll, in der L.P. zu belassen, dessen Frau sich nicht eines tadellosen Rufes erfreut. […] Entspricht der Ruf in dem die fragliche Frauensperson steht, nicht der Würde der Polizeibeamtenschaft und sieht der Polizeibeamte von einer ehelichen Verbindung nicht ab, so ist derselbe rücksichtslos zur Entlassung einzugeben, da derselbe zur weiteren Verwendung im Kolonialdienst ungeeignet ist. Die Einwirkung einer nicht standesgemäßen Frau wird auf die moralischen Eigenschaften des Ehemannes ihren Einfluß nicht verfehlen und kann dem Einzelnen wie der Gesammtheit [sic] nur schaden. Auch kann es den verheirateten Beamten und ihren Frauen nicht zugemuthet werden, daß sie eine minderwerthige Person in eine gewisse engere Gemeinschaft aufnehmen. […] Die L.P. wird einen großen Vorteil davon haben, wenn sie so ihre tüchtigsten Beamten, die nichtstandesgemäße Ehen eingehen entläßt, als wenn sie auch nur einen Beamten mit einer minderwertigen Frau in ihren Kreisen behält." Directive drafted by Chief of Police Bethe (IdL), signed by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices and Police Depots, 21.07.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 4.

Possibly, the Chief of Police was referring to prostitutes here. In any case, he was alluding to women suspected of promiscuous behavior. The lack of European women is mentioned, but had it been solely a question of race, Bethe would have made that clear. The directives to that effect were, at that point, fairly plain.[238] Thus, in addition to fears of racial mixing, the suspicion of female promiscuity that would tarnish the institution's reputation was taken seriously by police headquarters. In a way, the police leadership did not trust in its men's resilience. Their moral failing was caused by women. Sergeant Reichelt's wife, for instance, was considered the main culprit for *his* conniving tendencies.[239] The consequences would be catastrophic, the Chief of Police feared,

> on a lonely police station […] where, among several unmarried [men], sits one married official whose wife soon falls back into the habits of her former, not so blameless lifestyle.[240]

He thus kept women as far removed as possible from his men, even when that meant that he could not achieve the goal of a police force constituted of bourgeois husbands, and that he would lose good men.[241] As with the pictures I discussed in the last section, everyday

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[238] The initial draft of the general police regulations had an explicit passage which was later edited out: "Die Braut muss eine Nichteingeborene sein und sich eines tadellosen Rufes erfreuen." I suppose that the prohibition against interracial marriage for employees of the colonial state was understood to be so self-evident that it did not need special mention. First draft of *Dienstvorschrift* by Police Headquarters, Sept. 1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 11. On the fear of miscegenation and the political and legal debate over "race-mixing", see Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten*, 219-265; Laura Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 79-130.

[239] Staff evaluations by Magistrate Brill (District Office Windhuk), 05.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2492, 21.

[240] "Die üblen Folgen, die auf einer einsamen Pol. Station entstehen können, wo unter mehreren unverheirateten ein verheirateter Beamte sitzt, dessen Frau bald wieder in die Gewohnheiten ihres früheren, nicht einwandfreien Lebenswandels verfällt, liegen klar auf der Hand." Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to RKA, Berlin, 21.07.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2431, 16.

[241] "Es kann einer Beamtenschaft, die in jeder Beziehung das vollste Vertrauen der Bevölkerung sich erwerben und erhalten soll, nicht zugemuthet werden, minderwertige Elemente von Frauen bei sich aufzunehmen, und ich muß daran festhalten, daß ich lieber einem tüchtigen und bewährten Polizeibeamten

realities and identification references for policemen were conditioned by a tension between bourgeois aspirations, considerations of honor, and economic and other constraints, in this case, the lack of "respectable" German women. One could also speculate that, conceivably, a police force that formed an all male community was in many ways more appealing, for it was perceived as less disruptive, less challenging.

Regarding African police assistants, there is, as usual, less direct evidence for their family situations. They lived in close proximity to their German superiors, but not in the same building. Their families, if they had them, lived with them in the *Eingeborenenwerft*, the "natives quarter." The general notion seems to have been that the German administration let families stay together if possible. Pictures from the period (figure nr. 2) show African police assistants posing as proud patriarchs in front of their homes with their household members and belongings. African wives received food, but no pay, although it was expected that they should work (usually assisting their husbands with domestic labor).[242] Later on, this understanding was turned into a rule, and family members who were not contributing in some way or other to the German administrational economy were removed from the police stations' perimeter.[243] My impression is that, as a rule, African policemen sought to build families after having acquired enough wealth to sustain them. As I have alluded to before, founding a household might have been a motivation for joining the police, for it assured social standing and respectability. Given the much higher number of African women compared to European women living in the colonial realm, and the extent

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sein Dienstverhältnis kündige und ihn entlasse, wenn er von einer Verlobung mit einer fragwürdigen Frauensperson nicht lassen will, als daß ich der Beamtenschaft zumuthe, eine moralisch nicht einwandfreie Frau in ihre Reihen aufzunehmen." Ibid., 16-17.

[242] See the example of a domestic conflict because the African policeman's wife was supposedly not fulfilling her domestic duties. Report by Inspection Officer Hirschberg (Police Depot Kupferberg) to IdL, 01.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 85. Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 73.

[243] Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 07.06.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 173.

that police headquarters, and the colonial administration in general, were less concerned about regulating the sexual and moral behavior of African men, one can assume that African policemen were more likely to live with a wife or mistress than their German counterparts; that is, at least more likely to do so openly than their German counterparts. In relation to this, since African women must have been quite present, maybe even on remote outposts, it should not be underestimated how they themselves shaped everyday life at stations, whether they were in matrimonial, concubinary (both with African and German policemen), or no relationships at all.[244]

To sum up, all policemen – the African and the German alike – were supposed to and to some extent did embody ideals of family life and patriarchal masculinity. However, as I have already noted earlier, they were far from living a bourgeois life in the material sense. And all of them, the married and the single men alike, regularly went on long patrol rides in small units of usually two to four men. So, whether married or not, the policemen spent a large part of their time in homosocial groups roaming the wide spaces of the colonial territory. Indeed, their everyday resembled much more an earlier, pre-colonial form of social life, that of the all-men raiding party.[245] And as we shall see now, the bourgeois and family man identities were not the only masculinity concepts available to policemen.

Historian Birthe Kundrus distinguishes between two kinds of German colonial masculinity. A first, more traditional model was based on notions of homosocial comradeship and adventure; a second model relied on a more modern, liberal-nationalist, bourgeois concept of the heterosexual couple and the family. Kundrus calls the former kind

[244] I thank Dag Henrichson for pointing that out to me.
[245] As Marion Wallace notes with respect to the Nama-Oorlam *komandos*, "the term 'Oorlam' essentially indicated an economic and cultural identity, and also a deeply gendered one"; it referred to "a mounted group of men armed with guns." Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 51.

of masculinity "pioneer", the latter "head of family".[246] The policemen of the *Landespolizei* exhibited features of both of these kinds of masculinity. To speak in the terms used by R. W. Connell, who stressed the dynamism of gender as a social practice, the policemen were living two divergent "gender projects."[247] Depending on the situation, on their public, on the task at hand, they sought to achieve masculine honor by enacting either the one or the other, or something in between. Violence was performed in relation to the one or the other standard of manliness. Or, conversely, violent acts made them more the one or the other kind of man.

Likewise, as Iliffe stresses in his work on the history of African honor, notions of heroic and householder honor coexisted in African societies. They were linked to different stages in a man's life. Only a man who could provide for a family could be regarded as a fully grown man. But first, he had to have proven himself worthy through brave deeds. "Male honour," Iliffe notes,

> related strongly to age and notions of masculinity, distinguishing the heroic behaviour expected of the young warrior from the civic honour appropriate to the adult householder.[248]

When African men joined the police, passing over or accelerating important stages of growing into manhood, heroic and householder identifications merged together, similar to the oscillation between European adventurer and head of the family masculinities. Thus, both German and African policemen needed to reconcile young and courageous with mature and patriarchal male behavior in their everyday actions.

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[246] Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten,* 77-96, 283.
[247] R.W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1995), 72.
[248] Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 100.

In this regard, the spatial component mattered. Men had to adjust between the all-male environment of the patrol and the context of larger settlements which included women and all in all more people. Furthermore, there was a similar vacillation regarding age. In the case of African policemen, although primarily determined by the colonial discourse on the "childlike" nature of Africans, there are signs that some individual district administrators and police superiors esteemed Africans' seniority and experience in their local community. Magistrate Zastrow from District Office Grootfontein, for instance, observed that older, "seasoned" policemen's influence among their community "cannot be overestimated."[249] In the case of German policemen, police headquarter's take on age was equally ambivalent. These men were supposed to be young, but old. At first, the *Landespolizei* recruited men not older than 30. But soon, men above the age of 27 were no longer wanted.[250] Older men would not be able to "cope with the physical strains" of the colonial theatre, police headquarters claimed.[251] Nevertheless, young men would not be up to the "difficult demands of a certain independence and inner strength of character," the Colonial Office in Berlin declared.[252] Policemen were required to be young and physically fit, yet, they were expected to bring a certain experience and sophistication one could only have acquired after a certain age.

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[249] Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to Gouv. SWA, 16.06.1913, NAN, ZBU 2365, VIIm, 21. Quoted in Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 76.
[250] For the age limit of 30, see Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to RKA, Berlin, 25.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2417, 1-3. For the age limit of 27, see Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 27.02.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2417, 30.
[251] Senior Civil Servant Hollaender (IdL) to RKA, Berlin, 13.03.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2417, 29. See also Senior Civil Servant Hollaender (IdL) to Gouv. SWA, 12.07.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2417, 34.
[252] Interestingly, maturity would come through military training. "Die […] im jugendlichen Alter stehenden Leute würden den schweren Anforderungen des eine gewisse Selbständigkeit und innere Charakterfestigkeit verlangenden Polizeidienstes nicht gewachsen sein. Wenn schon für den Polizeidienst in der Heimat eine längere aktive Militärdienstzeit verlangt wird, so muß für die aus der Heimat in die Kolonien entsandten Polizeibeamten umsomehr daran festgehalten werden, als sie in ihnen fremde schwierige Verhältnisse kommen." State Secretary Lindequist (RKA) to Gouv. SWA, 27.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2502, 79-80.

A paternal, caring kind of violent masculinity pervaded the characterization of what a good policeman was in general. For even though he was primarily supposed to be a soldier, he strove for something more: qualities that would dignify him as a member of a modern, rational state, not a traditional, atavistic, military institution. His honor was founded on bourgeois, Christian values of masculinity like sober-mindedness, restraint, and temperance. Honor, in this context, was fulfilled through duty and service. Police Sergeant Johannes Boll, for instance, "showed great calm and sensitivity [*Gefühl*] in his dealings with the public."[253] And Sergeant Josef Alefelder was described as having "composed and humble" manners.[254] Commendations of individual policemen stressed above all their calm and self-possessed conduct in difficult situations. Especially in the field, violence was to be wielded in a controlled and dispassionate manner.[255] Strong emotions and urges were to be repressed. Senior Staff Sergeant Otto Donicht's leadership of a patrol, for example, was praised as an altogether "thoughtful" [*umsichtig*] enterprise.[256] On the patrol in question, he had raided several settlements, forcefully captured men, women, and children, and most likely burnt down their dwellings and belongings. His interrogation techniques had included depriving people of water and had resulted in the death of one man.[257] These actions, though brutal, were understood as legitimate because they were undertaken in a spirit of rational and conscientious duty. The language used in patrol reports did not draw the picture of heroic, courageous, or belligerent men. "Prudent," "attentive," or

[253] Evaluation of Sgt. Boll by Magistrate Todt (District Office Windhuk), 05.01.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ /2805, 67.
[254] Evaluation of Sgt. Alefelder by Magistrate Blumhagen (District Office Swakopmund), 09.01.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2793, 25.
[255] In the metropole, due to public and political pressure, there was a similar call for more delicate, more composed methods of policing. Reinke, "Armed As If For War," 68.
[256] "Sehr guter Bericht und umsichtige Leitung." Marginal note by Chief of police Bethe on patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Otto Donicht, (District Office Karibib), 19.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 187.
[257] Patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Otto Donicht, (District Office Karibib), 19.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 187-190.

"conscientious": those were the terms with which superiors described subalterns, with which lower-rank policemen described their colleagues, even their African associates.[258] And those were the descriptors of their actions as well, including violent acts like the ones committed during Constable Donicht's patrol.[259]

But, precisely due to the many caring, protective, and welfare qualities of police work, the men of the police were at times depicted as effeminate or weak. Sergeant Lippke, for instance, was accused of passivity and yelled at by a farm steward: "You're too limp for the job, you're too limp!"[260] The local newspapers were filled with articles deploring the loss of the military troops which were being disbanded after the war, complaining about the impotence of the *Landespolizei* that had been deployed to replace them.[261] It is in this context, then, that violent practices had an important function in thwarting emasculating, enfeebling images and in constructing tough, fearless, relentless, pioneer-type masculinities instead. Although these practices are less documented, archival evidence nevertheless allows us to assume that many policemen meted out "petty" violence wherever they went. The slap in the face, the kick in the rear, the seizing and dragging of colonial subjects constantly occur in the sources. I will elaborate on these in the following chapters. At this point it suffices to recognize their dynamic in the process of building masculine identities. Moreover, African women were recurrently regarded as prey and as

[258] Examples for 'prudent': report on Sgt. Link by Inspection Officer Hollaender to District Office Gobabis, 10.2.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 231; 'attentive' and 'cautious': patrol report by Senior Staff Sergeant Eggersglüß, (Police Station Nonidass), 21.01.1912, 2710, 204; 'conscientious': qualification report for Sgt. Otto Müller by Distrikt Office Okahandja, 15.12.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 3224, 70.
[259] I will come back to this telling contrast – that is, the way in which very violent actions were considered consonant with being calm and considered – when I discuss patrol practices in chapter 3.
[260] "Sie sind zu schlapp dazu, sie sind zu schlapp!" Official complaint against farmer Potthast by Sgt, Bruno Lippke (Police Station Gurumanas), 24.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2466, 42.
[261] See, for instance, "Die wehrlose Polizei," *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, 25.08.1909; "Polizei und Polizeitruppe in Deutsch-Südwest," *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, 19.04.1913.

property, as the numerous quarrels between German policemen over who got to "keep" or to "have" some woman attest.[262] Cases of physical fights between policemen themselves were also not rare.[263] These could operate as violent rituals with which the men of the *Landespolizei* proved and reaffirmed a certain kind of boisterous, adventurous, comradely manliness. All these behaviors were accepted as long as they did not undermine the appearance of cohesion, loyalty, and comradeship, and thus did not harm the honor of the institution.[264]

Finally, German policemen also built their masculinity on the back of their African subordinates, not rarely through paternally chastising them. They declared that African men were childlike, that they could never reach paternal maturity. German policemen practiced the same kind of "petty" violence towards their African subalterns that I describe above. Within the collective identity of wielding violence together, racial hierarchy was preserved. German policemen had larger horses, more powerful weapons, and different tasks of violence. Consequently, these acts did not only foster a certain kind of masculinity, but also a racial identity, namely white supremacy.

Thus, the construction of African masculinities was overshadowed by racist ideology. As historian Stefanie Michels notes, Africans' own "patronage systems and masculinity concepts […] contradicted the idea of clear 'racial hierarchies'."[265] German colonial

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[262] For instance, confidential report re: Sgt. Höning versus Sgt. Geffke by acting Magistrate Ferse (District Office Bethanien), 29.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2466, 18-22, 24-26; or report re: Constable Fischer by Sgt. Wilhelm Reddig (Police Station Naukluft), 10.01.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2416, 21-22.
[263] For instance, reprimand of Sgt. Melzer who had caused a brawl in a bar. Report by Magistrate Runck (District Office Warmbad), 28.07.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, 24.
[264] When a fight was considered to have harmed the police force's reputation, it could however result in dismissal. Cf. Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager to Sgt. Johann Sterzenbach (Police Station Choantsas), 18.12.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 3483, 61.
[265] Stefanie Michels, Schwarze *deutsche Kolonialsoldaten: Mehrdeutige Repräsentationsräume und früher Kosmopolitismus in Afrika* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009), 229.

representations "de-masculinized" and anonymized African men. They aimed at excluding the possibility of African men "representing themselves as the head of households, often including several women, many children, and servants."[266] However, practices of everyday violence might have operated slightly differently than the hegemonic representations Michels describes. As a cultural practice they might have produced moments in which a "mutual recognition of what it meant to be a man" was possible across the color-bar while still upholding the racial hierarchy.[267] Working on violent encounters between black and white miners in South Africa, historian Keith Breckenridge observes that

> systematic violence - whether applied by an over-enthusiastic black supervisor or a paternalistic white boss - gave a tangible meaning to race in the mines, and perhaps in the wider society. On the other side of this grim coin, the prevalence of violence encouraged a strange form of mutual recognition between white and black workers. The banality of violence in the daily operations of mining, and the simple, terrifying, dangers of the mine itself placed a premium on individual personal strength for all workers, but particularly for senior workers [...]. The physical interdependence between the most senior workers and their African assistants encouraged a close masculine bond. In these relationships white workers celebrated African masculinity as physical strength and courage. These are the same qualities that black workers celebrated in their own accounts of retaliation. The point here is that racist violence formed a piece of a larger masculine ethic that valorised interpersonal violence underground. While this shared idea of manliness prompted some white and black workers to recognise each other as men, it also served to reproduce the endless violence of mine work.[268]

Although I do not have the evidence Breckenridge can present, it is quite plausible that a similar dynamic existed among German and African policemen in Southwest Africa. There too, the daily challenges and dangers of policing led policemen to put great value on physical strength and the ability to wield violence. And there too their violent trade might

[266] Ibid.
[267] Keith Breckenridge, "The Allure of Violence: Men, Race and Masculinity on the South African Goldmines, 1900-1950," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24,4 (1998):689.
[268] Ibid., 693.

have brought both African and German policemen to valorize each other's masculinities – without undermining the racial order.

Social and cultural backgrounds, class, gender, race, the policemen's identities as "new" and "old" men, as adventurers and paterfamilias, as Herero, Nama, Baster or Prussian, Bavarian, Hessian, all informed their professional identities. But their identities also grew out of their specific experiences in the colony: out of their interactions with one another and with the policed population, out of the mixed-race composition of the force, and, in particular, out of their emerging organizational and professional culture.[269] This culture was defined by two facets – that of the soldier, and that of the bureaucrat. Policemen were expected to have a military *habitus*, and they very often sustained a military mindset. They were equally expected to be effective administrators, and they understood many of their action within the logic of bureaucratic procedure. The second chapter addresses now those crucial features.

[269] Historian Susanne Kuß makes a similar argument with respect to the German colonial military, stressing the importance of the conditions on site, in the "theater of war," for the formation of identities and practices. Kuß, *Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen*.

CHAPTER TWO

Organizational and Professional Identities

Above all, the policemen of the *Landespolizei* were soldiers and bureaucrats at once, or "bureaucrat-soldiers" as one historian of the Prussian Police has called them.[270] This hybrid identification sprang from the merging of military careers with bureaucratic assignments. German policemen had typically lived a martial identity for quite a while before their entry into the police force, and this experience continued to have a significant effect on how policemen perceived themselves and their work. The clerical side of identity formation was often new to them, but it was nevertheless consequential, for it set policemen apart from their military counterparts. Likewise, two main paths generally led African policemen to enter the police: either via the *Schutztruppe* or, as I already mentioned, via a missionary school. It is not unlikely that some of the men might have gone through both institutions before ending up in the police.[271] What is more, missionary schooling resembled in many respects military training: the young African men were subjected (as had been German policemen in their home country schools) to a rigorous disciplinary regime which oftentimes inculcated language and scribal skills by means of military drill.[272] How military

[270] Herbert Reinke, "'Armed As If For War': The State, the Military and the Professionalisation of the Prussian Police in Imperial Germany" in *Policing Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940*, ed. by Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 55.
[271] Zollmann seems to believe that African policemen did *not* come primarily from the military but rather from missionary schools. I believe that there is no certain way to know, but that the *Schutztruppe* must have been at least as influential as the missions, if not even more so. Cf. Jakob Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen: Die Kolonialpolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1915* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 70-71.
[272] On schooling in the Kaiserreich, see Hellmut Becker and Gerhard Kluchert, *Die Bildung der Nation: Schule, Gesellschaft und Politik vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1993), 28-48. On the

and bureaucratic characteristics came together in a complex, at times ambivalent, way to form German and African policemen's professional identities shall be addressed in this chapter.

As I already evoke in chapter one, a "game of honor" (Bourdieu) was, in many respects, the glue that held the two different strands of police identity together in the everyday.[273] Within the contingencies of this everyday, there were many situations that might challenge the honor of the policeman. But his violent acts always implicated his honor in a way that demanded adjudication by word and deed. The crucial conclusion of this chapter is that, for these men, in order for violence to be honorable, it had to be bureaucratically correct.

Moreover, the honor of the individual policeman and of the colonial state as a whole were always intertwined and reciprocal. The interplay between violent and bureaucratic practices in the service of individual and state honor was confusing, unstable, and piecemeal. But it contributed to the emergence of the effective and powerful, though improvised, colonial state that I wish to describe in this dissertation. Unlike their superiors, the foot soldiers of the German colonial state sought in many ways to create an *Ehrenstaat* more than a *Rechtsstaat*. Thus, although formulated in terms of law, the moral economy that gave order to the new colonial society was to a certain extent one of competing social status.

1 Soldier Identities

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military elements in colonial education and discipline, see Timothy Mitchell, "An Appearance of Order," in *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 63-94, esp. 72-82.

[273] "Game of honor": Pierre Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society," in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. by John Peristiany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 197.

In 1910, Chief of Police Bethe stated that "the *Landespolizei* stands or falls with its military organization."[274] Bethe, like his predecessor Heydebreck and others of the head staff, repeatedly stressed how important the "military spirit" of their policemen was.[275] Within their understanding, the police was first and foremost a military institution. As a consequence, policemen were almost exclusively recruited from the military. Regarding the African police members, recruiters (as well as the recruits themselves, as we shall see) also exhibited a military or warrior imprint. With the exception of some few auxiliary policemen, it was mandatory for the German men who wished to enter the force to have served at least six years and reached the rank of an NCO.[276] The vast majority of these men had fought in the genocidal war against the Herero and the Nama (1904-1907). Indeed, for many of the German policemen, the war had been the reason to venture out into the colony. I will come back to the impact of the war on both African and German police identities shortly.

The NCO Type

[274] Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein), 09.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 58.
[275] The term "militärischer Geist" figured initially in a draft of the police's main instruction manual, "a term which every soldier is familiar with," Chief of Police Heydebreck claimed. Marginal note by Heydebreck on letter by Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to IdL, 01.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page number.
[276] *Dienstvorschrift*, 16. However, difficulties in finding enough suitable men led the colonial administration to repeatedly reconsider whether it should also accept candidates who had only served five years. Governor v. Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to *Schutztruppe* Command, Windhuk, 21.09.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2497, 28. Auxiliary policemen, the so-called *'Zivilpolizisten'* or just '*Polizisten'* whom I call "constables," were employed with or without contract and paid daily or monthly. They had no civil servant status, and although they did not have to have served six years, they too were often former military men – mostly with the rank of trooper or private. Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to *Schutztruppe* Command, Windhuk, 12.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2418, 2; Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all Police Depots, 17.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2418, 4-5.

In the metropole, recruitment practices for police forces were similar to the ones implemented in the colony. There too, most policemen were formerly military.[277] We can therefore learn much about *Landespolizei* identities if we look at their peers in the motherland. There, an arrangement, codified in 1874, guaranteed that NCOs would find employment in the civil administration after they had served their term of service.[278] With few other skills than the ones learned in the armed forces, to many men a career in the police or gendarmerie (or sometimes also as prison guards, night watchmen, and similar professions in the security sector) seemed the only possible option. A caricature published in the *Vorwärts* in 1892 captures quite strikingly how the lives of many of these men must have unfolded:

> Born in Farther Pomerania, went to village school, pulled beets, became a soldier, signed up for the twelve-year service, was promoted to NCO, learned a little writing and sums, drilled recruits, was promoted to sergeant, drilled recruits, staff sergeant, still drilled recruits, got his guaranteed spot in the civil service, and, finally, became a policeman.[279]

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[277] Thomas Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik: Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 1900 bis 1914* (Bonn: Dietz, 1995), 75; Reinke, "'Armed As If For War'," 59; Robert Harnischmacher and Arved Semerak, *Deutsche Polizeigeschichte: Eine allgemeine Einführung in die Grundlagen* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1986), 67. However, scholars debate to what extent these standards could be upheld. Cf. Richard J. Evans, "Polizei, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1700-1933," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22, 4 (1996): 622; Ralph Jessen, "Polizei im Kaiserreich – Tendenzen und Grenzen der Demilitarisierung und Professionalisierung," in *Die Polizei der Gesellschaft: Zur Soziologie der Inneren Sicherheit*, ed. by Hans-Jürgen Lange (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003), 21.

[278] NCOs were entitled to the so-called *'Zivilversorgungsschein'* after a twelve-year commitment with good standing. Manfred Messerschmidt, "Die preußische Armee," in *Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648–1939. Vol. IV.2: Militärgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert 1814–1890. Strukturen und Organisation*. Edited by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (München: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1976), 201; Wilhelm Deist, "Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1914" in *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft: Studien zur preußisch-deutschen Militärgeschichte* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 32; Ralf Pröve, *Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert* (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006), 43.

[279] "In Hinterpommern geboren, Dorfschule besucht, Rüben gezogen, Soldat geworden, kapituliert, zum Unteroffizier avanciert, Schreiben und knapp Rechnen gelernt, Rekruten dressiert, Sergeant geworden, Rekruten dressiert, Vize-Feldwebel, immer noch Rekruten dressiert, Zivilversorgungsschein und schließlich Polizeibeamter." *Vorwärts,* 04.06.1892, quoted on the website of the Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei: http://www.dhpol.de/de/hochschule/Ausstellung/Austellungsseiten/index.php?p=6,0 (accessed on 30.01.2012). For *"kapitulieren*" and *"Zivilversorgungsschein,"* see next footnote.

Note the different components of police identity formations evoked in the quote: the rural background I already addressed in the first part of this chapter; the low but nonetheless existent educational level which I have also already touched upon in this chapter; and, finally, the military path, especially the lengthy and repetitive character of that military existence which is the object of inquiry in the current section of this chapter.

The quoted passage illustrates quite clearly that the average German policeman was not just a discharged soldier, but a very specific type: the long-serving NCO. What characterized the NCO most was his role as a drill sergeant. Enlisted usually for a minimum period of twelve years of service, he instructed men day in, day out.[280] This too is well depicted in the *Vorwärts* quote. But maybe even more important than his role as an instructor, the NCO type was a man who *served*.

> Whoever would become an upright, virtuous NCO, who would act according to the heart of our highest Commander-in-Chief and to the pleasure of his superiors, he must immerse himself, the longer the better, in his professional and class duties [*Berufs- und Standespflichten*] so that he is completely filled by them. Only in this way can he become a worthy member of the corps of non-commissioned officers and live up to his difficult task: to form the soldiers entrusted to him into virtuous, duty- and honor-loving men.[281]

Thus read the introductory sentences from a 1909 manual for NCOs. According to the rationale expressed here, the NCO's primary duty was to serve his superiors (even to

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[280] There were two ways to become an NCO: training in specific NCO-schools, or the system of *'Kapitulation.'* The *'Kapitulanten'*-system, which in the early 1900s became the predominant NCO career-path, was a procedure by which the aspirant (often a common soldier in good standing) signed up for twelve years of duty. Since 1874, these NCOs were promised a transfer into civil service after the twelve years - the so-called *Zivilversorgung* mentioned above. Messerschmidt, "Die preußische Armee," 201; Deist, "Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1914," 32.

[281] "Wer ein rechtschaffender, tüchtiger Unteroffizier werden will, so recht nach dem Herzen unseres Allerhöchsten Kriegsherrn und zur Freude seiner Vorgesetzten, der muß sich je länger um so mehr in seine Berufs- und Standespflichten vertiefen, damit er von ihnen durch und durch erfüllt werde. Nur so kann er ein würdiges Mitglied des Unteroffizierkorps werden und seiner schweren Aufgabe, die ihm anvertrauten Soldaten zu tüchtigen, pflicht- und ehrliebenden Männern herauszubilden, gerecht werden." Spohn, *Berufs- und Standespflichten der Unteroffiziere* (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1909), 3.

please them), and to know and accept his assigned place in the social order. This duty stood in first place. It was the necessary condition for his actual task, namely to train the troops. Before being able to deal with and be an example for those beneath him, he needed to be absolutely aware of and compliant with those who were above him. Accordingly, his duty included acting according to the "heart" of the emperor. He was to be the epitome of a loyal subject. Given their long terms of service in the military and the likelihood of continuing that service in the civil sector, (ex-)NCOs had ample time to "prove" their loyalty. Or rather, their career paths condemned them to a life of servitude and loyalty. Their social and political identity was strongly shaped by the idea of a lifetime of service to the state and its monarch. In the romanticizing words of a monographer, "for them the notion of service [*Dienen*] meant the absolute fulfillment of a self-imposed task."[282] The quote captures well the way in which the NCO persona was thus also built on notions of self-sacrifice and devotion.[283]

Ideological incentives like these were crucial to NCOs, for their relatively low pay and the poor conditions of their service were not conducive to creating the social prestige to which NCOs were supposed to feel entitled and which was supposed to set them apart from the lower classes.[284] Nor was education much valued: the shorter a candidate's school

[282] "Für sie bedeutete der Begriff Dienen die volle Erfüllung einer selbstgewählten Aufgabe." Werner Lahne, *Unteroffiziere. Gestern – heute – morgen* (Herford-Bonn: Verlag Offene Worte, 1974), 318.
[283] Interestingly, this devotion was exclusively directed towards higher authority; service for the community was not included in the notion. In that sense, service was closely related to the notion of loyalty. On specifically German notions of service and loyalty, see Nikolaus Buschmann and Karl Borromäus Murr "'Treue' als Forschungskonzept? Begriffliche und methodische Sondierungen," in *Treue: Politische Loyalität und militärische Gefolgschaft in der Moderne*, ed. by Nikolaus Buschmann and Karl Borromäus Murr (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2008), 18.
[284] An NCO's pay around 1900 corresponded barely with that of a day laborer in the western provinces of Imperial Germany. Messerschmidt, "Die preußische Armee," 193.

education, the higher his chances of being accepted.[285] What is more, there were no career paths that rose above the NCO rank. Except within technological units, not one single NCO was made officer in the decades before World War I in the Prussian-German military.[286] Historian Wilhelm Deist has therefore rightly observed that their "social prestige was attractive only to certain petty bourgeois strata."[287] They were the necessary complement for the creation of a well-defined and elevated officer *Stand*. Historian Detlef Bald comments on the deep divisions internal and external to the military:

> The rejection of the NCOs from the officer corps paralleled the social distance from other classes that the high bourgeoisie had established. This tension within the military was carried over into society through the civil employment of NCOs who became civil servants, who in the public administration embodied discipline, orderliness, and reliability. The 'attitude of absolute obedience' of the former NCOs increasingly came into conflict with the bourgeois circles that were turning against the authoritarian state. The Prussian-German NCO […] became the negative symbolic figure of the German military.[288]

The NCOs' uneasy, conflicted position between officer caste and draftees also becomes evident if we look at their use of physical force. The many instances of abuse against troops in their care, discussed at length in the press, made NCOs appear as cruel oppressors or brutish boors, depending on the angle from which they were observed. Common soldiers feared and loathed them for their ruthless discipline, and officers despised them for their participation in necessary but "dirty" tasks. Violent behavior – unauthorized but perceived

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[285] See Lahne, *Unteroffiziere,* 281; Bald, *Vom Kaiserheer zur Bundeswehr,* 73. My own database.
[286] Bald, *Vom Kaiserheer zur Bundeswehr,* 68-69.
[287] Deist, "Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1914," 32.
[288] "Die Ablehnung der Unteroffiziere im preußischen Offizierkorps entsprach der sozialen Distanz, die das höhere Bürgertum gegenüber den übrigen Bevölkerungsschichten aufgerichtet hatte. Dieses Spannungsverhältnis innerhalb des Militärs wurde durch die zivile Verwendung des beamteten Unteroffiziers, der in der öffentlichen Verwaltung Disziplin, Ordnungsliebe und Zuverlässigkeit verkörperte, in die Gesellschaft übertragen. Die 'dem unbedingten Gehorsam verpflichtete Haltung' der ehemaligen Unteroffiziere geriet zunehmend in Konflikt mit den gegen den Obrigkeitsstaat sich wendenden Bürgerkreisen. Der preußisch-deutsche Unteroffizier wurde – auch so – zur negativen Symbolfigur des deutschen Militärs." Ibid., 68.

by some as a necessary evil for the greater good of forming hardened defenders of the nation – was thus an integral part of who NCOs were expected and understood to be.[289]

In a society in which the military as a whole was held in the highest regard, NCOs did nevertheless enjoy a certain renown, as did all men in uniform. Many historians have by now shown how the military increasingly gained preeminence in the *Kaiserreich* era, and how society in Imperial Germany was permeated by a "double-militarism," that is by an official and a populist drive for militarily organizing society and politics.[290] And Ute Frevert has compellingly demonstrated that "the army steadily evolved into an extremely influential and valued instance of socialisation."[291] The mentality of militarism thus pervaded all social levels and almost all aspects of life. Most German men's identities were saturated with the military spirit, whether it came from their education, their nationalist sentiment, or their notion of masculinity.[292]

And so, inevitably, the "school of the nation," as the military was called, had put its mark on the men who would become policemen – in the motherland as well as abroad in the colony. The tradition of recruiting policemen from the military existed since the creation of police institutions in German states.[293] This was not an exclusively German model. Most

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[289] For an account of abuse in the military in Imperial Germany, see Hartmut Wiedner, "Soldatenmißhandlungen im Wilhelminischen Kaiserreich (1890–1914)," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 22 (1982): 159-199.

[290] Stig Förster, *Der doppelte Militarismus: die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik zwischen Status-quo-Sicherung und Aggression, 1890-1913* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1985). See also Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 103-109; Thomas Rohkrämer, *Der Militarismus der "kleinen Leute". Die Kriegervereine im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1914* (München: R. Oldenburg, 1990).

[291] Ute Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 149.

[292] On militarism and "patriarchal-military *habitus*" in the German police, see Alf Lüdtke, *'Gemeinwohl', Polizei und 'Festungspraxis'. Staatliche Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preußen, 1815-1850* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 323-325, and Lindenberger, *Straßenpolitik*, 68-72.

[293] Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, introduction to *Policing Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940*, ed. by Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (New York: Greenwood Press,

continental European countries – contrary to Anglo-American traditions – governed and regulated their populations with militarized or (para-)military police forces in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[294]

To sum up, we have to picture the German policemen of the *Landespolizei* as specimens of the NCO type I have tried to describe here: long-serving military men whose assigned role within the institution and within society was overdetermined by notions of dutiful subservience, whose everyday practice however had mainly consisted in commanding and (violently) disciplining others. Their place in the military was a liminal (and uncomfortable) one: neither simple soldier nor officer, neither lower-class nor bourgeois. However, as bearers of uniforms they held a prominent and privileged position and were used to ordering people around in an Imperial German society marked by an *Untertan* mentality.[295]

The Warrior Hero and the Bambuse

The African policemen also belonged to a martial type, but one with importantly different contours. As I already alluded to in the first part of this chapter, all the Southwest African societies from which members of the *Landespolizei* came valorized martial forms in

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1991), vii-ix; Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4; Albrecht Funk, *Polizei und Rechtsstaat: Die Entwicklung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols in Preussen 1848-1918* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1986), 25-27.

[294] France did not even have a civil police until 1907, and then only for limited fields of operation like political police. Jean-Marc Berlière, "The Professionalisation of the Police Under the Third Republic in France, 1875-1914," in *Policing Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940*, ed. by Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 36-54. See also Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le monde des polices en France: XIXe-XXe siècles* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1996); Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[295] On the deep-seated mentality of "Autoritätshörigkeit" and "Untertanengeist," see the brilliant portrait of Imperial German society by Heinrich Mann, *Der Untertan* (Leipzig, 1918).

one way or another. Fighting for and defending the few resources available was essential in their economies. Henrichsen describes nineteenth-century Herero and Damara communities as "gun-owner societies."[296] To sustain their lives, they – as well as the Nama and the Baster – relied on the military institution of the *komando*.[297] Historian Nigel Penn explains the development of *komando* culture on the frontier of the Cape colony in the late eighteenth century with the increased competition for natural resources:

> Without the ability to appropriate more land, water and grazing for the increasing flocks and herds of its members, a pastoralist society is doomed to stagnation or decline. Without the means to protect livestock against predators, both human and animal, there could be no increase in the first place. At its most simple level, therefore, the commando was the military institution of a pastoralist society.[298]

Komandos were relatively small, armed and mounted parties of men, a form of organization well suited to hunting, raiding, and trading. Scholars have shown that Nama, Herero, and Basters varied in their adaptation of the *komando* system.[299] But they all generated forms of warrior identifications with it. Dissimilar to the German ideal NCO and his valorization of discipline and obedience, this warrior hero was a man who could expertly handle his rifle while on horseback, who could track, reconnoiter, prey, and whose courage was measured by his cunning and assertiveness in skirmishes and other encounters with man or

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[296] Dag Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag im vorkolonialen Zentralnamibia. Das Herero- und Damaraland im 19. Jahrhundert* (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien 2011), 259.
[297] On Baster *komandos*, Maximilian Bayer, *The Rehoboth Baster Nation of Namibia*, ed. by Peter Carstens (Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien, 1984), 29; on Nama *komandos*, Brigitte Lau, "Conflict and Power in Nineteenth-Century Namibia," *Journal of African History* 27 (1986): 29-39.
[298] Nigel Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 108.
[299] On the differences between the various African groups, see Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 260, and Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 111.

animal.[300] Thus, the increased presence of firearms and horses redefined ideals of African soldiery.[301] Besides other weapons, firearms were now included in male rituals such as the Herero *ozombimbi* rituals, those victory dances or parades of armed hunter or combatant groups which celebrated and mobilized men as heroes.[302] Display and symbolic practices were crucial, as Iliffe observes with respect to the example of Zulu warrior ideals:

> The heroic ethos […] stressed physical strength and beauty, whether displayed in the near-nakedness of daily life or the elaboration of military costume and personal adornment carefully graded by age and rank. Dance was a further means of display, replacing military drill and demonstrating athleticism, discipline, and solidarity.[303]

The introduction of rifles had a deep social and spiritual impact on male subjectivity. There is evidence, that Herero men, for instance, had awakening experiences during battles against Nama-Oorlam groups when using their newly acquired weapons.[304]

Moreover, *komando* units fostered forms of authority and power that were not reliant on kinship. For "the power of the commando system […] far exceeded the potentials of a system based solely on kinship."[305] Some of the male relationships and identities that evolved within these warrior groups were characterized by homosocial, non-kin

[300] For a while this ideal was even cherished by some German colonial officials. Before the war, in the summer of 1903, the German authorities asked Nama *kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi to put together a police *komando* of twelve Nama men to hunt down a presumed thief. The German colonial administrators particularly admired the independent, guerrilla-like character of this auxiliary police force. Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 64-68.
[301] On firearms as important markers of male identity in increasingly militarized African societies, see Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 147.
[302] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 257. According to Henrichsen, rifles were also used in other religious rituals like cleansing or rain summoning/preventing rituals. Ibid., 258-259.
[303] Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, 142-143.
[304] Jakob Irle, *Die Herero. Ein Beitrag Zur Landes-, Volks- & Missionskunde* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1906), 181f. See also Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 258.
[305] Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 110.

interactions. Again, the Herero example is well researched.[306] Among Herero, the non-kin male bonds were called *epanga* [otjiherero: friendship]. Within the *omapanga* relationship [otjiherero: allies, friends] cattle were exchanged and sometimes wives were shared to strengthen the male fellowship.[307] They were thus another form of organizing cattle redistribution, sex, and power. And they cultivated male warrior identities which emphasized companionship.

Another form of militarized identity which evolved towards the end of the nineteenth century, but particularly thrived during late German and eventually South African colonial rule were soldiering groups, the so-called *oturupa*.[308] In the *oturupa*, African men re-enacted, or "played" German military culture. Anthropologist Larissa Förster observes that these troop performances were "not simply an imitation, but also a symbolic usurpation, a parodic commentary and counter-narrative."[309] Scholars convincingly argue that this form of social organization were "embodied opposition," and a form of "mastery through mime."[310] It provided status to its members and was a means of asserting or reaffirming one's warrior masculinity and the honor denied by local and colonial elites. By participating in those groups younger men – especially those with access to weapons, but with no wealth in livestock or kinship – rebelled against both older pre-colonial elites with

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[306] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 228-231. But see also Lau, "Conflict and Power in Nineteenth-Century Namibia."
[307] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 229-230.
[308] Dag Henrichsen, "Ozombambuse and Ovasolondate: Everyday Military Life and African Service Personnel in German South West Africa," in *Hues Between Black and White: Historical Photography from Colonial Namibia, 1860s to 1915*, ed. by Wolfram Hartmann (Windhoek: Out of Africa Publishers, 2004), 161-184; Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1907* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999), 160-163; Wolfgang Werner, "'Playing Soldiers': The Truppenspieler Movement among the Herero of Namibia, 1915 to ca. 1945," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 16, 3 (1990): 476-502.
[309] Larissa Förster, *Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften: Wie Deutsche und Herero in Namibia des Kriegs von 1904 gedenken* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2010), 250.
[310] Cf. Paul Stoller, *Embodying Colonial Memories: Spirit Possession, Power, and the Hauka in West Africa* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 90.

their "traditional" *komando* structures, and against those colonial authorities who had taken over the roles of "chiefs" or *"kapteins*", that is German missionaries and military commanders.[311] Referring to the 1890s, missionary Jakob Irle recalled the soldiering practices of three different groups of young African men, who identified themselves with different colors:

> A spirit of disobedience and insolence against the elders and the missionaries arose among the male youth of all stations. Playing soldiers began. [...] We had now not only White and Black Boys [Oorlam and Nama groups; M.M.], but also the Red Boys [Herero group; M.M.], who developed to a dangerous element. It was as if a spirit of rebellion moved with these red bands among the youth. There was drilling, swearing, boozing and aping the German soldiers.[312]

On the other hand, the self-organization of young African men as soldiers, or as soldier-likes, resulted from as well as furthered their close insertion into the German colonial web. What is more, a not negligible number of African men, did in fact enter the military as auxiliary or "native" soldiers. Stefanie Michels estimates that, just before the war, about 80-100 Nama, 200 Baster, and 130 Damara/Herero served as soldiers for the German military.[313] Thus, whether it sprang from usurping imitation or actual employment, their warrior identity was marked by the experience of living in proximity to the *Schutztruppe*. As Henrichsen points out,

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[311] Henrichsen, *Herrschaft und Alltag*, 294. Stefanie Michels, Schwarze *deutsche Kolonialsoldaten: Mehrdeutige Repräsentationsräume und früher Kosmopolitismus in Afrika* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009), 115. On its later function of providing unity and mutual support under South African rule, see Werner, "Playing Soldiers."
[312] Irle, *Die Herero*, 299. Cited in Deborah Durham, "Passports and Persons. The Insurrection of Subjugated Knowledges in Southern Africa," in *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and the Political Imagination*, ed. by Clifton Crais (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003), 160.
[313] Michels, Schwarze *deutsche Kolonialsoldaten*, 108. See also Morlang, *Askari und Fitafita*, 64-66.

> Whatever the immediate reasons may have been for the attraction the colonial military had for these African boys and youths, the fact remains that until 1904 large numbers of youths and men in central Namibia received military training in the German forces, or were at least able to experience an everyday military reality.[314]

And what mattered most of all to the German army were exercises and discipline. Hence, Southwestern African identification as warrior hero had two distinct but intertwined features: it drew from *komando* culture and from German drill culture alike.[315]

Finally, racial preconceptions about martial identities of different groups of colonized imposed onto African men by colonizers – the 'martial races' ideology so prominent in British colonial planning – existed in the German colonial context but were not decisive for recruitment policy.[316] In 1909 the farmer association of Grootfontein formulated a petition requesting that, instead of using African, especially Herero, policemen, the *Landespolizei* should exclusively recruit Basters, thus making the force a degree whiter, so to speak.[317] Police headquarters did, as a matter of fact, experiment for a while with a "martial race" logic, with the idea that a lighter race might be more capable and independent, and conveniently would still cost less than German personnel.[318] Yet ultimately, Magistrate Vietsch who was in charge of the trial in Rehoboth concluded that Baster policemen were too invested in loyalty to their own racialized group than to the German colonial state. Their skin color was seen as a corrupting rather than a beneficial factor for employment.

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[314] Henrichsen, "Ozombambuse and Ovasolondate," 168.
[315] Michelle Moyd's study of African soldiers in the German colonial service gives a much more sophisticated answer to the question of why military service in a colonial army could have been appealing to African men. Michelle Moyd, "Becoming Askari: African Soldiers and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa, 1850-1918," (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2008). Cf. Morlang, *Askari und Fitafita*.
[316] In colonial Togo, for instance, the logic of martial races was applied to the police forces by the French colonial regime, that is only after the German era. Joël Glasman, "Les corps habillés: genèse des métiers de police au Togo (1885-1963)" (PhD Diss., Université Paris 7, 2011), 201-227. On the development of a martial races paradigm in German East Africa, see Moyd, "Becoming *Askari*," 41f.
[317] Petitions by farmer association Grootfontein, 21.08.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2506, 26-29.
[318] Magistrate Vietsch (District Office Rehoboth), 05.02.1912, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 1-2 [new series]; Senior Civil Servant Hensel (IdL) to District Office Rehoboth, 22.01.1913, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 45.

The project was quickly abandoned.[319] Instead, pragmatic issues such as African recruits' availability and their skills were the decisive factor in admitting them into the police force – even when they belonged to the Herero or Nama, the two "enemy races" who had taken arms against the German colonizers in 1904.

The War

As historian Gesine Krüger concisely remarks, "the German colonial war of 1904-1907 left deep marks on the society and collective memory of Namibia's population."[320] After the war, German Southwest Africa was suffused with paranoia. Anxiety and fear were probably the most salient sentiments of the colonial realm. It had a crucial impact on how the colonized related to men in uniforms. To many onlookers, military and police personnel were simply not distinguishable. Or, if they were, they often meant the same thing: repression, control, and recurring violence. Tellingly, scholars who collected oral testimonies on the war have never come across recollections of the police force.[321] Many colonized may have experienced the post-war persecutions, forced labor and ongoing military and police manhunts, as a continuation of the state of war in which everyone had to fear for their personal safety well into the 1910s.[322]

[319] Magistrate Vietsch (District Office Rehoboth) to IdL, 01.02.1913, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 44. On the experiment of a "Barstard-Feldkornett" (derived from the Afrikaans term 'veldkornett' meaning an elected official), see also Sven Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens: Auf Spuren der Kaiserlichen Landespolizei von Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2009), 144, and NAN, ZBU 750-G.I.E.4.
[320] Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein*, 22.
[321] Personal email exchange with Memory Biwa (University of Western Cape) January 11, 2012; and with Larissa Förster (University of Cologne), January 19, 2012.
[322] This perception was shored up by the fact that there had been no peace negotiation or treaty. Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein*, 183.

But the war also affected the men who wore the uniforms themselves. Most men of the *Landespolizei* had participated in the war – on the one or the other side. War-like mentality, friend-foe thinking, and a profound fear continued to influence people's behavior well after the armed conflict had ceased. Rumors about a resurgence of the war, about people being "stolen" and brought to other colonies, and other panic-based and panic-inducing stories spread throughout the colony. Historian Luise White points out that "what made a rumor or a legend powerful was that people believed it," and that they enclosed "passionate contradictions and anxieties" grounded in historical experience.[323] Most rumors were told by farmers[324] and the colonized. But policemen were not immune.[325] Embedded within a general atmosphere of post-war distress were those feelings of anxiety specific to policemen.

Hence, as a pivotal transformative event, the war needs to be factored in if we want to understand police identities. Dag Henrichsen summarizes in a few sentences what the war meant for the region and its African populations:

> When war broke out […], the whole of southwestern Africa plunged into unprecedented violence and suffering. Never before in the known history of this region had so many people died. Never before had so many people been imprisoned and/or forced into flight on such a wide regional scale and across colonial borders, [...]. The Southwest African war […] developed into genocide of various pastoral societies, notably otjiHerero-speaking Herero and Mbanderu communities of central Namibia and various Khoekhoegowab-speaking Nama communities in southern Namibia. This war changed the political, social and economic landscape of the region decisively. Tens of thousands of Africans were killed

[323] Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 57, 83.
[324] For instance, report by Bender (3. Batt. Schutztruppe), 22.09.1907, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BA-B), 2707, 36-40. Also: Farmer Lerm to District Office Keetmanshoop, 20.01.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 23-25.
[325] Sergeant Dufring, for instance, suspected a broad transnational conspiracy of human trafficking. Report by Sgt. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja),16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 19-37.

> during the war, perished due to their enforced flight into the harsh Kalahari Desert of eastern Namibia, or died in the concentration camps for prisoners-of-war.[326]

On the German side, the war remained ingrained in the settler community's and administration's memory as a drastic, traumatic event culminating in political radicalization and, as historian Helmut Bley states, a "circle of violence, hate, and hysteria about security."[327] One does not have to go as far as Bley who claims that the war made everything that came before irrelevant for the historical analysis of what came after. But it is not wrong to ascribe a significant role, or "independent significance" (*Eigengewicht des Krieges*) as he terms it, to the war and especially to the deep-seated fear of another uprising in shaping German post-war identities.[328] Krüger notes that the German settlers' "distrust, arrogance, and lordly presumption had turned into hate and hysteria."[329]

For some in the colonial administration, this anxiety influenced deeply their way of conceiving of a post-war society and of the *Landespolizei's* role. Vice Governor Brückner, for instance, declared that the police force's principal purpose was to replace the *Schutztruppe* as a standing army to be deployed in case of emergency.[330] For rank-and-file policemen, their war experiences must have had highly divergent impacts on what kind of militarized

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[326] Dag Henrichsen, "Pastoral Modernity, Territoriality and Colonial Transformations in Central Namibia, 1860s-1904," in *Grappling with the Beast: Indigenous Southern African Responses to Colonialism, 1840-1930*, ed. by Peter Limb, Norman Etherington, and Peter Midgley (Leiden: Brill 2010), 87-88.
[327] Helmut Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1914* (Hamburg: Leibniz-Verlag, 1968), 313. For an analysis of how German soldiers remembered their experiences of the war, see Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein.*, 82-103. On the impact of the war on German military culture, see Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 131-196.
[328] Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft*, 189, 193.
[329] Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1907* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999), 133.
[330] "Unbeschadet ihrer Verwendung im Verwaltungsdienste ist der Hauptzweck der Kaiserlichen berittenen Landespolizei, im Ernstfalle als fechtende Truppe verwendet zu werden und Ersatz für die immer mehr verminderte Schutztruppe zu bieten. Es ist daher dringendes Erfordernis, die militärische Ausbildung der Beamten nicht nur zu erhalten, sondern stetig bis zu möglichster Vervollkommnung zu fördern." Vice Governor Brückner (Gouv. SWA) to Magistrate v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru), 10.11.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 41.

men they perceived themselves to be. The sources, at least, make no common thread appear. In chapter three and four, which go into everyday policing practices, I draw out those dynamics which can be attributed to behavior internalized in wartime and those that broke with such patterns.

For African policemen, the war had destroyed most of their identifying structures and values. Their social and cultural foundations had come apart and they had to find or (re)invent new forms of identification. Krüger observes that with the war in 1904 initiation rites for young Herero of the same age group of men ceased to exist. Only in 1923 were they reintroduced into Herero culture. "Thus, not only did an important male socializing experience disappear, but also a foundation of group unity beyond kinship in Herero society."[331] The procedures that entry into the German police force entailed (signing a contract, receiving clothing and equipment, standing at attention etc.), might have provided a replacement "initiation" ritual to young African men. In fact, historian Jan-Bart Gewald points out that German colonization – especially after the war – offered conflicting initiation "alternatives" with competing power sources attached to them:

> Given that Christian conversion came to replace initiation, conflict arose between the Herero Christian converts and those whom, in their eyes, were the uninitiated youth. However, these uninitiated youths were very powerful, for they served in the army and the police. This is not to say that the *bambusen* who became soldiers [or policemen; M.M.] were not initiated; all recruits are initiated into an army.[332]

In short, the war affected Germans and Africans in quite different ways, but nevertheless served as a foundational event for both groups. For the former, it was in many

[331] Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein.*, 162.
[332] Jan-Bart Gewald, *Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia 1890 and 1923* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999), 229.

cases the first, that is, in a sense "initiating" experience in the colony. The war impressed them not only as soldiers but as colonial soldiers. For the latter, it destroyed most of their identity founding structures. But at the same time, the war brought into the colonial theatre one of the two major institutions which shaped their new identities and became sites of initiation. As a "foundational myth" the war has been central to the identity of both Africans (notably Herero and Nama) and Germans in Southwest Africa and Namibia even long after the colonial era.[333]

Militarized Police: Training, Appearance, and Performance

Once in the police, the men continued to be predominately soldiers. Police training focused to a large extent on riding and shooting – not on legal knowledge, administrational skills, or other civil competences.[334] Military loyalty and comradeship were highly esteemed values, and military protocol was a constant concern among police officials. The police archives are filled with cases of quarrels over whether a salute had been executed correctly, whether hierarchies had been respected, or whether a uniform had been properly worn.[335] Sergeant Hugo Baudeck, for instance, was reprimanded not only for not having recognized a *Schutztruppen* officer's rank, but more because he "left one hand in his pocket while he gesticulated with the other, [and] moved his upper torso back and forth."[336] Moreover, in this fashioning of the ideal-type martial policeman, external physical

[333] Förster, *Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften,* 181.
[334] See, for instance, curriculum of the police school in Windhuk, 25.10.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2537, 194-195.
[335] For instance, letter regarding salute of six policemen by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to Captain Saurma (*Schutztruppe*), 07.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2467, 35.
[336] "Weitere Feststellungen haben ergeben, dass sich der Polizeibeamte auch sonst nicht richtig benommen hat. Er behielt eine Hand in der Rocktasche, während er mit der anderen Hand herumgesticulierte, bewegte den Oberkörper hin und her und markierte in Gesichtsausdruck und Tonfall ein grosses Erstaunen, als ihm

features were regularly intertwined with internal character traits. A man who was corpulent, for instance, was thought to lack the suitable mental faculties for police work.[337] Men who applied for posts in the police sometimes sent pictures and physical descriptions of themselves to support their candidacy, often emphasizing that they were tall and strong.[338] Being of vigorous, soldierly physique, able to exert violence, so they implied, they would make good enforcement officers.

The quality of the *Landespolizei* rested on the capacity of each individual policeman to embody state authority through an impeccable exterior and interior martial self.[339] Especially the higher ranks had to be of "immaculate military form."[340] If that standard was not met, the honor of the police force was harmed, with detrimental effects on the colonial state as a whole. Police Sergeant Arnold, for example, was a former NCO who had served eleven years in the military, and was described as "a highly literate, absolutely independent worker."[341] But Inspection Officer Hollaender regarded him nevertheless as "totally unfit for the *Landespolizei*," for he "had had the effrontery [*sich nicht entblödete*] to repeatedly cry out for help during riding exercises and to make an exhibition of his infinite fear in

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mitgeteilt wurde, dass ein Diätar Militärbeamter im Offizierrange sei." Commander in Chief Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (*Schutztruppe*) to IdL, 06.07.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 98-101.

[337] See, for instance, inspection report by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to Gouv. SWA, 01.02.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 4. The German military paid equal heed to the physical appearance of its soldiers. In 1904, General Headquarters decided that soldiers were not allowed to weigh more than 140 pounds. Kuß, *Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen*, 143.

[338] See, for instance, application by policeman Otto Olkiewicz, 12.03.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2501, 99.

[339] "Zu den Bezirks- und Distriktämtern sollen nur solche Polizeibeamte kommandiert werden, die in ihrer militärischen Haltung, Ausbildung und Denkweise so gefördert sind, daß sie das Leben auf kleinen Stationen, ohne strenge Kontrolle vertragen können. Vernachlässigen sie sich in der militärischen Haltung, worüber der Inspekteur zu befinden hat, so wird man sie zwecksmäßig zu den Depots zurückversetzen, um sie erneut unter strengere, militärische Kontrolle zu nehmen." Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all Police Depots, 12.11.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 82.

[340] "[…] daß der diensttuende Wachtmeister vor allem beweglich, erprobt als Vorgesetzter und von einwandfreier militärischen Formen sein muß." Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to Magistrate Schulze (District Office Grootfontein), 27.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 3219, 34.

[341] "Arnold [ist ein] sehr schreibgewandt, absolut selbständiger guter Arbeiter […]." Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub) to IdL, 23.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2799, 18.

every possible way. […] No threat, acrimony, or appeal to [his] sense of honor," Hollaender reported, had helped. Sergeant Arnold was bound to "harm in an irreparable way the reputation of the *Landespolizei*."[342] Arnold's case prompted the Chief of Police to issue a circular noting such "riding caricature" was unacceptable in the police force, and that "all policemen must be kept at the depots until their military training is accomplished."[343] Constable Türk, on the other hand, was considered by the same inspection officer a useful addition to the force, because his "good military demeanor" had made up for his "limited physical and mental abilities."[344] And Sergeant Thelen who did not know how to write properly when he entered the police force, and who, after two years of service, had still only "sufficient" knowledge of police work, was nevertheless recommended for promotion, because besides being diligent and ambitious, he had a "dashing and energetic demeanor and good form," and he was very much liked by his comrades.[345]

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[342] "Da dieser alte Unteroffizier (11 Dienstjahre) sich nicht entblödete, wiederholt auf Reitschule und in der Abteilung laut um Hilfe zu schreien und in jeder Weise seine genzenlose Angst zur Schau trug, halte ich diesen Mann trotz seiner sonstigen Vorzüge, für die Landespolizei für völlig ungeeignet. [...] Keine Drohung, Schärfe oder Appell an das Ehrgefühl war im Stande den etc. Arnold zu veranlassen, sich nicht mit beiden Händen am Sattel anzuklammern, und zu schreien wie ein kleines Kind. Während meiner ganzen Dienstzeit ist mir ein derartiger Fall von Feigheit nicht vorgekommen. […] Arnold würde das Ansehen der Landespolizei bei Farmern u.s.w. und namentlich bei Eingeborenen, durch diese Reitkarikatur, in nicht wieder gut zu machender Weise schädigen." Ibid.

[343] "Es ist vorgekommen, daß ein Depot einem Beamten, welcher sich durch besondere Ängstlichkeit zu Pferde auszeichnete und beritten eine Karikatur darstellte, bereits nach wenigen Wochen einem Amte zugewiesen hat. Ich kann mich mit dieser Maßnahme nicht einverstanden erklären, weil durch solche mangelhaft ausgebildeten Leute das Ansehen der Landespolizei herabgesetzt [wird]. Der Zweck der Depots ist, in erster Linie die militairische Ausbildung der Landespolizei zu festigen. Hierzu gehört vor Allem das Reiten. Wenn ein Beamter das Reiten beim Depot nicht erlernt, wird er die Lücke im praktischen Polizeidienst niemals ausfüllen. Ich ersuche die Beamten solange auf dem Depot zu behalten bis ihre militairische Ausbildung erreicht ist." Circular by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all Police Depots, 12.11.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 82.

[344] "Machte in der kurzen Zeit bei mäßiger körperlicher u. geistiger Begabung durch gutes militärisches Auftreten u. große Bescheidenheit einen guten Eindruck." Qualification certificate for Constable Türk by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kupferberg), 01.01.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 3513, 13.

[345] "[…] schneidiges und energisches Auftreten und gute Umgangsformen." Qualification certificates for Sgt. Thelen by Magistrate Brill (District Office Lüderitzbucht), 26.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 3503, 31; and 22.08.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 3503, 14.

What counted in the end were features that mattered externally, that polished and honed the public face of the institution. Policemen needed the ability to perform symbolic power through an honorable military persona. And violence was always present in that identity as a potentially lethal threat inherent in the disciplined, martially trained, armed, and mounted bodies of the policemen.[346] Military obedience and discipline structured every aspect of policemen's activities. Military training provided internalized behavioral patterns that helped in those many situations where action was left to individual discretion, especially since there were neither clearly delimited areas of competence nor positively defined rules. The military *habitus* by itself was supposed to inspire awe among the population. And above all, the military offered a large pool of disciplined recruits who were loyal and obedient servants of the state, who could function as visible and exemplary representatives of state power. The precedence given to military background and conduct applied also to Africans, although they had not received the same military training as German NCOs. Inspection Officer Hollaender, for instance, deemed four African policemen particularly competent because they had "all [been] former native soldiers."[347] Thus, the primacy of military values pertained to German and African members of the police force alike.

Yet, in many ways, African policemen were "almost but not quite" like German policemen, to paraphrase Homi Bhabha's famous formulation of the ambivalent concept of

[346] I have come across only one document that shows evidence of the desire to limit military training for the sake of more "theoretical" training, that is, writing exercises. See circular re: "training of police sergeants" by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all Police Depots, 08.08.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 61.
[347] "Da das Depot der Ansicht ist, daß nur starke Patrouillen Aussicht auf Erfolg haben, wurden 9 Polizeisergeanten mit 4 guten Eingeborenen, sämtlich ehemalige eingeborenen Soldaten, nach Goamus stationiert." Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub) to IdL, 21.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 64.

mimicry.[348] This becomes particularly clear when we look at physical appearance again – in this case at uniforms. The uniform was the most visible marker of the African policeman's belonging to the German colonial state. But it signified more than that. It became a marker of belonging to another social organization, a new "caste" of African men.[349] The uniform can thus be analyzed as an indicator of the complex system of alliances and allegiances in which African policemen operated. The uniform of a Police Assistant resembled in all aspects the one his German fellows wore with the exception of military insignia. Instead, he wore two large metal letters – "L.P." – on the side of his hat and a red armband with the same letters. Many African policemen did, however, carry badges of rank. As the commander of a *Schutztruppe* unit in Keetmanshoop complained to the local police in July 1909, "many natives disobeye[d] the law prohibiting the 'wearing of military insignia', especially the native police servants who almost all [had] cockades attached" to their hats, and who acted quite surprised when reminded of the ban.[350] Baster policeman Friedrich Boekis for instance, appeared on duty dressed in a uniform with aiguillette and cords on his shoulders.[351]

Africanist scholars have extensively studied this mimicking appropriation of military signs of power especially by the Herero people.[352] Wearing a German uniform, the African policemen of the *Landespolizei* were not only servants of the German state, *Polizeidiener*, they were also *ovasolondate* [otjiherero: soldiers] of the *oturupa*, representatives of "new

[348] Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *October* 28 (1984): 125–133.
[349] Andreas Selmeci and Dag Henrichsen, *Schwarzkommando: Thomas Pynchon und die Geschichte der Herero* (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 1995), 97.
[350] "In letzter Zeit wird vielfach von Eingeborenen gegen das Verbot des 'Tragens militärischer Abzeichen' verstossen, besonders von den eingeborenen Polizei-Dienern, von denen fast der größere Teil Kokarden angelegt hat." Commander of Verkehrsabt. *Schutztruppe* to Police Station Keetmanshoop, 28.12.1909, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 7.
[351] Sgt. Ehret to District Office Keetmanshoop, 29.09.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 25.
[352] See literature in fn. 308.

systems of authority in keeping with their own ideals of (male) identity."[353] In order to obtain the attributes that supported African policemen's hybrid identity they relied on their clientage relationship to German policemen. A brief account of a recruitment scene illustrates this well. Senior Staff Sergeant Max Ehrlich in Okahandja reported about the way in which Baster Petrus approached him to get hired:

> On the occasion of a police servants' clothing muster in front of the office building I saw Baster Petrus standing nearby. At first, I did not take notice of him. But when he greeted me with the words 'good day, Staff Sergeant,' I remembered that I knew Petrus from Windhuk from the police mess room. During my stay in Windhuk Petrus had ridden a longer patrol with me. I asked him what he was doing in Okahandja. He answered that he had been put on leave, and that he was working for farmer Dewitz. I then asked him why he had left the police, and he replied that it hadn't been nice [*schön*] with the police any more, and that he preferred to work for Mister Dewitz. But he kept pointing at the police servants' things and stated that one did not have these with a farmer, and that also his old employer [*Herr*] (Pol[ice] Sgt. Dohndorf) was in Germany.[354]

To what extent Petrus was attracted by the uniforms or by other police equipment, notably weapons, does not become clear in this passage. What does become apparent, however, is the way in which he reassessed his situation several times, and that his relationship to an individual police superior (patron) as well as access to uniforms, weapons, and probably horses were crucial in the choices he made. The fact that usually German policemen gave their old uniforms and instruments to their African subordinates fostered even further the

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[353] Henrichsen, "Ozombambuse and Ovasolondate," 182.

[354] "Gelegentlich eines Bekleidungsappells der Polizeidiener vor dem Büro der Polizei sah ich den Bastard Petrus stehen. Ich beachtete ihn anfangs nicht, erst als er mich mit den Worten: "Guten Tag, Herr Wachtmeister" begrüßte, fiel mir ein, daß ich Petrus von Windhuk aus der Polizeimesse kannte. Während meines Aufenthaltes in Windhuk hatte Petrus auch mit mir eine längere Patrouille geritten. Ich fragte ihn, was er hier in Okahandja mache, worauf er mir antwortete, er sei hierher beurlaubt und arbeite bei dem Farmer v. Dewitz. Ich fragte ihn dann weiter, weshalb er von der Polizei fortgegangen sei, worauf er mir sagte, bei der Polizei wäre es nicht mehr schön und er arbeite lieber bei Herrn v. Dewitz. Dabei zeigte er laufend auf die Sachen der Polizeidiener und meinte, so etwas gibts bei einem [4r] Farmer nicht, sein früherer Herr (Pol. Sergt. Dohndorf) sei auch in Deutschland." Report by Sen. Staff Sgt. Max Ehrlich (Police Station Okahandja), 16.12.1901, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 4.

connection between patron-client relationship and accouterment.[355] The nature of personal relationships between individual policemen and how these formed (race) identities and (racialized) group dynamics shall be therefore scrutinized now.

Group Dynamics

A careful reading of the sources indicates that many of the African policemen had for a long time been in contact with Germans. They had found ways to accommodate themselves to the new power rather than to avoid or resist it. They had been batmen, workers, and soldiers for the colonial military, sometimes from a very young age.[356] The *Schutztruppe* was key in producing African police personnel. There, individual relationships between German and African men had often already been formed. Evidence shows that many African men knew some German policeman or other from their previous careers in the military. Nama policeman Jan, for instance, served in the colonial military for ten years before his former commander found employment for him in the police force.[357] And Police Assistant Zacharias had served twelve years in the *Schutztruppe* prior to his employment at police depot Kupferberg.[358]

Because of these long acquaintances, often, German policemen projected concepts of European military loyalty onto their African subalterns. A sense of mutual obligation

[355] For instance, Sgt. Albert Bruhn (Police Station Keetmanshoop) to Verkehrsabt. *Schutztruppe*, 28.12.1909, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 7; An interesting discussion of the way in which gift giving shaped relationships between African and German colonial policemen in Togo offers Glassman, "Les *Corps habillés*," 171-175.
[356] Hans Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland zum Ordnungsstaat: Geschichte der ehemaligen Kaiserlichen Landespolizei für Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Emil Wernitz, 1930), 101f; Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 136-137.
[357] Request by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub) to IdL, 02.08.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2601, 8-9.
[358] Inspection Officer Müller (Police Depot Kupferberg) to IdL, 18.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2602, 4.

sometimes emerged out of the shared experience of careers in military service. In July 1908 for example, at the request of an unnamed African policeman Senior Civil Servant Müller from police headquarters arranged for the release of the man's wife who was still in war captivity, and had her brought to live with her husband at the police's "native" quarters.[359] And Captain Streitwolf noted in his journal about one of his African policemen who died from a disease, that he "felt deeply for him […] this Herero who in most loyal fulfillment of his duty for Emperor and Empire has given his life."[360] To the African policeman, employment in the *Landespolizei* meant entering a patron-client relationship with an individual German superior, who, in an ever-threatening and ever more restrictive colonial setting was most likely to be able to provide goods, pay, and a desirable warrior status. Moreover, one cannot exclude that above mentioned Herero friendship or male bond concepts were, from the perspective of the African policemen, mapped onto German notions of military loyalty and comradeship. However, some apologetic narratives of the German colonial era have taken these relationships as proof of Africans' unwavering loyalty to the German nation, even after it had ended.[361] The example of Police Assistant Josef Frederik who in 1927 wrote a letter to his former superior, Sergeant Bruno Vogel, giving

[359] Request by Senior Civil Servant Müller (IdL) to *Schutztruppe* Command, 28.07.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 42. In another example, when a settler had his dog attack an African policeman's wife, Inspection Officer Freytag gave credence to his subaltern's account rather than believing the settler's version and went out of his way to have the settler penalized. Inspection Officer Freytag (IdL) to District Office Windhuk, 10.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 3.
[360] "Ich fühle innig mit ihm, den ein bitteres Los so fern von seinen Lieben ins Gras beißen ließ. [...] Und dieser Herero, der in treuster Pflichterfüllung auch für Kaiser und Reich sein Leben ließ, stand noch vor drei Jahren im Hererokrieg gegen uns im Felde." Kurt Streitwolf, *Der Caprivizipfel* (Berlin: Süsserott, 1911) 138. Cit. in Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 139.
[361] For a deconstruction of the loyalty myth regarding *Askari* in German East Africa, see Moyd, "Becoming *Askari*," 267-301.

his latest news, but above all asking for some clothes, has been interpreted in such a way.[362]

As I already pointed out regarding masculinities, violence within the group itself was common. German policemen used violence against German colleagues, either to settle a conflict between equals in rank or to remind the lower ranks of military hierarchy.[363] Fistfights and petty violence among policemen generated and strengthened male bonds. An integral part of an NCO's life, these everyday violent practices against members of the own group had become a habit and continued to exist within the police force. Unfortunately, there is no evidence whether brawls and other forms of "comradely" violence were commonplace between African policemen. More frequent than petty violence between men of one racial group must have been the slaps in the face, kicks in the buttocks and so forth that African policemen were subjected to by their German superiors.[364] All of these forms of everyday, irregular violence were part of the interpersonal dynamics among policemen. They were expressions of the often tense, emotionally charged conditions under which policemen operated, and as such they were intrinsic to police organizational culture.

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[362] Letter by former Police Assistant Josef Frederik (Bethanien) to former Police Sgt. Bruno Vogel, 31.12.1927, published in: Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 532. See also letter by former Police Assistant Hermann (Windhoek) to former Police Sgt. Walter Kuck, 1928, published in *Nachrichtenblatt des Verbandes der Polizeibeamten für die deutschen Kolonien e.V.* 9,3 (1928).

[363] For instance, reprimand of Sgt. Melzer who had caused a brawl in a bar. Magistrate Runck (District Office Warmbad), 28.07.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, 24. When a fight was considered to have harmed the police force's reputation, it could however result in dismissal. Cf. Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager to Sgt. Johann Sterzenbach (Police Station Choantsas), 18.12.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 3483, 61.

[364] See, for instance, an incident that occurred between Sgt. Max Kobert and Police Assistant Hendrik Frehse. Deposition by Sgt. Max Kobert and Police Assistant Hendrik Frehse (District Office Hasuur), 16.02.1910, NAN, DAR, 18 E.II.5, pp. 16-18. Or depositions by Sgt. Wilhem Wilhelmi and Police Assistant Lucas (Police Station Aninus), 19.02.1913, NAN, DAR, 4 E.4.d, no page number.

Officially administered corporal punishment as disciplinary action against African policemen was on the other hand rare and controversial.[365]

> The police servants must feel themselves within a higher position towards other natives, or else we will never be able to find and keep useful and good elements for the *Landespolizei*. […] We will never educate the natives to a sense of honor with corporal punishment. And we must and will educate the police servants to a sense of honor.[366]

Thus read the explanation Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe gave in July 1914 when he finally decided to prohibit this disciplinary method entirely. The African policemen's belonging to the colonial state made them different in the eyes of the German administrators, a difference they meant to cultivate. As inspection officer Medding noted, for the sake of availing oneself of able African policemen, it was necessary "to treat those natives differently than the average of our natives".[367] In fact, he referred to a decree regarding the proper salute for African policemen to suggest that, since they were military men, they were entitled to honor.[368] When it comes to honor and race, the profound contradictions within colonial ideology in German Southwest Africa become most evident. The desire to "educate" this group of men to a sense of honor sat uncomfortably between two common received ideas about "native" honor. The first one stipulated that the colonized did not have

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[365] A request by Chief of Police Bethe to provide information about the numbers and kinds of punishments African policemen had received shows that corporal punishment was rare and decreased over the years to be replaced by imprisonment. Circular by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) To all District Offices and Police Depots, 29.12.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2594, 3; Replies by the District Offices and Depots, BA-B, R 1002/ 2594, 4-28.

[366] Draft by Chief of Police Bethe (IdL) to all District Offices, 13.07.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2432, no page number. Cit. in Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 81-82.

[367] "[…] wenn wir diese Eingeborenen Anders [sic] behandeln, wie [sic] den Durschnitt unserer Eingeborenen, vor Allem, wenn wir sie nicht mit 'körperlicher Züchtigung' bestrafen." Inspection Officer Johannes Medding (Police Depot Spitzkoppe) to Inspetion der Landespolizei: Bestrafung von Polizeidienern. 11.03.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2594, 17.

[368] Ibid. Decree regarding salute for African policemen by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL), 18.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2591, 37.

a concept of honor and were thus impervious to being humiliated through corporal punishment. The second idea stated the exact opposite, that is, that Africans, especially Herero, had such a high sense of honor that they would be most severely humiliated by corporal punishment. In any case, both ideas left no room for an inculcation of honor. And none of the ideas took into account the understanding of honor of African policemen themselves.

For a sense of professional honor, or "pride in the office" (*"Amtsstolz"*) as Zollmann calls it, was not just promoted from above.[369] African policemen claimed it for themselves, as much as German policemen did. "Sergeant, I am not a *bambuse*, I am a police servant," Baster Police Assistant van Wyk was reported to have said when he was insulted by his superior.[370] This professional honor relied heavily on military traditions, both African and German ones.[371] But beyond that, the policemen conceived of their professional honor as a group ethic which they had created within a specific historical situation: being military men charged with civilian tasks.

2 Bureaucrat Identities

Bureaucrats and Interpreters

Given that their training, their socialization, and their demeanor was considerably military in nature, the policemen of the Landespolizei were most of the time poorly trained

[369] Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 64.
[370] "Sergeant, ich bin kein Bambuse, ich bin Polizeidiener." Deposition by Police Assistant van Wyk, 04.09.1912, NAN BKE 292, U.A. 33.8, no page number. Cit. in Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 78.
[371] On professionalism and professional honor among colonial soldiers, see Moyd, "Becoming Askari," idem, "'All People Were Barbarians to the Askari…': Askari Identity and Honor in the Maji Maji War, 1905-1907," in *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*, ed. by James Leonard Giblin and Jamie Monson (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 149–179, and Michels, Schwarze *deutsche Kolonialsoldaten.*

bureaucrats who learned their administrational trade on the beat, supervised by the local magistrates and district chiefs, formed in relation with the policed population. Their bureaucratic reality was in gross contradiction to Max Weber's ideal-type official who was a highly specialized, objective, rational man. In Weberian theory, state officials, including policemen – whom Weber ironically characterized as "representatives of God on earth" – were supposed to execute bureaucratic tasks with the precision of a machine, entirely neutral towards the public.[372] Their professional ethos lay in their treatment of all cases "irrespective of a person's status," he claimed. That is, the ideal bureaucrat did not pay attention to *ständisch* notions of honor. Herein lay the bureaucrat's honor. Thus, paradoxically, the honor of the bureaucrat rested on his impartiality, his ability to be blind to status honor.[373]

Historian Ann Goldberg has recently demonstrated how libel suits played a crucial role in modernizing and democratizing German honor culture during the Kaiserreich. She rightly points out that honor and modernity should not be viewed in a simplistic dichotomy, but instead one should look at the way in which German honor culture was "juridified", was transformed and introduced into modern life "at all levels of society."[374]

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[372] Max Weber, "Bürokratismus," in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. Teilband 4: Herrschaft*, ed. by Edith Hanke (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 2005), 150-234; quote: 183.

[373] "'Sachliche' Erledigung bedeutet in diesem Fall in erster Linie Erledigung 'ohne Ansehen der Person' nach *berechenbaren Regeln*. 'Ohne Ansehen der Person' aber ist auch die Parole des 'Marktes' und aller nackt ökonomischen Interessenverfolgung überhaupt. Die konsequente Durchführung der bürokratischen Herrschaft bedeutet die Nivellierung der ständischen 'Ehre', […]." Ibid., 186-187; emphasis in the original. But Weber noted that "also the modern, public or private official always seeks and often enjoys toward the ruled a certain higher, *"ständisch"* social esteem. His social status is guaranteed by particular criminal regulations." "Auch der moderne, sei es öffentliche, sei es private, Beamte erstrebt immer und genießt meist den Beherrschten gegenüber eine spezifisch gehobene, 'ständische' *soziale Schätzung*. Seine soziale Stellung ist durch Rangordnungen und, bei politischen Beamten, durch besondere strafrechtliche Bestimmungen für 'Beamtenbeleidigungen', 'Verächtlichmachung' staatlicher und kirchlicher Behörden usw. garantiert." Ibid., 161.

[374] Ann Goldberg, *Honor, Politics and the Law in Imperial Germany, 1871-1914* (Cambridge/ New York:

According to Goldberg, honor lawsuits were both tools of state repression and of democratic emancipation. They "made sense in a society where status and identity remained closely bound up with honor."[375]

A similar process of adaptation can be observed in the colony. The laws pertaining to honor and reputation were also valid in the colonies, and policemen could appeal to the courts in defamation cases. Even Africans were allowed to make a case if they felt that their honor had been harmed. Interestingly, the implicit acknowledgement that Africans had honor and a right to defend it was given in a half-sentence when "defamation" was named as one example to specify which "minor offenses" Africans were allowed to bring before the law personally. Major offenses had to be prosecuted by a higher colonial official, usually the "native commissioner" or magistrate.[376]

However, it was more often the bureaucratic state rather than the judiciary that was appealed to by policemen. Just as Goldberg observes for the metropole, colonial policemen held on to the codes of military and masculine respectability that defined them. Only, they introduced them into their everyday working routines and thus, by doing so, altered them. Their endeavors to establish an institution, to define a profession, to build a state had an impact on how honor was achieved. Their professionalizing ambitions can best be seen in their attempts to validate police duties through acts of writing – in reports, notes, or book entries – or through reference to written texts – to laws, decrees, or regulations. For the policemen, this was a crucial, self-defining moment. State violence and bureaucracy were

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Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.
[375] Ibid., 13.
[376] Vice Governor Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to Native Commissioner Ferse (District Office Bethanien), 08.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2466, 16-17.

thought and practiced together as one concerted effort to claim the legitimate use of force and to fashion one's professional self.

Obviously, it is in the nature of reading bureaucratic sources that bureaucratic procedures will appear to have played a prominent role in the policemen's work. But I wish to push this matter a bit further and suggest that bureaucracy, that is authority and authorization through documentation, was a form of identity formation for these men. The bureaucratic archive is itself a product of the intense emphasis on bureaucratizing police practice: every patrol had to be documented, every shot bullet had to be accounted for. Part of what made everyday violence into policing was the fact of its being recorded, organized, and justified in relation to inscribed codes of behavior and normativity which were distinguishable from wartime rules. Here are some examples of how these processes unfolded.

First, policemen could get retroactively authorized for their violent deeds merely by indicating that the individual policeman's honor and the honor of the state were interchangeable, that they were one and the same. The state took very seriously the idea that its respectability and the individual policeman's honor were reciprocal, a concept which found expression in the "special definition of the [German] criminal code against 'insults of officials' [*Beamtenbeleidigung*]".[377] This is a phenomenon that can be observed for other German state institutions, and for other colonies, as well. The German postal services, for instance, "were, above all, concerned with the image they conveyed, with their reputation," a study of the colonial *Reichspost* affirms.[378] But take Senior Staff Sergeant Karl

[377] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 161.
[378] "Le point essentiel est [...] la *Reichspost* était par-dessus tout soucieuse de l'image qu'elle renvoyait, de sa réputation." Fanny Duffétel-Viste, "L'emploi d'indigènes dans une administration publique au sein de l'Empire

Schlink, for instance, who had arrogated to himself the authority to pronounce corporal punishment sentences in the absence of his depot commander. Asked to explain himself, he noted that "several natives have expressly refused obedience, have behaved themselves against police officials in such an insolent manner, that in order to prevent any further setbacks and to avoid undermining *the reputation of a police official*, I have made use of this right to punish."[379] To support his argument he referred to "written communication from the Imperial District Office Keetmanshoop in 1912 (I cannot exactly recall date and I. n[umber])," and added that all German policemen who had been present at the time could testify.[380] Schlink's official and procedural gesturing was successful. He had been able to mobilize his bureaucratic expertise, as limited as it was, to make his superiors accept his justifications. No disciplinary action was taken against him. When the reputation of one individual policeman was at stake, as Schlink made sure to mention in his statement (it was not even his own), the whole police institution had to rally to his cause.

Another example in which police actions were retroactively authorized, or at least attempted to be settled and re-narrated in a way that would preserve a policeman's reputation, was Sergeant Julius Streibel's case. Stationed in Windhoek, he filed a complaint against an African police assistant. In the grievance, Streibel observed that "since a couple

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colonial allemand: l'exemple de la *Reichspost*," in *Empires et colonies. L'Allemagne, du Saint-Empire au deuil postcolonial*, ed. by Christine de Gemeaux (Clermond-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal 2010), 226.

[379] "Während der monatelangen Abwesenheit des Herrn Depotchefs, haben einzelne Eingeborene des Depots den Gehorsam ausdrücklich verweigert, sich gegen Polizeibeamte derartig frech benommen daß ich, um weitere Rückfälle zu vermeiden und das Ansehen eines Polizeibeamten nicht zu untergraben, von diesem Strafrecht auch bei den Eingeborenen des Depots Gebrauch machte." Sen. Staff Sgt. Karl Schlink (District Office Warmbad) to Police Depot Spitzkoppe, 11.02.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 56. Emphasis added.

[380] "Gemäß Schreiben des Kaiserlichen District Office Keetmanshoop von 1912 (Datum und I.Nr. kann ich nicht mehr genau angeben) […]." Ibid.

of days ago, the natives […] mock me when I have to pass them or come near them."[381] The reason for this, he claimed, was that one of his African subordinates, namely policeman Gottlib, had told lies about him. Reportedly, Gottlib had related the tale that Streibel had chased Africans from their dwellings, beaten them, and then been reprimanded for unauthorized police action. Interestingly, Streibel did not want to refute that he had been violent. Not at all. Rather, he wished to be cleared of the suspicion that his violent behavior might have been unauthorized. He closed his statement noting that "my reputation with the natives has suffered."[382] On the one hand, Streibel framed the issue as a defamation case, that is, as a matter of defending his name. On the other hand, he was concerned about the fact that the public could view his use of force as having been wielded outside the given set of rules. The two reference points for him were honor and the bureaucratic state. There is no record of whether Gottlib was censured or not. But the short episode offers insight into German policemen's self-fashioning by means of retroactive bureaucratic confirmation.

In many other cases state authorization was at the onset of police action. In these instances policemen were authorized to authorize. They were the ones who monitored violence within the colonial theatre by whomever it was deployed. And one essential monitoring means in this undertaking was again bureaucratic procedure.[383] Whether authorized retroactively or in advance, practices of bureaucratized state violence

[381] "Seit einigen Tagen habe ich bemerkt, daß die Eingeborenen der Inspektion sobald ich an ihnen vorbei muß, oder in deren Nähe komme, sich über mich lustig machen." Report by Sgt. Julius Streibel (IdL), Windhuk, 30.11.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 55.

[382] "Da ich dieses Benehmen nur auf die falschen Angaben des Polizeidieners Gottlieb, wonach er mich beschuldigt hat , daß ich die Eingeborenen der Inspektionswerft aus den Pontocks herausgeworfen und verprügelt hätte, zurückführen kann, bitte ich, daß die vor kurzem gegen mich erhobene Anschuldigung untersucht und der Verbreiter dieser Lügen bestraft wird. Mein Ansehen bei den Eingeborenen hat gelitten, denn nach dem jetzigen sonderbaren Betragen derselben, muß ich annehmen, daß sie glauben ich sei wegen den Beschuldigungen von der Inspektion zur Rechenschaft gezogen worden und sie hätten Recht bekommen." Ibid.

[383] I elaborate on bureaucratic procedures of the police, especially with respect to violence against African workers, in chapters 3 and 4.

functioned as techniques of distinction and professionalization. The policeman's use of his firearm is a good example. The rifle was the attribute which most visibly marked the policeman's identity as a wielder of violence. But many actors in the colonial theatre possessed weapons. Thus, the specific manner in which policemen made use of guns became important to distinguish their actions from those of others in the colonial realm. They had procedure. The bureaucratic practice of inserting violent acts into narrative formulas formed police identities. These acts were undertaken by men who prided themselves in being respectable state servants who honored the law.[384]

Other textual and administrational techniques, distributing passes or pass marks, taking identification pictures and fingerprints, drafting biometric profiles according to the Bertillon system, and so forth, contributed furthermore to the police's professional identity. In these instances policemen advanced their professionalization not only with bureaucratic practice but sought also to achieve it through technological progress.[385]

The extent to which bureaucratic practices included the African policemen within the group identity or excluded them from it is debatable. There was a tendency among German policemen to literally write their African subalterns out of the record. African policemen are for example rarely mentioned in patrol reports even though they were practically always present. They have no individual personnel files. Yet, the numerous depositions in which African police assistants brought forward their own grievances or conveyed the voice of the colonized show evidence that they were well aware of the importance of

[384] For a discussion of the relationship between regulation and weapons usage, see chapter 5.
[385] Letter regarding policeman Kelz's commission to acquire the latest criminal investigation skills in the metropole by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 10.05.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 3131, 119-120. Request for investigation material by District Chief Schneidenberger (District Office Okahandja) to IdL, 01.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 49. See also chapter 5.

certain wordings and procedures, and of paperwork in general. Moreover, African policemen could have recourse to their familiarity with written culture from before the German colonial era.[386] Historian Gesine Krüger argues compellingly that it was actually colonial officials who forcefully transformed the literacy of many Southern African societies into an impression of illiteracy thus laying the foundations for the myth of African cultures as exclusively oral cultures.[387] Also, especially during and after the war, Africans were wary of producing written documents knowing that this was a technology no longer available to them.[388] Perversely, they thus contributed to the disappearance of their written archive.[389]

There is very little evidence that African policemen served as scribes in the colonial administration, but it exists.[390] There is plenty that testifies to African policemen's crucial role as interpreters.[391] And even if the majority of police assistants were not employed in clerical positions, as messengers and translators they were situated at a pivotal point of communication and inscription. Thus, they did in point of fact quite considerably participate in the bureaucratization of police practices and identities. This position guaranteed them an exclusive position in their own community, for it situated them closest to colonial power in terms of production of administrational knowledge.

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[386] Dag Henrichsen, "'Iss Worte!' Anmerkungen zur entstehenden afrikanischen Schriftkultur im vorkolonialen Zentralnamibia," in *Afrikanische Beziehungen, Netzwerke und Räume*, ed. by Laurence Marfaing and Brigitte Reinwald (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2001), 329-338; Werner Hillebrecht, "'Habe keinerlei Papiere in Deiner Kiste...'" *WerkstattGeschichte* 1 (1992): 57-58.
[387] Gesine Krüger, *Schrift - Macht - Alltag: Lesen und Schreiben im kolonialen Südafrika* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), esp. 174-184.
[388] Hillebrecht, "Habe keinerlei Papiere in Deiner Kiste..."; M.J. Daymond, et al. (eds.), *Women Writing Africa: The Southern Region* (New York: Feminist Press at CUNY, 2003), 157-158.
[389] Henrichsen, "Iss Worte!" 330.
[390] Record of an African policeman employed in "office service" (*"Bürodienst"*): Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to District Office Keetmanshoop, 16.12.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 61-62.
[391] "Bitte das kaiserliche Distriktsamt gehorsamst, bei Versetzung zur Bauspitze, den Polizeidiener Franz Boy (Kaffer), zwecks guten Dolmetscher in der Kaffern und Hottentottensprache mit hiesigem Maultier sowie mein Pferd mitnehmen zu dürfen." Request by Sgt. Karl Eckel (Police Station Holoog) to District Office Keetmanshoop, 15.06.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 16. Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 71-73; Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 103-106.

To sum up, bureaucratic modes of fashioning police identities did not replace martial and masculine patterns of identification, but instead were layered onto them. Thus, codes of honor were not abandoned for the sake of an exclusively rationalized state. In Weberian terms, the traditional and the bureaucratic kind of authority overlapped. Both contributed to the constitution of the colonial civil servant's honor.

Conclusion

This and the preceding chapter have laid out the complex historical constellation of a group of men who to many onlookers *were* the state. German and African policemen of the *Landespolizei* were men invested deeply in honor: in their social status, in their masculinity, but especially in their professional identity as soldiers and bureaucrats. One might say that their military identity pertained more, though by no means exclusively, to the past (that is, to their background and socialization), whereas their bureaucratic identity pertained more to the present (that is, their everyday experiences in the colonial theatre). The numerous systems of honor and identification (German - African; adventurer - head of family; drill sergeant - hero warrior; military - bureaucracy) sometimes worked together, sometimes did not. The rules of the "game of honor" were not necessarily sound, but rather a "casuistry."[392]

German policemen executed power as members of the colonizing society. But as lower-rank civil servants coming from the lower middle classes of their home society they were liminal figures dependent on support from their superiors and African subordinates. The exercise of power by African policemen – as limited as it may have been – stemmed from

[392] Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honour," 207.

their hybrid position, their performance of "bricolage" identities which at the same time resisted and accepted colonial power.[393] Underlining the commonalities between African and German soldiers, Stefanie Michels observes "how similar the *habitus* of 'black' and 'white' soldiers, troops and 'war lords' was in German Southwest Africa, and how established the shared military culture in the contact zone" was.[394] Despite fundamental cultural differences, as intermediaries of the colonial regime, German and African policemen drew nearer to each other. And this proximity reinforced the overlay of their respective honor codes.

Nevertheless, the racially mixed identity of the men of the *Landespolizei* was a fragile concoction, for, as has already become clear in these first two chapters, the men of the state were not ideal-type bureaucrats, but feeling men with a strong sense of honor. Policemen's emotions were part of who they were and accordingly affected how they policed. Ann Stoler proposes to include "affective states" as significant element of the art of statecraft into the analysis of colonialism. She argues that scholars of colonial regimes have focused too much on the Western celebration of reason and rationality and have thus failed to account for the ways in which

> strategically reasoned forms of administrative common sense informing policy and practice were grounded in the management of […] affective states, in assessing both appropriate sentiments and those that threatened to fly 'out of control.'[395]

[393] Jean Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), 227.
[394] Michels, *Schwarze deutsche Kolonialsoldaten*, 76. Based on this observation she argues that the war between Germans and Herero and Nama was all the more brutal because distinctions between colonial rulers and colonial subjects were not clear at all but rather ambiguous.
[395] Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 59.

If we give up the analytical distinction between emotion or embodied experience on the one hand and cognition or thought on the other, we can see that these motions were, in a way, one and the same thing to the historical actors in question (a notion that may be difficult for us as post-Weberian, not to mention post-Cartesian scholars).[396] Doing so, one can see how colonial statecraft was not simply rationally performed, but rationally and sensorially felt. As policemen went about their daily work, they were expected to be "men of reasoned feeling," that is, to regulate their own emotions even as they contributed to regulating public life, and hence the emotional expression of others.[397] Yet, the archives show that policemen were not always able to keep in check their feelings, notably their fears and frustrations. Thus, policemen weaved apprehensive nervousness into statecraft.[398] In that sense, German Southwest Africa was an affective state.

Keeping in mind that affects were a significant part of the practices with which policemen produced a colonial order and state, the following chapters delve into the heart of this dissertation's subject matter: the everyday of policing.

[396] Asking "what emotions do" rather than what they are, feminist political theorist Sara Ahmed suggests using the idea of "impression." The term carries the meaning of leaving a mark and allows her "to avoid making analytical distinctions between bodily sensation, emotion and thought as if they could be 'experienced' as distinct realms of human 'experience'." Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 6.
[397] Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain,* 66.
[398] On "nervous states," see Ulrike Lindner, Maren Möhring, et al. (eds.), *Hybrid Cultures – Nervous States: Britain and Germany in a (Post)Colonial World* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010).

CHAPTER 3

Police Work

Max Weber's famous notion of the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence [*Gewalt*] has been the starting point for many social scientists to describe what the police is and what it does. Following that dictum, the police is often sociologically defined as a means. Yet, this definition needs qualification. First, the police never fully holds a monopoly, nor does it always have full legitimacy.[399] As social scientists have rightly noted, the police is an expression and a tool of the *claim* to a legitimate monopoly, not its reality.[400] Second, the definition of the police as merely a tool is too limited. The police force is much more complex than a simple instrument. As an organization, it is a collective that does not only follow the rationality of its command (i.e. the government). It has its internal logics and bureaucratic mechanisms, an organizational culture, a certain degree of autonomy based on its expertise. Sociologist Dominique Monjardet offers a particularly helpful definition that combines all the considerations mentioned here. According to him, the police is

> inextricably an instrument of state power [*du pouvoir*] from which it receives orders; a public service theoretically available to everyone; a profession that develops its proper interests. This triple determination by no means resolves in perfect harmony. On the contrary, these three dimensions can confront each other as distinct and competing.[401]

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[399] Jean-Paul Brodeur, "High Policing and Low Policing. Remarks about the Policing of Political Activities," *Social Problems* 30,5 (1984): 507-520; David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing. A Comparative International Analysis* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985); Dominique Montjardet, *Ce que fait la police. Sociologie de la force publique* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1996).
[400] Montjardet, *Ce que fait la police*, 8.
[401] Ibid., 9.

In this chapter I discuss the colonial police's mandate in German Southwest Africa and the organizational culture it developed from that mission: its tasks, working conditions, routines, and procedures.

Police work in German Southwest Africa comprised virtually everything that pertained to the organization of a productive society – infrastructure, health, agriculture, mining, education, security, welfare, etc. – in essence, police worked with the assumptions of an early modern notion of *Policey* (a concept I will explain below). How the police was supposed to proceed in this seemingly limitless range of tasks was unclear. Decrees were issued at all levels of the colonial administration, but rarely did they include instructions to the lower-ranking men about the means and modes of enforcing them. Regulations aiming at organizing the police itself mostly referred to appearance and formality. Proper bearing, etiquette, and social convention were the guides which were to assist policemen in the field.

Despite or maybe even because of the impossibility of achieving the official colonial state's goals, the police built a colonial state based on improvisation. Because of the specific psycho-social dynamic that emerged out of permanent uncertainty, inadequate means, and all-encompassing authority, policemen felt constantly compelled and/ or enabled to do things. Their doings produced the improvised colonial state. In the policemen's own minds, it did not matter so much what they were doing, but that they were being proactive. Policemen had little professional training. The material conditions and the climate were taxing. The territory they policed was immense and close supervision by superiors was limited. Because of these circumstances, policemen relied on and came to highly value their own practice and experience. Moreover, the police force was a racially mixed institution.

African and German men worked together. The resulting group dynamics and possibilities to act on both the settler and the colonized community prompted practices which were experienced as participative and shared endeavors. Yet, although they were a crucial part of the improvised colonial state in German Southwest Africa, African policemen were also active outside of it – as enterprising subjects seeking a place in the new social and economic order, as independent patriarchs, and as members of the *oturupa*. Or put another way, as African carriers of what was understood on all sides to be "white" power, their very existence hybridized colonial power along its many axes: state/non-state, colonizer/colonized, official/unofficial, and even white/black.

Police practices were furthermore generated by the effort to distinguish police from other actors in the colonial realm, notably from the military, settlers, and colonized – that is, by the formation of a professional identity. The police force had its distinct way of doing violence and being violent. Policemen prided themselves on doing diligent, professional, and "clean" violent work.

1 Everyday Tasks and Conditions. The Nature of Police Work

> "This is no history of war and heroism, but simply of hard, selfless work and the cheerful fulfillment of duty."[402]

Police Tasks and the Notion of 'Policey'

[402] "Es ist keine Geschichte von Krieg und Heldentaten, nur von harter selbstloser Arbeit und fröhlicher Pflichterfüllung." Hans Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland zum Ordnungsstaat: Geschichte der ehemaligen Kaiserlichen Landespolizei für Deutsch-Südwestafrika*. Ed. by Verband der Polizeibeamten für die Deutschen Kolonien e.V. (Berlin: Emil Wernitz, 1930), 11.

Throughout the existence of the colonial police in Southwest Africa, colonial leaders struggled over its form of organization, its mission, and its rules. What the police was there for and how it should operate never became entirely clear. This is not particular to the colonial context. Policing in the *Kaiserreich* at the turn of the nineteenth century was still rooted in the diffuse idea that it pertained to the very broad complex of a state invested in the security and welfare of its people and in the maintenance of its power through optimized methods of administration.[403] In a period that was crucial both for the development of police institutions and for European imperialism, earlier, cameralist concepts of police – the notion of *Policey* – prevailed. Eighteenth-century German legal and political thinker Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi defined the police in his work *Grundsätze der Policey-Wissenschaft* (1756) as follows:

> […] under the name police [*Policey*] we include the laws and regulations that concern the interior of a state, which endeavor to strengthen and increase its power, to make good use of its forces, to produce the happiness [*Glückseligkeit*] of its subjects, in a word, the commerce, finances, agriculture, mining, woods, forests, etcetera, in view of the fact that the welfare [*Wohlfahrt*] of the state depends on the wisdom with which all these things are administered.[404]

[403] Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4.

[404] "In weitläufigem Verstande begreifet man unter der Policey alle Maaßregeln in innerlichen Landesangelegenheiten, wodurch das allgemeine Vermögen des Staats dauerhaftiger gegründet und vermehret, die Kräfte des Staats besser gebrauchet und überhaupt die Glückseligkeit des gemeinen Wesens befördert werden kann; und in diesem Verstande sind die Commercien, Wissenschaft, die Stadt- und Landöconomie, die Verwaltung der Bergwerke, das Forstwesen und dergleichen mehr, in so fern die Regierung ihre Vorsorge darüber nach Maaßgebung des allgemeinen Zusammenhanges der Wohlfahrt Staats eingerichtet, zu der Policey zu rechnen." Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi, *Grundsätze der Policey-Wissenschaft: in einem vernünftigen, auf den Endzweck der Policey gegründeten, Zusammenhange und zum Gebrauch Academischer Vorlesungen abgefasset,* 3rd ed. with commentary by Johann Beckmann (1756; Göttingen: W. Vandenhoek, 1782), 4. Transl. in Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978*, ed. by Michel Senellart, transl. by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 330, fn. 8.

The police institutions and agents that grew out of this understanding were responsible for a whole variety of tasks and were directly linked to the authority of the state. They had to ensure welfare and security at the same time. Their main concern was the organization and regulation of the "necessities of life,"[405] e.g. food supply[406] and health, and of the population's activity and productivity – all with the goal that their activities would "constitute a differential element in the development of the state's force."[407] Historians of late nineteenth-century German policing have recently shown that welfare duties had not yet been entirely detached from the realm of the police, and that its functions were not yet fixed into clearly defined categories despite an ongoing process of bureaucratization and legalization. This is particularly true when observed on the level of daily practices and handbook instructions.[408] In short, at the turn of the century, the police as we know it today was still in the making. And it was still conceived to be responsible for anything that "strengthen[ed] and increase[d] [the state's] power," and "produce[d] the happiness of its subjects."[409] In addition to the widespread influence of German administration science, Western and Central European police systems had all to a certain degree been under the

[405] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population,* 324.
[406] Charles Tilly notes that "before the nineteenth-century proliferation of professional police forces as we know them, the word Police referred to public management, especially at the local level; regulation of the food supply was its single largest component." Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1992), 119.
[407] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population,* 322.
[408] Ralph Jessen, "Polizei, Wohlfahrt und die Anfänge des modernen Sozialstaats in Preußen während des Kaiserreichs," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 20, 2 (1994): 157-180; Alf Lüdtke, introduction to *"Sicherheit" und "Wohlfahrt": Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), 13-15; Herbert Reinke, "'... hat sich ein politischer und wirtschaftlicher Polizeistaat entwickelt': Polizei und Großstadt im Rheinland vom Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges bis zum Beginn der zwanziger Jahre," in ibid., 219-243.
[409] Justi, *Grundsätze der Policey-Wissenschaft*, 4.

impact of the Napoleonic model of a militarily organized *gendarmerie*.[410] In some sense, we can understand the First French Empire's *gendarmerie* as a "colonial" police. This fact becomes an important backdrop against which colonial police in Africa has to be examined.

If we turn our attention to German Southwest Africa we discover that the *Landespolizei* was in fact responsible for an overwhelming variety of tasks. In his 1930 history of the force, former policeman Hans Rafalski enumerated some of them:

> […] for instance, the execution of health and veterinarian police measures, the procurement of bacteriological and toxicological samples, of blood tests and such, the monitoring of mining regulations, the management of weapons and ammunition stocks for trade, meteorological observations, route surveying, the supervision of prisons and lost livestock [*Fundkral*], and oftentimes also postal and customs duties as well as juridical duties.[411]

The list is far from complete and can be extended with seemingly endless, random activities. Policemen enforced hunting and nature protection laws, oversaw alcohol licensing and distribution, erected road signs, and maintained sewage systems, wells, telegraph lines, fences, soldiers' graves, and other public equipment.[412] They collected dog taxes. They carried out the population census. They registered all births, deaths, and

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[410] Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 153-190; Albrecht Funk, *Polizei und Rechtsstaat: Die Entwicklung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols in Preussen 1848-1918* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1986), 25-27.

[411] "z.B. die Durchführung gesundheits- und veterinärpolizeilicher Maßnahmen, Beschaffung bakteriologischer und toxikologischer Untersuchungsobjekte, von Blutproben u. dgl., Ueberwachung bergpolizeilicher Bestimmungen, Verwaltung von Waffen- und Munitionsbeständen für den Handel, meteorologische Beobachtungen, Routenaufnahmen, Gefängnis- und Fundkralverwaltung und vielfach auch die Wahrnehmung des Post- und Zolldienstes sowie des gerichtlichen Zustellungs- und Vollstreckungsdienstes." Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 28.

[412] See the list of laws relevant for police work sent to all police depots: Bureau Assistant Lauterbach (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 01.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2552, 67-68. Hunting and nature protection: Governor v. Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to RKA: Betr. Errichtung einer Polizeistation im Caprivizipfel. 31.12.1907, BA-B, R 1001/ 2183, 31-34. Alcohol: "Gesetz betr. Einfuhr und Vertrieb geistiger Getränke in dem südwestafrikanischen Schutzgebiet," 11.03.1911, in: Zorn, *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung* (1913), 591-596. Public equipment: "Wege-Ordnung," 14.06.1912, cit. in: Philipp Zorn, *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung: Text-Ausg. m. Anm. u. Sachreg.* (Berlin: Guttentag, 1913), 755-762.

marriages. They made lists of European men married to indigenous women.[413] They made sure that settler children went to school, that they were immunized, and so forth.[414] This long enumeration shows that the *Landespolizei* was charged by the colonial state with organizing more or less all aspects of colonial society, just as Justi's cameralist view of *Policey* had prescribed. Out of this "total responsibility"[415] could arise a certain feeling of all-importance coupled with the feeling of constant frustration because one was of course never able to fulfill all the tasks at hand. Often linked to the challenge of having to deal with potentially everything was the notion that therefore things had to be resolved immediately, especially in a settler society which was rapidly growing and changing.[416] I will come back to the matter of urgency later in this chapter.

Rafalski's list above did not mention the one mission that occupied most of the police's time: namely finding, capturing, registering, organizing, monitoring, guarding, protecting, and punishing African labor on the one hand, and supervising, inspecting, controlling,

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[413] Sgt. Oskar Junge (Police Station Klipdam) to District Office Hasuur: "Verzeichnis über die im Bezirk Klipdam vorhandenen weißen Männer welche mit farbigen Frauen getraut sind." 30.09.1909, NAN, DAR, 20 S.V, 10-11.

[414] Dog tax: Decree by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA), 23.02.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2771, 15-17. Census and school attendance: "Gesetz betr. Einführung der Schulpflicht, 20.10.1906," cit. in: Zorn, *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung* (1913), S. 558-560; patrol report by Staff Sgt. Karl Schlink (Police Depot Kub), 01.07.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 147; "Zählung der weißen Bevölkerung und Feststellung der eingeborenen Familien auf den Farmen" in: patrol book, Police Depot Spitzkoppe, Jan-March 1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 210-217; "Umlauf der Wählerliste zur Bezirksratswahl" and "Volkszählung" in: patrol book, Waterberg, 31.03.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 220-221; patrol book, Police Depot Spitzkoppe, no date, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 178-185. Immunization: "Impf-Verordnung des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika," 30.07.1912, cit. in: Zorn, *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung* (1913), 300-304.

[415] Lüdtke and Wildt coined the term "Allzuständigkeit" regarding the police in German history. Alf Lüdtke and Michael Wildt, introduction to *Staats-Gewalt: Ausnahmezustand und Sicherheitsregimes. Historische Perspektiven*, ed. by Alf Lüdtke and Michael Wildt (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2008), 17.

[416] For an analogous conception of the importance of immediacy with respect to police work in mid-nineteenth-century Germany, see the politician and state publicist Gustav Zimmermann: "Die Polizei soll gewissermaßen als fliegende Kohorte den Wirrwarr des neuen Lebens durchdringen; überall gegenwärtig und tätig sein; und beachten, hemmen, zurechtlegen, entdecken, was ihr als regelwidrig aufstößt, auf der Stelle und rasch, weil die Zustände der modernen Welt das Warten nicht vertragen, sondern gleich dem Chamäleon unter den Händen sich verwandeln oder entschlüpfen." Gustav Zimmermann, *Die deutsche Polizei im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol.3, (Hannover, 1849), 161. Cit in Alf Lüdtke, Lüdtke, *"Gemeinwohl", Polizei und "Festungspraxis": Staatliche Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preußen, 1815-1850* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht 1982), 82.

supporting, defending, and restoring European property on the other hand. Perhaps more surprisingly, Rafalski did not include fighting crime on his list. I see this as yet another indicator for my claim that policemen saw themselves primarily as "girl Fridays"[417] of the colonial state for whom preventing crime was just one – certainly not the most important – duty among many. Interestingly, the police's mission statement read much more like a modern police description. It emphasized security over welfare. Remarkably short, the passage entitled "Preface. Purpose" stated:

> The institutions of the police are there to maintain public peace and security [*Ruhe und Sicherheit*]. They have to ensure that the existing laws, ordinances, and rules are followed, they have to protect persons and property against punishable infractions, and to supervise [*überwachen*] the natives.[418]

The passage has little informative value on what policemen actually did on an everyday basis, except for perhaps the particular attention given to policing the indigenous population.

In order to have an approximate idea of the tasks policemen carried out, especially those that came up repeatedly, it is more helpful to look at examples of the patrol logs that were produced at regular intervals. The following excerpt of one of them gives a fairly representative list of activities in the Windhuk district for the first months of 1908:

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[417] Rafalski himself used the term to characterize policemen in German Southwest Africa. The gendered language appears not to have bothered him. "Er half, wo er konnte. Und er half gerne. Noch mehr wie in der Heimat war die Landespolizei im Schutzgebiet das 'Mädchen für alles'." Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 30.

[418] "Allgemeines. Zweck. Die Organe der Landespolizei sind bestimmt zur Erhaltung der öffentlichen Ruhe und Sicherheit. Sie haben darüber zu wachen, daß die bestehenden Gesetze, Verordnungen und Vorschriften befolgt werden, Personen und Eigentum gegen strafbare Verletzungen zu schützen und die Eingeborenen zu überwachen. Die Landespolizei übt insbesondere auch den Grenzschutz und den Sicherheitsdienst im Schutzgebiet aus." Kaiserliches Gouvernement Deutsch-Südwestafrika (ed.), *Dienstvorschrift für die berittene Landespolizei* (Breslau: F.W. Jungfer, 1910), 1. In an earlier draft, the first sentence had referred only to public peace but not to security. Another draft included the terms peace, order, and security. IdL: Dienstvorschrift (drafts), no dates, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page numbers.

> […] Supervision [*Controlle*] of the paths and water conditions […] Revision of the horse quarantine outpost [*Sterbeposten*] […]Supervision of the paths and water conditions, supervision of the natives […] Supervision of the natives a[nd] legal notices […] Pursuit of escaped Police Assistant Benjamin and companions - unsuccessful […] Supervision of natives […] Legal notices […] Adjustment of the native registries […].

"Supervision", of course, could mean all kinds of things. It could signify that the police had checked passports or labor contracts, that it had searched African dwellings or inspected work sites, that it had shown its face for a brief moment or spent a whole day maybe even a night at a farm, and many other measures. Another log, stretching from summer 1907 to spring 1908, and equally representative of everyday police work, listed the following undertakings of the police depot of Waterberg situated in the north of the colony:

> […] for orientation […] Arranged a grave […] for legal notice […] Legal notice a[nd] questioning […] For orientation […] In search of farmer Hermann. At the same time farm protection […] Postal patrol. Searching for escaped natives of a farmer […] To search the area for nat[ives] […] For the collection of salaries and copy.[ing] of local police decrees […] Exploration of water holes […] Legal notice and questioning […] Searching for an alleged Herero settlement (unsuccessful) […] Riding with compass and charting route. [..] Farm protection. Postal patrol […] Standing patrol, livestock census […] Reparation of the telephone line […] Standing patrol (to capture nat.[ives]), quest.[ioning], survey of water conditions, registration of nat.[ives], […]. Farm protection. […] Closing down of a Kaffir settlement. Search f[or] escaped nat.[ives] o[f] farmers.[419]

[419] Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg) to IdL, 05.04.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 73-82, here a longer excerpt than in the main text (pp.77-81): "Auszug aus dem Patrouillenbuch:[...] Zur Orientierung [...] Grab in Ordnung gebracht. […] zwecks Zustellung vom Gericht. [...] Suchen des verirrten Farmers Hermann [...] zwecks Zustellung u. Vernehmung. Suchen des Farmer [sic] Hermann. [...] (stehende Patrouille) zwecks Verhütung von Artjägerei. [...] Aufsuchen Grab [...] zur Orientierung. [...] Suchen des Farmer [sic] Hermann. Gleichzeitig Farmschutz. [...] Vernehmung des Bur Dreyer. [...] Erkundung der Wasserstellen, zwecks Errichtung von Polizeistationen. […] Postpatrouille [...] Mit Eselwagen Hafer für Patrouille mitgenommen, Poliz. Böttcher z. Farmschutz dort geblieben. [...] Suchen nach entlaufenen Eingeborenen eines Farmers [...] Die dortige Gegend nach Eingeb. abzusuchen. [...] Grabstätte in Ordnung bringen. Mit Ochsenwagen Steine hingefahren zu diesem Zweck. [...] Zum Abheben der Gehälter und Abschr. von ortspolizeilichen Bestimmungen. [...] Erkundung der Wasserstelle [...] Zur Orientierung u. Abholen des Pol. Sergt. Böttcher […] Proviant holen. [...] Zustellung und Zeugenvernehmung […] Aufsuchen einer angeblichen Hererowerft. (erfolglos.) [...] Reiten nach Kompaß und Weg aufzeichnen […] Farmschutz, Farm Bauer. Verfolgung des Harzheimers wegen Unterschlagung. [...] Postpatrouille [...] Zeugenvernehmung [...] Erkundung der Wasserstellen. [...] Postpatrouille [80r] [...] Stehende Patrouille, Viehzählung u. Zeugenvernehmung des Farmers Degenhardt. [...] Reparieren der Telephonleitung […] Stehende Patrouille,

Noteworthy is again the vagueness about what actually had been done or achieved by a particular patrol. Most patrol books did not even give the names of all policemen involved.[420]

Nevertheless, the major areas to which most police assignments pertained become fairly evident: first, policemen were striving to get a grasp of the territory, to produce knowledge, and to make it theirs by covering it with infrastructure; second, they provided postal, administrational, and legal services; and last but not least, as I have already pointed out, policemen tried to regulate the indigenous population while supporting European settlement. A fourth, particularly significant field of occupation, which is not explicitly mentioned in the patrol logs but is connected to all of the above tasks, was desk work. Policemen spent large amounts of their time – too large according to some officials – writing reports, compiling lists, issuing papers, copying texts, and so on.

Depending on the area and on the year, priorities could shift. Delivery tasks remained quite stable. Searches for African laborers intensified and abated over the years. It is difficult, however, to make out a pattern. A first wave of tenacious pursuit seems to have occurred immediately in the aftermath of the war when colonizers frantically tried to secure the few African survivors for their farms, mines, and other workplaces.[421] A second wave appears to have occurred about halfway through the existence of the *Landespolizei*

[...] (Eingeb. einfangen), Verhandl. [...], Aufnahme der Wasserverhältnisse, registrieren der Eingeb., Grab [...] in Ordnung gebracht. Farmschutz. [...] Aufheben einer Kaffernwerft. Suchen n. entlaufenen Eingeb. v. Farmern. […] Zustellungen vom Gericht. Anbringen v. Wegetafeln. Zwecks Vollstreckung, Farmaufnahmen. [...] Leitungspatrouille. [...]."

[420] For an exception, see patrol book by Staff Sgt. Hermann Raab (Police Deppot Spitzkoppe), 03.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 22-23.

[421] See, for instance, Aimé Weiss who in July 1907, like so many others, asked to "have one or two native families reserved" for her. Request by Aimé Weiss, 24.07.1907, NAN, DOK, 27 E.2.e, 90. The archive is filled with requests like these from the years 1907/08.

when the institution was relatively well established and thus scarcity of African labor could no longer be ascribed to a malfunctioning administration.[422] Regarding bureaucratic and legal tasks, there was a steady increase of the police's workload as both the court system and the bureaucratic apparatus kept expanding, despite bitter protestations from some colonial officials that these clerical duties did not belong to the "actual purpose" of police.[423] Over the years, exploring and surveying the territory became less and less pressing, although it is important to stress that until the very end of German colonial rule, the police's familiarity with the land and its people remained limited. All in all, variations in what the police concentrated on doing were mostly linked to individual local administrators' preferences, or even to those of individual police station commanders, rather than to earlier or later periods of colonial rule.

That said, some regions had specific policing issues: in the diamond fields south of Lüderitzbucht, for instance, policemen mostly struggled to combat theft and smuggling; in the very north of the colony, they primarily regulated the flow of migrating Ovambo workers who entered the territory from the Angolan border; in and surrounding the town of Rehoboth, policing pertained predominantly to the surveillance of the large Baster population who had settled there in the late nineteenth century and had been given some political autonomy in exchange for allegiance to the German regime; and finally, in urban

[422] To my knowledge, there was no particular directive issued to that regard. But my survey of the patrol logs and the letters from worried employers shows evidence that more patrols were organized for the sole purpose of capturing Africans in the initial years of police existence and from about mid-1912 onwards after a decree regarding "measures against vagrant natives," by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager. Decree by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA), 26.06.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 5-6. See, for instance, the archival files regarding "searches for natives," 1911-1914, and "requests for workers," 1914-1915, of the Rehoboth District Office, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.B (vol.2); 27 E.2.B (vol.3); 27 E.2.E (vol.2).

[423] "Es ist nicht angängig, daß Polizeibeamte dauernd ihrer eigentlichen Bestimmung entzogen werden, da hierunter ihre Ausbildung leidet. Die Verwendung von Polizeibeamten als Schreiber kann mithin nur vorübergehend stattfinden und der jetzige Zustand bedarf eines anderen Ausweges." Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL): "Aufzeichnungen zur Organisation der Landespolizei." 29.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 18.

spaces like Windhuk or Swakopmund or at remote border stations of the colony's outskirts, the police focused on slightly different details than in the rest of the territory.

Now that I have given a rough idea of the multitude of police assignments and pointed out the more important ones, I can turn to the set of rules which were supposed to provide guidance on executing the given tasks.

Regulations and Conditions

Scholars of German colonial law have demonstrated how, in an effort to exclude the German parliament from the decision-making process, colonial legislation was directly linked to the administrative body of government (the *Kaiser*, the chancellor, ministries, etc.), thus creating a regime of executive orders (*Verordnungsstaat* rather than a *Rechtsstaat*).[424] Society was to be organized by the state, not by its citizens, nor by the settlers in the colony (and even less by the colonized subjects). The state's aspiration to create a regime of executive orders was part of a broader idea which historians have characterized as a utopian view of absolute control and order.[425] In this vision, every tiniest facet of colonial society needed to be brought under state direction for, within nineteenth-century German state theory, only a state which could establish perfect order was a strong state.[426] This vision also went together with the aforementioned notion of *Policey*, which stipulated that the strength of the state stemmed from good and exhaustive management of

[424] Jakob Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen: Die Kolonialpolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1915* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010), 14-17.
[425] See particularly Jürgen Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner. Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (Münster: Lit, 2004).
[426] Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 14-17.

all aspects of human life. The "utopia of absolute rule"[427] dictated that civil servants, settlers, and Africans all had an assigned place in a rigid social and racial hierarchy. This fantasy of absolute rule envisioned that the African population would be fully registered and supervised, making it easily available for cheap wage labor. The fantasy also envisioned that the settler community would abide by executive orders in order to guarantee an efficient economic system.

For the policemen of the *Landespolizei*, the regime of executive orders meant that directives were not an expression of settler interests, but that they absolutely needed to be enforced for the sake of the vital goal of establishing order, even when settlers insisted on customary rights or other "laws" like tradition, racial supremacy, "survival of the fittest", or maximization of profits. It also meant for the policemen that orders were issued at all different levels of the colonial administration. Decrees could come directly from the colonial office in Berlin, from the central colonial government or police headquarters in Windhuk, as well as from any local administrator, that is, from the magistrates (*Bezirksamtmänner*) and district chiefs (*Distriktschefs*) who were the immediate civil superiors of all policemen in the field.[428] These orders sometimes contradicted each other.

[427] Jürgen Zimmerer, "Der koloniale Musterstaat? Rassentrennung, Arbeitszwang und totale Kontrolle in Deutsch-Südwestafrika," in *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904-1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen,* ed. by Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (Berlin: Links Verlag 2004), 31.
[428] Policemen also had military superiors, the so-called inspection officers, who were responsible for military discipline, training, and deployment. For better readability, I have translated all relevant titles and ranks into English equivalents: *Bezirksamtmann* = Magistrate.; *Distriktschef* = District Chief; *Regierungsrat* = Senior Civil Servant; *Inspekteur der Landespolizei* = Chief of Police; *Inspektionsoffizier* = Inspection Officer; *Kriminalbeamter* = Detective Sergeant; *Diensttuender Wachtmeister* = Senior Staff Sergeant; *Wachtmeister* = Staff Sergeant; *Sergeant* = Sergeant; *Polizist* = Constable; *Polizeidiener* = (African) Police Assistant.

Not seldom, policemen were simply unaware of many orders that theoretically applied to them.[429]

Moreover, the framework of rules regulating the police was vague and obscure. A first charter had been worked on since 1900 and circulated as early as March 1905 when the *Landespolizei* was officially created.[430] But the text had little consequence while the war was raging. The policemen's legal status was regulated partly by civil service laws (*Reichsbeamten-*, *Kolonialbeamtengesetz*),[431] and partly by military codes (*Schutztruppen-Ordnung*, *Mannschaftsverordnungsgesetz*).[432] In October 1907, the police force finally got its own codification in the form of an executive order from the Emperor.[433] But that order merely determined the policemen's rights and obligations, mostly by referring to the general laws above and including some minor qualifications. The decree's so-called "implementation rules," which were intended to provide additional and crucial explanations about how the police should function, took over a year to be drafted.[434] These rules were meant to revisit the 1905 charter and, with the experiences gathered since the

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[429] Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 03.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2552, 4. Cf. Zimmerer on the unwillingness of local administrators to burden themselves with more work and more decrees. Zimmerer, "Der totale Überwachungsstaat?" 107-117.

[430] Gouv. SWA: "Bestimmungen über die Organisation der Landespolizei." 01.03.1905, BA-B, R 1002/ 3506, 6-9. Published in *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung,* vol. 9 (1905), 64-69. For the history leading up to the official creation of the *Landespolizei* in 1905, see Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 33-41.

[431] "Bestimmungen des Reichs-Kolonialamts für die Landesbeamten und sonstigen Angestellten in den Schutzgebieten" (1907), in *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung*, vol. 11 (1907), 386-392; "Reichsbeamtengesetz" (1907), *RGBl.*, 245; "Kolonialbeamtengesetz" (1910), *RGBl.*, 881. Summaries and commentary in: Johannes Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen Kolonialbeamten, ihre Pflichten und Rechte*. 6. verm. Aufl. (Berlin: Otto Salle, 1912), 106-115, 414-449.

[432] "Schutztruppen-Ordnung" (1896), *RGBl.*, 653; "Mannschaftsverordnungsgesetz" (1906), *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung*, vol. 10, 218.

[433] "Verordnung betreffend die Rechtsverhältnisse der Landespolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika." 04.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 113-114. Published in *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung*, vol. 11 (1907), 395-396, in Tesch, *Die Laufbahn der deutschen Kolonialbeamten*, 185-188, and in Zorn, *Deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung*, 274-276.

[434] Draft of "Ausführungsbestimmungen gemäß Verordnung betr. die Rechtsverhältnisse der Landespolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika vom 4. Oktober 1907," no date, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page number. The rules were sent to the colonial office in January 1909. Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 02.01.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 3-6.

formation of the police, to redefine the institution's organizational structure, internal allocation of competencies, and its position within the post-war colonial administration. The text was initially written up by a legally trained civil servant at police headquarters, then circulated to and commented on by all magistrates, district chiefs, inspection officers in the colonial territory, as well as other branches of the colonial government in Windhuk. The final result represented a compromise between the military and the civil forces striving to assert their influence on policing questions. It thereby gave the Landespolizei a hybrid, semi-civil, semi-military form, an arrangement which was debated among police administrators, colonial military leaders, and officials in the Berlin foreign office recurrently[435] and did not help to give clarity to the lower ranks. What is more, the legal status and role of African police assistants – that is, of about forty percent of the police force – was left out of the new charter entirely.[436] The 1905 regulations could be interpreted as including African policemen in the body of civil servants of the German state, an interpretation colonial administrators wanted to rule out at all costs.[437]

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[435] See, for instance, the conversation in August 1908 between State Secretary Dernburg, Governor v. Schuckmann, and Chief of Police Heydebreck: Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouvernement SWA) to IdL, 16.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 3-6; Meeting notes, Gouv. SWA, 12.08.1908, BA-B, R 1001/ 1914, 43-44. As late as 1909 the colonial government and military were still debating whether a more militarized form of organization (gendarmerie) would be preferable to the existing one. Governor Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to Colonial Offie, 04.10.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 121-127; Commander v. Glasenapp (*Schutztruppe* Command) to Lindequist (RKA), 28.07.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 116-118; Golinelli (Abt. A, RKA) to Lindequist (RKA), 30.07.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 119-120; State Secretary Dernburg (RKA) to Gouv. SWA, 05.04.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 7-11.

[436] In the 1905 charter, African police assistants had a whole paragraph dedicated to them. In 1907, in an internal note on the organization and regulation of the *Landespolizei*, Chief of Police Heydebreck noted, that "the solution to the native question [meaning Africans who were employed in the police force, policemen included; M.M.] encounters difficulties which will have to be reported on separately." I have found no evidence following this statement defining or regulating the status and role of the African police staff afterwards. Notes by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL), 29.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page number.

[437] See Zollmann who elaborates on the discussion among officials regarding African policemen's "Beamtenstatus." *Zollmann, Koloniale Herrschaft*, 64.

While police headquarters sketched out the "implementation rules" of the 1907 decree, Chief of Police Heydebreck simultaneously initiated the effort to standardize police work in a general instruction manual, the so-called *Dienstvorschrift*. I found several drafts in the archive as well as extensive comments from officials within the colonial government and military, and from magistrates, district chiefs, and inspection officers.[438] This little book was designed to give each policeman "in brief form, an instruction about his status [*Stellung*] and his behavior."[439] Together with their daybook (*Dienstbuch*), policemen were expected to have one on hand at all times. Or rather, each police station was supposed to have at least one available for the policemen to consult.[440]

The manual focused on form and formalities. In the first section (there were five total), two pages were dedicated to the various kinds of salute or address policemen had to conform to depending on the rank and station of an encountered person.[441] Paragraph seven entitled "Oral Reports and Notifications" detailed how policemen had to hold themselves when reporting to their superiors:

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[438] The entire complex is filed in BA-B, R 1002/ 2692.

[439] "[…] in kurzer Form eine Anleitung für seine Stellung und sein Verhalten geben." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 02.01.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 5.

[440] A decree from September 1909 ordered, since the manuals "still have not been distributed by some district offices to their subordinate police stations," to report in December every year whether "all police stations [had been] supplied with at least 1 copy," and stipulated that if the offices did not have enough, to have them replicated. Cirular by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices and Police Depots, 04.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 101.

[441] §§ 4-7: "Ehrenbezeugungen," "Verhalten den Offizieren usw. der Kaiserlichen Schutztruppe gegenüber," "Vorschrift, betreffend Anrede", "Mündliche Meldungen und Anzeigen." *Dienstvorschrift*, 6-8. Metropolitan police stressed appearance and formality above everything else as well. The entire first part of an instruction manual (1886) for the Prussian police forces focussed exclusively on proper saluting, hierarchies, and obedience. Only one of the 39 articles within this first section gave advice on proper behavior towards the public, simply stating that it was to be "polite and obliging." Otto Held, *Die bestehende Organisation und die erforderliche Reorganisation der preußischen Polizei Verwaltung mit Rücksicht auf die wünschenswerthe Erweiterung derselben zur Deutschen Reichspolizei* (Berlin, 1886), sec. 4. Cit. in Herbert Reinke, "'Armed As If For War': The State, the Military and the Professionalisation of the Prussian Police in Imperial Germany," in *Policing Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940*, ed. by Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 55.

> When giving oral reports and notifications the policeman's address has to be short, decided and clear, and must not be accompanied by any illustrative [*erläuternd*] gestures, hand or body movements.[442]

Correct uniforming was meticulously spelled out over another four pages in the annex.[443] Instructions to the middle management usually mentioned first questions pertaining to the supervision of form. Senior staff sergeants, for instance, had to visit all their sector's police stations once a month and check on "military demeanor [and] appearance."[444] Only thereafter did the *Dienstvorschrift* instruct the senior staff sergeants to inquire into "overall training and overall police duties," closing the paragraph with yet another list of issues about proper form, namely "the keeping of the daybooks, horses, weapons, ammunition, and equipment."[445] Photographic evidence documenting the inspection visit of an officer shows a police station's crew standing to attention in front of their office building while holding out their equipment (figure 3). The form I am referring to here was thus primarily related to appearance, to the outward aspects of the policeman's body, his uniform, movements, material, to the image of the police he conveyed, and less to the formalization of action-reaction routines. In chapter one I argue at length that the *Landespolizei* was particularly anxious to uphold its own and each individual member's reputation and honor, and the manual precisely reflected this concern for the instructions about proper appearance were mostly about attaining and retaining authority through dress and comportment.

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[442] "Bei allen mündlichen Meldungen und Anzeigen soll die Rede der Polizeibeamten kurz, bestimmt und deutlich sein und darf nicht von erläuternden Gebärden, Hand- und Körperbewegungen begleitet sein." *Dienstvorschrift*, 8.
[443] Annex 4, Ibid., 51-55.
[444] "Dienstanweisung für die diensttuenden Polizei-Wachtmeister (Oberwachtmeister) der Bezirks- und Distriktsämter," Ibid., 38. This order of priorities is also given to the inspection officers. "Dienstanweisung für die Inspektionsoffiziere," Annex 3, Ibid., 49.
[445] Ibid., 38.

FIGURE 3
Review of a police station by an inspection officer, no date. Source: Bildarchiv, Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt a.M.

Accordingly, the entire second section of the book was exclusively dedicated to the policemen's professional and social standing and to the duties and codes of behavior that were prescribed by his status (*Berufs- und Standespflichten*). "Obedience towards all superiors, discipline [*Manneszucht*], sense of honor, and a comradely mind" – those were the principles policemen had to abide by.[446] The manual prescribed "sober, virtuous, and honorable conduct,"[447] and stipulated "reputable behavior"[448] both during and outside of duty. To assure the policeman's reputation, wives and children were to be "kept under order and discipline."[449] Policemen had to be free from debt, and their uniforms had to be clean. Accepting gifts was prohibited, as was drinking alcohol while on duty, or engaging in any form of trade. Moreover, policemen were not allowed to join political organizations.[450] In several passages, the *Dienstvorschrift* urged policemen to pay close attention to their

[446] "Gehorsam gegen alle Vorgesetzten, Manneszucht, Ehrgefühl und kameradschaftlicher Sinn." Ibid., 9.
[447] "[…] nüchterner, sittlicher, ehrenhafter Lebenswandel […]." Ibid., 9, 12.
[448] "[…] sich in und außer Dienst eines anständigen Benehmens zu befleißigen." Ibid., 9.
[449] "[…] so sind die Verheirateten verpflichtet, Frau und Kinder in Zucht und Ordnung zu halten." Ibid., 12.
[450] Ibid., 9-12.

manners and behavior. They had to be "polite and obliging," and to "keep a calm composure at all times" as well as maintain "self-possession."[451] These prescriptions were thus more of the order of self-discipline rather than detailed recommendations on how to navigate particular encounters when representing the colonial state. In this sense, and borrowing from Clifford Geertz' useful reminder of the tripartite etymology of the state, the manual reflected notions of estate and stateliness, rather than statecraft.[452]

Among the 57 paragraphs, several annexes, and an additional series of bulletins, the "treatment of the natives" received merely four paragraphs.[453] Initial drafts had stated that

> one of the most difficult and most important tasks of the policeman is the treatment and education of the natives, [and] justice must prevail in particular in those cases in which the policemen have the difficult task to rule on disputes between whites and natives.[454]

Both the idea that policing Africans was the hardest and most important part of policing as well as the admission of difficulty when it came to mediating between colonizers and colonized were edited out of the later drafts.[455] What remained in the final version was ambiguous counsel based on racist assumptions. It cautioned policemen not to interfere in

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[451] Ibid., 9-10.

[452] "That master noun of modern political discourse, *state*, has at least three etymological themes diversely condensed within it: status, in the sense of station, standing, rank, condition - *estate* [...]; pomp, in the sense of splendor, display, dignity, presence - *stateliness* [...]; and governance, in the sense of regnancy, regime, dominion, mastery - *statecraft* [...]. And it is characteristic of that discourse, and of its modernness, that the third of these meanings, the last to arise [...], should have to come to dominate the term as to obscure our understanding of the multiplex nature of high authority. Impressed with command, we see little else." Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteeth-Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 121.

[453] "Behandlung der Eingeborenen." *Dienstvorschrift*, 13-15.

[454] "Eine der schwierigsten und wichtigsten Aufgaben der Polizeibeamten ist die Behandlung und Erziehung der Eingeborenen." And: "Gerechtigkeit muss besonders in den Fällen obwalten, in denen den Polizeibeamten die schwierige Aufgabe erwächst bei Zwistigkeiten zwischen Weissen und Eingeborenen zu entscheiden." Draft by Chief of Police Heydebreck, no date [ca. Sept. 1907], BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 13-14, quote: 13; and, draft by Chief of Police Heydebreck, no date [ca. spring/summer 1908], BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page number.

[455] Notes in the margin might have provided reasons for editing one of the two passages out, but unfortunately they were written with pencil and were later erased.

"petty" conflicts amongst Africans, or between them and their European employers. Especially regarding the latter relationship, the handbook recommended "keeping reticent," just to remind its readers immediately thereafter that this was true only if compatible with their duty to police labor relations.[456] The overall "guiding principle" (*Richtschnur*) that the manual suggested was to show "severity which must not degenerate into harshness or cruelty."[457] Policemen were to "abstain from any kind of swearwords towards natives or even assaults accompanied by gross swearwords," yet had to make sure that Africans would not "be spared" their "deserved punishment," for "indulgence is not interpreted by the natives as benignity and clemency but as weakness."[458] The manual stated that "a kind word toward natives is often advisable to instill trust or to laud their work. But one is to desist from joking and banter."[459] In order to "assess the natives fairly," the manual recommended that policemen learn about their "minds and characteristics." Two lines further down, however, it already provided such an assessment when it noted that "on the one hand, the native is not yet a mature member of humanity, on the other hand, his natural dispositions [*Naturanlagen*] make him in various abilities superior to men of culture [*Kulturmenschen*]."[460] In short, the *Dienstvorschrift* reflected common racist views advocating a paternalist while vigilant attitude toward the colonized, resulting in rather equivocal directions as to when to use what measures, notably violence.

At the end of the manual, in the last section, hidden between some general explanations about the police's overall structure and training and a couple of paragraphs on disciplinary

[456] *Dienstvorschrift*, 13-14.
[457] Ibid., 14.
[458] Ibid., 14-15.
[459] Ibid., 15.
[460] Ibid., 14.

actions in case of transgression, were some concrete and fairly detailed guidelines as to how to proceed in specific situations. These remaining paragraphs seem to have been modeled on gendarmerie and police manuals from the homeland, and thus made sense only to a limited extent in the colonial context.[461] The directives covered: filing charges, making arrests and confiscations, house searches, proper weapon usage, overseeing mass gatherings, transporting prisoners, and handing out deliveries.[462] In theory, these applied to policing both the colonizer and colonized populations. But since the latter had received attention in a separate section, this last part of the handbook could easily be perceived as irrelevant to the African population and was probably not pertinent to the bulk of everyday police work.[463]

Finally, just like the 1907 decree mentioned above, the entire *Dienstvorschrift* gave not a single word to the African staff, detailing neither their rights and tasks, nor their conduct and attitude towards the public.[464] Revealingly, the rare cases of regulations that did pertain specifically to African policemen concerned primarily questions of appearance and standing. This becomes evident in the repeated orders emphasizing that African policemen were not allowed to wear military insignia.[465] Also, police headquarters found it necessary

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[461] The district office in Swakopmund had equipped itself with several police handbooks from the homeland – for instance, a copy of the "Dienstanweisung des Polizei-Präsidiums Berlin" (1899). NAN, BSW, 125 UA.26/1, 1-30. Police headquarters in Windhuk got interested in these around the time it drafted its own manual. See Freytag (IdL) to Magistrate Blumhagen (District Office Swakopmund), 29.11.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 12-13. Moreover, I found a copy of another police manual in the headquarters' files. Weydemann, *Diensteintheilung der Polizei-Exekutive zu Halle a. S.* (Halle a.S.: Heynemann'sche Buchdruckerei, 1891), BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 64.

[462] *Dienstvorschrift*, 26-33.

[463] The colonized are explicitly mentioned in this last section, but only as an exception to the rule, and only once. When listing the different variables that have to apply before an arrest can take place, Africans are listed as the one category where no prerequisites are necessary. Ibid., 27.

[464] They only show up once in the annex, and there only to specify their equipment. "Bestimmungen für die Haltung der Pferde, Waffen, Munition und Ausrüstungsstücke bei der berittenen Landespolizei," Ibid., 39-42.

[465] See, for instance, Transportation Bureau *Schutztruppe* to police station Keetmanshoop, 28.12.1909, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 7.

to decree expressly how police assistants had to salute superiors and what their correct posture towards Europeans in general should be.[466] In 1914, although too late to go into effect, Chief of Police Bethe prohibited disciplining African policemen with corporal punishment.[467] Inspection Officer Medding had already laid out the issue as it had been discussed amongst magistrates and other officials. His wording, on which Bethe's ordinance was based, testifies to the way in which even this crucial matter was unfailingly discussed in terms of honor and prestige. What mattered above all was to fare well in comparison to the British Empire and to instill a sense of honor in the African members of the *Landespolizei* in order to distinguish them from the rest of the colonized. In addition, Medding's letter is a telling confirmation of the German police force's dependence on its African counterparts:

> At the border where there will always be the comparison with English natives and their different treatment, we will only have good natives who fulfill the very important and indispensable position of police servant, who can read tracks well, and who are particularly well suited as interpreters, if we treat these natives differently than the average of our natives, especially if we don't punish them with 'corporal chastisement'. […] The police servant has to feel himself above the other natives. […] Additional drill, detention, deprivation, and fines are in my long years of experience a complete alternative to corporal punishment which, notably among the Herero, is always perceived as dishonorable.[468]

[466] Decree by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL), 18.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2591, 37.
[467] Draft of a circular by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all District Offices, 13.07.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2432, no page number, cit. in Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 81-82.
[468] "Gute Eingeborene, die der sehr wichtigen und nicht zu entbehrenden Stellung als Polizei Diener gerecht werden, die gut Spuren lesen können, vor Allem sich als Dolmetscher [16v] eignen, werden wir an der Grenze, wo immer der Vergleich mit englischen Eingeborenen und deren anderer Behandlung vorhanden ist, nur dann bekommen, wenn wir diese Eingeborenen Anders [sic] behandeln, wie den Durchschnitt unserer Eingeborenen, vor Allem, wenn wir sie nicht mit "körperlicher Züchtigung" bestrafen. […] Der Polizei Diener muß sich den andern Eingeborenen gegenüber in "gehobener Stellung" fühlen, dies ist aber unmöglich, wenn er mit Prügelschlägen bestraft wird. […] Nachexercieren, Arrest nicht Trunk-Geldstrafen [sic] sind nach meiner jahrelangen Erfahrung ein vollkommener Ersatz für die namentlich bei den Herero immer als entehrend empfundene Prügelstrafe." Inspection Officer Medding (Police Depot Spitzkoppe) to IdL, 11.03.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2594, 14-18.

In the discussion of the *Dienstvorschrift*, one magistrate went so far as to ask if written guidelines were necessary at all. He suggested that one should leave the instruction of policemen to the local authorities, that is, to men like himself. He specifically objected to formulating rules of conduct regarding contact with Africans. "Such rules of action," he wrote, "should rather belong in verbal instruction, they should remain unwritten, for they might raise wrong ideas."[469] Other magistrates, on the other hand, were impatient to receive written directives. One of them declared that he would soon write his own.[470] Windhuk colonial officials and local administrators debated for almost two years over the instruction manual, and when it was finally sent out in June 1909, authorization by the colonial ministry in Berlin was still pending.[471] Moreover, local administrations did not or could not necessarily forward the manuals to their outlying police stations.[472] Or if they did, it was not guaranteed that the handbooks would be read. Vice-governor Hintrager noted in January 1910 that

> although the offices have reported that the *Dienstvorschrift* has been distributed and is known to all policemen, investigation has shown that the policemen were unable to provide information on the simplest topics, such as superiors, professional and social duties, weapons usage. During briefing they utterly failed.[473]

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[469] "Ich bin für W[e]glassen. Derartige Verhaltensmassregeln gehören in die mündliche Instruktion, bleiben aber besser ungeschrieben, denn sie können falsche Vorstellungen erwecken." Magistrate Berengar Zastrow to IdL, 01.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, no page number.

[470] Magistrate Schultze from Grootfontein suggested he would write his own regulations. IdL to Dr. Schultze (District Office Großfontein), 10.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 95-95. Police headquarters had to appease several district offices. See, for example, District Office Omaruru to IdL, 21.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 112-113; District Office Maltahöhe to Idl, no date, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 123; IdL to District Office Omaruru, 29.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 177-178.

[471] State Secretary Dernburg (RKA) to Gouv. SWA, 05.04.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 7-11.

[472] For an early example, see Inspection Officer Müller who reported that Sergeant Hapke whom he had deployed to Otjiswa had repeatedly asked for instructions from the district office but had never received any and thus could not do his job. Inspection Officer Müller to IdL, 12.11.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 7. In fall 1909 some police stations had still not received their manuals. Circular by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to all district offices and police depots, 04.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 101.

[473] "Die Aemter haben zwar gemeldet, dass die Dienstvorschrift ausgegeben und sämtlichen Polizeibeamten bekannt sei. Eine Prüfung hat aber ergeben, dass die Polizeibeamten über die einfachsten Temata [sic] der

Eventually, in that same year, a printed version of the manual was published in Breslau. Two years later, in 1912, when police headquarters suggested an alteration regarding recruitment requirements, the Colonial Office in Berlin claimed that it had still not given its final approval for the initial manual.[474] By then, having made do without a manual, or with minimal knowledge of the content of the existing one, policemen had constructed their own code of conduct.

Other, more specific policing rules, notably those pertaining to the use of force – regarding the usage of weapons, for instance – remained indeterminate and qualified by exceptions until the end of the German colonial period. Notably, the question of whether African policemen should be allowed to carry firearms was debated throughout the colonial period. I address in more detail the development of weapons usage – that is, who was allowed to use which kind and in what way – in the chapter on technologies of violence.[475] Likewise, uncertainties about disciplinary powers – who was authorized and in what way to reprimand policemen – took a long time to be resolved. Here, the conflict was first and foremost about whether the civil or the military arm of the police force was responsible, and which was more capable.[476]

It appears, then, that a majority of administrators at police headquarters and in the local offices felt that, to a certain extent, the less they put in writing about handling

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Dienstvorschrift, als da sind, Vorgesetzte, Berufs- und Standespflichten, Waffengebrauch nicht Auskunft zu erteilen wussten und bei der Vorinstruktion vollständig versagten." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 03.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2552, 4.

[474] "Die Genehmigung einer Abänderung der Dienstvorschrift für die berittene Landespolizei kann zur Zeit nicht in Frage kommen, da die Dienstvorschrift selbst noch nicht genehmigt ist." State Secretary Wilhelm Solf (RKA) to Gouv. SWA, 23.05.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2417, 32.

[475] See chapter 5.

[476] Governor v. Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 09.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2467, 9; Decree by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA), 05.08.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 5.

concrete situations, the better it would be. Or at least, they hesitated to consolidate such guidelines on paper, because they did not want to be hemmed in by the law. I am not sure how conscious a decision this was, but it supplemented the structural inconsistencies, the hybrid institutional make-up as well as the uncertainty, of what pertained to the realm of policing. My argument is hence that, despite an insistence on absolute order, and despite the will to regulate each and every part of life through executive orders, to a large extent the official state left open the question of *how* to bring about that order. This observation pertained particularly to the realm of violence and its relation to race. There, the colonial state officials who debated and decided upon police regulations seemed to rely on an under-articulated and unreflective ideology, on unquestioned and ostensibly shared assumptions, on notions of honor and duty, which would somehow guide the policeman in the field and indicate to him how to act.[477]

Furthermore, pragmatic considerations fed into this understanding. Some administrators were well aware that the limitations and constraints of the colonial system granted individual policemen room for maneuver that they would not have enjoyed in the homeland. Magistrate Todt, for instance, noted that,

> remote police stations must be granted a certain independence when making decisions. Otherwise the organization of orderly conditions will be made illusory as a result of delays caused by great distances.[478]

[477] I do not think that the emphasis on values such as honor or respectability which dictated restraint and moderation was hypocrisy or a lip-service to appease a liberal public, as Lüdtke has argued regarding a similar discourse in Prussian police handbooks of the mid-nineteenth century. To the contrary, I believe that those were honestly intended counsels understood to be much more helpful than any practical step-by-step guide. Cf. Lüdtke, *"Gemeinwohl", Polizei und "Festungspraxis"*, 318.

[478] "Entlegeneren Polizeistationen muß eine gewisse Selbständigkeit im Entschluß zugesprochen werden, wenn anders die Durchführung geordneter Zustände nicht infolge Verzögerungen wegen großer Entfernungen illusorisch gemacht werden soll." Magistrate Todt (District Office Windhuk) to IdL, 04.11.1912, NAN, ZBU, 108, A III e 1, 126.

State Secretary Lindequist affirmed that the "difficult exigencies" of the colonial theater demanded "a certain independence and inner strength of character" from policemen.[479] And if one read the *Dienstanweisung* very carefully, one could find that even there independent initiative was allowed when the situation asked for it.[480] Depending on their disposition, policemen perceived this leeway as an opportunity or as a burden. Either way, it forced the men to come up with procedures and ways of handling things by themselves. In the following section of the chapter I show how policemen filled out and appropriated the sphere of action opened to them by the equivocality of their regulations and the generally indefinite structure and mission of the police. But first, I close this section with a brief contextualizing account of the general daily conditions in which police practices emerged.

The compound organizational structure of the police force caused frequent internal conflict. In theory, chains of command were parceled out according to different functions: the military division, i.e. notably the inspection officers under the chief of police's command, was responsible for the policemen's initial (military) training, their physical form and bearing, and their deployment; the civil division, i.e. the magistrates and district chiefs under the governor's command, was responsible for additional training and gave orders with respect to day-to-day business.[481] In reality, roles were not that well separated. Since recruits who were still in training already carried out actual police duties, their instructors, that is the inspection officers, were in fact also in charge of everyday police

[479] "[…] schweren Anforderungen des eine gewisse Selbständigkeit und innere Charakterfestigkeit verlangenden Polizeidienstes […]." State Secretary Lindequist (RKA) to Gouv. SWA, 27.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2502, 79-80.
[480] "In dringenden Fällen hat jeder […] Beamte der Landespolizei, auch ohne einem Amte überwiesen oder von ihm beauftragt zu sein, die Pflicht, selbständig polizeiliche Handlungen vorzunehmen." *Dienstvorschrift*, 23.
[481] Ibid., 22.

affairs. And magistrates and district chiefs often decided on deployment questions by way of commissioning mandates which called for additional staff at some station or other.[482] Moreover, these magistrates and district chiefs found it particularly difficult to accept directives from the chief of police who was the highest commander of all policemen, but ranked equally with local administrators; he was not their superior.[483] Equally tense was the relationship between the police and the military in general.[484] Thus, scholars are in principle right when they state that discord internal to the colonial administration hindered the development of a well-greased state apparatus.[485] Not all conflict between the two branches resulted in malfunction, however. In some cases, it caused both magistrates and inspection officers to urge their policemen to more activity.[486]

The most grievously felt limitation of the police force, from the perspective of its members, was the lack of manpower. Not dissimilar to the argument often repeated by police forces (as well as publics and states) today, and equally dubious, their claim was that

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[482] Chief of Police trying to mediate in questions of deployment: Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all District Offices and Police Depots, 24.02.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 131-132. On the conflict between inspection officers and magistrates, see also Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 44-48.

[483] See, for instance, a letter by District Chief v. Falkenberg, who perceived police headquarter's "tone of patronizing censure [*belehrender Zurechtweisung*] as misplaced and offending." District Chief v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru) to IdL, 29.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2508, 26-27. Full quote: "Da die Inspektion der Landespolizei – soweit die hiesige Information reicht – nicht eine dem Distriktsamt übergeordnete, sondern gleichgeordnete Dienststelle ist, so empfindet das Distriktsamt den von der Inspektion angeschlagenen Ton belehrender Zurechtweisung als deplaciert und verletzend. Es bittet daher das Kaiserl. Gouvernement sehr gehorsamst, die Inspektion hierauf aufmerksam zu machen, und geneigtest dahin wirken zu wollen, daß ein solcher Ton in Zukunft unterbleibt."

[484] See, for instance, commander of the *Schutztruppe*, Major Estorff, disapproving of having to send out military missions on false information because in his eyes, the police had not done its job. Commander Estorff (*Schutztruppe* Command) to Gouv. SWA, 30.11.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 3. See, in return, an inspection officer from Bethanien who complained in 1911 that military had not even taken notice of the police's existence. Police Depot Bethanien to IdL, 31.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2694, 51.

[485] Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*; Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft.*

[486] The long lasting dispute between District Chief von Frankenberg and Inspection Officer Hildebrandt, which prompted both men to spur their subordinates on, is a good example for this. See, for instance, Magistrate v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru) to IdL, 09.01.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2508, 159. Magistrate v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru) to Gouv. SWA, 29.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2508, 26-27. Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Depot Waterberg) to IdL, 28.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2535, 134-136.

more policemen would necessarily create more security.[487] *Landespolizei* superiors and subordinates alike claimed that if only they had sufficient staff things would run smoothly in the colony.[488] As a matter of fact, although manpower rarely reached the level authorized in annual budgets, the discrepancy was not as severe as some accounts would have us believe. The initial budget sanctioned by the *Reichstag* in 1907 had foreseen a size of 720 German and 370 African men. Just one year later, the budget was cut to an authorized size of 470 and 260.[489] In early 1908, only about 160 German but already 220 African policemen were in the *Landespolizei*. Yet by the end of that year, boosted by sustained recruitment from the metropole, the number of German recruits had surpassed 400.[490] By 1912, they were at a high of circa 570 and 320, respectively. In 1914, the numbers decreased again to around 470 and 370 men.[491] Granted, this was not an exorbitant number of men to police a population of about 70,000 Africans and 14,800 settlers (1913),

[487] Cf. Karl-Heinz Reuband, "Steigert Polizeipräsenz das Sicherheitsgefühl? Eine Vergleichende Studie in West- und Ostdeutschen Städten," in *Angewandte Kriminologie zwischen Freiheit und Sicherheit: Haftvermeidung, Kriminalprävention, Persönlichkeitsstörungen, Restorative Justice*, edited by Heinz Schöch and Jörg-Martin Jehle (Mönchengladbach: Forum Verlag Godesberg, 2004), 255–272.
[488] See, for instance, Magistrate Schenke (District Office Swakopmund) to Gouv. SWA, 13.07.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 151-152. Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 30ff.
[489] 1907 budget: "Denkschrift betreffend die Stärke und die Organisation der Schutztruppe und der Landespolizei in Südwestafrika nach Beendigung des Eingeborenen-Aufstandes," in *Stenographische Berichte des Reichstags (SBRT)*, vol. 242 (1907), annex 397, addendum I, 28-30; see also an early draft of *Landespolizei* regulations where the numbers mentioned are 700 and 300. Heydebreck, Joachim Friedrich (IdL): Entwurf betr. die Organisation der Landespolizei. Im Anschluß an die Denkschrift Beilage I. zur zweiten Ergänzung zum Etat für das Südwestafrikanische Schutzgebiet. 02.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 120-145. 1908 budget: Heydebreck (IdL) to Gouv. SWA: Jahresbericht. 14.05.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 7. Cf. Rafalski, who erroneously lists an authorized strength of over 700 men for 1907 through 1911, of 600 for 1912, and of 500 for 1913 and 14. Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 72.
[490] Cf. 1908 annual report which already lists 16 staff sergeants and 278 sergeants. Annual report by Chief of Police Heydebreck (IdL), 08.05.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 2. The 1909 annual report claims that the authorized strength of 470 was met in October 1908. See annual report by Chief of Police Heydebreck (IdL), 14.05.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 7.
[491] For numbers by years, see IdL: "Nachweisung Etatstärke," BA-B, R 1002/ 47, 160; Bureau C2: "Aufzeichnung zur Frage der Umgestaltung der Landespolizei in S.W.A.," 16.04.1912, BA-B, R 1001/ 1914, 200; Registers of staff members of the IdL, 1909-1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2485, 4-140. Hans Hensel (IdL): Wirtschaftsplan 1914, eingeb. Arbeiter u. Pol.Diener. 19.03.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2593, 1-4; Cf. Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 72, 102; Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 46, 69; Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 297.

on a territory of approximately 501.000 square kilometers.[492] It differed little, however, from the situation, at least in rural areas, in the mother country.[493] Police stations were usually manned by two to six men while keeping a slight white majority. Obviously this was not possible at stations where there was only one German policeman, and on patrols the ratio was often 1:1.[494] Larger town stations attached to district offices and the police depots garrisoned ten to thirty men.[495]

Interestingly, the *Landespolizei* was initially meant to be an exclusively German force, merely helped by a few African men serving as messengers, guides, and prisoner guards.[496] But police headquarters quickly realized that particularly as trackers and interpreters, and "to mediate in negotiations with the native population, a sufficient number of loyal and dependable native police servants are an absolute necessity."[497] In many respects, the

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[492] Not the entire colony was policed. The *Landespolizei* limited its activity to the so-called police zone in which settlers could buy property and expect protection. See "Karte des unter polizeilichen Schutz der Regierung zu stellenden Gebietes in Deutsch-Südwestafrika" (1907) Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz. For the population numbers, see Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 110.

[493] Jürgen W. Schmidt: *Die Kommunale Polizei der preußischen Klein- und Mittelstädte und ihre Probleme von der Mitte des 19. bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts.* In: Jürgen W. Schmidt (ed.) *Polizei in Preußen im 19. Jahrhundert.* (Ludwigsfelde: Ludwigsfelder Verlagshaus, 2011), 8-46. Even in Berlin the ratio was 1:350, compared to Windhuk with 1:175. Reinke, "Professionalisation of the Prussian Police," 63; Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 218.

[494] Ideally, all stations should have had at least three German men. Stations with only one German man were not supposed to exist, but they did. District Grootfontein, for instance, had three stations with only one German man and another manned with both four German and four black men in December 1908. Magistrate Schulze (District Office Grootfontein) to IdL, 23.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2694, 20-22. For examples of patrols with as many African as German men, see, for instance, patrol book, Police Depot Waterberg, 02.01.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 54.

[495] Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 73-75, 120.

[496] "Die Einrichtung der eingeborenen Polizisten, die früher mangels genügender weißer Polizeimannschaften verwandt werden mussten, hat sich nicht bewährt. In Zukunft sollen nur eingeborene Polizeidiener angestellt werden, die den Boten und Führerdienst bei Patrouillenritten sowie die Beaufsichtigung der eingeborenen Gefangenen bei der Arbeit zu übernehmen haben." "Denkschrift Landespolizei" in *SBRT*, vol. 242 (1907), annex 397, addendum I, 30.

[497] "Ferner werden diese Polizeidiener zum Spurenlesen auf Patrouille, als Dolmetscher und zum Vermitteln bei Verhandlungen mit der eingeborenen Bevölkerung […] verwendet ist eine genügende Zahl von treuen und zuverlässigen Polizeidienern ein unbedingtes Erfordernis." Probably because it revealed too much the police force's dependency on African policemen, the second part of the sentence was struck out of the final draft. Annual report by Chief of Police Heydebreck (IdL), 14.05.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 11. See also the *Landespolizei* 1910 annual report that stated, "Das [schwarze; M.M.] Personal muß als durchaus unzureichend

African police assistants were the linchpin of policing. Without them, little would have worked. And thus, although it was seen as an annoyance, the police force kept its racially mixed composition until the end of German colonial rule, as the numbers above confirm. In the everyday, African and German policemen worked together. In fact, as should become clear later on, in many cases, colonial state power could only unfold and be effective because it was practiced as an interracial project on the ground.

The available "human material", as Governor Schuckmann called the men of the *Landespolizei*, was certainly not always the best.[498] Promotion prospects were minimal, which deterred more accomplished men from transferring from the military to the police. A policeman with a sizable criminal or disciplinary record was not a rarity. In its 1910 annual report, police headquarters observed that the military was not sending them the "worst of the worst" anymore, but that "former *Schutztruppen* members poll[ed] badly with regard to penalty figures."[499] A survey of the military rolls in the personnel files of the *Landespolizei* supports this assessment.[500] The Colonial Office in Berlin stated in 1911 that repeated examples had shown that it was "not dependable" to ask the candidate himself whether he

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bezeichnet werden, der Mangel an Eingeborenen erschwert den Dienstbetrieb ungemein." Annual report, IdL, 14.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 59.

[498] In 1909, governor Schuckmann deplored that most "shortcomings" of the police were caused by poor staff ("Menschenmaterial"). Governor Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 18.06.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2692, 15. Regarding colonial officials in general, Assistant Secretary of State Heinrich Schnee observed in 1911, "that one has not always the very best civil servant material at one's disposal," but that if only trained properly, "even mediocre civil servants can achieve something useful." ("Es kann nicht damit gerechnet werden, daß immer nur das allerbeste Beamtenmaterial für das Gouvernement zur Verfügung steht, […] daß selbst mittelmässige Beamte brauchbares leisten." RKA to Gouv. Kamerun, 24.11.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2424, 19.

[499] "Die Truppe scheint nunmehr auch im Süden von dem Grundsatz abgegangen zu sein 'für die Polizei ist das Schlechteste noch nicht schlecht genug', für die L.P. besseres Material zu stellen, demzufolge ist der Ersatz aus der Truppe als gut zu genügend zu bezeichnen, wenn auch die ehemaligen Schutztruppenangehörigen in der Bestrafungsziffer schlecht abschneiden." Annual report 1909 by bureau D and IdL, 25.05.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 25-47, quote: 27-28.

[500] Each German policeman had to provide his military roll excerpt on which penalties were registered. See personnel files in BA-B, R 1002/ 91-1957 and BA-B, R 1002/ 2804-3591.

had committed any crimes prior to his enlistment in the military and police.[501] Accusations raised by the settler parliament (*Landesrat*) that the African policemen in particular had been former criminals led to an internal investigation which revealed that this was not the case.[502] The magistrates' and district chiefs' reports show, however, that police assistants were as likely to have previous convictions as were their sergeants or staff sergeants.[503] Moreover, both African and German policemen were disciplined for smaller and greater breaches on numerous occasions during their time in the police force.[504] As Chief of Police Bethe noted, "unfortunately, there are only a few ideal types among the policemen."[505] Oftentimes, policemen were bereft of one set of skills entirely, but proficient in another. For example, many men who were recruited for their artisanal expertise could barely read or write. In the end, a lot depended on how sensitive inspection officers or magistrates were to the problem. If they knew where to deploy what sort of men, affairs usually ran more fluidly.[506] But that was not always the case. Sergeant Strunck, for instance, noted in a letter to his brother, that "me, with my lousy handwriting, they have now ordered to the office, and now I have to run the whole shebang."[507]

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[501] "Die Anwärter selbst zu befragen, ob sie bestraft sind oder nicht, führt weniger verlässig zur Feststellung etwaiger Vorstrafen als die Einholung eines Strafregisterauszuges." State Secretary Lindequist (RKA) to Gouv. SWA: Feststellung von Vorstrafen. 09.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2427, 65.
[502] Circular by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all district offices, depots, and officer posts, 29.12.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2594, 3, and corresponding replies, BA-B, R 1002/ 2594, 4-31.
[503] Ibid.
[504] Ibid., and disciplinary records in personnel files, BA-B, R 1002/ 91-1957 and BA-B, R 1002/ 2804-3591.
[505] "Idealgestalten gibt es leider auch unter den Polizeibeamten nur wenige." Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to District Office Grootfontein, 02.11.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 3483, 48.
[506] Magistrate Böhmer from district Lüderitzbucht, for instance, was quite good at deploying men where their skills were needed. That inspection officers should be aware of this and deploy accordingly was stated in a circular to all police depots. Governor v. Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to all Inspektionsoffiziere: Neuordnung der Landespolizei. 23.06.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 57. See also the case of Sgt. Wernicke who was annoyed to be constantly redeployed to places because his skills were needed. Letter by Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Großfontein) to Sgt. Otto Wernicke (Police Station Nurgas), 07.02.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 28-31.
[507] "Was sagst Du nun dazu, mich mit meiner miserablen Handschrift haben sie nun aufs Büro k'diert und muß nun da den Kram schmeißen." Hermann Strunck to Johann, Strunck, 26.09.1910, (private archive of

Moreover, the police force had little equipment. Furniture, horses, paper, uniforms, even entire buildings were lacking. The old firearms and the insufficient housing gave particular cause for complaint.[508] A more peculiar deficiency were camels that were used in some places instead of horses and seemed to be not at all useful.[509] Often, policemen had to rely on outside help such as buildings provided by farmers or equipment made available by the military, for instance.[510] The many privations, and hence dependence on material support from other actors in the colonial theater, made policemen long for a strong professional culture and identity that would distinguish them and would accord with their official standards of social standing. One can detect this desire in the way individual policemen spruced up their only uniform and their sparsely furnished office (see figure 4), and in their overly correct manner when in contact with farmers.[511]

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family Strunck), quoted in: Kuno Franz Robert Budack, *Raubmord 1912: Die "Falk- und Sommer-Morde". Ein Beitrag zur Kriminalgeschichte von Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Windhoek: self-published, 1999), 9.

[508] See, for instance, District Chief v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru) to IdL, 18.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 3226, 56; report by Senior Civil Servant Roebern (IdL), 18.11.1909, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h, 15; and circular by Chief of Police Bethe (IdL), 25.03.1911, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h, 31.

[509] Not even to make an impressive entrance. See Sergeant Gentz's complaint about the fact and his frustration that there was no way one could ride the animal and keep one's dignity (or honor, as he framed it). Request for transfer by Sgt. Paul Gentz (Police Station Aninus) to District Chief Struwe (District Office Hasuur), 29.01.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2992.

[510] Annual report 1910, IdL, 14.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 68.

[511] For instance, Senior Staff Sgt. Eduard Boßenbeger (Police Station Maltahöhe) to IdL, 08.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 64.

FIGURE 4
"Police Sgt. Fritz Bursig in his room," no date.
Source: Schepp *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 155.

The climate was another taxing factor. Namibia's environment is hostile, comprised mostly of desert or arid highland. Very high and very low temperatures, scarcity of water punctuated by heavy rainfalls, as well as numerous pathogens accompanied the policemen's daily efforts. A significant number of men – especially the Europeans – were regularly unavailable because they were sick or exhausted. A 1912 report estimated the proportion of men on sick or home leave at twenty-five percent.[512] Police Sergeant Kowalke at police station Chairos, for instance, "suffer[ed] constantly from fever."[513] Concurrently, his station colleague Sergeant La Croix was hospitalized at the district's headquarter location Outjo with malaria. "He had broken down on his way hither ca. 40 km outside of Outjo, and had to be retrieved by a medical sergeant."[514] The station's senior,

[512] Internal report by bureau C2, 16.04.1912, BA-B, R 1001/ 1914, 200; Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 72.
[513] "Der Polizeisergeant Kowalke in Chairos hat andauernd unter Fieber zu leiden. Der Polizeisergeant La Croix - Chairos - liegt seit Ende Februar cr. im hiesigen Lazarett an Fieber [Malaria; M.M.] krank; er war auf dem Wege hierher ca 40 klm vor Outjo liegen geblieben und mußte durch einen Sanitätssergeanten hereingeholt werden." District Office Outjo to Depot Waterberg: Anfrage Ersatz. 10.03.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2507, 19.
[514] Ibid.

Sergeant Dawedeit, fractured his collarbone and was also off duty, which must have left the station manned with sick Kowalke and two police assistants. Contrary to racist preconceptions of their adaptation to harsh environments, African men fell sick too. Sergeant von Dufring, for instance, had to abort a patrol because one of his police assistants had fallen ill.[515] Almost the entire staff of police depot Kub, whatever their race, contracted malaria during the heavy rains of 1909. Five Africans died in the incident.[516] Coping with harsh climactic conditions often became the main achievement in police narratives. Coupled with the material deprivations these exploits seem to have fostered romanticized notions of an adventurous, dangerous life. Doctor Zachlehner promoted the idea when he told police headquarters that policemen in the colony had to be and were indeed tougher than their peers in the metropole.[517] And Vice Governor Brückner stressed that the extraordinarily hard lot of policemen and their secluded work demanded that they be tougher than *Schutztruppen* soldiers.[518] Police reports became more detailed, sometimes even florid, when danger had been involved.[519]

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[515] Patrol report by Sgt. v. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja) to District Office Okahandja, 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 19-37.

[516] "Der Gesundheitszustand der Beamten war ein mäßiger, da fast sämtliche Beamte infolge des starken Regenjahrres 1909, trotz der angewandten Chininprophylaxe von Malaria ergriffen wurden. [...] Auch die Eingeborenen hatten unter dem Malariafieber zu leiden, es sind 5 Todesfälle unter den Erwachsenen zu verzeichnen." Annual report 1909/1910 by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Kub), 01.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 48-55, quote: 51-52.

[517] "Wenn hier zu Lande jeder, der syphilitisch inficiert wurde, für tropendienstunfähig gelten soll, so müsste ein recht erheblicher Prozentsatz von Beamten und sonstigen Gouvernementsangestellten eliminiert werden. Nun kannte und kenne ich eine grosse Zahl von Leuten hier, die trotz überstandener Syphilis nicht nur jahrelang ihren Dienst getan, sondern auch den Orlog mit seinen sehr erheblichen Strapazen ohne weiteres mitgemacht haben und bin im Laufe einer annähernd 7 jährigen Tätigkeit in Südwestafrika zu der Ueberzeugung gekommen, dass die Syphilis hier zu Lande leichter und rascher verläuft als zu Hause […]."Medical report Makosch by Dr. Zachlehner to District Office Grootfontein, 01.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 3219, 30-31.

[518] "Die Anforderungen die an die Angehörigen der Landespolizei gestellt werden müssen, sind in den meisten Fällen höher, als die, denen die Soldaten der Schutztruppe ausgesetzt sind. Das liegt begründet in der Organisation der Landespolizei, der Eigenart des hiesigen polizeilichen Dienstes, der Tätigkeit auf einsamen kleinen Stationen, der Unmöglichkeit aus einer grösseren Mannschaft die für den Einzelfall geistig und

Space significantly determined the manner in which police work developed. Communication and transportation of supplies took a great deal of time. Policemen spent long stretches of time on horseback crossing the wide expanses of German Southwest Africa. Sergeant Link reported, for example, that on a patrol he and his African colleague had covered an average distance of six kilometers per hour. During the patrol in question they had traveled 488 kilometers in a span of twelve days.[520] An outlying post could operate on its own for weeks, even months, before it would get a visit from its inspection officer or a senior staff sergeant.[521] As a consequence, accountability was only sporadically guaranteed. One can assume therefore that policemen could get away with things as long as they were not caught by their superiors or exposed by the public. That policemen would let themselves go without regular superintendence and "go native" under the malign influence of the African climate, was a constant fear of superiors.[522] Inspection officer Freytag of depot Spitzkoppe worried in 1909, for instance, that his men on remote posts had been "smothered by the rather bleak conditions." "On many stations sloppiness reigns," he

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körperlich besonders geeignete Persönlichkeit immer heraus zufinden [sic]." Circular by Vice Governor Brückner (Gouv. SWA) to all district offices, 31.07.1910, NAN, BSW, 85 L.2.c, 13.

[519] See, for instance, Sgt. Hagner's overwritten report of a patrol on which he was attacked by San people with bows and arrows. Patrol report by Sgt. Xaver Hagner (Police Station Okaukwejo), 20.10.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 68-69; Patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Wilhelm Schweizer (Police Station Grootfontein), 05.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2793, 59-62.

[520] Patrol report by Sgt. Albert Link (Police Station Gobabis), 30.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 232-233. For distances in general, see, for instance, the very orderly patrol book from police depot Spitzkoppe: "Monat Januar 16 Patrouillen 2248 zurückgelegte Kilometer; Februar, 14 [Patrouillen], 2014 km; März, 18 [Patrouillen], 2534 km. Im 1. Vierteljahr 1911 wurden geritten: 48 Patrouillen mit insgesamt: 6796 zurückgelegten Kilometern." Patrol book for Jan. to March 1911 (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), 01.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 32-43.

[521] According to regulations, inspection officers had to inspect each station in their assigned area every three months, senior staff sergeants every month. *Dienstanweisung*, 38, 49.

[522] On "Verkafferung" and "Tropenkoller" see Felix Axster: "Die Angst vor dem *Verkaffern* - Politiken der Reinigung im deutschen Kolonialismus," *WerkstattGeschichte* 39 (2005): 39-53; Eva Bischoff, *Kannibale-Werden: Eine postkoloniale Geschichte deutscher Männlichkeit um 1900* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2011).

observed, and "the good life, drinking and other enjoyments are the main thing."[523] Thus, a year later, he sent several men back to the depot to be reminded of military discipline, "for it became noticeable that some of them could not bear the long freedom without strict supervision."[524] Moreover, training in civil matters was supposed to be a continuous enterprise for which policemen were required to return regularly to their district's headquarter location. This rule, however, took them away from their duty and took time. Thus, oftentimes, local administrators preferred to keep their men in place to the detriment of their further learning.[525]

That the policemen could not be experts in all the domains they were asked to administer is obvious. All men went through a quick training (usually six to eight weeks) at the police depots, focused primarily on military skills and those abilities useful in the colonial terrain, before being deployed to their station. Not seldom, instruction at the depot was inconsistent and patchy for various reasons.[526] Sometimes, because of shortages in

[523] "Es ist m.E. ein kolossaler Schlendrian auf vielen Stationen eingerissen, das gute Leben, trinken und andere Vergnügungen bilden die Hauptsache, worunter der Polizeidienst leidet und auch gelitten hat." Inspection report by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), 07.05.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2723, no page number.

[524] "[…] zur Disziplinierung von einer Außendienststelle ins Depot versetzt werden, da es sich bei manchen bemerkbar machte, daß sie die lange Freiheit auf einer Station ohne strenge Aufsicht nicht vertragen konnten." Annual report 1909/1910 by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Kub), 01.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 48-55, quote: 51.

[525] See, for instance, Magistrate v. Frankenberg who claimed that his men were not able to attend regular instruction sessions because of long distances. "Im hiesigen Verwaltungsbezirk ist es undurchführbar, daß die Beamten der Außenstationen allmonatlich am Amtssitz erscheinen, sei es zu einem Informationskursus, sei es zu anderen Zwecken. Der Grund hierfür ist in den großen Entfernungen der Stationen von Omaruru (65, 75, 100, 143, 215, 300km) und in der zu geringen Zahl von Beamten zu suchen." Magistrate v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru) to Brückner (Gouv. SWA), 03.11.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2553, 39.

[526] One inspection officer noted for instance that instruction had to be cancelled several times because of too much fluctuation in personnel, and because repairing the depot's buildings was more pressing. "Die Instruktion mußte infolge der vielen Ab- und Zugänge sowie, da die notwendigste Instandsetzung der Häuser viel Zeit in Anspruch nimmt mehrmals ausfallen." Report re: instruction by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub), 06.01.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2535, 30, 64. And acting Magistrate Krafft was so unsatisfied with the limited training of his men at the depots that he introduced his own exams. Acting Magistrate Krafft (District Office Outjo) to IdL, 17.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2535, 16-20.

personnel, policemen were sent out almost immediately.[527] Once deployed, ideally, policemen were supposed to be taught administration and legal skills by their local civil superiors. Some magistrates and district chiefs passed this responsibility down to their senior staff sergeants, some took it upon themselves to instruct the men. Whereas the superiors were learned men, usually in the law, staff sergeants were simple military men who had barely received any specialized training themselves. Only about half of the senior staff and staff sergeants of the *Landespolizei* had attended classes at the police school in Windhuk.[528] Due to the shortage in manpower, it could happen that sergeants were promoted even though they had failed their exams.[529] Others never passed an exam but were advanced in rank based on their seniority.[530] The schooled knowledge of these men could therefore have been only fragmentary. And, as I just suggested, on-the-job training was difficult to sustain for structural reasons. A significant number of African policemen had gone to missionary schools to learn the German language, as well as reading and writing.[531] Yet once in service, they were merely trained, if at all, in how to salute and how to stand at attention.[532] Their other skills, it was assumed, were "natural" and did not need to be taught. Thus, both African and German policemen were to a large extent left to learn

[527] See annual report 1908 by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub), 24.04.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 14-17; and Chief of Police Heydebreck's assessment: "Bisher mußten vielfach Polizeisergeanten, deren Ausbildung auf dem Depot noch nicht in zweckensprechender Weise beendet war, nach kurzer Zeit Verwaltungsstellen überwiesen wurden." Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to Police Depots Kupferberg, Kub, and Waterberg, 27.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 12.
[528] See all the files pertaining to "Vorschläge und Kommandierungen pp. für den Ausbildungskursus in Windhuk," 1908-1915, BA-B, R 1002/ 2536. For examples of men not being sent to police school for various reasons, see request re: suggestion of candidates by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all district offices and depots, 10.03.1909, and replies by District Offices Windhuk, Omaruru, and Gobabis, BA-B, R 1002/ 2536, 153, 156, 157, 161.
[529] Written exam by Sgt. Bruno Elsner, 21.12.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 9-11.
[530] Chief of Police Bethe (IdL) to District Office Bethanien, 02.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2536, 54; Chief of Police Heydebreck (IdL) to District Chief Wasserfall (District Office Bethanien), 27.01.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2796, 74.
[531] Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 70-71.
[532] Decree by Chief of Police Bethe, 18.04.1911. NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 72r. Report by Sgt. Johann Slottke (District Office Keetmanshoop), 01.05.1911, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 72v.

their job on the beat – by doing it. Savoir-faire was acquired through practice, rather than through instruction from above or from handbooks. In response to the harsh conditions, the shortage of manpower, and the lack of a definite body of regulations, an attitude emerged that celebrated precisely this reality. In a written exam a sergeant wrote that "practice and one's own experience are and remain the best teachers."[533] An ideology of the primacy of practice and experience had taken root.

2 The Workings of Everyday Policing

Police Procedure and Routine: Paperwork and Patrolling

Procedures revolved around either stationary or itinerant forms of police work.[534] The first kind was typical of larger stations which were attached to district offices or police depots. The second kind unfolded in the open territory at and in between the remote outposts. Procedures also varied depending on the rank of the policeman. Higher grades, that is senior staff and staff sergeants, developed daily routines consonant with their command responsibilities, whereas the sergeants, constables, and police assistants fashioned procedures in accordance with obeying orders.

Stationary procedures were created and carried out by larger groups of policemen under relatively close supervision. These groups were usually composed of married men

[533] "Der beste Lehrmeister ist und bleibt die Praxis und die eigene Erfahrung." Written exam by Sgt. K[…] [name illegible] (Police Depot Waterberg), 16.02.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2538, 79.
[534] I understand procedures to be structured ways of performing a task according to a prescribed plan of action, or according to one that is perceived as the correct one. That is, procedures pertain to the how, the modality of proceeding. De Certeau defines procedures simply as "schemas of operations and of technical manipulations." Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 43.

and those considered unfit for horseback duty.[535] Sometimes, these men lived with their families in rented apartments among the town population; sometimes they lived together in buildings adjacent to the station.[536] The group dynamics and organizational culture that arose out of stationary police work were marked by sustained contact with the public and the commanding authorities. Collegial relationships could remain fairly professional, since sociability could be found outside of the group. Policemen assumed specific responsibilities and thus did not need to be highly versatile. The southern town Keetmanshoop, for instance, had nine German and nine African policemen. The staff sergeant was in charge of general supervision and inventory; one sergeant led criminal investigations and answered to the court; two men managed weapons sales, customs, and population registries, and acted as clerks for the "native courts"; two men supervised the prisons (one for Africans, one for Europeans); finally, three sergeants undertook "police services proper", that is, patrolling and attending to the public's concerns and requests.[537] The nine African police assistants were also given different functions. As evidenced in another document, these men were assigned to specific tasks as well: to guard prisoners, to provide for livestock, to interpret, or to patrol.[538]

[535] Circular by Governor v. Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to all inspection officers, 23.06.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 57.
[536] Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 66-70. For a notion of the spatial setup, see the detailed map of all police stations in the Keetmanshoop area drafted by a sergeant for Magistrate Karl Schmidt (District Office Keetmanshoop), 31.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2695, 1-3; and map of the Grootfontein area (District Office Grootfontein), 23.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2694, 20-22.
[537] Ibid., 276.
[538] Senior Staff Sgt. Max Bahn (District Office Keetmanshoop) to IdL, 16.12.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 61-62.

Work at small, remote police stations differed from that in towns. Here, small units of two to five men had to work and live together in a "forced community."[539] They had to somehow get along with each other, and leisure time was spent with colleagues. Although it is difficult to prove empirically, I suspect that interracial contact was more frequent than at the larger town stations, by sheer virtue of the small numbers of men and the isolation. Men at police outposts had to perform all kinds of tasks and thus, by necessity, had to be resourceful. Daily life revolved around movement. In order to be able to do their job, policemen needed to travel between different posts, farms, and construction and mining sites, and along borders, waterways, and railways.

As a rule, the operation sequence of police work was the following. First, the magistrate or district chief would utter a directive which would be received by the senior commander of any given station. He would then verbally instruct his subordinates and simultaneously enter the assignment onto a blotter (*Dienstbuch*).[540] After fulfillment of the task, subalterns would report back, either orally or in writing. Depending on the importance of the mission, station commanders would then either write a separate report to the district chief or magistrate, or simply mention it in their next regular report. Thus, directions and accounts would move down and up the echelons by means of bureaucratic procedure.

To the higher officials of the administration, the bureaucratic recording of policemen's work was their most important link to subalterns. It guaranteed accountability and was, in their eyes, the basis for rationalized colonial rule. This notwithstanding, officials did not

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[539] "Zwangs-Gemeinschaften": see Alf Lüdtke, "Arbeit, Arbeitserfahrungen und Arbeiterpolitik. Zum Perspektivenwandel in der historischen Forschung," in *Eigen-Sinn: Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus*, edited by Alf Lüdtke (Hamburg: Ergebnisse, 1993), 379.
[540] For a template and instructions on how to fill out the blotters, see IdL to all offices and depots, 11.08.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2590, 193-198.

want bureaucratic practice to get out of hand. That would not be appropriate for the colony. A note to that effect by Vice Governor Hintrager commenting on a particular case in Outjo was sent to all police depots for instruction:

> A proceeding as has become favored there [in Outjo; M.M.] can, for the local circumstances, only be called exceedingly bureaucratic. For the protectorate, police work [*Polizeiwirtschaft*] as done in the homeland will not do. I must therefore expect that the decrees are strictly followed, but not in a way that will devolve into harassment of the population. The colony should not be administered with such a form of police spirit [*Polizeigeist*] which in the eyes of other nations is a German peculiarity.[541]

Besides, as I already mentioned earlier, paperwork was not considered to be the core of police work. But to the lower-rank policemen themselves bureaucratic procedure was the anchor, the practice that distinguished and legitimized them. The way they performed bureaucratic tasks was a "*differentiating* activit[y]" to use Michel de Certeau's conceptualization of everyday practices.[542] Stamps, signatures, reports – paper in general was of the utmost import to them. A staff sergeant at police depot Kub, for example, made it his task to certify signatures for a long time before Chief of Police Heydebreck put an end to this practice, reminding the staff sergeant that the depot was "a police station and not a civil service [*Behörde*]."[543] Likewise, Senior Staff Sergeant Boßenberger insisted resolutely on bureaucratic procedure even in the smallest of matters. In one case he prevented an African worker from picking up an ox and bringing it back to his employer. The police had

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[541] "Ein Vorgehen, wie es dort beliebt worden ist, kann ich für die hiesigen Verhältnisse nur als äusserst bureaukratisch bezeichnen. Für das Schutzgebiet passt die heimische Polizeiwirtschaft nicht. Ich darf daher erwarten, dass die Verordnungen zwar streng beachtet werden aber nicht in einer Weise, die zur Belästigung der Bevölkerung ausartet. Mit solchem Polizeigeist, der in den Augen anderer Nationen eine deutsche Eigentümlichkeit ist, darf eine Kolonie nicht verwaltet werden." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 30.12.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2552, 118.
[542] De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 59. Italics in original.
[543] "[…] daß das Depot sich jeglicher behördlichen Verwaltungsmaßnahme enthalten soll, da man Polizeistation keine Behörde ist [sic]." Internal note by Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to Senior Civil Servant Müller, 11.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2725, 5-6.

not been informed that the worker was permitted to do so. Without any means to get the ox back to his remote farm, farmer Bergemann had to sell the animal and thus had incurred a great loss, as he wrote in his inarticulate, misspelled complaint to the police.[544] Written expression being manifestly his forte, Senior Staff Sergeant Boßenberger responded:

> Since I have merely acted in the farmer's interest, I cannot see that I have caused harm by my correct line of action. Had Mr. Bergemann sent a written communication regarding his designs to the local police, the incident in question would not have occurred.[545]

Through bureaucratic practice Boßenberger drew a distinction between himself and the farmer, between the profession of police and that of husbandry, between officials and settlers. He lodged his professional identity in eloquent writing and paper.

Bureaucratic procedure as differentiating practice could also be brought to bear within the police. It shored up social and institutional hierarchies. Status seeker Sergeant Melzer, for example, deployed bureaucratic means in order to assert superiority over his station colleagues. A former farm hand, son of a foreman, he did "not keep[ing] company with his peers" when off duty.[546] Unduly often, Melzer made the men under his command collect written statements from settlers in addition to making them regularly confirm his instructions in writing.[547] But first and foremost, bureaucratic procedure separated

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[544] Complaint by farmer Bergemann to IdL, 29.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 61–62.
[545] "Da ich lediglich im Interesse des Farmers gehandelt habe, kann ich nicht einsehen, daß ich ihn durch meine korrekte Handlungsweise einen Schaden zugefügt habe. Hätte Herr Bergemann ein Schreiben betr. seiner Wünsche an die diesseitige Ortspolizei gesandt, wäre der in Frage stehende Vorfall nicht eingetreten." Senior Staff Sgt. Eduard Boßenbeger (Ortspolizei Maltahöhe) to IdL, 08.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 64.
[546] "Zum Schluß erlaube ich mit noch zu bemerken, daß auf der Station unter uns Beamten schon seit längerer Zeit Reibereien bestehen, da P.S. Melzer außer Dienst gewohnt ist, kameradschaftlich nicht mit seinesgleichen zu verkehren." Complaint against Sgt. Melzer by Sgt. Johann Kullick (Police Station Karions), no date [transcript from 05.09.1912], BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, no page number.
[547] "Die Kenntnisnahme seiner Anordnungen müssen wir schriftlich anerkennen." Ibid. Melzer was transferred to another station. See also Sgt. Paul Melzer (Police Station Karions) to District Office Warmbad, 15.10.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, no page number.

German policemen from their African subalterns – even if, or maybe especially when, these were very well capable of reading and drafting texts. As historian Gesine Krüger has demonstrated,

> the history of textuality in South Africa is marked by a paradoxical process: the increasing dispersion of script was accompanied by a simultaneous denial of script. […] While more and more people learned how to read and write the notion of an 'oral' African society was solidified. Flanked by laws and decrees, more and more people were factually and potentially excluded from the sphere of colonial dominated textuality – understood as a collectively shared consciousness of universal civilization, not as the necessary knowledge of how to deal with passes and contracts which was by all means desired.[548]

Although the written word was denied to the colonized, they understood how powerful papers were and how necessary it was to know how to navigate the bureaucratic system, as shown by a letter of a Herero woman to her brother from 1909:

> My beloved brother! I greet you heartily and let you know that I am still well. Rudolphine Kanjende intends to come, but her pass has been taken away, because you have not got her a pass from your master and from the police in Swakopmund. […] I tell you this: do not have any papers in your box, if you have any, throw them away, burn them. For a black man there are no papers anymore in our country now. If you have sense, you will take sense from this letter. […] For the Herero have died, and the enemy kills whoever he finds. Enough. Keep this first and last letter coming from this place. I posted it with my master, because no black man is going this way.
> If you are asleep, open your eyes so they are vigilant, and pray. Greetings to all my relatives. I have no one who judges but God.
> Enough. I close with greetings.[549]

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[548] "[…] die Geschichte der Schriftlichkeit in Südafrika ist durch einen paradoxen Prozess gekennzeichnet: Mit der zunehmenden Verbreitung der Schrift ging gleichzeitig eine Verweigerung der Schriftlichkeit einher. [...] Während immer mehr Menschen lesen und schreiben lernten, verfestigte sich das Bild der "oralen" afrikanischen Gesellschaft und flankiert von Gesetzen und Verordnungen wurden immer mehr Menschen faktisch und potentiell aus der Sphäre der kolonial dominierten Schriftlichkeit ausgeschlossen - verstanden als ein gemeinsam geteiltes Bewusstsein von universaler Zivilisation und nicht als notwendige Kenntnis des Umgangs mit Pässen und Verträgen, die durchaus erwünscht war." Gesine Krüger, *Schrift - Macht - Alltag: Lesen und Schreiben im kolonialen Südafrika*. (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), 325-326.

[549] Letter to Josephat Kanjende, Karibib, 1909, translated by Werner Hillebrecht, NAN, ZBU W 111, 2. Cit. in M.J. Daymond et al. (eds.), *Women Writing Africa: The Southern Region* (New York: Feminist Press at CUNY, 2003), 158. On written culture in pre-colonial Namibia, see Dag Henrichsen, "'Iss Worte!' Anmerkungen zur enstehenden afrikanischen Schrifkultur im vorkolonialen Zentralnamibia," in *Afrikanische Beziehungen,*

Thus, the colonized – which in this instance included African policemen – were in a situation where they constantly had to deal with passports, stamps, and official documents while at the same time being excluded from the textual community. Bureaucratic procedure was key to fostering power, even for the lower echelons of the colonial state. As representatives of a rationalistic, modern colonial state, policemen laid exceptional claim to it. It set policemen apart from the rest of the colonizers. And it set the higher-ranking German men apart from the lower-ranking African men. As historian Deborah Durham shows, invoking the power of the state by referring to the office as an impersonal, rationalistic, bureaucratic one was an "everyday tactic" which made "bureaucracy, the system, and the state become [….] both abstract and very real in their effects." And in the process, the office holders' power was made quite real, too.[550]

However, bureaucratic practice was not purely instrumental. The practice itself could encompass all kinds of styles, some accepted, others not. Sergeant Henke, for instance, wrote a patrol report which read more like an essay or short story than a matter-of-fact, descriptive text.[551] Chief of Police Bethe was deeply surprised that the report could have slipped through the bureaucratic instances without causing concern. He ordered the

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Netzwerke und Räume/ African networks, exchange and spatial dynamics/ Dynamiques spatiales, réseaux et échanges africains, ed. by Laurence Marfaing and Brigitte Reinwald (Münster: Lit, 2001), 329-338.

[550] "Rationalistic, bureaucratic government divides authority, categorizes offices and persons [...]. The office is impersonal; in theory the power exercised is vested in the office, not the holder, and invocations of that fact allude to the ideological state and the relations that devolve from it. Bureaucracy, the system, and the state become, through such everyday tactics, both abstract and very real in their effects. [...] Mystified yet powerful, the state is a fetish, both in Western political theory and in practice and experience. At the same time, of course, the concrete material of its negotiation, bureaucrats and stamps, are also fetishes, for they too are imagined as the bearers of a power that always originates elsewhere, whether with a higher office or for the abstract 'nation' the government embodies. Their power is nonetheless real." Deborah Durham, "Passports and Persons. The Insurrection of Subjugated Knowledges in Southern Africa," in *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and the Political Imagination*, ed. by Clifton Crais (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 155.

[551] Patrol report by Sgt. Walter Henke (District Office Grootfontein), 07.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 26-29.

district office to make sure that policemen drafted reports in "short, concise form" and that they refrained from using any "general observations and superfluous colloquialisms."[552] Thus, bureaucratic practice was also a form of training policemen, of disciplining them in the art of statecraft.[553] The fact that registers were still not filled out properly in 1914 shows that this was an ongoing process.[554]

Finally, the last stage in an operation sequence might be legal procedure. Both African and German policemen acted as court scribes, witnesses, guards during trials, and – most importantly – executory officers. In these functions they were directly under the command of a judge or court official, and expected to follow the rules of legal procedure.[555]

Other procedures did not necessitate that higher authorities gave an explicit order every time. These procedures followed the logic of established routines. More mundane kinds of such routines involved cleaning, repairing, and maintaining police equipment and grounds, or reviewing inventory, as well as drill and target and riding practice. But the most prominent routine was the patrol – notably the patrol on horseback. This itinerant procedure was the main scope of small station police, but it was also performed by men from larger stations, particularly from police depots. The police patrol was in German Southwest Africa the archetypical practice of what Michelle Moyd has termed "itinerant

[552] "Ich ersuche ergebenst die unterstellten Polizeibeamten darauf hinzuweisen, daß sie dienstliche Berichte in kurzer, knapper Form abzufassen haben, allgemeine Betrachtungen und überflüssige Redensarten sind fortzulassen. Der Bericht des P.S. Henke [...] ist in der Form eines Aufsatzes abgefaßt und entspricht nicht einer dienstlichen Meldung an seine vorgesetzte Behörde. Es ist unverständlich, daß dieser Bericht unbeanstandet die Hand des D.P.W. passieren konnte." Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to District Office Grootfontein, 23.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 25.
[553] See Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 49-51; 226-234.
[554] Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 03.02.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2591, 103.
[555] Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 81.

colonialism." In her study of the military in German East Africa she claims that colonial rule relied heavily on a "fundamentally itinerant style of governance."[556]

Usually, police went on regular patrol at least once a month.[557] The routinized patrol system guaranteed, on the one hand, communication and transportation of goods, salaries, people, etc. between police and district headquarters, individual stations, and farms. On the other hand, it made individual stations and individual men responsible for a number of farms or work sites in their sector. Magistrate Groeben from district Gibeon issued a detailed decree including schedules, routes, and names of farmers to be visited.[558] District Chief Schneidenberger from Okahandja ordered that patrols should be ridden twice every week to nearby locations, and once or twice a month to remote areas. From his policemen at stations Groß-Barmen und Otjizongati he required that they draw a map of the territory covered by their weekly patrols.[559] Not all district administrators were as systematic as Groeben and Schneidenberger, however. District Outjo's patrols were, at least at first, organized on a case by case basis with neither regularized schedules nor territories assigned to specific men.[560] This notwithstanding, sociological scholarship on present-day police occupational culture has convincingly shown how important an assigned territory is in shaping police attitudes and practices. The allocation of a territory generates a "my

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[556] Michelle Moyd, "Becoming *Askari*: African Soldiers and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa, 1850-1918," (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2008), 186, 195.
[557] See detailed patrol instructions by District Chief Kurt Streitwolf (District Office Gobabis), 11.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 13-16; Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 78-80.
[558] Magistrate Groeben (District Office Gibeon) to Chief of Police Heydebreck (IdL), 12.01.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2694, 30-33.
[559] "Die Polizeistationen haben den Auftrag, jede Woche wenigstens eine Patrouille in ihrem Bereiche zu reiten. Zweck dieser Patrouille ist Orientierung der Leute selbst, sowie des Distriktsamts. Über die ausgeführten Patrouillen reichen die Polizeisergeanten Meldungen mit Skizzen ein […]. Report on patrol routines by District Chief Schneidenberger (District Office Okahandja) to IdL, 10.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 12.
[560] Magistrate Victor Franke (District Office Outjo) to IdL, 28.11.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2694, 11.

beat"-, or "my turf"-mentality and a claim to exclusivity within it. As sociologist John Crank puts it:

> Territory carries a great deal of meaning for the police. Police territories are infused with important values – commitment and responsibility – that surpass simple conceptions of spacial arrangement and population flows. Officers don't simply patrol areas, they control them, and they invest their energies and reputations in them.[561]

Patrolling along familiar routes, or exploring new paths within a precinct (*Beritt*), and subsequently solidifying their grasp of that territory through the sketching of maps, attached policemen of the *Landespolizei* to a specific piece of land. They increasingly identified with it, claimed it as theirs, and distanced themselves from others. Competition and distrust between different precincts was one result of this attachment. Police station Nauchas from district Rehoboth, for instance, refused to cooperate with police station Ururas from district Swakopmund in a capturing mission, noting that the latter had been quite unsuccessful in this kind of enterprise while it was doing well.[562] Moreover, in 1913, police headquarters fueled competitive attitudes between precincts when it introduced

[561] Crank's powerful characterization of policemen's attitudes towards their territory is worth being quoted at length in this footnote: "Bestowed with a specific beat assignment, […] [cops] act out their subjective, shared sense of morality every time they decide whether, how, and when to intervene in the affairs of the citizenry. They are granted moral dominion over a turf and act, insofar as they are permitted or can get away with, as sovereigns. […] Details of control that we social scientists carefully ponder–for example, was the intervention for purposes of order maintenance, service, or did somebody actually break the law are simply irrelevant. It is their territory and exists to be controlled. To do less is to fail utterly. Territory is, for cops, more than a geographical assignment. It is their prize for being morally righteous, a divine gift, placed in their care so that they can deal with the assholes and bad guys of the world. A cop's territory is *theirs*, not management's, not another cop's, certainly not the media's, those sovereigns of a darker order. And cops take it seriously. […] Territory carries a great deal of meaning for the police. Police territories are infused with important values–commitment and responsibility–that surpass simple conceptions of spacial arrangement and population flows. Officers don't simply patrol areas, they control them, and they invest their energies and reputations in them." (Emphasis in the original) John P. Crank, *Understanding Police Culture* (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Pub, 1998), 43-44. For similar assessments of the role of territory for police work, see Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, *Two Cultures of Policing: Street Cops and Management Cops* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), and John Van Maanen, "The Asshole," in *Policing: A View from the Street*, ed. by Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing, 1978), 226.

[562] Magistrate Vietsch (Bezamt Rehoboth) to IdL, 06.02.1914, and following correspodance, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 21-24.

another rationalizing bureaucratic measure which rendered the task of catching Africans a numbers game. Henceforth, each districts' monthly report had to list "under the rubric 'patrol work' the number of all collected natives, divided into men, women, children […]." Recaptured escapees from prisons or farms were to be included in the calculation.[563] Although the decree was issued to thwart "unjustified attacks" from the public regarding the efficacy of patrols, and thus to polish the police's image, the effects of it were also internal to the police institution.[564]

In the year 1908, the *Landespolizei* conducted about 675 patrols.[565] With increasing manpower this number grew over the following years.[566] In addition to the monthly patrols, policemen were sent on concrete missions, notably to track down "criminals," "thieves,"and "runaways." So-called flying stations were established ad hoc in places of important economic or geopolitical interest.[567] With varying accuracy, all patrols were documented in patrol logs. The patrol logs mostly stated the date and length of a given

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[563] "[…] in die Monatsrapporte unter der Rubrik 'Patrouillentätigkeit' die Zahl sämtlicher eingebrachten Eingeborenen, getrennt nach Männern, Weibern, Kindern, aufzunehmen. Aus Gefängnissen entsprungene bezw. d. Farmern pp entlaufene und wiedereingebrachte Eingeborene sind mitzurechnen." Circular by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe to all districts, depots, officer posts, 06.10.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 10. In May 1915, Bethe sent out a preprint form for the monthly reports. Ostensibly, the ones he was receiving were not standardized enough for his taste. In the preprint police had to fill in, among other things, the number of captives and had to list the policing activities they had performed on each patrol. Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all offices, depots and officer posts, 25.05.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2489, 23-25.

[564] In fact, as Peter Manning's sociological police study shows, there is a direct relationship between honing the police's image and indexing: "The public's response has been to demand even more dramatic crook-catching and crime prevention, and this demand for arrests has been converted into an index for measuring how well the police accomplish their mandate. [...] The protection of the public welfare, however, including personal and property safety, the prevention of crime, and the preservation of individual civil rights, is hardly achieved by high pinch rate. On the contrary, it might well be argued that protection of public welfare could best be indexed by a low arrest rate. Because their mandate automatically entails mutually contradictory ends–protecting both public order and individual rights–the police resort to managing their public image and the indexes of their accomplishment." Peter K. Manning, "The Police: Mandate, Strategies, and Appearances," in *Policing: A View from the Street*, ed. by Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing, 1978), 13.

[565] Annual report 1908 by IdL, 14.05.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 6-12.

[566] Annual report 1909 by IdL, 25.05.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 31.

[567] For instance: Magistrate Beyer (District Office Warmbad) to IdL, 20.03.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2694, 72-74; Chief of Police Bethe (IdL) to Gouv. SWA, 10.02.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2508, no page number.

patrol, the name of its commander, sometimes also of its participants, the route and distance, and – in very few words – the purpose and/ or policing acts performed during the patrol.

A careful study of the relationship between distances covered, days spent in the field, and number of accomplished deeds documented in the patrol logs reveals the extent to which the patrol experience was primarily a succession of long, uneventful rides. For example, in the first quarter of 1911, the policemen of depot Spitzkoppe rode 48 patrols covering a total of 6796 km. The number of missions accomplished (both successfully and unsuccessfully) in that time period amounted to about 100. That means, only one police act per 67 kilometers.[568] In district Omaruru, in 1908, patrols of one to five men, over distances of 72 to 490 km, lasted between one and eleven days. The record shows not more than one to three tasks per patrol.[569] Moreover, in both of these historical sources most missions pertained to the order of service and supervision rather than to any form of forceful prevention or intervention. Thus, the observation regarding contemporary police that "most police work resembles any other kind of work: it is boring, tiresome, […] [and] it is rarely dangerous," seems also to apply to the *Landespolizei* of German Southwest Africa.[570] Given the tediousness of their everyday experience, not achieving the little that was possible on such long rides, often not being able to do any kind of "real" police work, must

[568] Patrol book Jan.-March 1911, by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), 01.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 32-43.
[569] Patrol book by District Chef v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru), 07.04.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 93-101.
[570] Manning, "The Police: Mandate, Strategies, and Appearances," 13.

have been frustrating.[571] This feeling seems to resonate in Sergeant Wenzel's report when he bluntly noted: "success of the patrol = 0."[572]

Patrols were in themselves organized by routinized procedures. Policemen repeatedly had to saddle up and unsaddle, water and feed the horses, pack and manage provisions, secure weapons and prisoners, orient themselves, observe the terrain and the weather conditions, and, of course, ride for long hours. I suggest that not following official procedure punctiliously in some of these instances of unspectacular police work could have had reanimating, entertaining, or exciting effect and thus might have been a technique to cope with frequent boredom and frustration.[573] To phrase it differently, not following procedure to the letter may also have been a form of minimal dissent, of having a mind of one's own, of temporarily disregarding authority, or being at least careless about it. For example, there are numerous instances documented in which policemen hunted game during patrol, sought to have some kind of (dangerous) adventure, or simply paused for a

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[571] Again pertaining to contemporary police, but possibly pertinent to the colonial case under scrutiny here, sociologist John Van Maanen observes, that "the young officer learns that there is a subtle but critical difference between 'real' police work and most of what he does on patrol. 'Real' police work is, in essence his *raison d'être*. It is part of his job that comes closest to the romantic notions of police work [...][and] calls for a patrolman to exercise his perceived occupational expertise: to make an arrest, save a life, quell a dispute, prevent a robbery, catch a felon, stop a suspicious person, disarm a suspect, and so on. [...] Yet, because of this narrow definition of police work, little of his time on the street provides the opportunity to accomplish much of what he considers to be his primary function. Thus, 'real' police work to the patrolman is paradoxical; a source of satisfaction and frustration. John Van Maanen,"Kinsmen in Repose," in *Policing: A View from the Street*, 121-122.

[572] "Erfolg der Patrouille = 0." Patrol report by Sgt. Julius Wenzel (Police Station Otjimbingwe), 04.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 102.

[573] Sociologist Maureen Cain lists three major techniques of coping with boredom and frustration on the beat: the first is "making the work more interesting," that is, trying to get in contact with people, to have friendly encounters with the public. As second means of coping she identifies as "easing behavior," which mainly consists of finding an excuse to take a break (and tea) at the station, in a pub, or elsewhere. "The third means of making a dull and cold eight hours more tolerable was to seek marginally legitimate arrests. This gave excitement, the opportunity to go off duty early or at least to return to the warmth and relative conviviality of the police station, as well as prestige." Maureen Cain, "On the Beat: Interactions and Relations in Rural and Urban Police Forces," in *Images of Deviance*, ed. by Stanley Cohen (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), 71-73.

moment to look at the scenery.[574] Sometimes, policemen veered off course to investigate something on their own initiative or to look for a diversion. African Police Assistant Bumskopf, for instance, went absent without leave during a patrol, presumably to follow a trail. He returned to his station several days later.[575] For a short period, Bumskopf had taken a break from colonial control. He might have even taken care of his own affairs. And it is likely, though we cannot be certain, that Sergeant Gehrmann did not receive orders to take a guided tour through the mines in Tsumeb, but did so anyway and even included a long description of it in his patrol report.[576] Historian Alf Lüdtke's notion of *Eigensinn*[577] comes to mind when looking at these police practices. In his studies of industrial labor he argues that everyday activity in the factory meant also:

> Illegal break taking, risky 'games' and the 'carelessness' combatted by superiors, that is, the *Eigensinn* at and with machinery […]. It was about holding oneself free of exertions, to establish niches for one's own time, for 'oneself'. What is more: expectations, incentives, impositions that were fixed in commands and liabilities were not just ignored or accepted – in everyday practices they were also always transformed. This form of appropriation of industrial work was not predicated on neglect of the work process. To the contrary, intimate familiarity with the modes of operation as well as an exact knowledge of the social power relations in the workshop were the preconditions for being able to fulfill requirements while at the same time satisfying one's own needs.[578]

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[574] Hunting: Circular by Senior Civil Servant Hans Hensel (IdL) to all District Offices and Police Depots, 09.05.1913, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h, 93.
Observation of nature: Report by Sgt. Walter Henke (District Office Grootfontein), 07.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 26-29.

[575] Patrol report by Senior Staff Sergeant Hermann Eschen (District Office Gobabis), 08.08.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 30-32.

[576] Patrol report by Sgt. Albert Gehrmann (Police Depot Waterberg), 11.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 133-137.

[577] The concept is not easily translated into English. It means a combination of obstinacy, stubbornness, self-will, determination, strong-mindedness, having a mind of one's own. Lüdtke himself uses the English terms "self-will" and "self-reliance." He also gives a useful explanation of the way German authors have employed the term and how he wants it to be understood in his work in Alf Lüdtke, "Cash, Coffee-Breaks, Horseplay: *Eigensinn* and Politics among Factory Workers in Germany circa 1900," in *Confrontation, Class Consciousness, and the Labor Process: Studies in Proletarian Class Formation*, ed. by Michael P Hanagan and Charles Stephenson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 79, fn. 28.

[578] "Illegales Pausen-Machen, riskante 'Spielereien' und der von Vorgesetzten bekämpfte 'Leichtsinn', d.h. der Eigensinn an und mit den Maschinen [...]. Es ging darum, sich für Anstrengungen schadlos zu halten, Nischen

Policemen of the *Landespolizei* pursued their own interests and desires within, along, or against the procedural framework of patrol routines. In some cases, this deviating behavior could be fatal. For instance, Sergeant Hergert accidentally killed a soldier of the *Schutztruppe* when he showed off his gun.[579] And Sergeant Schreiber was shot at by a man who had seized his rifle which he had carelessly left unattended while taking a break.[580] Needless to say, the risks of *"eigensinnig"* behavior were much higher for African policemen, and the consequences they faced when caught were much more severe. This phenomenon can be observed among all ranks, not just the lower.

The wide expanses that needed to be crossed, the sparseness of population, the competition between precincts and possessiveness regarding one's own beat, the big and small events experienced side by side on the road, the little "divergences" unknown to police command: all of these features of patrol work made the men of a patrol unit come together. Or rather, formulated in the negative, patrolling isolated the men participating in a patrol from others – the public, the colleagues of another precinct, and their superiors. In his poem "From the Dunes of Southwest," former Staff Sergeant Kleinau bemoaned but also glorified the dire conditions he and his colleagues were working in. Regarding the distance

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für eigene Zeit, für 'sich selbst' zu etablieren. Mehr noch: Erwartungen, Anreize, Zumutungen, die in Aufträgen, Pflichten fixiert wurden, wurden nicht nur ignoriert oder akzeptiert – in den alltäglichen Praktiken wurden sie immer auch umgeformt. Diese Formen der *Aneignung* von Industriearbeit gründete nicht auf Vernachlässigung des Arbeitsprozesses. Im Gegenteil, intime Vertrautheit mit den Handhabungen selbst war ebenso wie genaue Kenntnis des sozialen Kräftefeldes im Betrieb die Voraussetzung dafür, beim Erfüllen von Vorgaben *zugleich* eigene Bedürfnisse befriedigen zu können." (Emphasis in the original) Alf Lüdtke, "Arbeit, Arbeitserfahrungen und Arbeiterpolitik. Zum Perspektivenwandel in der historischen Forschung," in *Eigen-Sinn: Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus*, ed. by idem (Hamburg: Ergebnisse, 1993), 374

[579] Magistrate Karl Schmidt (District Office Keetmanshoop) to Gouv. SWA, 11.12.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 733.

[580] The incident prompted Chief of Police Bethe to dispatch a circular regarding "patrol riding according to regulations [*Vorschriftmäßiger Patrouillenritt*]" in which he instructed his staff to address regularly the subject of proper gearing up and weapons' handling during patrols. Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all district offices, 05.01.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 20.

of his station Dawignab situated in the far Southeast of the colony to all superiors he wrote: "O Dawignab! When your dunes blow, no inspection officer will show, even less the governor, O Dawignab, o Dawignab! They don't want to see you anyway!"[581] Adding to this actual or felt isolation was the fact that suspicion towards the public was in the nature of the job. Every person encountered was, in the mind of the policemen, a potential criminal. Policemen distrusted both settlers and colonized, and not rarely surmised that these were plotting against them.[582] All subjects of the colonial realm were, however, also always potentially in need of help and protection. Sociologist Peter Manning calls this the "impossible" mandate of the police.[583] Scholars of police occupational culture persistently come back to the notion of isolation linked to what they perceive as the uniquely contradictory nature of police work.[584] Some have called its results "siege-mentality,"

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[581] O! Dawignab, o, Dawignab!
Wenn deine Dünen wehen,
Dann kommt leicht kein Inspekteur
Viel weniger der Gouverneur
O! Dawignab, o, Dawignab!
Die woll'n dich garnicht sehen!
Friedrich Kleinau: "Aus den Dünen von Südwest," *Nachrichtenblatt des Verbandes der Polizeibeamten für die deutschen Kolonien e.V.* 6, 4 (April 1925).

[582] Sergeant Ebermann, for instance, plagued a passing trader whom he suspected of illegal trade and, what is more, whom he was convinced was lying. Sgt. Paul Ebermann (Police Station Gosorobis) to District Office Rehoboth, 16.02.1910, NAN, BRE, 13 B.9.A, 11. Sgt. Melzer was persuaded that the farmers in his precinct were conspiring against him; so was Sgt. Ptaschek in his. Report by Sgt. Paul Melzer, (Police Station Karions) to District Office Warmbad, 21.09.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, no page number; report by Sgt. Bruno Ptaschek (Police Station Alt-Maltahöhe), 01.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2466, 47-48.

[583] Manning, "The Police," 13.

[584] A recent dissertation sums up the field's preoccupations as follows: "The police occupational culture is commonly portrayed as having risen from the unique role police officers occupy within society. Literature suggests the strain and inconsistencies inherent in the contradictory roles police officers are expected to perform serve to isolate police officers from the public, encourage cynicism and distrust of the public, and create a unique world view and set of occupational values centered on a preoccupation with suspicion, danger, territoriality, solidarity, deception, distrust of supervisors, and the legitimate use of force. The occupational response to these tensions has resulted in a unique and complex set of values referred to as the "police culture". The police culture, grounded in suspicion and solidarity, is characterized as being closed to outsiders, extraordinarily inflexible, and highly resistant to change." James Brecher, "Generation and the Occupational Culture of Policing" (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Springfield, 2009), 1.

others solidarity.[585] In any case, patrol rides were group experiences, across the racial divide, and they generated (a feeling of) isolation.

The patrol logs I have drawn on so far only rarely stated the outcome of a mission. In no instance did the logs document how missions were enforced. For that, we need to look at the longer patrol reports which were written occasionally. In these we learn more about police interactions with the public. They tell us about the oscillation between moments of sociability and moments of formality, about how official procedures and personal habits interwove in the everyday, in short, about policemen's concrete ways of getting things done.

Tactics of Interaction: Sociability, Trickery, Affects, and the Art of Making Do

At least during patrols meeting people was an event. As a rule, some kind of verbal exchange occurred, if only the shouting of a command, not seldom unintelligible to its listeners. Oftentimes whole conversations unfolded, notably between speakers of the same language, but also via interpreters. Greetings and other social rituals took place depending on the level of acquaintance between interlocutors. But more important, information was traded, stories were told. On arrival at a farm, for instance, police assistants usually went to talk to the African workers (after having taken care of the horses) while their superiors went to see the employer. Policemen listened to the latest news, concerns, stories and

[585] Lüdtke calls it siege-mentality. Lüdtke, *"Gemeinwohl", Polizei, "Festungspraxis."* Most sociologies of policing call it solidarity, or comradeship, or esprit de corps. I would be careful with the term "solidarity" since it suggest unity and harmony within the group which was by no means always the case. For a discussion of the literature, see chapter 15 "Mask of a Thousand Faces," in Crank, *Understanding Police Culture*, 187-203.

rumors.[586] Sometimes, although strictly speaking not permitted,[587] they stayed over night, or at least spent some time with the farm inhabitants, maybe ate and drank with them, and listened and talked some more. On one late evening, Constable Türk, for instance, sat down with farmer Schmidt in front of his farmhouse. Whether they had a conversation, a drink, a smoke, a break, or were attending to formal business is not clear. But Constable Türk was evidently spending the night at the farm.[588] Sergeant Kuse repeatedly shared gossip with farmer Deckert.[589] And Police Assistant Petrus Claasen went to have a chat and drink some water with a number of prisoners.[590] Procedures of formal investigation and interrogation alternated, overlapped, or even merged with informal and convivial forms of intercourse.

What exactly determined how an encounter developed, whether it was mutual understanding and sympathy, or the desire for company (even disliked company), can hardly be assessed. Indeed, in other instances, men avoided contact beyond what was professionally necessary. The farmer couple Glose, for example, was shunned by all members of the nearby police station Nam, because of their "unfriendly behavior."[591] The evidence shows that policemen inserted their personal preferences and habits into the framework of patrol procedure when they encountered others. And hence, information and communication so crucial to police work was as much the product of affections, animosities

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[586] Sergeant Geffke, for instance, gossiped with three farmers about one of his colleagues. Confidential communication by District Office Bethanien to IdL, 17.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2976, 42-45.
[587] Policemen were not allowed to receive free shelter and food from farmers. If they had to spent a night somewhere, they were supposed to camp out and use their own rations. § 12 "Annahme von Geschenken," *Dienstvorschrift*, 10.
[588] Judgment against Constable Türk by District Judge Dr. Hirschberg (District Court Keetmanshoop), 24.05.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 3513, 37-39.
[589] Internal investigation regarding allegations against Sgt. Kuse for, among other things, gossiping. IdL to District Office Großfontein, 23.12.1910-28.02.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 28-52.
[590] Sgt. Oskar Junge (Ortspolizei Keetmanshoop) to District Office Keetmanshoop, 21.02.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 12-13.
[591] "[…] lediglich das unfreundliche Verhalten des Farmers Glose und seiner Frau führte dazu, daß die in Nam stationierten Polizeibeamten jeden Privatverkehr mit Glose abzubrechen gezwungen waren." District Chief Seydel (District Office Maltahöhe) to IdL, 03.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2466, 48.

and informal conversation as it was of rationalized, procedural templates. Some among the colonized were well aware of the dynamics, noting that "if the boss [baas] drinks beer and schnapps with the police, that is not good for us; if the police is at war [*orlog*] with the boss, then we can sheer out [*nücken*] from time to time without being punished."[592]

Knowing the beat and the people was a prerequisite for effective control. However, the (racist-)biologistic idea that there existed a category of "natural" recidivists could block the quest to "know" policed subjects, and reduce knowledge to the stereotypes that "suspects" were always the same or even the entire population.[593] Moreover, "suspects" who had already been entered into the bureaucratic system were recurrently arrested. And at least the German policemen were constantly confronted with the contradiction between their firm racist belief in the inherent lack of credibility of all colonized and their dependence on these very colonized to provide them with information. In fact, oftentimes, it is difficult to discern from the source material how a policeman came by a piece of information and why he chose to believe it. Often the means and the process by which policemen gathered intelligence remains obscure. Take the example of Sergeant Heuer's report of a patrol sent out to apprehend some thieves. First, Heuer writes that he had "provisionally taken in Hottentot Jan" because the latter had no pass. Heuer continues his account noting that African workers at a farm recognized the arrested man, and that he "thereupon admitted" to having stolen and slaughtered small livestock. "Another questioning," Heuer writes next, revealed that Jan had actually escaped from a prison in Windhuk two years before. The

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[592] "Wenn der Baas mit der Polizei Bier und Schnaps trinkt, dann ist es nicht gut für uns; wenn aber die Polizei mit dem Baas Orlog macht, dann können wir auch mal nücken ohne gestraft zu werden." Farmer Wulff, paraphrasing one of his workers, to Gouv. SWA, 25.12.1912, NAN, ZBU 2045, W III b 5 (vol.1), 184. Quoted in: Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 284.

[593] On discourses of criminality qua race, see Eva Bischoff, *Kannibale-Werden: Eine postkoloniale Geschichte deutscher Männlichkeit um 1900* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2011), 165-194.

report leaves entirely open who received what information from whom. It is unclear who did the questioning or how these were performed. Heuer never mentions African policemen, and he never alludes to interrogation techniques. The report is also ambiguous on whether the workers who identified Jan were the ones to make him admit his alleged crimes or whether the police, presumably an African police assistant, questioned Jan at that point. In light of these uncertainties it is even unclear how Heuer came by the simple information of the man's name.[594]

Finally, policemen did not merely gather information from the population, but themselves took part in the constant fabrication and circulation of truths, half-truths, rumors, and myths that made up the imaginary of colonial life. Their bureaucracy could help the colonized take up new identities.[595] Thus, sociability, emotions, storytelling, and ideology were all elements of police procedures of knowledge production.

When patrols arrived at a farm or approached an African settlement in the hinterlands they could be fairly sure that somebody had already noticed them from afar. Therefore, when policemen were not interested in talking or feared that potential interlocutors or suspects could flee, they inspected dwellings by night, early in the morning, or late in the evening. A German sergeant and his African police assistant, for instance, were sent to a

[594] "Auf dem Viehposten von Maiburg traf ich den Hottentotten Jan ohne Paßmarke an und nahm ihn vorläufig mit. Jan gab an, Ochsenwächter beim Farmer Spatz Farm Maiburg zu sein, seine Paßmarke habe sein Dienstherr. In Hoffnungsfelde wurde Jan von den Eingeborenen der Farm erkannt und gestand nun ein, daß er sich seit etwa 4 Monaten, nachdem er von der Farm Maiburg entlaufen war, im Felde umhergetrieben und teils allein, teils mit den Kaffern Oister-Amab und Johannes etwa 24 Stck. Kleinvieh von der Farm Maiburg gestohlen und geschlachtet hat. Ein weiteres Verhör ergab, daß Oister-Amab vor etwa 2 Jahren aus dem Gefängnis in Windhuk entwichen ist." Patrol report by Sgt. Heuer (Police Depot Kupferberg), 15.09.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 132-133.

[595] Nama woman Uibis, for instance, was a prisoner of war who ran away several times. The last time she escaped it took the police 6 months to find her again. She had married a San man who worked for the land surveying office and had these authorities make her a pass under the name of Katharina. Senior Civil Servant Hans Hensel (IdL) to District Office Windhuk, 09.05.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 170.

farm "unexpectedly [*überraschend*] to inspect the natives in the early morning hours."[596] Another sergeant and his police assistants raided several settlements in the middle of the night.[597] Deception was a common practice in the *Landespolizei* repertoire, but it could not be found in the manuals or directives. In fact, clothing disguise was explicitly forbidden, but still occurred.[598] Sergeant Dufring, for instance, dressed up in civilian clothes to uncover what, according to him, was an organized crime ring of "Boers, Cape-Landers [*Kapländer*], Jews, and unfortunately also Germans," whom he suspected of "steal[ing] away" African workers for the mines in South Africa.[599] His undercover operation was not commented on by his superiors, nor did he get disciplined for it. Magistrate Zastrow from district Grootfontein tried repeatedly to institute police patrols in plainclothes. He allowed these to take place even though he never received permission from headquarters.[600] The rule against disguise did not apply to African police assistants, it seems, who were often poorly uniformed anyway. Police Assistant Westerhuizen, for example, led one such undercover mission. Under the command of Sergeant Ptascheck, who only checked in on him once a week, Westerhuizen and two other African police assistants dressed up as cattle herders and stayed on a farm with the goal of apprehending three men. The architect of the plan,

[596] "Polz. Sergt. Wenzel sandte ich mit einen [sic] Eingeborenen nochmal […] nach Diebdal um dort nochmal überraschend in den Morgenstunden die Eingeborenen Brockerhofs zu kontrollieren." Report by Senior Staff Sgt. Otto Donicht (Bezamt Karibib), 09.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 199.
[597] Patrol report by Sgt. Richard Malsch (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), no date [may 1910], BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 63-66. There are many more examples documented in the archives.
[598] Policemen had to wear uniform on and off duty. Only when on leave in the homeland and on foreign ships were they allowed to wear plain clothes. "Bekleidungsvorschrift," *Dienstvorschrift*, 54.
[599] Patrol report by Sgt. v. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja), 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 19-30.
[600] The first time, Magistrate Zastrow had given permission to his subordinates while at the same time asking authorization from above. "Um die im Sandfelde und am grossen Omuramba sitzenden Buschleute besser kontrollieren zu können und um so Nachrichten über die sich im Sandfelde aufhaltenden Eingeborenen zu erhalten habe ich den Stationen Otjomaware und Otjituo gestattet Patrouillen in das Sandfeld gelegentlich in Zivil zu reiten." Magistrate Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to IdL, 01.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 57. A year later, he tried to avoid headquarters and instead to win inspection officer Hirschberg as ally in his endeavor. The latter did not like the idea, though, and informed police headquarters. Magistrate Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to Police Depot Waterberg, no date, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 59.

Staff Sergeant Eggersglüß, had "talked the matter through with Sergeant Ptascheck and the [Boer farmers; M.M.], the Boers want to help so that the disguise succeeds."[601] The African policemen's deception scheme did not violate police regulations, but their independent proceeding did. The two examples show how, on the ground, formal and informal working practices went hand in hand. Among these, trickery featured prominently. Or, as the aforementioned Sergeant Dufring somewhat theatrically phrased it, policemen used "guile against guile."[602] In this context German policemen might have been inspired by or relied on what they perceived to be an African tradition of "native trickery."[603] Surprise and guile worked best when performed as a concerted enterprise of African and German policemen, and with the help of the African or the settler population depending on who was the object of investigation. Sometimes, the "trick" consisted plainly in leaving a farm and letting the farmer or his workers make the arrest for the police, or even kill in their stead. After raiding African villages twice by night without arresting anyone but having learned more about the suspected thieves, notably that their wives lived and worked on a nearby farm, Sergeant Heuer and his patrol left the area and let the farmer and/or his workers apprehend the men when they came to see their families.[604] And when a Baster farmworker named Trion killed a presumed San thief, the reporting sergeant called it a "stroke of luck," and no legal consequences followed.[605]

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[601] Dipatch by Staff Sgt. Heinrich Eggersglüß (11. Pol.Beritt Maltahöhe), 30.03.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 25-26; quote: 25.
[602] "List gegen List." Patrol report by Sgt. v. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja), 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 30.
[603] Referring to African guerilla tactics and the practice of shouting deceptive or irritating things across the battle lines, *Schutztruppe* Captain Maximilian Bayer, noted: "There are many examples of annoying native trickery." Bayer, *The Rehoboth Baster Nation*, 33.
[604] Patrol report by Sgt. Heuer (Police Depot Kupferberg), 15.09.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 132-133.
[605] "Es ist als ein Glücksfall zu betrachten, daß es den [sic] Bastard gelungen ist, gerade den Führer der Diebesbande […] zu erschießen, derselbe hat sich bis [152r] jetzt allen Nachstellungen zu entziehen gewußt."

Capture patrols were more successful, it seems, when African policemen took the lead or were sent off by their superiors to spearhead an operation. Usually (but not always) they knew the terrain and the population of their precinct better than did their German colleagues. Moreover, they might not have been perceived as policemen right away, or if so, they might not have been expected to be on a capture mission. Their appearance somewhere was sometimes the beginning of a ruse to apprehend colonized people. Seven African policemen, for instance, were the chief protagonists in a series of raids which caught about fifty Africans. The German sergeant in charge of the patrol and who wrote the report made that unusually clear: they were the ones who found the settlements and who spoke to the inhabitants. In one case, which is described in more detail, "African leader [*Führer*] Samuel" went into the village together with a previously apprehended inhabitant of the village to set in motion the upcoming arrests. The formulation leaves open whether Samuel was a simple guide or whether he was the leader of the African police contingent. The German sergeant's rendition of the event also remains silent on what Samuel actually did or said once he had made contact. In any case, his arrival in the village led to the capture of 26 men, women, and children.[606]

Placing major responsibility in the hands of African policemen was a regular form of improvised policing with which practical constraints were overcome. In the midst of World War One, when there was no one else to do the job, Police Assistant Franz was stationed

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Sgt. Albert Siegmann (Police Station Büllsport) to District Office Rehoboth, 11.11.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 152.

[606] Patrol report by Wilhelm Westphal (Police Depot Kupferberg), 07.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 145-150, quote: 146.

alone at an outpost near Swakopmund. During his time of duty there he managed to arrest two men by himself.[607]

Another way of proceeding during patrols was to advance in a somewhat unfocused and uncoordinated manner, to deal with facts as they presented themselves, and to creatively build a case. Sergeant Georg Dawedeit's report sheds light on this form of making do. Relying on information given by farmers and their African workers, his patrol went into the veld to find Africans. After several attempts to encircle several of their settlements had failed to capture anyone, the policemen finally came across two children who led them to a small village. The sergeant told a man whom he encountered there "to gather his people, for I wanted to issue each native with a pass."[608] The man obeyed. Thirteen Damara came out of their huts. The huts were searched and a pelt with bullet holes was discovered. The Damara man was asked where he had hidden the gun but denied owning one. At this point, the whole group of men, women, and children was arrested and brought to a police depot. On their way back to the depot, a farmer identified the man Dawedeit had been supposedly talking to (it is more likely that one of the police assistants had spoken to the man) as a "thief." Thus, only subsequently did Dawedeit learn that he was a presumed thief. That was probably also the moment when he heard the man's name for the first time. In his report, however, the sergeant made it sound as if he had been tracking down Damara "thief" Jakob from the beginning. And in his last sentence – emanating a certain sense of pride – he finally labelled *all* captives as "thieves."[609] The sergeant had made false promises to lure the

[607] Report re: Police Assistant Franz No. 9267 by [Sgt.?] Kühnast (District Office Swakopmund) to IdL, 27.02.1915, BA-B, R 1002/ 2593, 42.
[608] Patrol report by Sgt. Georg Dawedeit (Police Depot Waterberg), 06.03.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 191.
[609] Ibid., 192.

Africans out of their shelters, had apprehended them based upon a vague suspicion, and had then built a case with information he had come by after the fact.[610]

Finally, a variety of emotions affected daily beat routines. Notably, fear was a constant companion of policing. As might be expected, fear was an "unacceptable" emotion. Within the emotional communities of both German and African men of honor, fright betrayed an unmanly, weak character.[611] This notwithstanding, fear was omnipresent in a colonial regime based on coercion that had just committed a genocide. And, although policemen belonged to the coercing party and were thus the agents of threat, intimidation, and terror, rather than their victims, they were not spared from feeling the attendant fear. They found themselves in situations in which they were outnumbered or exposed to probable ambushes. Their bodies were vulnerable to the perils of nature. And their psyches and imagination generated frights and phobias. As much as police headquarters or cultural codes of conduct wanted to "forbid" fear, it affected police behavior. The ways in which policemen overcame, dealt with, or succumbed to their fears were diverse.

Being inexperienced, not having received enough training, or none at all, and entrusted with challenging missions to ride into unknown territory, policemen regularly fretted about basic aspects of police work. They were afraid of riding, of using their weapon in a non-standardized setting, or of navigating uncharted terrain. The sergeant whom I mention in chapter two, who reportedly clung to his saddle while crying out in panic, was an extreme case. But also other men, like one Sergeant Hammerich, who fell off his horse several times before being "taken by the hand" by another colonial official and escorted to

[610] Referring to himself and nobody else in the entire report, he moreover obscured the role African policemen had played in the enterprise. Ibid., 190-192.
[611] On the concept of "emotional communities," see Barbara Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

his station, had to deal with their fear of riding and with the humiliating spectacle such fears generated.[612] Such personal phobias may appear to be minor matters, but they gave rise to particular, sometimes even peculiar police behavior. Shame, the fear of humiliation, was a strong motivator, and one must surmise that many policemen preferred not to be seen when struggling with their mount, their equipment, or with their sense of orientation.[613] I have used the example of fear of riding, but I suspect that the concern for appearances was at the source of a whole variety of solitary or secluded operations. This worry for honor might even have trumped the more existential fear for one's own life. "The fear of death," historian Joanna Bourke notes, is "not universal."[614] In other cases, however, policemen did act upon the worry for their safety. They sought the company of colleagues, often making up an excuse to secure it. Professing that his horse was too young to manage the passing of a mountain range, Sergeant Malsch, for instance, preferred to ride together with Police Assistant Zacharias.[615] Thus, whether they were solitary police initiatives or concerted efforts, police practices can be partly explained as the attempt to deal with fear: either to hide it in the desire to conform to standards of affective control, or to overcome it through denial and disavowal.

As the examples above show, fear was closely related to shame and humiliation, often caused by a perceived slight to one's honor. Shame could prompt or co-exist with a sense of

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[612] "Herr Weber ließ ihn nun mitreiten, da er aber zu bestimmter Zeit in Windhuk sein wollte und Polizei Sergeant Hammerich bei dem verhältnismäßig schnellen vorwärts reiten nicht mitkam, nahm ihn Herr Weber an die Hand. Zwischen Kl. Aub und Windhuk ist P.S. Hammerich nicht mehr heruntergefallen." Inspection Officer Hirschberg (Police Depot Kupferberg) to Police Headquarters, 09.01.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2535, 99-100.

[613] George Orwell's short story "Shooting an Elephant" is particularly insightful on the range of emotional experiences among colonial officials caused by the stress of having to perform in front of an audience. George Orwell, *Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1950), 31-40.

[614] Joanna Bourke, *Fear: A Cultural History* (Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker Hoard, 2006), 3.

[615] Report by Sgt. Richard Malsch (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), no date [ca. may 1910], BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 66.

helplessness and frustration. In numerous cases, policemen felt frustrated on account of "external" forces (that is, mostly resistance by the population, but also taxing conditions etc.) and claimed that they had been pushed, compelled to do violence, that violence had been their "last resort." Police Assistant Friedrich Boekis, for instance, defended himself, stating that,

> in order to fulfill my assignment, […] I have arguably pushed and beat the woman, but not more than I had to, […] because I could not help myself otherwise in order to carry out my assignment."[616]

Assistant Boekis and a second African policeman had struck a female Herero prisoner repeatedly with the whip until she fell, whereupon they had continued hitting her, including in the face. Their superior merely reprimanded them, and only because a settler had registered a complaint.[617] And Police Sergeant Hermann Wandrei wrote that he "had been forced […] to administer a couple of blows" to a Damara man who had refused to come with him.[618]

The presence of an on-looking public was crucial in forming emotions of shame, frustration, and anger. The sense of losing control over one's own body and over a situation, mixed with the realization that some external factors simply could not be brought under one's control, permeated colonial police action. Often, this set of sensations activated and accompanied violent behavior. On August 15, 1910, in the little town of Kuibis,

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[616] "Um nun meinen Auftrag auszuführen, […] habe ich das Weib wohl gestoßen und geschlagen, jedoch nicht mehr als ich mußte, um das Weib an ihren Bestimmungsort zu bringen, da ich mir nicht anders helfen konnte, um meinen Auftrag auszuführen." Statement by Police Assistant Friedrich Boekis (Police Station Keetmanshoop), 09.08.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 76-77.
[617] Report re: Police Assistant Boekis by Sgt. Otto Hense (Police Station Keetmanshoop), 09.08.1911, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 75-77.
[618] Sgt. Hermann Wandrei (Police Station Gochaganas) to District Office Rehoboth, 30.07.1912, NAN, BRE, 34 E.5.e, 6. Emphasis added.

Sergeant Bruno Vogel "let himself get carried away, slapping in agitation [*Erregung*]" a South African woman in the face.[619] In fact, Vogel slapped Anna Hendricks repeatedly and dragged her by the arm. Vogel, known for his paternal character, his role as care-taker,[620] was evidently highly irritated by Hendricks' defiance, by her rejection of his care. In a store where the sergeant had addressed her in front of the European shop owner, some African employees, and possibly a few customers, she had refused to follow his request to come to the police station in order to get registered and to have issued a passport. Without further ado, he hit her. Then Hendricks walked away, perhaps trying to escape Vogel's reach, but not without complaining loudly. Sergeant Vogel followed her, hit her again, and dragged her away. During the entire incident, several onlookers observed the scene as it took its course from the store out onto the street, into a hotel filled with guests, and out onto the street again.[621] Later, Anna Hendricks, a British subject, appealed to the British Consul. The British involvement is the only reason why there is an archival record of the incident: otherwise it would have hardly raised any interest. Vogel was put in front of a judge and fined the trivial fee of five Mark. The judge observed in mitigation that Vogel's behavior was understandable since he had been "extremely irritated" [*gereizt*] by the South African woman. Moreover, he noted that

> the defendant might have had the sensation that, in the interest of the reputation of the white race and of the German state, the insolence of the negro girl [*Negermädchen*] needed

[619] "Es handelt sich um eine Angelegenheit mit einem Kapmädchen, welches der Polizeisergeant Vogel sich hinreissen liess, in der Erregung zu ohrfeigen." District Chief Wasserfall (District Office Bethanien) to IdL, 21.02.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 3520, 53.
[620] Cf. Sven Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens: Auf Spuren der Kaiserlichen Landespolizei von Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaften, 2009), 119, 359, 532.
[621] Judgment against Sgt. Vogel by District Judge Lämmermann (District Court Keetmanshoop), 31.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 3520, 60-61.

> to be redressed on the spot with a chastisement commensurate to the mental and moral level of the girl.[622]

Vogel's feelings, his inner stirrings, were directly linked to broader political contexts: to colonial state power and racist ideology. The state, through its representatives like Sergeant Vogel, had "affects" and was called to act upon them.

Anger is an important element in any honor repertoire. Honor is essentially felt, not reasoned.[623] And a notion of "righteous anger" in the face of perceived humiliation and shame was often at the source of "restitutive measures." In September, 1910 Baster Police Assistant Friedrich Boekis and Damara Police Assistant Wilhelm Markus were suspected of having caused the death of an African worker from the Cape Colony. They had beat the man with clubs, and hours later the man had died. Magistrate Hilzebecher, however, acquitted the two policemen. The victim, his explanation stated, had "rightly" incurred the beating. Indeed, it had been his own doing, for he had coveted Boekis' wife and, to boot, had been insolent. From the judge's perspective, Police Assistant Boekis had "acted in protection of his innermost interests." And since the victim had been a "colossal opponent," it was only understandable that the cuckolded policeman had asked for help from his comrade Markus.[624] Boekis himself declared that he had been "angered" [*aufgebracht*] in a twofold way, first by his knowledge of the adultery, and second by the victim's impertinent behavior. He grabbed the man by the chest and struck him several times with a bamboo

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[622] "[…] der Angeklagte das Empfinden haben mochte, die Frechheit des Negermädchens müsse im Interesse des Ansehens der weißen Rasse und der deutschen Staatsgewalt auf der Stelle gesühnt werden durch eine Züchtigung, wie sie dem geistigen und moralischen Niveau des Mädchens entsprach." Verdict Sgt. Vogel by Judge Lämmermann (District Court Keetmanshoop), 31.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 3520, 61. Emphasis added.
[623] The police force's instruction manual called for a "feeling of honor" [*Ehrgefühl*]. *Dienstvorschrift*, 9. And for good reason Pierre Bourdieu called his study of honor "The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society" in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. by John Peristiany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 193-241.
[624] Report re: Police Assistants Boekis and Markus by acting Magistrate Hilzebecher (District Office Keetmanshoop), 08.09.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 24.

cane on the back.[625] Sergeant Albert Bruhn, Boekis' immediate superior, also came to his defense. He vouched for Boekis' good character and expertise, and expressed understanding for his subaltern's behavior: Boekis had "simply made use of his domestic authority [*Hausrecht*] in defense of legitimate interests" and only after he had been "gravely irritated" by the other man.[626] Thus, in all these statements, anger was the result of a combination of broader contextual and immediate situational factors: offense to the "right" of masculine, paternal honor, on the one hand, and the face-to-face insult, on the other. In such a combination, the consensual tone of all sources implied that "righteous anger" and violent retribution were appropriate. These ways of reasoning (and feeling) fit well into a concept of honor that was situated somewhere in-between external law and internal sensibility, between social significance and inner life.

Certainly, it is difficult to evaluate what "anger" meant from a Baster perspective. And the temptation to compare anger from a different time and different culture to one's own experience of anger is great. But Catherine Lutz observes in her anthropological study of emotions that depending on the cultural context there can be either antisocial or "prosocial aspects of anger."[627] In the case of Police Assistant Boekis, his angry outbursts were amenable to being framed as "righteous" and thus belonged to the prosocial type, for with them (moral) redress was considered possible and necessary. As such, "righteous," justified, or justifiable anger organized social life by defining the inclusions and exclusions of specific communities.

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[625] Statement by Police Assistant Friedrich Boekis (District Office Keetmanshoop), 22.08.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 19.
[626] Report by Sgt. Albert Bruhn (Police Station Keetmanshoop), 23.08.1910, 22.08.1910, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 21-22.
[627] Catherine Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenges to Western Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) 156-157.

Lastly, policemen's violent practices were partly derived from the principle of sadistic gratification. No individual historical example or singular case study will do justice to the difficult issue of pleasurable violence. But one has to take for granted that among the 700 policemen at least some of them felt bodily and mental elation in inflicting harm on others.[628]

Given the different dynamics of everyday practices I have outlined here one can sum up stating that policemen "muddled through" their everyday duties. They did so by deceiving, bluffing, threatening, hiding from, making promises to, and surprising the men, women, and children they encountered. They acted upon instructions, upon individual interests, upon their capacities and their feelings. And thus, policemen deployed an array of means which can best be described as tactics. In his theory of everyday practices Michel De Certeau defines tactics as follows:

> [Tactics] operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of 'opportunities' and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids. What it wins it cannot keep. This nowhere [editorial note: lack of fixed location; MM] gives a tactic mobility, to be sure, but a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. It must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected. It is guileful ruse.[629]

De Certeau's elucidation of this form of practice, of what tactics can do and how they operate, is in my opinion quite resonant with the kind of police work I have described here. Furthermore, if we think of low-level violent acts as belonging to the realm of tactics, their

[628] See also Mark Mazower who observes, that the "state-centered approach has often hidden a reluctance to consider the idea that occasionally ordinary people enjoy or take pride in killing […]."Mark Mazower, "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century'. *The American Historical Review* 107, 4 (2002): 1166.
[629] De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 37.

potential in being effective within an overall unstable, dysfunctional power constellation becomes patent. The frequent grabbing, kicking, and hitting when opportunity presented itself unfolded their greatest power in the moment when they occurred. Policemen had "the power of action" (*Aktionsmacht*) in that moment.[630] They hit and then denied or had to justify the deed after the fact; their power was the greatest in the act; afterwards it decreased again. The logic within which this form of immediate power was inscribed was that of the "men on the spot."[631]

Police Discretion: Common Sense and the Range of Policing Styles

In a letter to police headquarters a district chief in Okahandja explained what kind of patrols he assigned to his policemen. He distinguished between two forms. The first kind of patrol was,

> as a rule, made up of one police sergeant and one native police servant. It issues court orders, executes legal enforcement [*Zwangsvollstreckungen*], inspects the native situation [*Eingeborenenverhältnisse*] and so forth, and, after return, it reports orally on notable [*besondere*] occurrences.[632]

[630] Heinrich Popitz, *Phänomene der Macht: Autorität, Herrschaft, Gewalt, Technik*, 2nd ed.(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992), 65.
[631] See Alexander Schölch, "The 'Men on the Spot' and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882," *The Historical Journal* 19, 3 (1976): 773-785; Kirsten Zirkel, "Military Power in German Colonial Policy: The Schutztruppen and Their Leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888-1918," in *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964*, ed. by David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 91-113.
[632] "Der Patrouillendienst der Polizei ist folgendermaßen geregelt: […] Wöchentlich 2 Mal nach Osona und in die nähere Umgebung von Okahandja. Die Patrouille besteht in der Regel aus einem Polizeisergeanten und einem eingeborenen Polizeidiener. Sie erledigt gerichtliche Zustellungen, Zwangsvollstreckungen, sieht sich die Eingeborenenverhältnisse u.s.w. an und berichtet nach Rückkehr über besondere Vorkommnisse mündlich." Report on patrol routines by District Chief Schneidenberger (District Office Okahandja) to IdL, 10.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 11.

The second kind was comprised of "one police sergeant and 2 native police servants." It was charged with carrying out the same tasks as the first, but in addition it had to survey livestock on visited farms, and then again to "orally report after return about the observations made."[633] Note the minor difference in wording with respect to what needed to be reported back. Whereas the latter patrol was asked to give an account of all that had been observed, the former was supposed to only mention instances that seemed to be out of the ordinary. I suppose that the different formulations were not intentional, but here lay the individual policeman's discretionary power. He had to decide what he considered noteworthy and thus necessary to communicate to his superior. In a situation of constant and utter unpredictability, his evaluation counted.[634] Based on this assessment, actions followed. And often, these actions were his to take, too. In brief, he made a judgment call. Take Sergeant Gehrmann's account of a visit to two remote farms, for instance. He had been informed that

> supposedly, the workers had behaved intractably [*renitent*] against their employers. I inquired of the natives about working and boarding conditions. Some of the people spoke actually very well of their employers. The discontented natives were admonished [*ermahnt*].[635]

[633] "Monatlich eine, oder nach Bedarf auch zwei Patrouillen, bestehend aus einem Polizeisergeanten und 2 eingeborenen Polizeidienern, in der Richtung Waterberg bis an die Distriktsgrenze nach Nordwesten, im Bedarfsfalle bis Okasise. Auch diese Patrouille erledigt gerichtliche Angelegenheiten, informiert sich über Eingeborenenverhältnisse der einzelnen Farmen, über Viehbestand u.s.w., und berichtet nach Rückkehr mündlich über die gemachten Beobachtungen." Ibid.

[634] On "unpredictability and situational uncertainty" in present-day police work, see Crank, *Understanding Police Culture*, 113-121.

[635] "Auf die Bitte der Farmer Woost und Havemann ritt ich am 9.2. nach dem ca. 45km entfernten Platz Damerun. Angeblich sollten sich die Arbeiter renitent gegen ihre Arbeitgeber benommen haben. Ich erkundigte mich bei den Eingeborenen nach den Arbeits- und Verpflegungsverhältnissen. Ein Teil der Leute sprach sich auch sehr gut gegen ihre Arbeitgeber aus. Die unzufriedenen Eingeborenen wurden ermahnt." Patrol report by Sgt. Albert Gehrmann (Police Depot Waterberg), 18.03.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 182-183.

After a ride of several hours to the location, the sergeant had formed his opinion based on what he heard and what he saw, had acted upon it, and had left again. In this case he decided to wag his finger. But he might well have used more drastic measures or lectured the farmers instead. In the passage quoted above his reasoning is curtailed. We do not learn how he got from learning about discontented farmers and partly contented, partly discontented workers to reprimanding the latter. In situations like these, the policeman's experience and his ability to use common sense became crucial. Gehrmann and his African police assistants relied on their prior experiences, their habits, on "ways of knowing that are available and 'easy to think'," [636] to favor the course of action they chose.

Common sense, sociologist Elizabeth McNulty observes, is characterized by "simplicity and contradiction." [637] She suggests that its production is a collective enterprise, that

> everyday life routines provide the essential taken-for-granted context in which police together generate common sense knowledge 'on the street.' […] Common sense […] is neither univocal nor consistent. Instead, it mirrors the unpredictability and uncertainty on the street, [638] […].

Thus, policemen put practice and experience at the core of what constituted their behavioral guiding principles. [639] They built these principles in concert during formal and informal routines when they shared experiences, narrated them, and collectively tried to make sense of them. Their superiors shared to a certain extent the valorization of

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[636] Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 39.
[637] Elizabeth McNulty, "Generating Common Sense Knowledge Among Police Officers," *Symbolic Interaction* 17, 3 (1994): 292.
[638] Ibid., 282, 285.
[639] Sociologist Peter Maning notes that one of the main police "postulates or assumptions" is "experience is better than abstract rules." Peter K. Manning, "The Police: Mandate, Strategies, and Appearances," in *Policing: A View from the Street*, ed. by Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing, 1978), 11.

experience. Seasoned men like Sergeant Hergert, for instance, who had been in the colony since 1893 were valued. From his evaluation sheet in October 1904:

> Hergert is a calm, sober, and dutiful man. For a couple of months now he has been married to a young German woman of immaculate reputation, from all that I have heard, in a very happy marriage. Although his writing skills are a little bit clumsy for lack of practice, as an old African who has been active in a wide variety of positions he possesses a plenitude of practical competences and knows how to gain authority with the whites and the natives. I highly value having in Hergert a practical policemen who is well acquainted with the conditions of the country.[640]

But this assessment could easily turn negative when the policeman, from the perspective of his superiors, "let himself go". This is precisely what happened to Hergert who, in a crushing evaluation in May 1909, was characterized as "ponderous, dull," and "sluggish."[641] But from the sergeant's perspective, he might have depicted his policing style entirely differently. Having seen a lot and having been in the country for a long time, he might have decided to turn a blind eye to certain situations.

Police discretion coupled with the all-encompassing responsibility that I evoke at the very beginning of this chapter had the consequence that everything could be, but nothing

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[640] "Hergert ist ein ruhiger, nüchterner und pflichttreuer Mann. Er ist seit einigen Monaten mit einer jungen Deutschen von tadellosem Ruf verheiratet, nach allem was ich höre in sehr glücklicher Ehe. Im Schreiben mangels Übung etwas unbeholfen, besitzt Hergert als alter Afrikaner, der schon in den verschiedensten Stellungen tätig war, eine Fülle praktischer Kenntnisse und versteht es, sich bei Weissen und Farbigen Achtung zu verschaffen. [...] Es ist mir sehr wertvoll in Hergert einen mit den Landesverhältnissen genau bekannten, praktischen Beamten zu besitzen." Qualification certificate for Sgt. Hergert by Magistrate Rudolf Böhmer (District Office Lüderitzbucht), October 1904, BA-B, R 1002/ 733. Cit. in Sven, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 73.

[641] "Hergert macht nach ununterbrochenem Aufenthalt von 16 Jahren in Südwest einen schwerfälligen, stumpfen Eindruck. […] seit sechzehn Jahren angeblich ununterbrochen im Schutzgebiete, vor s. Zt. ein guter Soldat, ist aber jetzt ein schlechter Polizeisergeant geworden. Er war lange auf Außenstation und ist da verbummelt." Minutes of interrogation with Sgt. Hergert by Inspection Officer Müller, 09.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ R 1002; inspection report by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Spitzkoppe) to IdL, 07.05.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2723. Cit. in Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 72-74.

had do be, a policeman's concern. Policemen necessarily made choices. Montjardet notes that

> it is thus inevitable, normal that, in this immense and desperate universe, policemen cut out a segment that is well-defined, delimited, clean, visible, easy to measure, and that they make of it the core, heart, and exclusive object of their mission.[642]

As a result, police work in Southwest Africa had a wide variety of different styles. Some policemen dragged their feet, avoided tasks, or turned a blind eye to certain transgressions. Others sought every occasion to enforce the law, intervened brutally, or proceeded in exceedingly formalistic manner. Senior Staff Sergeant Hermann Kratz, for instance, noted in passing that African worker Wilhelm Matrohs had "already asked three times from police patrols" to have a pass issued to him, but that he had still not received one. The staff sergeant himself did not take action either, believing that another office would take care of the issue.[643] Other sergeants came late to their duty or left their post to visit friends.[644] And yet others were much more proactive. They went out of their way to surveil a single person

[642] "La mission policière est infinie, indéterminée, indéfinissable, non mesurable, floue, toujours recommencée, les critères de l'accomplissement, de la réussite, du travail bien fait sont impalpables, évanescents. Il est donc inévitable, normal, que les policiers se découpent dans cet univers immense et désespérant un segment saillant, délimité, net, bien visible et aisément mesurable et qu'ils en fassent le noyau, coeur et objet exclusifs de leur tâche." Dominique Monjardet, *Notes inédites sur les choses policières, 1999-2006,* suivi de *le sociologue, la politique et la police*, ed. by Antoinette Chauvenet and Frédéric Ocqueteau (Paris: La Découverte, 2008), 29.
[643] Report by Sgt. Richard Brunk (Police Station Dawignab), 17.08.1913, NAN, DAR, 3 E.1.d, no page number. See a similar case in which missing papers were not dealt with but simply condoned with. Patrol report by Sgt. Wilhelm Westphal (Police Depot Kupferberg). 20.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 89-91.
[644] Tardiness: Qualification report on Sgt. La Croix by Inspection Officer Hirschberg (Police Depot Waterberg), 20.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2492, 47. Absence: Inspection report by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), 07.05.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2723, no page number.

with the single goal of verifying that person's identity.[645] They intruded on domestic lives,[646] or pressured workers to press charges against their employers.[647]

Moreover, many policemen combined "a repressive with an 'obliging' or preventive approach."[648] For what mattered was that something was done, whatever it was, and that it happen promptly. As McNulty notes,

> police officers demonstrate that they 'have' common sense by how they act on the street. To be seen as competent, officers must often act quickly and decisively.[649]

Or as Sergeant Maletz recalled, sanctions had best "come on the heels" of a misdemeanor.[650] The call for immediacy and pragmatism buttressed the importance of men on the spot and of their experience. Ultimately, it motivated many policemen to "make short shrift," that is, to use some form of violence or the threat of violence.

Violence as Work

Alf Lüdtke has compared the "work" of making war to industrial work. He has shown how certain practices and experiences on a modern battlefield resembled processes and perceptions of work in the factory:

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[645] Report re: Sgt. Paul Melzer by Sgt. Johann Kullick (Police Station Karions), no date [transcript from 05.09.1912], BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, no page number.
[646] For example, report by Magistrate Weber (District Office Swakopmund), 17.10.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 3501, 83-88.
[647] For example, excerpt of patrol book by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub), 01.01.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 26.
[648] "Dieses 'Ermessen' meinte freilich nicht allein die unmittelbar gewaltsamen Eingriffe, die 'einhaltende' Repression vermuteter bzw. erkannter 'Störungen', Vergehen oder Verbrechen. […] Offizianten praktizierten die Gleichzeitigkeit von repressivem mit 'zuvorkommendem' oder präventivem Vorgehen." Lüdtke, *"Gemeinwohl", Polizei, "Festungspraxis"*, 146-147.
[649] McNulty, "Generating Common Sense," 285.
[650] Ludwig Maletz, "Aus meinem Dienstbuch. Auf Station Kalkfeld," in Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 403.

> Room for manoeuvre at the respective point of production was crucial to both industrial work and soldiering. Similar if not largely identical in both areas were the demands for skillfully moving and using one's body. Only then would specific varieties of behavior combine efficiency with effectiveness.[651]

He has also stressed important differences. Notably the intense experiences of imminent, life-threatening danger and of killing were a specificity of the battlefield and did not exist in the factory.

> It must be left open to which extent such emotionally heightened responses reflected dangers of and the isolation in combat or, on the contrary, if they aimed at distancing a participant from those. The spectrum of soldiers' feelings obviously ranged from disgust and shame to pride if not pleasure, time and again seemingly combining all of them. But whether soldiers felt it disturbing or appealing (or both): killing helped transform the meaning of 'doing a good job' into the excitement of an ultimate transgression.[652]

Police violence in German Southwest Africa was in many ways like waging war. Policemen were former soldiers or warriors. Their leadership trusted most in their military training and bearing to face daily tasks. They were expected to maintain a military set of skills, notably automatic body movements, and the immediate readiness to do violence while remaining calm and in control of a situation. In fact, police raids of African settlements were not seldom organized and executed like military operations,[653] or were even a joint venture of police and *Schutztruppe*.[654] Occasionally policemen used militarized language

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[651] Alf Lüdtke, "War as Work. Aspects of Soldiering in Twentieth-Century Wars," in *No Man's Land of Violence: Extreme Wars in the 20th Century*, ed. by Alf Lüdtke and Bernd Weisbrod (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 134.
[652] Ibid., 134-135.
[653] For instance, report of a series of raids by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kupferberg), 27.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 77-82; and by Sgt. Wilhelm Westphal (Police Depot Kupferberg), 07.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 145-150.
[654] For joint operations, see for instance, Inspection Officer Johannes Medding (Police Depot Waterberg) to IdL, 08.08.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 131; District Chief Seydel (District Office Maltahöhe) to IdL, 17.03.1909, NAN, ZBU, 479 D.IV.o (vol.1), 205-206; Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe to Governor Seitz, 07.11.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 38, 40-45.

and imagery to describe their work. They spoke of the "enemy" that needed to be "defeated,"[655] of the "encirclement" of settlements,[656] or of "reconnaissance missions" and of "penetrating into terrain."[657]

But above all, what brings me to interpret the police's use of violence as work, is the emphasis that policemen laid on dexterity when they described violent deeds. They often specified how, and with what tool or part of the body a blow had been executed. To stress the precise mastery of their body, time and again policemen insisted that they had used their flat hand and not their fist, for instance.[658] Or they indicated that they were able to use their firearm in an efficient, methodical, and non-lethal way, underlining that they had wielded the butt end of their gun. Sergeant Scheiter, for instance, "fended off" an African man dealing "an acute [*heftig*] blow with the rifle butt."[659]

Moreover, the terms proficient or stalwart (*tüchtig*)[660] and assiduous or eager (*eifrig*) were frequently employed to depict violent police types and deeds. According to his superior, Sergeant Lange who was "feared for his fierceness," who "spared no pains," was simultaneously characterized as "eager to serve [*diensteifrig*], [and] staunch."[661] Being fierce and tough was thus associated with the idea of qualitatively good work, of *savoir-*

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[655] Patrol report by Sgt. v. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja), 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 30.
[656] Patrol report by Sgt. Wilhelm Westphal (Police Depot Kupferberg), 07.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 146.
[657] Patrol report by acting District Chief Scheben (Distriktamt Rehoboth), 19.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 117, 120-121.
[658] "Ich gebe zu, […] den Polizeidiener Hendrick zwei oder drei mal mit der flachen Hand ins Gesicht geschlagen zu haben. Ich betone, daß ich nicht mit der Faust zugeschlagen habe […]." Statement by Sgt. Paul Melzer (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), 10.12.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, no page number.
[659] "[…] ich wehrte ihn durch einen heftigen Schlag mit dem Kolben ab, wobei mir der Kolben abbrach. Patrol report by Sgt. Arno Scheiter (Distriktamt Okahandja), 14.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 157. On the different uses of violent technologies, see also chapter 5.
[660] Interestingly, etymologically, the noun *"Tüchtigkeit"* initially meant "bravery" and "violence" in old medieval German. Duden-online, s.v. "tüchtig," accessed March 30, 2013, http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/tuechtig.
[661] "Diensteifrig, zuverlässig, schreibgewandt und findig. Vorzüglicher Patrouillenreiter, der sich im Gelände auskennt und keine Strapazen scheut. Vom Publikum wegen seiner Schärfe gefürchtet." Qualification certificate for Sgt. Lange by Magistrate Brill (District Office Windhuk), 05.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2492, 20.

faire and accomplishment. This is also the case for the description of three policemen who in fall 1911 in Keetmanshoop severely beat South African prisoners with a sjambok and a belt on repeated occasions, as well as holding these prisoners down on the ground and gagging them. Police headquarters noted in a communication to the colonial government that "the 3 officials are reliable [*bewährt*] men" and that it was "of the opinion that they merely [acted] in exaggerated diligence [*übertriebenem Diensteifer*]."[662] Good, dedicated work was the work where one occasionally got one's hands dirty.

Policemen considered their work to be valuable not so much because it was heroic like soldiering, but because it was a modest and honorable service. As Staff Sergeant Rafalski noted, policing in German Southwest Africa was not a "history of war and heroism, but simply of hard, selfless work and the cheerful fulfillment of duty."[663] Part of that work was violence. Violence was an important and necessary part of the profession. Policemen saw the value of their work to lie in a job well done, a kind of violent craftsmanship. With it they claimed to mold and cultivate the land and its people. In the words of Chief of Police, Major Bethe: "that we are not only qualified, but that it is our vocation to supervise and culturally develop dependent peoples."[664]

Conclusion

[662] "Da die 3 Beamten tüchtige und im Polizeidienst bewährte Leute sind und die Inspektion die Ansicht vertritt, daß sie sich lediglich in übertriebenem Diensteifer zu einem derartigen Vergehen haben hinreißen lassen, so bitte ich gehors., von einer Entlassung dieser bewährten Beamten absehen zu wollen." IdL to Gouv. Windhuk, 19.03.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2466, 74.
[663] "Es ist keine Geschichte von Krieg und Heldentaten, nur von harter selbstloser Arbeit und fröhlicher Pflichterfüllung." Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 11.
[664] "[…] daß wir nicht nur befähigt, sondern an erster Stelle berufen sind, unselbständige Völker zu beaufsichtigen und kulturell zu entwickeln." Preface by Heinrich Bethe in Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 10.

By and large, policemen had to rely on what they thought or felt was right based on their military socialization, what they happened to have read in the instruction manuals and regulations, or what they had learned on the beat and at the station from their colleagues and in interaction with the public. Policemen were neither all-knowing "killing-machines,"[665] nor were they totally ignorant, useless good-for-nothings.[666] They were not idle either. They "got the job done", that is, the job that they thought was theirs and that they were able to fulfill. And they did it their way. Policemen followed procedure, but added their own note to it. The everyday conditions of Southwest Africa allowed for some degree of autonomy and imposed improvisation. The result was a mode of operation that could vary between pedantry and laissez-faire, overactivity and idleness, and brutality and kindness.

Although neither of them has made the connection, De Certeau's "tactics" and Lüdtke's *Eigensinn* are helpful concepts when analyzing police practices. Policemen worked for their superiors, they followed rules, and executed orders, just like the factory workers who produced goods for their employers in the examples De Certeau and Lüdtke evoke. The manner of operation, the tactics they deployed, were their own, however. And, policemen added a good portion of "self-will" (*Eigensinn*), of appropriating the task at hand, into the mix.

The notion of a failed or limited colonial state suggests inactivity or ineffectiveness. I propose that the policemen's practices did not necessarily have the highest efficiency, but were by all accounts transformative. They did not create a stable colonial state in Trutz von

[665] Brigitte Lau, "Uncertain certainties", in: *History and Historiography, 4 Essays in Reprint* (Windhoek: Discourse/MSORP, 1995), 39.
[666] Which is the impression one gets from reading Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner.*

Trotha's sense.[667] But they had effects owing to the fact that they were potently adaptable and performed in concert with other colonial actors, as I elaborate in the following chapter.

[667] Trotha describes colonial state-building as a succession of stages of institutionalization and consolidation of state power. Trutz von Trotha, *Koloniale Herrschaft: zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des 'Schutzgebietes Togo'* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994).

CHAPTER 4

"He who knows how to treat people well…"

Violent Regulation of the Labor Market

The colonial regimes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries dealt in economic exploitation. Pressured from the metropoles that paid their bills, colonies needed to be productive and thriving. By the end of the nineteenth century, the system of chattel slavery that had so powerfully affected Atlantic societies was on the wane, while a new, global, and more insidiously coercive system of "free labor" under a capitalist framework was under development. Most colonizers by the turn of the twentieth century tried, both in theory and in fact, to produce wage labor systems that encompassed the metropole and the colony.[668] As within Europe itself, one of the most powerful instruments for disciplining populations into a wage labor system was violence – both of a spectacular and an everyday variety. And the typical state instrument for such violence was the police.

In German Southwest-Africa, the limited supply of labor, largely a result of the colonizers' own genocidal war against the Herero and Nama, was the single most important factor limiting economic growth. Hence, securing African labor was one of the foremost interests which guided state policy in that colony. In the German state's logic, only absolute control of the colonized could ensure a functioning, profitable economy. It fell to the

[668] On new historical approaches that interpret labor history globally, see Marcel van der Linden, "The Promise and Challenges of Global Labor History," *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 82 (2012: 57-76.

Landespolizei to install that all-encompassing control. Thus, most police work was a matter of policing work. Whereas the last chapter addressed the former, this chapter deals with the latter.

The colonial economy of SWA was built on a semi-free labor market. Semi-free because even after forced labor, which had been instituted during the war, was officially abolished in 1908, aspects of the system remained quite overtly coercive: men and women who did not wish to enter the colonizers' wage economy and were trying to hide in the outskirts of the colony were forced into it by numerous measures; workers who left their employment before the end of the contracted term were brought back to their employer by force; some Africans were restricted in their mobility and could not choose their work place; and, of course, forced labor continued to exist as a penal practice.[669]

Furthermore, the fact that African labor was extremely scarce after the war – in 1911 about 15,000 workers were lacking in a country with a colonized population of about 70,000 and an ever increasing colonizer, i.e. employer, population[670] – intensified the situation and made settlers fight amongst each other over the labor force. The mode of production settlers put into place – sedentary cattle farming on privately owned, apportioned pieces of land – aggravated economic dysfunction even further. Colonized labor was hard. Working hours were long, often there was no rest even on Sundays. Accommodations and provisions were insufficient.[671] Most Africans worked on farms or as

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[669] Cf. Jürgen Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004), 182-199.
[670] I am not sure how reliable the numbers, which I borrow from Zimmerer, are. But the fact that labor was scarce seems hard to dispute, even if the scarcity was overemphasized by the settler community. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 110.
[671] See Zollmann on African workers' insufficient sustenance, notably on farms. Jakob Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen: Die Kolonialpolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1915* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010), 289-290.

domestics, but also in mines and on construction sites such as the railway. The general framework of semi-free labor, the scarcity of the labor force, the nervousness of employers, and the harsh working conditions – all these were circumstances which facilitated or even generated violence.

But colonial violence was not just excessively applied by some, or limited by some others. Violence is more complicated than that. The attempt to limit violence can itself be violent, for instance. As I argued in the preceding chapter, policemen claimed to be competent wielders of violence, their military training conjoined with their experience in the field making them experts in dexterous, professional violence. This understanding encompassed a notion of "constructive" or "educative" violence toward the colonized. It also made the policemen feel entitled to supervise other colonial actors' use of violence and to correct them if they deemed it necessary.

In an internal note circulated amongst civil servants of the colonial government in Windhoek, Magistrate Fromm stated in 1911: "He who knows how to treat people well, will always have workers."[672] This statement captures policemen's general understanding of labor relations, their attitude toward employers and employees, and their illusions about the workings of the labor market. In this chapter I wish to expand on the active role policemen assumed within the colonial economy based on the idea that there was a "right treatment" of colonized workers. The German colonial police created an economy of violence which I characterize as an economy of "educative violence." This specific form of violence was economically viable. In fact, it was integral to the colonial economy. It refined

[672] "Wer Leute behandeln kann, hat immer Arbeiter." Internal note by Senior Civil Servant Fromm (District Office Windhuk) to IdL, 07.08.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 114.

interaction between employers and employees. It instilled discipline. Put in crude terms, it assured that workers did not die, but instead kept on working.

Historians of German Southwest-Africa have aptly shown that the utopian vision of total colonial rule was limited in reality by various factors, not least by a settler community which did not always want to cooperate. In their analysis, European farmers and company owners put their individual economic interests first.[673] That meant that they exploited their workers to a maximum using excessive violence. The colonial government, however, endeavored to check extremely violent behavior against African workers and to introduce rudimentary protective laws with the objective of establishing a national economy. Thus, in many scholarly readings, two understandings of how to attain economic productivity competed. One stipulated that violence be exercised without restraint, the other that violence be reduced or limited.

In addition, scholars have argued that regulations aimed at limiting violence could not be put into practice because of the resistance of subaltern functionaries and judges acting mainly on their racist worldview, and because of material constraints. This historiography has set up a dichotomy between severely restricted violence on the one side and excessive violence on the other, between a stinted but genuine liberalizing effort by the state on the one hand and a reactionary, cruel conduct particularly by farmers, but also overseers on the other hand. Historian Jakob Zollmann, for instance, concludes that policemen "almost never were able to have a moderating effect on farmers."[674]

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[673] Helmut Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1914* (Hamburg: Leibniz-Verlag, 1968); Horst Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft. Der Kampf der Herero und Nama gegen den deutschen Imperialismus (1884-1915)* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966); Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*.

[674] "Mäßigend auf die Farmer einzuwirken, gelang den Beamten fast nie." Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 281. The dichotomy is also strongly drawn in Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*.

Such a polarized narrative is based on too simple an understanding of violence. And I suspect that this understanding originates in a specific source situation: namely, almost exclusively excessive violence has made its way into the archive. A description of the "normal", low-level violence which happened everyday has not been recorded. Hence, the kind of violence which was accepted by colonial rulers, which in everyday practice was pervasive, does not become an object of study for historians.

Another reason which might have led historians to distinguish simplistically between excess and containment of violence, is projection of our present-day ethical and political condemnation of violence onto the historical situation. Unlike in the virtually hegemonic liberal political culture of the early twenty-first century, in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Germany, certain violent practices were highly valued. And many state policies which had the goal of protecting and providing welfare, including the limitation of violence, were enforced in a quite violent manner. Therefore, I will try to recover the more ambiguous acts of violence which cannot simply be characterized as "bad" or excessive, but remain nevertheless violent acts. I do not wish to assert that violence is or was not that bad after all. Rather, I wish initially to avoid moralizing in order to point out the more intricate workings of violence in the construction of the colonial state. That colonial states were very violent – especially to discipline and exploit labor – should not come as a surprise. What intrigues me, however, is that the discourses and practices of violence enacted by the state and its representatives were often produced in a logic of wanting to "treat well", to protect and care. Restricting or even abolishing violence was not the goal. The policemen of the *Landespolizei* tried, and often succeeded, to replace extreme, destructive forms of violence with educative, community-building violence.

Race, Work, and Discipline

German policemen's writings, notably the certification exams they had to compose on "legal concepts and customs of the natives" betray the policemen's racist world views and reflect contemporary ethnographic discourses.[675] Regarding work and ownership, German policemen oftentimes correlated the idea that land was owned by those who cultivated it with the idea that all colonized were lazy, that they "prefer[red] a life in which they were left to their own devices, even if they had to suffer hunger, rather than regular employment [*geregelte Tätigkeit*]."[676] Police Sergeant Emil Hirschmüller, for instance, observed that

> with us, the principle applies: 'where I earn my bread is my home.' This is different with the Herero. He only leaves his home and relatives when forced, and he rather suffers deprivations and dangers here, than to live in abundance in foreign lands.[677]

Another sergeant stressed that it would take "still very much patience and effort," before the Herero would work "willingly." For they "only work because they have to, but never of [their] own accord."[678] This idea could go as far as to justify mass murder. In the best-selling adventure novel *Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest* (*Peter Moor's Voyage to the*

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[675] See files re: "Written exams and term papers, 1908-1914," BA-B, R 1002/ 2537, 2538.
[676] "Also ziehen die Eingeborenen immer noch ein Leben wo sie sich selbst überlassen sind, wenn sie auch Hunger leiden müssen, einer geregelten Tätigkeit vor." Annual report by Sgt. Paul Gentz (Police Station Aninus), 22.02.1912, NAN, DAR, 19 J.III, no page number. Quoted also in: Sven Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens. Auf Spuren der Kaiserlichen Landespolizei von Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2009), 408-410.
[677] "Bei uns gilt der Grundsatz: 'Wo ich mein Brot habe, dort ist meine Heimat.' Anders beim Herero. Er verläßt nur gezwungen Heimat und Angehörige und erträgt hier lieber Entbehrungen und Gefahren als daß er in der Fremde im Überfluß lebt." Written exam by Sgt. Emil Hirschmüller (Police Depot Waterberg), no date, BA-B, R 1002/ 2538, 94.
[678] Written exam by Sgt. K. [name illegible] (Police Depot Waterberg), 28.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2538, 90.

Southwest), published in the midst of the German war against the Herero and Nama, and probably read by quite a few German policemen, the main protagonist declares:

> The blacks deserved death before God and humanity, not because they murdered two hundred farmers and rebelled against us, but because they have not built any houses and have not dug any wells. […] God has let us win here, because we are the nobler and more determined […]. The world belongs to the industrious, the vigorous.[679]

Considered fundamentally different and inferior, indigenous populations needed to be taught how to work, or else be excluded from colonial society. Racist ideology distinguished between different racial "types" of workers: the colonized were classified along a scale ranging from those who could and those who could not be domesticated to wage labor.[680] In his written exam, one sergeant drew such distinctions. He portrayed the Herero as particularly lazy and dishonest; the Damara as "the most dull-witted [*stumpfsinnigsten*];" the Basters as the most adaptable, but pretentious; the Nama as malicious and "less suitable for work because of their weak build;" and finally the San (or Bushmen)[681] as "rabble" who were afraid of people and would shun all whites.[682] Thus, policemen had

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[679] "Die Schwarzen haben vor Gott und Menschen den Tod verdient, nicht weil sie zweihundert Farmer ermordet haben und gegen uns aufgestanden sind, sondern weil sie keine Häuser gebaut und keine Brunnen gegraben haben. [...] Gott hat uns hier siegen lassen, weil wir die Edleren und Vorwärtsstrebenden sind [...]. Den Tüchtigeren, den Frischeren gehört die Welt." Gustav Frenssen, *Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest. Ein Feldzugbericht* (Berlin: Grohe, 1906), 200-201.

[680] See George Steinmetz's study on German ethnographic descriptions of Herero, Witbooi, and Baster in *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 75-134. On the contradictory nature of the classifications made by local administrators, see also Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 181f.

[681] On the difficulty of self-identification and identification by others of the San/Bushmen, see Robert J. Gordon, *The Bushman Myth: The Making of a Namibian Underclass* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), esp. 4-8. In the following, I call this group "San."

[682] Written exam by Sgt. K. [name illegible] (Police Depot Waterberg), 28.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2538, 89-91. Cf. also the French colonial discourse where, for instance, Arabs were construed as "barbarians," equated with wild animals like foxes or wildcats who could thus not be domesticated or disciplined. During the Algerian war of independence, Algerians were called locusts, scorpions, or jackals. Sub-Saharan Africans, on the other hand, were construed as "savages," equated with domestic animals like dogs who were considered to be

more or less complex, often motley systems of racial categorization in their heads when they went about disciplining workers. Sergeant Gentz noted in an annual report:

> One can still not accustom the Bushmen to do regular work. They do their work for a couple of months, then they disappear one night, never to return again.[683]

And Magistrate Zastrow in Grootfontein branded the San as "a through and through uncultivatable, untamable element."[684] As a consequence, the San were particularly targeted as harmful to the economic system. They were removed from their homes and put to work under high surveillance in other regions.[685] Increasingly, they were seen as a threat – a "plague" as the local newspapers called it in 1911.[686] They were hunted down, and murdered.[687] To some, like Governor Seitz for instance, the Nama were similarly unable to fit into a wage economy, for their "love of living in the bush can never be stamped out."[688]

Responsibility to discipline the colonized into labor, if deemed possible, was believed to lie with all European men. In fact, policemen often saw the primary responsibility residing with employers:

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tamable and a reliable work force. Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *Coloniser, Exterminer. Sur la Guerre et l'État Colonial* (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 58.

[683] "Die Buschleute sind immer noch nicht an ständige Arbeit zu gewöhnen. Einige Monate tun sie ihren Dienst, dann verschwinden sie eines Nachts, an ein wiederkommen ist nicht zu denken…" Annual report by Sgt. Paul Gentz (Police Station Aninus), 22.02.1912, NAN, DAR, 19 J.III, no page number.

[684] "[…] die Buschleute sind zudem ein durch und durch unkultivierbares, unzähmbares Element." Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (Bezamt Grootfontein) to IdL, 14.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 91. Another Magistrate also reported: "Aufgegriffene Buschleute die zur Arbeit an Farmer abgegeben werden, sind regelmäßig nach kürzester Frist wieder entlaufen. Alle Bemühungen, die Buschleute zu ständigen Arbeitern zu erziehen, werden solange erfolglos bleiben, als für sie die Möglichkeit besteht ihr freies Jagd- und Räuberleben wieder aufzunehmen." Magistrate Schultze-Jena (District Office Outjo) to Gouv. SWA, 20.01.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 58-59.

[685] Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to District Office Warmbad, 23.09.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 9; Ibid.

[686] For instance, "Buschmannsnot in Südwestafrika," *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung,* Nr. 28 (1911). See also "The 'Bushmen Plague' of 1911" in Gordon, *The Bushman Myth*, 57-68.

[687] See chapters 6 through 9 in Gordon, *The Bushman Myth*, 49-85. I trace this development through the changing regulatory framework for weapons usage among the police in Chapter 5.

[688] Governor Seitz to RKA, 12.08.1913, BA-B, R 1001/ 2091, 11. Cited in Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting*, 176.

> There will always be complaints about the laziness and unreliability of the natives from farmers. In part, the farmers are to blame for these circumstances, for where there is not constant control, the best worker will get lazy and remiss.[689]

The tool held to be appropriate was violence. In 1900, the Foreign Office in Berlin had asked the colonial governments to assess the general opinion on corporal punishment.[690] The numerous testimonies given by local administrators, military personnel, settlers, and missionaries are proof of an overwhelming consensus on the subject.[691] Corporal punishment was regarded as necessary and particularly suitable for Africans, whose cultures were believed to have accustomed them to this form of correction. Missionary Fenchel from Keetmanshoop noted that his "experience of many years" in Southwest Africa had shown that corporal punishment was "a disciplining tool one cannot do without."[692] Especially the Nama people, he claimed, had "from ancient times" known no other form of penalty than corporal punishment.[693]

That this was a misconception, and that African peoples in Southwestern Africa commonly relied on other forms of conflict resolution and justice, especially material settlement, was actually already established in the scholarship at the time. Historian Martin Schröder discovered that contemporary law experts had come to the conclusion that

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[689] "Klagen über Faulheit und Unzuverlässigkeit der Eingebeorenen kommen von Seiten der Farmer immer vor, zum Teil sind die Farmer selbst Schuld [sic] an diesen Zuständen, denn wo nicht dauernde Kontrolle herrscht wird der beste Arbeiter faul und nachläßig." Annual report by Sgt. Paul Gentz (Police Station Aninus),22.02.1912, NAN, DAR, 19 J.III, no page number.
[690] Request regarding the "expedience" of corporal punishment by Foreign Office, Berlin, to Government GSWA, Windhuk, 12.01.1900, NAN, ZBU, 694 F.V.f.1, 1.
[691] See the numerous responses to the Foreign Offices's request, NAN, ZBU, 694 F.V.f.1, 2-84.
[692] "Meine langjährige Erfahrung ist, dass die Prügelstrafe ein, besonders bei dem Nama-Volke nicht zu entbehrendes Zuchtmittel ist." Report by missionary Thomas Fenchel, Keetmanshoop, 03.06.1900, NAN, ZBU, 694 F.V.f.1, 76.
[693] "Es gab, von Alters her als Strafe für Besitzlose eigentlich kein anderes Strafmittel unter den Hottentotten als die Prügelstrafe, […]." Ibid.

among the seven African peoples living in the German colonies they had surveyed, penalties usually consisted in capital punishment or in property forfeiture, but "seldom in imprisonment or corporal punishment."[694] Likewise, the ethnographer Carl Meinhof observed that corporal punishment of adults was "not as common as is mostly assumed."[695] Schröder concludes therefore that

> the penal law of many African ethnicities attributed great importance to the atonement of wrongdoings through compensation and additional payment [*Bußzahlung*]. It was grounded in an African understanding of the purpose of punishment which differed fundamentally from the European concept. This understanding aimed at the redress of harm inflicted to the victim. Such a compensation was meant to restore the social order that had been disrupted by the misdeed.[696]

But policemen, as so many others in the colonial realm, reproduced the prevailing racist narrative of a backward colonized population who understood only the language of violence, when, in fact, this fixation on violence as a means of education and communication was more specific to their own upbringing.[697] Sergeant Hirschmüller wrote in his exam, for example:

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[694] "Die Strafe, auf die bei Vergehungen verschiedener Art erkannt wird, bestehen in Todesstrafe und in Vermögensstrafen – Bußen – selten in Einsperrungen oder Leibesstrafen." Schreiber, "Rechtsgebräuche der Eingeborenen der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika," *Beiträge zur Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialwirtschaft* 5 (1903): 246. Cit. in Martin Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht in den deutschen Schutzgebieten Schwarzafrikas* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 1997), 15.

[695] Carl Meinhof, *Afrikanische Rechtsgebräuche* (Berlin: Berliner Missionsgesellschaft, 1914), 71. Cit. in Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht*, 16.

[696] "Im Strafrecht vieler afrikanischer Ethnien kam somit der Sühnung eines Verbrechens durch Entschädigung und zusätzliche Bußzahlung eine große Bedeutung zu. Die Ursache hierfür lag in der sich von europäischen Auffassungen wesentlich unterscheidenden afrikanischen Vorstellung vom Zweck der Strafe. Diese zielte auf die Wiedergutmachung des dem Opfer entstandenen Schadens hin. Durch den Ausgleich sollten die durch die Tat gestörten sozialen Beziehungen zwischen den Beteiligten und damit auch innerhalb der Dorfgemeinschaft wiederhergestellt werden." Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht*, 16.

[697] For an interesting, original account of corporal punishment in schools taking the perspective of the punished children, see Jacob Middleton, "The Experience of Corporal Punishment in Schools, 1890-1940," *History Of Education* 37, 2 (2008): 253-275.

> In any case, the best administered remedy is an immediate, really palpable [*wirklich fühlbare*] punishment. [...] Besides the withdrawal of foodstuffs, drinks, and tobacco, the Herero recognizes only a palpable [*fühlbar*] beating as real punishment.[698]

Thus, added to the idea of violence as the only appropriate means of correction was the notion that it could "have the desired effect only if it was executed at once."[699]

How this punishment was supposed to be implemented and by whom was less obvious. Corporal punishment of the colonized was regulated – like so many other aspects of colonial rule – by a confusing mixture of executive orders, internal regulations, and customary law.[700] It could be either a penalty in a criminal case, a disciplinary measure within a military or state institution, or a paternal chastisement (*väterliches Züchtigungsrecht*), that is a civil, customary right. In this last sense it differed not much from the laws regarding domestics, farm workers, apprentices, students, soldiers, convicts, wives, and children in the homeland. This common law was buttressed by the ideology that some members of society needed to be taught to work. "Education to work" was the widely used expression.[701] It applied to the lower classes in the *Kaiserreich*, as well as to Africans in the colonies. Judge Bruhns from the high court in Windhoek considered the "education" of colonial subjects to be a "cultural mission" of all Europeans and claimed that

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[698] "Jedenfalls ist aber wohl eine sofortige wirklich fühlbare Bestrafung die am besten angewandte Heilmethode. [...] Der Herero erkennt außer der Entziehung von Kost und Genußmitteln nur eine fühlbare Tracht Prügel als wirkliche Strafe an." Written exam by Sgt. Emil Hirschmüller (Police Depot Waterberg), no date, BA-B, R 1002/ 2538, 96-97.

[699] "Die Prügelstrafe hat nur dann die gewünschte Wirkung, wenn sie alsbald nach der Tat vollzogen wird." Decree by Magistrate Anton Heiligenbrunner (District Office Keetmanshoop), 07.01.1914, NAN, BKE, 32 L.2.e, 53.

[700] For a comprehensive discussion of the compound of legal regulations regarding corporal punishment, see Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht.*

[701] On the relationship between "native policy" and labor policy, notably the ideology of labor discipline both in the metropole and the colony, see Sebastian Conrad, "'Eingeborenenpolitik' in Kolonie und Metropole. 'Erziehung zur Arbeit' in Ostafrika und Ostwestfalen," in *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914*, edited by Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 107–128.

> if one wants to fulfill honestly and properly one's educational responsibility [*Erziehungspflicht*], one is left with no other choice but to bring to bear the same means of correction that the educator at home is entitled to.[702]

Contrary to its legal and disciplinary counterparts,[703] the paternal right of chastisement was never codified or standardized (in terms of punishable misdoings, forms and magnitude of punishment, disciplining tools, etc.). Interestingly, nothing in this regard was formulated in the 1907 "native ordinances," where one would have expected at least a mention of the customary law in the decree regarding employer-employee relationships.[704] This meant that it was left to the chastising person to determine the appropriate form and extent of a beating.

Missionary Fenchel cautioned the colonial government that not all colonizers were competent in the arts of disciplining:

> An experienced and sensible [*verständiger*] person would not dare to object to the application [*Anwendung*] of corporal punishment in this country. However, it all depends on the manner of that application in each individual case. In the hands of a pedagogue the whip can do miracles, whereas in the hands of a brutish [*unverständigen*] person it can lead to abuse.[705]

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[702] "[…], daß dem Weißen hier eine Kulturaufgabe zufällt, er auch die Erziehungspflicht gegenüber den Eingeborenen hat. Weil dem so ist, deshalb hat das Obergericht auch gesagt: wenn du ehrlich und richtig der Erziehungspflicht nachkommen willst, dann bleibt dir nichts weiter übrig, als auch die Zuchtmittel anzuwenden, die Erzieher [sic] daheim zustehen.'" Quoted in Henning Melber, *Namibia: Kolonialismus und Widerstand* (Bonn: Informationsstelle Südliches Afrika, 1981), 42f.

[703] The most important decrees were: Governor Friedrich von Lindequist (Gouv. SWA): "Runderlass des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika betreffend die Vollziehung von Prügelstrafen." 22.12.1905, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 20; Secretary of State Bernhard Dernburg (RKA), "Erlass zur Handhabung der Prügelstrafe." 12.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 21-22; Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) "Verfügung betr. Vollzug der Prügelstrafe." 30.10.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 51.

[704] "Verordnung des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika, betr. Dienst- und Arbeitsverträge mit Eingeborenen des südwestafrikanischen Schutzgebiets," 18.08.1907, in *Deutsches Kolonialblatt* 18.Jg., Nr. 24 (1907): 1179-1181.

[705] "Ein erfahrener und verständiger Mensch wird gegen die Anwendung der Prügelstrafe hier zu Lande nichts einzuwenden wagen, es kommt nur auf die Art der Anwendung in jedem einzelnen Falle an. In der Hand des Pädagogen kann die Ruthe Wunders wirken, während sie in der Hand des Unverständigen zu

In theory, the different forms of corporal punishment (criminal, disciplinary, paternal) were supposed to be strictly separated. Judge Bruhns stated on that issue:

> Those who do not know how far they can go with the usage of educative tools, should keep their hands out of it! Never should the paternal right of chastisement get out of hand so that it replaces the state's penal power![706]

Yet, in practice the categories were constantly confused. Farmers punished theft and policemen punished laziness. In fact, Magistrate Hirschmüller admitted to this very fact in a circular to his subordinates suggesting ways by which one could work around the blurring of penal categories.[707] He advised his policemen

> to check whether the native's behavior (disobedience, insubordination, laziness, escape) can simultaneously be construed as a slight [*Mißachtung*] (libel of employer). Routinely, one will be able to assume this.[708]

Hirschmüller's insistence that policemen check up on something that they should regularly assume was perhaps self-contradictory and confusing. To complicate the matter further,

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Mißhandlung führen kann." Report by missionary Thomas Fenchel, Keetmanshoop, 03.06.1900, NAN, ZBU, 694 F.V.f.1, 76.

[706] "Wer nicht die Grenze ziehen kann, wie weit er bei der Anwendung von Erziehungsmitteln gehen darf, der soll die Hände davon lassen! Niemals darf das Züchtigungsrecht dahin ausarten, daß es die staatliche Strafgewalt ersetzt!" Quoted in: Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht*, 103.

[707] Decree by Magistrate Anton Heilingbrunner (District Office Keetmanshoop), 07.01.1914, NAN, BKE, 32 L.2.e, 51-55.

[708] "Es ist daher in allen Fällen, wo Strafantrag wegen Verletzung des Dienstverhältnisses gestellt ist, zu prüfen, ob in dem Verhalten des betr. Eingeb. (Ungehorsam, Widersetzlichkeit, Trägheit, Entlaufen) nicht zugleich eine Mißachtung (Beleidigung des Albeitgebers) liegt. Regelmäßig wird man dies annehmen dürfen. In solchen Fällen können [a]lso [sic] die mit Strafbefugnis ausgestatteten Beamten anstelle der Disziplinarstrafe eine gerichtliche Strafe (wegen Beleidigung) […] [verb missing]." Ibid, 53.

settlers could refer to paragraph 17 of an 1896 ordinance which allowed them to entrust their paternal right of chastisement to a representative of the state.[709]

As a matter of fact, what mattered to the colonial administration, discernible in both missionary Fenchel's and judge Bruhns' statements above, was not so much the confusion of legal categories, but rather that violence had to be done in the "proper" way, that the person who disciplined had the ability and knew how to do it "correctly." This is where the role of the police force became crucial. Policemen were in many instances the authority who distinguished "right" from "wrong" violence. They defined what constituted the correct treatment of African workers. They specified what was the appropriate behavior toward a colonized population considered in need of care. So, when a European employer did not know how to deal with his employees, that is, how to "educate" them to work, the police intervened. If he did know how, however, then the police did not interfere and merely assisted him. In some sense, they were the teachers of the teachers of work. They were the guardians of "civilizing" violence. And their guiding principles were honor and propriety, as well as their trust in their own practice and experience.[710]

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[709] "Eingeborene, welche in einem Dienstverhältnis oder einem Arbeitsvertragsverhältnis stehen, können auf Antrag der Dienst- oder Arbeitgeber wegen fortgesetzter Pflichtverletzung und Trägheit, wegen Widersetzlichkeit oder unbegründeten Verlassens ihrer Dienst- oder Arbeitsstellen sowie wegen sonstiger erheblicher Verletzung des Dienst- oder Arbeitsverhältnisses disziplinarisch von dem mit Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit betrauten Beamten (§§1,14) mit körperlicher Züchtigung und in Verbindung mit dieser Strafe oder allein mit Kettenhaft nicht über 14 Tage bestraft werden." Chancellor v. Hohenlohe: "Verfügung wegen Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit und der Disziplinargewalt gegenüber den Eingeborenen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika." 22.04.1896, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 16.

[710] Lüdtke on honor as a guiding principle for the state administration's relationship to business interests: "Eine […] vorbehaltlose Allianz der Administration mit den wirtschaftenden Interessenten mußte mit der 'Beamten-Ehre' kollidieren. Selbst-Deutung und Gestus der Beamten erlaubten zwar wohlwollenden Einsatz, um 'drohenden Schaden' abzuwenden und 'Hindernisse der freien Bewegung' des Eigentums zu beseitigen. Eine unmittelbare Identität von bürgerlich-kapitalistischen und administrativen Maximen und Verhaltenspraktiken blieb jedoch verpönt. In keinem Fall durfte eine mögliche 'Engführung' sichtbar werden, weder intern noch nach außen." Alf Lüdtke, *"Gemeinwohl", Polizei und "Festungspraxis": Staatliche Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preußen, 1815-1850* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1982), 144.

By now, the ideas and ideologies that framed the violent policing of work should be clear, and many of them will be familiar to scholars of colonialism in other contexts. In order to bring greater specificity to my analysis of the German context, and to ground it in material practices, I will now turn to the three main aspects of labor regulation in which the colonial police was involved: recruitment, distribution, and supervision.

Finding and Seizing Labor

First, the police played a major role in recruiting, or better, finding labor. In order to impose their "care" onto the colonized, the police had to bring them forcefully under their wing. Many of their patrols were organized with the sole purpose of ruthlessly hunting down Africans who were living in remote areas, far away from the colonizing centers. How brutal these capturing tours often were is barely detectable in the language which the policemen used to describe the patrols in their reports. In those reports the policemen talk about having "drawn out" (*ausgehoben*) or "closed down" (*aufgehoben*) some village, about having "cleaned" (*gesäubert*) an area, or about having "collected" (*aufgesammelt*), "picked up" (*aufgegriffen*), and "gotten hold of" (*habhaft geworden*) men, women, and children.[711] Sometimes the reports were not only vague in their choice of verbs but also obscure about the actors involved in the raids. Inspection Officer Hildebrandt, for instance, noted that he

[711] "Drawn out": Patrol report by Sgt. v. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja), 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 19-37. "Closed down": Patrol report by Sgt. August Goldacker (Police Station Karibib), 04.07.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 105-109. "Cleaned": Report by Senior Staff Otto Donicht (District Office Karibib) to IdL, 09.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 198-199. "Collected": Annual report by IdL, 14.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 68; and patrol book by District Chief v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru), 07.04.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 93-101.
"picked up" and "gotten hold of": Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg) to IdL: "Patrouillen-Bericht." 27.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 129; Senior Staff Sgt. Otto Donicht (Bezamt Karibib) to IdL: "Bericht des diensttuenden Polizeiwachtmeisters Donicht über den Verlauf der Patrouille in der Kuisebgegend." 19.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 187-190.

himself had "personally brought back people,"[712] when it is fairly certain that he must have been accompanied by at least one African police assistant if not a whole group of well-armed German and African policemen – very likely for a higher ranking man like Hildebrandt.

That one must assume that police patrols involved a fair amount of everyday violence, in many cases of an intense kind, is indicated in other sources. There, we hear of men and women being subjected to extended interrogations, or deprived of water so that they would give up information about hideouts.[713] We hear of threats, seizure, and blows to the face.[714] These sources also testify to the repeated instructions to policemen to burn down huts and personal belongings once the African settlements had been raided.[715] Whether Africans had never been in the employ of a settler or whether they had escaped it, whether they had stolen something or not, should have made a difference. But often to the patrolling policemen most, if not all, Africans they encountered were somehow suspect, for they had avoided the state's influence. At this stage, efforts to force colonial subjects into the labor market followed an either/or logic. Compared to subsequent phases, violence in this initial stage was not about education or discipline, not about honing labor relations. What was important then was to bring the colonized under the state's control and protection, with

[712] "Ich habe zum Teil persönlich Leute wieder aufgegriffen" Patrol report by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg), 27.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 129.
[713] Example of a two-hour questioning: Patrol report by Sgt. Albert Link (Police Station Gobabis), 30.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 233. Deprivation of water, and the mysterious death of a man shortly after his interrogation, ostensibly caused by a kick from a mule: Patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Otto Donicht (District Office Karibib), 19.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 188.
[714] See, for instance, Patrol report by Sgt. Xaver Hagner (Police Station Okaukwejo), 20.10.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 68-69; patrol report by Sgt. Johann Sterzenbach (District Office Grootfontein), 03.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 3483, 26-27.
[715] "Was die Eingeborenen nicht mitschleppen konnten ließ ich auf einen Haufen bringen und denselben sowie sämmtliche [sic] Pantocks verbrennen." Patrol report by Sgt. v. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja), 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 19-37, quote: 20. An official in the IdL wrote into the margins of a patrol report: "Wurden die Werften niedergebrannt? Doch sehr wichtig!" Margin notes in patrol report by Sgt. Hermann Wolff (Police Depot Waterberg), 27.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 93-94.

deadly force if necessary. Life outside the state-sanctioned realm of the colonial economy was made impossible. The logic of violence was different in the hunting stage than once the colonized subject had entered the labor market.

In the extreme, this desire for absolute control could develop into a perverse form of safari, an extreme dehumanization of the colonized, as in this request by Senior Staff Sergeant Eggersglüß at the end of his long patrol report:

> I humbly ask the district office for permission to go on a hunt for Bushmen with a larger patrol at the beginning of next month.[716]

The commander-in-chief of the *Schutztruppe* used hunting vocabulary as well when he complained about the police shying away his prey: "Otherwise it happens like on a drive hunt whereby somebody had already flushed through [*durchgekäschert*] beforehand." The commander formulated quite frankly the rationale of such indiscriminate measures when he noted that "it is tremendously difficult to distinguish among the prowling rabble [*Gesindel*] between the 'harmless' and the criminals."[717] Particularly regarding the San, the language and the mindset of the pursuers increasingly included images of disinfestation and pest control, referring to the "extermination" of this group of Africans.[718]

As indicated at other points in the dissertation, the colonial military and the colonial police operated differently, which could sometimes result in setbacks or malfunctions.

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[716] "Das Kaiserliche Distriktsamt bitte ich, daß ich mit Anfang des Monats […] mit einer größeren Patrouille […] Jagd auf Buschleute ausüben darf." Patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Heinrich Eggersglüß (District Office Maltahöhe), 17.05.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 226.
[717] "Für die Truppue [sic] ist es aber ungemein schwer unter dem herumstreifenden Gesindel die 'Harmlosen' von den Verbrechern zu unterscheiden. [...] dann muß dieses Regemachen der Buschleute durch einzelne Polizeibeamte unterbleiben. Sonst geht es wie bei einer Treibjagt [sic] wo vorher schon jemand durchgekäschert hat." *Schutztruppe* command to Gouv. SWA, 10.10.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 40.
[718] Patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Heinrich Eggersglüß (District Office), 24.03.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 15.

Holding on to the idea that policing was not the same as soldiering, representatives of the police were convinced that letting the military handle the "collection" of labor was the wrong approach, especially since soldiers had no experience in how to interact with Africans.[719] It did not, however, prevent the two institutions from occasionally joining forces, or at least declaring the intention to do so.[720] Nonetheless, in the first instance, capturing laborers for the colonial economy was a joint effort between African and German policemen.[721] German sergeants often asked specifically for support from their African subordinates.[722] The instances in which police assistants captured more persons than their superiors are numerous.[723] Sometimes, African police assistants even went on patrols on their own to "collect unemployed natives."[724] Police Assistant Fritz, for instance, led several foot patrols with a handful of African men. During those patrols, which lasted between five and thirty days, he apprehended between eighteen and a hundred and fifty people per patrol. Purportedly, Fritz captured 442 Africans altogether in one year.[725]

Furthermore, policemen practiced searches together with settlers and members of the colonized population. On many patrols farmers came along to add the force of their guns or

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[719] For a quite early defense of this position, notably regarding the regulation of "Bushmen," see Magistrate Eschstruth (District Office Grootfontein) to Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager, 19.05.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2506, 5-10.
[720] Decree that regulated police-military cooperation by Commander-in-Chief Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (*Schutztruppe* Command), 30.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, no page number. For an example of a joint patrol, see report by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub), 27.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 114. For an example of repeated requests by the police to the military to help out, see telegram from Distric Office Maltahöhe to IdL, 13.11.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 46.
[721] District Office Outjo exceptionally gave all names of patrol riders, Germans as well as Africans, and listed their joint "successes." Patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Oskar Weischer, (District Office Outjo), 21.01.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 71-72.
[722] See, for instance: "Die Genannten [Sergeants; M.M.] sprachen sich übereinstimmend dahin aus, daß es eines größeren Aufgebots - besonders an Eingeborenen - bedürfe…" District Chief Lux (District Office Bethanien) to Inspection Officer Pueschel (Officer Post Aus), 01.01.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 52-53.
[723] For instance, the patrol report by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg), 16.05.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 82.
[724] Under the heading "Native Police (Foot patrol)" one mission read: "Collection of unemployed natives." Patrol book by District Chief v. Frankenberg (Damt Omaruru), 07.04.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 97.
[725] Ibid., 97-98.

to act as guides. Farmer Grönert accompanied Sergeant Eschen's patrol, for instance, and farmer Glatt accompanied Sergeant Sterzenbach.[726] Local Herero leader Kathena, who accompanied and guided patrols, was promised one Mark "for every adult native able to work" whom he helped to capture.[727] Later, Kathena joined the German police force and continued to participate in labor searches and patrols to arrest "criminals."[728]

Finally, settlers captured people by themselves. Senior Staff Sergeant Schaaps noted casually in a patrol report that farmer Schurz had ventured several times into the Kupferberg massif by himself "in order to recruit prowling natives as workers."[729] Sergeant Wiesemann let several farmers do the same.[730] The necessary violence or threat farmers or their hands used in order to bring in Africans like the ones referred to here, who were probably hiding in the hills so they would not be forced into the colonial labor market, was considered acceptable by the policeman. The documents I rely on here do not make entirely clear whether the policemen explicitly gave their permission or whether they simply tolerated the farmers' actions. What does become evident in other sources, however, is that the police were without question annoyed when farmers did not have their tacit or explicit approval, or worse, when farmers hid people in order to keep them for themselves. Farmers Ehorn and Brockerhof in the Karibib area, for example, were suspected of having concealed the whereabouts of unemployed Africans, and of telling

[726] Patrol reports by Sgt. Hermann Eschen (District Office Gobabis), 08.08.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 30-32, and by Sgt. Johann Sterzenbach (District Office Grootfontein), 03.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 3483, 26-27.
[727] "Ich habe den eingeborenen Führer Cattena [sic] für jeden erwachsenen Eingeborenen, der arbeitsfähig ist, eine Mark versprochen, und bitte eine diesbezügliche Summe eventuell aus dem mir überwiesenen Fond abheben zu dürfen." Report by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg) to IdL, 28.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 66. Another patrol led by Kathena: report by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg) to IdL, 27.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 53-54.
[728] Cf. Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 381.
[729] Patrol report by Senior Staff Sgt. Josef Schaaps (Police Depot Kupferberg), 14.06.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 19.
[730] Reports by Sgt. Friedrich Wiesemann (Police Station Rote Berge), 21.01.1913, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.B vol.2, 351, and by idem (Police Station Hornkranz) to District Office Rehoboth, 01.11.1913, NAN, BRE, 77 L.2.i, 39.

others working on their farms to hide when patrols came through.[731] This kind of behavior was not accepted and severely censured.[732]

Whether searches resulted in seizures or not, the effect was twofold. On the one hand, such searches instigated a capturing practice wherein policemen not only wielded violence, but also delegated and authorized violence, thus including some of the settler and the colonized population into the colonial project. On the other hand, the searches installed a general atmosphere of fear in which hiding from or ignoring the colonial labor system was less and less an option for the indigenous population. Inspection Officer Hildebrandt noted in that regard:

> Unfortunately, without it being my intent or the sergeants' fault, the natives are frightened by the constant patrol traffic in such a way that some have declared: '[…] we want peace and move into another area.'[733]

To sum up, finding and capturing workers for the colonial economy was a concerted effort, even when the actors involved in it pursued different agendas and had different approaches and levels of intensity of violence. These ruthlessly pursued, concerted yet multifarious enterprises forced the colonized into choosing more often than not to seek wage labor, whether via the police or on their own, rather than resisting or evading the system.

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[731] Report by Senior Staff Sgt. Otto Donicht (District Office Karibib), 09.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 198-199.
[732] Chief of Police Bethe (IdL) to District Office Karibib, 21.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 204.
[733] "Leider sind ohne meine Absicht und ohne Verschulden der Sergeanten die Eingeborenen durch den ständigen Patrouillen-Verkehr derart eingeschüchtert, daß sich einzelne auf einer Farm geäußert haben: 'die Waterberger-Polizei ist banja quai, wir wollen Ruhe und ziehen in eine andere Gegend.' […] Halte es dann aber für notwendig die Patrouillen-Tätigkeit nun etwas einzuschränken, weil diese Maßnahme auf die Dauer durchgeführt trotz augenblicklichem Erfolg abstumpfend auf das Hirn des Negers wirken könnte." Report by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg) to IdL, 06.02.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 169-170.

Distributing Labor

Policemen were also at the linchpin of labor distribution. Even though the labor market was supposed to be free, the general scarcity of labor made it necessary to have an intermediary institution between employer and employee. Many settlers made direct requests to the police. "I kindly ask the District Office to reserve for me one or two native families as soon as possible," one woman wrote in July 1907.[734] Her letter is one example of the countless requests for workers stored in the archives.[735] In fact, some settlers believed that they would be automatically supplied by the administration.[736] Zimmerer notes that "the idea that the administration would merely set the framework" within which the distribution of labor was then regulated by the market, "was foreign to farmers."[737] He adds that "the colonial administration was not entirely blameless for the farmers' expectations," since the concept of a semi-free labor market "broke with the principle of distribution over the market."[738] Thus, in their day-to-day business at the station or on patrol, police officials listened to the many demands. And they promised, reserved, denied, delivered, reattributed, replaced, etc. Africans accordingly. As a result, policemen often had the power to decide where and for whom the colonized should work, as well as who would get what kind of workers and for what kind of work. In brief, they were the brokers of the labor

[734] Request by Aimé Weiss, Otana, 24.07.1907, NAN, DOK, 27 E.2.e, 90.
[735] See, for example, the two files entitled "Anträge auf Zuweisung" in the papers of the District Office Okahandja, NAN, DOK, 27 E.2.e, vol.1 and 2.
[736] "Es ist in letzter Zeit wiederholt vorgekommen, dass sich Farmer, die vor kurzem eine Regierungsfarm gekauft haben, auf den Standpunkt gestellt haben, dass die Regierung die Pflicht habe, ihnen auch Arbeiter zu beschaffen, wenn ihnen unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen eine Farm verkauft wird." Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 16.07.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2610, 53.
[737] Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 190.
[738] Ibid., 191.

market. A circular by the colonial government reminding all local district offices as late as 1914 that "[t]he decision to whom to distribute people" should "on no account" be entrusted "to lower ranking state representatives" is telling evidence that policemen did indeed oftentimes take up the role of labor supply middlemen.[739]

At any rate, police were officially intended to be involved at some point of the process. Work contracts were supposed to be drawn up and signed at the police station, at least those for a work period lasting longer than a month. However, in 1912, Vice Governor Hintrager observed that, "owing to the employers' carelessness," only few employments were sealed in written form.[740] His reminder to all police organs that contracts absolutely had to be written attests to the fact that on numerous occasions hires were made without paperwork even when the police had served as recruitment agents. The settlers' daughter Ruth Kühnast describes, for instance, how in 1906 her mother went to the concentration camp in Swakopmund to "choose from the crowd of prisoners a Herero boy and a Damara" whom she wanted for domestic labor. Whether she entered the camp by herself or with a policeman is unclear. But according to the daughter's narrative, she was in the "company of

[739] The circular noted further that it had happened "that farmers were promised workers" and "that these were all or partially not available any more when the farmers came to collect them, without the head of administration knowing about their whereabouts." "Schliesslich ersuche ich die Aemter auf die Verteilung der verfügbaren Arbeiter die grösste Aufmerksamkeit zu verwenden. Die Bestimmung, wem derartige Leute zuzuführen sind, darf in keinem Falle unteren Organen überlassen werden. Es ist vorgekommen, dass Farmern Arbeiter in Aussicht gestellt worden sind, dass diese aber schliesslich, als sie die Farmer abholen wollten, alle oder zum Teil nicht mehr verfügbar waren, ohne dass der Verwaltungschef über den Verbleib der Leute etwas feststellen konnte." Circular by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL and all District Offices, 16.07.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2610, 53. Cit. in Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*, 190.

[740] "Die Ämter haben ihren Einfluß dahin geltend zu machen, daß über alle Arbeitsverträge Weisser mit Eingeborenen Dienstbücher ausgestellt werden. Dieses ist bislang infolge der Nachlässigkeit der Arbeitgeber nur in bescheidenem Umfang geschehen. Um letztere dazu zu bringen, ordne ich an, daß in allen Fällen, wo ein Amt (Polizeistation) Eingeborene als Arbeiter einem Dienstherrn überweist, die Anlegung eines Dienstbuches zu verlangen ist." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 26.06.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 6.

a native policeman, who was to serve as interpreter," when she took the two African prisoners to her home.[741]

The vice governor also ordered that, if desired, the police had to make copies of the contracts for the hired Africans, "against payment of the usual fee."[742] Having written labor agreements could be advantageous or disadvantageous for employers and employees. There were both good reasons either to comply with or to evade the colonial state's imposition of bureaucratic control. But, as the evidence shows, and consistent with my assessment of improvised police procedures in chapter three, even policemen did not necessarily always follow bureaucratic protocols.

The distribution of captured "vagrant" or recaptured escaped Africans, as well as of imprisoned Africans, was exclusively organized by the police. Several decrees underscored that all African prisoners imperatively had to work.[743] Moreover, prisoners of war who had been massively pressed into forced labor during the war were oftentimes left with no option but to remain in their position long after the official end of war.[744] Acting on behalf of magistrates and district chiefs, German policemen often coordinated the distribution of

[741] "Meine Mutter suchte sich aus der Menge der Gefangenen einen Hererojungen und einen Bergdamara von ungefähr 14 Jahren aus, die sie zur Hausarbeit anlernen wollte. […] Meine Mutter hatte die Eingeborenen unter Begleitung eines Eingeborenenpolizisten, der als Dolmetscher dienen sollte, mit in unsere Wohnung genommen." Typed manuscript by Ruth Kühnast, "Die Erziehung der Eingeborenen in Südwest." (1928), Basler Afrika Bibliographien (BAB), PA.46 III.1.1, 31-32.
[742] "Auch dem Eingeborenen ist auf Wunsch ein Duplikat des Dienstbuches gegen Erstattung der üblicheen Kosten zu geben. Oft wollen nämlich die Eingeborenen deshalb den Arbeitsvertrag nicht unterschreiben, weil sie selbst keine Abschrift in den Händen haben." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 26.06.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 6.
[743] Decree by Gouv. SWA, 24.11.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2668, 7; decree by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager, (Gouv. SWA), 15.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2668, 9; decree by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA), 29.09.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2668, 11.
[744] Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 183; Gesine Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1907* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999), 183.

penal labor chain gangs. And African policemen accompanied and guarded the prisoners.[745] Even European prisoners could ideally be put to some useful occupation, lest their confinement have a "harmful impact on [their] mental state."[746]

Yet the bulk of Africans distributed by the police were captured and recaptured persons. The numerous men, women, and children Police Assistant Fritz and his men had caught "were handed over to the Otavi railway [company], the Tsumeb mines, as well as to farmers and private persons of the district."[747] When a farmer was killed, Sergeant Krey of district Maltahöhe was charged with securing and then redistributing the workers left behind.[748] Local administrations built a vast bureaucracy around the identification and redistribution of escaped workers. They sent descriptions – even photographs – of apprehended presumed escapees across district borders in search of their presumably rightful employers.[749] They transmitted lists of wanted workers, devising profile sheets, including information regarding age, height, or distinct marks.[750] A tremendous effort was put into tracking down runaways and returning them.[751] On the one hand, this effort bolstered the bureaucratization and professionalization of the colonial police in German

[745] Decree by Gouv. SWA, 24.11.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2668, 7.
[746] "[…] bei längerer Strafdauer auf den seelischen Zustand von schädlichem Einfluß ist." Decree by Governor Seitz, (Gouv. SWA), 20.06.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2668, 14.
[747] "Die gesammelten Eingeborenen wurden an die Otavibahn, Tsumebminen und das Gouvernement für [...] und die Landesvermessung abgegeben, sowie an Farmer und Private des Distrikts." Patrol book by District Chief v. Frankenberg (Damt Omaruru), 07.04.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 98.
[748] Interestingly, a former Nama police assistant, owner of ca. 150 small livestock and several cows, was put in charge to stay on site and to take care of late farmer Klinge's crops. Report by Sgt. Arthur Wegener (Police Station Altmaltahöhe), 12.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 169-171.
[749] For instance, written profile and two pictures sent by criminal investigator Sgt. Friedrich, (Criminal Investigation Dept. Swakopmund) to District Office Rehoboth, 23.01.1913, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.B vol.2, 347.
[750] For instance: "Als entlaufen wurde bei der hiesigen Polizei abgemeldet: Dem Farmer [...] der Hererojunge Paul Nr. 1498. [...] Es wird ergebenst ersucht nach den Entlaufenen zu fahnden." District Office Windhuk to District Office Rehoboth, 19.02.1912, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.B vol.2, 53.
[751] For instance, one of altogether three files entitled "Kontrolle der Eingeborenen Arbeiter. Recherchen nach Entlaufenen und Zugelaufenen" of District Office Rehoboth comprises 500 pages of documentation for the years 1911 to 1914 alone. NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.B vol.2.

Southwest Africa. On the other hand, it is proof that the colonial administration's endeavor to master the labor system absolutely was persistently defied by the colonized.

The colonial administration left nothing untried in its endeavor to compel every colonized – that "most important asset" of the colony as Dernburg called them[752] – to work for the colonial economy. Policemen combed through the registries of workers in the employ of public institutions, even personally went through their compounds in search of "appendages" (*Anhang*), that is, mostly family members of employees who were not working for the institution to which the compound belonged. Governor Seitz ordered that these men, women, and children, excluding those relatives who were unfit for work, be "remove[d] immediately from the public compounds [*amtliche Werften*] and delivere[d] to the district offices." The offices were then charged "to see to it that these [Africans] find employment at the soonest."[753] The list of Africans who had to leave their homes at the police headquarter's compound shows that a great majority of them were close relatives (cousins, brothers- and sisters-in-law, etc.) of African police employees. Only about thirty percent of those expelled were actually unemployed.[754] What little kinship relations and pre-colonial social structures the war had not destroyed, the labor distribution frenzy of the colonial administration finished off.

Although local district administrations sought to restrict the African workforce's mobility, their ambition to distribute labor in a planned and monitored fashion entailed that workers *were* moved from one place to another.[755] The African members of the

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[752] Bernhard Dernburg, *Zielpunkte des Deutschen Kolonialwesens. Zwei Vorträge* (Berlin: Mittler, 1907), 6.
[753] Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 07.06.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 173.
[754] Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to District Office Windhuk, 18.01.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 72-73.
[755] Governor Seitz reminded all district offices in fall 1911 that they were not authorized to hinder Africans from leaving their precinct. "Ein Specialfall veranlasst mich darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Bezirks (Distrikts)

Landespolizei were crucial in this respect. Police Assistant Jakob, for instance, was entrusted with transporting 46 workers over a distance of 200 km from Omaruru to Windhuk by train.[756] Whether and how he advised the workers on how to navigate the colonial economy during the journey must remain speculative.

Likewise, the fact that policemen on their patrol rides were the ones having to judge whether a settler had too many, just sufficient, or not enough workers, reveals how much these rank-and-file state representatives were implicated in labor distribution and therefore must have left their mark on distribution practices. Magistrate Vietsch from District Office Rehoboth, for instance, trusted his subordinate Sergeant Ebermann's opinion that a new flying station necessitated the recruitment of two more African policemen. The magistrate ordered his police staff to assess where one could find such men. A Baster widow who, according to this assessment, could forgo two workers, protested and pleaded to be allowed to keep at least one. Vietsch again left it to the policemen to decide whether her concern was grounded and, if so, to go and find someone else elsewhere.[757]

Thus, an abundance of documents testifies to the crucial role policemen played in distributing labor. Scrutinizing carefully their everyday distribution practices, I found that negotiations over the "proper" use of violence were key. Police delegated and authorized

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ämter nicht berechtigt sind, allgemein den Eingeborenen das Verlassen ihres Bezirks (Distriktes) zu verbieten. Die Aemter können nur dem einzelnen Individuum auf Grund § 5 der Passverordnung das Verlassen des Distriktes untersagen aber auch nur, wenn wichtige Gründe vorliegen. Will zum Beispiel der Eingeborene in einen andern Bezirk (Distrikt) gehen, weil er dort besseren [sic] Lohnverhältnisse findet, so kann es ihm nicht verwehrt werden." Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 18.11.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2597, 61. On the discussions among colonial administrators about confining Africans in order to better control the labor force, see Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 178-199.

[756] Acting District Chief Götte (District Office Omaruru) to District Office Karibib, 05.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 26.

[757] Report Sgt. Ebermann to District Office Rehoboth, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 21-22; Magistrate Vietsch (Bezamt Rehoboth) to police stations Gosorobis, Hornkranz, and Rote Berge, 03.01.1913, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 23-24. Cf. also a report on "available" workers on another Baster farm by Sgt. Bruno Lippke (Police Station Gochanas), 05.05.1913, NAN, BRE, 28 E.2.d, 78.

others in the colonial realm to do violence. But they also revoked such an authorization and took over.

Men the police deemed able to "treat their workers well" could receive permission to supply themselves with labor, that is, to deploy violence on their behalf or in concert with them. This form of violence involved settlers in the colonial project. The act of delegation and authorization on the part of the policemen shored up their own power; the act of violent participation on the part of the settlers legitimized the colonial state. Farmer Grüner, for instance, was told by Sergeant Frahm that he was "allowed to raid an [African] settlement, to keep as reward the people [he] needed, and to deliver the rest to the district office."[758] The relationship between farmer Grüner and the colonial administration was a particularly good one. Both the nearby military post and the nearby police station regularly allocated workers to his farm. He was also permitted to keep Africans who had "strayed" onto his property.[759] In another case, Inspection Officer Hildebrandt from the police depot in Waterberg urged farmer Speth to accompany the police patrols, for these were his only chance to provide himself with African workers.[760] However, Speth had wanted European workers. Upon hearing this, the inspection officer made it clear that, regarding the procurement of workers, farmer Speth was entirely dependent on the care the police would show him, and that he would get such attention if he treated his African workers correctly:

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[758] "[…] daß ich eine Werft ausheben darf, als Belohnung die für mich notwendigen Leute behalten u. den Rest dem Distr. Amt abliefern solle." Statement by farmer Grüner, Annex to Patrol report by Sgt. Dufring, 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 35.

[759] Ibid.

[760] Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg) to farmer Freiherr von Speth. 02.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2600, 19. In this particular case, farmer Speth benefited from Inspection Officer Hildebrandt's trust. District Chief von Frankenberg, however, did not trust the farmer. A year earlier, Speth had tried to procure workers by offering to have a public well built on his property and gambling that he would get to keep the large number of workers needed for such a project. The district chief refused. See District Chief v. Frankenberg (District Office Omaruru) to Gouv. SWA, 29.10.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2508, 26-27.

> I advise you again to see the native workers as capital which will yield interest [...] through sufficient provisions and good treatment. If you comply with those principles, you will receive the caring support [*sorgliche Unterstützung*] of the police should your employees become neglectful or impertinent. If not, you cannot count on the assistance of the organs of the Imperial Government regarding labor supply.[761]

Thus, in an apparent paradox, the police promised to supply or help supply laborers if employers treated them well, something they were only capable of proving once they had gotten workers. Therefore, other factors than the perceived treatment of employees must have been equally decisive in the officials' assessment of whether farmers were trustworthy. Getting along with the local police was a good start. Farmer Nass, for instance, emphasized that he and his farmer friends were "on the best of terms" with the local police. He declared proudly that "the police supports me in every possible way," that it protected his farm when he was away, and that it had "assisted me to hire available Kaffirs."[762]

More important, however, were notions of honor and social standing when it came to questions of labor distribution. Both African police assistants and German police sergeants had an impact on the perceived worthiness of farmers and other employers, for, as I noted about patrol procedures in the last chapter, information about conditions on the work sites was primarily gathered by them. In every transaction, both the policeman's and the potential employer's class or social position and reputation were at stake. A staff sergeant in Swakopmund, for instance, had denied additional workers to a farmer who, in the

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[761] "Ich gebe Ihnen daher also nochmals den Rat, die eingeborenen Arbeiter als ein Kapital anzusehen, daß [sic] sich durch genügende Verpflegung und gute Behandlung in Gestalt der Leistungen verzinst. Sie werden bei Innehaltung dieser Grundsätze die sorgliche Unterstützung der Polizei finden, falls sich Ihre Angestellten vernachlässigen oder frech werden. Im anderen Falle wollen Sie auf eine Unterstützung hinsichtlich Gestellung von Arbeitskräften seitens der Organe der Kaiserlichen Reichs-Regierung nicht rechnen." Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg) to farmer Freiherr von Speth. 02.12.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2600, 19.

[762] Farmer Nass to IdL: Erfahrungen mit der Polizei. 18.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 60-61.

policeman's eyes, had been responsible for an Ovambo worker's death, and, to boot, had not paid the hospital charges. The farmer in question had served as first lieutenant under the now acting chief of police, and was offended that, "although now just a simple farmer," he would be treated so poorly by a simple rank-and-file man, a subordinate of his former comrade-in-arms. He wrote that he "could not accept [this] from a policeman." The issue was resolved verbally and personally by the magistrate of Swakopmund, and one must assume that the farmer continued to be allocated workers since there are no further complaints from him in the archival file.[763] The farmer's negligence (and the worker's death) was accepted in the end. His class position and personal relationship to the police leadership allowed him to remain among those settlers whom the police regarded as able to treat their workers well.

Other settlers, on the other hand, were not trusted by the police and lacked the social standing and connections of the farmer in my last example. These were persons the police deemed in need of police attention themselves. The farmer couple Matzkuhn, for instance, were greatly upset when Staff Sergeant Rohde "took away their only boy," the Herero worker Wilhelm.[764] In a letter filled with orthographic mistakes – made even more obvious in comparison to Staff Sergeant Rohde's exceptionally eloquent writing – farmer Matzkuhn lamented how hard it was to get by without workers. Beforehand, his wife had gone to the police station to confront Rohde, in his words, "in a very exasperating manner."[765] As explanation for removing Wilhelm from the farm, the staff sergeant stated that Wilhelm had already been in the employ of another farmer.

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[763] Complaint by farmer Weitzenberg to Major Heinrich Bethe (IdL), 16.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 67-73, quotes: 68.
[764] Farmer Matzkuhn to IdL, 25.11.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 18-19.
[765] Statement by Staff Sgt. Rohde (District Office Omaruru), 09.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 26.

Further investigations showed, however, that neither the first farmer, nor the second farmer (Matzkuhn), nor a third employer for whom Wilhelm had worked for a short period in-between, had given him a work contract or registered the employment with the police.[766] What seemed ultimately to decide the issue in favor of Staff Sergeant Rohde's interpretation, i.e. to restore Wilhelm to his first employer, was a combination of portraying the Matzkuhn couple's low level of education, their irritability (depicted by Rohde in a cool and objective manner), and the general claim that

> family Matzkuhn is constantly involved in hassles [*Scherereien*] with the police regarding native matters. Matzkuhn's natives constantly present themselves at the police office to complain about being treated badly, or not getting their due food, or not receiving their wage.[767]

In short, who the employers were, their "appearance and moral conduct," as well as how they were represented by the police in their reports mattered, irrespective of actual or perceived conditions on the work site.[768] Interestingly, policemen also included in the evaluation of an employer's status the overall appearance of his or her farm. Chief of Police Heydebreck had asked his men early on to pay particular attention to the way in which production sites were organized, what they looked like, and what these observations might

[766] Senior Civil Servant Hollaender (IdL) to Magistrate Görgens (District Office Omaruru), 15.02.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 18-27.
[767] "Zum Schluß bitte ich gehorsamst bemerken zu dürfen, daß die Familie M a t z k u h n ständig Scherereien in Eingeborenen-Angelegenheiten mit der Polizei hat. Ständig erscheinen Eingeborene des M a t z k u h n auf dem Polizeibüro und führen darüber Beschwerde, daß sie schlecht behandelt werden, oder nicht ihre zuständige Kost bekommen, oder ihren Lohn nicht erhalten haben." Statement by Staff Sergeant Rohde (District Office Omaruru), 09.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 26.
[768] "Auftreten und Lebensweise [des Gastwirt Hülsmann; M.M.] durchaus nicht geeignet […], den Eingeborenen Respekt einzuflössen." Report by District Office Windhuk, 12.07.1907, NAN, ZBU, W.III.b.5, vol.1, 2. Cit. in Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner*, 192.

indicate about the productivity of the site.[769] And, indeed, policemen often backed up their appraisal of an employer's character and status with references to the orderliness and cleanliness, or lack thereof, of a particular place.[770]

One final example illustrates quite strikingly the ways in which different actors pursued their (economic) interests and the ways in which policemen brokered these ambitions. It shows the informal, improvised character those exchanges often had. Little sheets of paper, errands by African policemen and messengers, and encounters in the street or on the station, were the means by which many allocations took place. In the course of these exchanges, policemen negotiated questions of reputation, propriety, social standing, and "proper treatment," thus promoting, allowing, reprimanding, prohibiting, tacitly condoning, and so forth, the doings of the colonial population. The way in which Staff Sergeant Kups managed the distribution of labor in Karibib is a good example. In February 1911, he recounted an incident as follows:

> The Hottentott woman Lisbeth Nr. 288 was dismissed by hotelier Rosemann, because she had become increasingly disinclined [unlustig] to do work. She intended to go to Usakos where she would have had it easier to dodge work. But since people are absolutely needed here, I gave her a note and told her to go back to Rosemann, making clear that she was not allowed to leave for Usakos and that she was otherwise engaged for [farmer] Polle [in] Claustal. Lisbeth did not come back from Rosemann. But in the afternoon she brought a note from [manufacturing worker] Keseberg saying that she had been employed by him. Asked to explain herself, she answered that Rosemann had not wanted to take her back and that she had understood that she must find another job in Karibib. Apart from the fact that

[769] Questionnaire by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck to all district offices, 10.12.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2610, 3-8.
[770] For instance: "Nach Augenscheinnahme fehlt es auch hier am "Nötigsten." Im Gegensatz zu diesem Farmbetriebe [...] muß der in Osombuto [...] als besonders günstig in die Augen fallend, hervorgehoben werden. [...] Der Platz sah sehr sauber und ordentlich aus." Patrol report by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg), 27.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 130. Or: "Die Farm in Esere ist gut." Patrol report by Sgt. Franitzek (Police Depot Waterberg), 10.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 109.

> Lisbeth very well comprehended where she is supposed to work, Keseberg also knew absolutely that this was not proper [in Ordnung][771] […].

After several to-and-fros between the staff sergeant and the manufacturing worker Keseberg, personally or via the two men's African envoys, the policeman ended up losing his temper and insulting the man. His outburst incurred a formal complaint from Keseberg (again with quite a few misspellings) and produced the detailed documentation we can now find in the archive.[772] How Lisbeth's and Keseberg's agreement came about, whether it involved violence or threat, is unknown. One can only speculate about the Nama woman's interest and concerns, about her possible wish to remain in a town and not to be sent to a remote farm, about the relationship between her and Keseberg, and about the amount and nature of everyday violence that would have occurred between the two had the employment taken place. What the short account tells us, however, is the way Staff Sergeant Kups understood his task and the stance he had to take towards Lisbeth and Keseberg. The woman he considered work-shy and sly. The man he considered socially inferior and morally corrupt. Both were in need of his paternal care. Kups was exercising some form of *"fürsorglich"* coercion toward Lisbeth when he resolved to "protect" her from Keseberg and forced her to work for a farmer. To what extent his actions towards her

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[771] "Das in Frage kommende Hottentottenweib Lisbeth Nr 288 wurde, da sie in letzter Zeit immer unlustiger zur Arbeit wurde, vom Hotelier Rosemann entlassen. Sie hatte die Absicht nach Usakos zu gehen wo sie sich leichter vom Arbeiten drücken konnte. Da aber hier notwendig Leute gebraucht werden sagte ich ihr unter Mitgabe eines Zettels, sie solle nochmal zu Rosemann gehen, ob sie dort, da sie doch nicht nach Usakos entlassen würde, weiter arbeiten solle, andernfalls sie für Polle - Claustal engagiert sei. Lisbeth kam von Rosemann nicht zurück sondern nachmittags mit einem Zettel von Keseberg, daß sie bei dem eingestellt sei. Hierzu zur Rede gestellt, antwortete sie, Rosemann wollte sie nicht mehr haben und sie hätte verstanden sich in Karibib andere Arbeit suchen zu sollen. Abgesehen davon, daß Lisbeth wohl verstanden hat, wo sie arbeiten soll, hat auch Keseberg unbedingt gewußt, daß die Sache nicht in Ordnung ist, besonders da hier bei dem Arbeitermangel derartige Weiber für Junggesellen kaum zur Verfügung kommen." Report by Staff Sgt. Kups (Police Station Karibib), 28.02.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 55.

[772] Letter Gustav Keseberg to Gouv, 11.02.1911, and deposition by Keseberg, 09.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 53-54, 57-58.

involved everyday violence, a threatening gesture, groping or shoving, performed either by him or his African police assistant, is speculative, but, in my opinion highly probable.[773]

So far, I have emphasized that police assessments of "proper treatment" as well as their decisions to delegate or authorize the use of violence to other actors in the colonial realm were tightly linked to questions of social standing, appearances, and productivity. This notwithstanding, I wish to go beyond this observation and make a more structural, far-reaching argument about the mechanisms of labor distribution. One should recall the procedures and routines described in my last chapter: policemen watched over acceptable and unacceptable forms of violence in their improvised, commonsensical, pragmatic way of proceeding. In the process, employers' reputations, the police's evaluation of their ability to "treat well," could shift and be readjusted. They did encourage or "admonish" workers to return to employers even when their abusive behavior was well known.[774] However, when an employer kept losing his workers (that is, through escape, but also death) over and over again, policemen grew wary and became reluctant to resupply that person.[775] When an employer had been able to keep workers over a long period without "causing any stir," they

[773] Another time, and on the same basis, Staff Sergeant Kups refused to allocate a woman to an engineer named Cliff, whom he had apparently helped out in many other cases. Kups had probably acted as intermediary in Cliff's pelt trade. District Chief Groeben (District Office Karibib) to settler Cliff, 31.03.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2465, 96-97.

[774] "[…] muß ich zu meinem Bedauern ergebenst mitteilen, daß die betr. Hottentotten-Weiber sich trotz Ermahnung weigern, die Arbeit dort wieder aufzunehmen." IdL to settler Schloifer (Deutsch-Afrikanische Sandstein-Werke), 20.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 46.

[775] "Die Tatsache allein, dass Ihnen innerhalb neun Monaten kurz nacheinander zunächst zwei und dann abermals drei Familien entliefen, macht es notwendig, genau zu untersuchen, ob die Eingeborenen auf Ihrer Farm auch richtig behandelt und verpflegt werden. Abgesehen davon ist es mir von früher bekannt, dass Klagen über zu harte Bestrafung der Eingeborenen auf Ihrer Farm unter den Eingeborenen laut geworden sind. Es muss daher die Polizei in dem vorliegenden Fall ganz besonders gewissenhaft prüfen, ob Sie den Eingeborenen nicht zum sofortigen Verlassen des Dienstes Veranlassung gegeben haben. (§7 der Verordung betr. Dienst- und Arbeitsverträge [...]) Wäre dies der Fall, so können Ihnen die Eingeborenen unter keinen Umständen mehr zurückgegeben werden. Auch würde Ihnen dann das Amt keine Eingeborenen mehr besorgen können, da es sich nicht vertreten lässt, Arbeitgebern, die ihre Eingeborenen unrichtig behandeln, Eingeborene zu Überweisen, da die Behörden in diesem Fall der schlechten Behandlung der Eingeborenen Vorschub leisten würden." Senior Civil Servant Blumhagen (Gouv. SWA) to farmer Jacobs (Farm Etemba Süd), 03.02.1915, NAN, DOK, 27 E.2.f, no page number

were more often inclined to leave that employer alone, even when there was doubt as to whether the workers in question truly "belonged" to that employer.[776] When a worker sought support from the police in his effort to resign from a place, and knew to refer to proper procedure, policemen were willing to help that man out.[777] Moreover, different districts competed between each other to keep labor in their area. The meticulous, maybe even disproportionately time consuming investigation into whether a worker had had "good" reasons to have left an employer from another district could therefore be motivated not by a humanist commitment to protect the colonized, but rather by the calculating desire to keep that worker in one's own precinct and thus to be able to allocate him or her to one's own colonizer community. In other cases, the rivalry between administrative units led to a redistribution of workers in a rushed manner. Larger groups of unemployed workers were dealt with quickly given the pressure from demanding farmers. An overeager policeman, for instance, distributed a number of captives as soon as they had arrived at his station, even though they were not his to assign.[778] In June, 1912 one district chief drew the consequence from such police practice. He issued a decree stating that

> the procedure according to which native workers are assigned to applicants [*Antragsteller*] chronologically by date of incoming request, has proven impractical since the natives recurrently run away again. In the future, available natives are therefore assigned such that they are presented with the list of existing labor requests and then asked whose service they wish to enter. This is how requests will be dealt with. Of course, every employer is still free to recruit natives by himself.[779]

[776] District Office Rehoboth, for instance, let a seven year old boy who came to a farm to be with his mother even though he was employed somewhere else, stay on that farm. District Office Rehoboth to *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Wollzüchterei*, 12.09.1913, NAN, BRE, 28 E.2.d, 133.
[777] See, for instance, the case of Herero Johannes who insisted that he had properly resigned and not just run away. Report by Sgt. Karl Hofmann (Police Station Rehoboth), 19.06.1913, NAN, BRE, 28 E.2.d, 118-119.
[778] IdL to District Office Windhuk, 24.07.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2598, 37-38.
[779] "Die bisherige Handhabung der Überweisung von Eingeborenen-Arbeitern an die Antragsteller derart, daß die eingegangenen Anträge datenmäßig erledigt werden hat sich nicht als praktisch erwiesen, da die Eingeborenen immer wieder entlaufen. Die Überweisung verfügbarer Eingeborener wird daher in Zukunft

This district chief made explicit what must have been quite common all over the colony.

Hence, intentionally or unintentionally, the policemen's way of distributing labor was conducive to a market-driven logic. In the dire and utterly constraining economic situation of the post-genocide German colonial era, the colonized regained some degree of agency regarding their choice of a work place. Since their labor power was so highly in demand, they had some agency in choosing the least bad working conditions – aided by the "caring" and improvised practices of the police. To understand how exactly this dynamic unfolded I need to address what the police did once workers had been assigned to their work site, which is the subject of the last section of this chapter.

Supervising Labor

Third, and finally, the police had the task of supervising labor relations on work sites. As quoted in chapter three, the general regulations for the police force stipulated that "education of the natives" was not to be understood as "interference in petty quarrels between natives and their white employers."[780] The employer was to deal with his workers by himself. His paternal right of chastisement should be guaranteed. Nevertheless, in numerous cases the police did enter the farms or mining sites to take matters into their own hands. As Africanist historian Frederick Cooper notes, colonial regimes fostered

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derart erfolgen, daß die Eingeborenen unter Vorhaltung der vorliegenden Anträge auf Arbeitsüberweisung gefragt werden, bei welchen [sic] Antragsteller sie in Dienst gehen wollen. Dementsprechend werden die Anträge berücksichtigt werden. Im übrigen steht es natürlich jeden [sic] Arbeitgeber frei, sich selbst Eingeborene anzuwerben." Magistrate Wasserfall (District Office Omaruru) to all police stations, 28.06.1912, NAN, BOM, 28 [unregistered police files], no page number.

[780] *Dienstvorschrift*, 13-14.

> episodic exercises of collective punishment or direct coercion against unwilling workers or cultivators on whom the effects of routinized discipline had not been successfully projected.[781]

Policemen considered themselves to be responsible for the well-being of workers and hence for their productivity, up to and including "direct coercion." And, at the same time, they considered themselves responsible for the right conduct of employers. The policemen's identification with the state (as developed in chapter one) and their extremely broadly defined field of responsibilities (as developed in chapter three) generated the notion that policemen were the personification of the paternal state. They were to be fatherly figures to whom everything was a matter of interest. And as such they strove to give the impression – both to Africans and to European settlers – that they were constantly watching and omnipresent. Magistrate Schenke reported that the African compound in Swakopmund was under steady police surveillance and that "frequent, unexpected controls […] keep the natives under the impression, that they are being observed at all times."[782]

The policeman's paternalistic care was for all colonial subjects, colonizaers and colonized alike. For Africans, police such care mostly meant the oppressive feeling of constant surveillance as well as repeated actual violent coercion. But it also meant potential protection against abusive employers. German policemen, and more significantly African policemen conveyed to African workers the colonial state's concept of "right treatment."[783] Staff Sergeant Ehrlich, for instance, explained to Cape African workers who

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[781] Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *The American Historical Review* 99, 5 (1994): 1530.
[782] Report by Magistrate Carl Friedrich Schenke (District Office Swakopmund), 24.11.1908, NAN, ZBU, W.III.A.3. vol.1, 47-51.
[783] The district chief of Rehoboth explicitly instructed his men to inform workers about their right to quit a contract. Circular re: "native ordinances," by District Office Rehoboth to all police stations, 15.09.1908, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.A, 16-17.

were protesting against bad working conditions and insufficient pay the difference between penal and disciplinary authority, and that their foreman was not entitled to the former.[784] Thus, workers could (strategically) make reference to the notion of "right" violence to benefit from the police's care. I will come back to the deployment of the "right" violence discourse by the colonized at the end of this section.

To Europeans, police care was either a service or an annoyance. Settlers often took issue with with what they perceived as the police's failure to discriminate between the colonizers and the colonized. They often experienced the police as domineering and patronizing. Staff Sergeant Arnold, for instance, went to see the farmer Becker. There he read out loud a paper regarding the proper treatment of workers and then asked the farmer to sign it. Next, the staff sergeant went to interview the workers and refused the farmer's request to be present during those interviews. Afterwards, the staff sergeant demanded to see work contracts and threatened the farmer with removing his workers if he could not produce them. Farmer Becker complained bitterly that he was being treated like a child.[785]

Even though the police was by no means able to ensure effectively that all labor relations were bureaucratically and legally correct, they nevertheless made it their daily

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[784] "Auch beschwerten sich die Kapboys darüber, dass der Kommissar, ein gewisser Herr Quandt sie ungerecht behandle. Jedenfalls räumen sie ihm das Recht der Bestrafung nicht ein. Mir erzählte ein Kapboy in holländischer Sprache auch wegen der ungerechten Behandlung.Ich klärte ihn darüber auf und sagte ihm, dass wenn er noch mal geschlagen würde und er der Ansicht wäre, dass dieses ungerecht geschehen, sich bei der Polizei beschweren könne. Soviel mir bekannt sei, hätte Herr Quandt keine Strafbefugnisse. Dieses solle er sämtlichen Kapboys mitteilen." Patrol report by Staff Sgt. Max Ehrlich (District Office Okahandja), 01.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 128-129. Ehrlich's intervention marked the beginning of a series of events near the town of Wilhelmstal which, in October 1910, spiraled into the bloody suppression of the protest by the German military. On the massacre of Wilhemstal, see Willliam Beinart, "'Jamani': Cape Workers in German South-West Africa, 1904-1912," in *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics & Popular Movements in the Transkei & Eastern Cape, 1890-1930*, ed. by Willliam Beinart and Collin Bundy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 180-182.

[785] Report re: complaint from farmer Becker by Staff Sgt Albrecht Arnhold (Police Station Namutoni), 06.03.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2466, 50-51.

concern to check not only on Africans but also on Europeans. Existing scholarship has emphasized too much the impossibility of comprehensive state control over the settler population, and has neglected to inquire into what the recurring, though sporadic presence of the colonial state and the anticipation or apprehension of that presence did to the colonial social order. The police's concern for settlers framed the range of their possibilities. Whether they liked it or not, European employers had to factor the state's interference into the management of their businesses. They did so in a variety of ways. They forged papers and work contracts; they hid workers on their farm when patrols approached; or they preemptively reported workers' "misbehavior" when these were about to disclose their employer's maltreatment, for example.[786] But they also invited the police onto their farms and mines and actively sought their assistance, especially regarding the disciplining of workers.

Examples of cooperation between policemen and employers were numerous. Some farmers relied from the beginning on the police's violent services to exercise paternal chastisement for them. This form of participative violence fostered the bond between state representatives and settlers. Sergeant Franitzek, for instance, stopped on patrol at a farm where he was asked to mete out corporal punishment to a worker. He, or possibly his assistant, gave the San man fifteen blows with a wooden stick for having been ostensibly negligent and insolent.[787] And farmer Nass lauded the nearby police depot, writing that,

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[786] Forged papers: Patrol report by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg), 27.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 130. Hiding workers: Report by Senior Staff Sgt. Otto Donicht (District Office Karibib), 09.12.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 198-199. Complaint to preempt worker's report of abuse: Deposition from farmer Lisse taken by Sgt. Lindinger at farm Choaberib, 18.07.1911, NAN, BRE, 28 E.2.f, 2.

[787] "1.6.08 6 1/2 Uhr wurde der Buschmann Sim dortselbst beschäftigt auf Verlangen des Farmers Schneider mit 15 Stockschlägen bestraft, weil er letzterem absichtlich ca 3 ha Mais beim Viehweiden abfressen ließ. Außerdem ist er frech und belästigte die Farmer Schneider, Zimmermann und Brummer durch Widerreden,

"regarding the punishment of the natives, the police has always done its job."[788] Making reference to one case in particular, he noted that, "when my […] workers […] behaved insolently and let themselves go, I approached the police […] which then punished the Hottentots thoroughly."[789] Reciprocally, local administrations not only tolerated or acknowledged non-state violence, but explicitly invited employers to administer violence by themselves. District Office Rehoboth, for instance, advised a sheep farm manager to "observe closely" a Nama worker it was sending to the farm and "in addition, to handle him harshly."[790]

Other farmers, however, needed to be shown "how it was done." Sergeant Maletz, for instance, recounted that he was asked by an utterly overwhelmed and frightened farmer to help him with his African workers.[791] The sergeant and his police assistant accompanied the farmer immediately back to the farm. At their arrival, Police Assistant Gustav and a Boer employee went to the African compound to assemble all the workers.

> In one procession, with Gustav at the rear, they arrived: men, women, and children. We made the whole flock, about 40 in number, stand at attention in front of the house, the men in the first row. The farmer recounted the events in the presence of everyone. […] I had the three culprits come six steps forward. They were big, sturdy men. After the farmer had finished his accusation, and after the accused had confessed to their misdoings, I declared to the assembly that they had committed a grave breach against the regulations of the governor which they knew of from their work contracts. I told them that for this kind of proven explicit disobedience and physical [*tätlich*] resistance against their master [*Dienstherrn*] they had to reckon with a high prison sentence in chains, if their master would press charges against them at the district office. But he wanted to desist from doing so this time, because he believed that they had only acted out of foolishness [*Dummheit*] and he took pity on them, for sentences in fetters [*Kettenstrafe*] were hard. They had to vow,

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dadurch verleitete er die anderen Eingeborenen zum Ungehorsam. Die Strafe ist durch den Unterzeichneten vollstreckt." Patrol report by Sgt. Franitzek (Police Depot Waterberg), 10.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 112.
[788] Letter by farmer Nass (Otjuruntjondjau) to IdL, 18.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 60.
[789] Ibid., 60-61.
[790] "Ich bitte ihn hierauf scharf zu beobachten, im übrigen scharf anzufassen." Letter by District Office Rehoboth to *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Wollzüchterei*, 12.09.1913, NAN, BRE, 28 E.2.d, 133.
[791] Maletz, "Aus meinem Dienstbuch," 401-405.

> though, that they would be obedient from now on. Then, he would leave it at the corporal punishment. According to regulations I pronounced the verdict and had Gustav translate the judgment and statement of grounds. Thereafter, Gustav carried out at once the punishments in the regularized form. Each of the 3 culprits received 10 blows with the sjambok.[792]

This account of police regulating labor was published as a memoir and consequently dramatized to make it more entertaining. But the story conveys clearly the policeman's on-the-spot, paternalistic, and educative interventions with the policed public, black and white. Sergeant Maletz portrayed himself as the man who saved the day, who taught the farmer how to be firm but not cruel. He also took satisfaction in having resolved the incident simply, without too much legal interference. At the end of the tale, he even prided himself that the punished Africans became fond of him, relating that the three men who had been punished came up to him personally to promise that they would never resist their employer again. The sergeant "sent them on their way with one last strict admonition."[793] From that moment on, he declared, every time he happened to ride by the farm, these three men would wave at him.

This last story also illustrates that cooperation between African and German policemen was absolutely necessary in the (violent) supervision of labor. Labor regulation was a

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[792] "In einem Zug, den Gustav beschloß, kamen sie an, Männer, Frauen und Kinder. Wir ließen die ganze Schar, etwa 40 an der Zahl, vor dem Hause aufmarschieren, die Männer in der vorersten Reihe. Der Farmer schilderte in aller Gegenwart die Vorgänge […]. [Die] drei Uebeltäter ließ ich bis auf 6 Schritt vortreten. Es waren große stämmige Leute. Nachdem der Farmer seine Anklage beendet hatte und die Beschuldigten ihre Vergehen zugaben, erklärte ich den Versammelten, daß sie sich eines groben Verstoßes gegen die Bestimmungen des Gouverneurs, die ihnen aus ihren Arbeitsverträgen bekannt seien, schuldig gemacht hätten, und daß sie bei dem bewiesenen ausdrücklichen Ungehorsam und tätlichen Widerstand gegen ihren Dienstherrn auf eine hohe Gefängnisstrafe mit Kettenhaft zu rechnen hätten, falls ihr Herr die Anzeige beim District Office erstatten würde. Er wolle aber diesmal davon absehen, weil er glaube, daß sie nur aus Dummheit gehandelt hätten und er Mitleid mit ihnen habe, denn eine Kettenstrafe sei hart. Sie müßten aber geloben, von nun an gehorsam zu sein, es würde dann bei einer Prügelstrafe sein Bewenden behalten. Nach Vorschrift sprach ich die Strafe aus und ließ ihnen das Urteil und die Begründung durch Gustav verdolmetschen. Darauf wurden die Strafen durch Gustav in der vorgeschriebenen Form sofort vollzogen. Jeder der 3 Uebeltäter erhielt 10 Prügelschläge mit dem Schambock." Ibid., 404.
[793] "Ich gab ihnen noch eine strenge Mahnung mit auf den Weg und entließ sie." Ibid., 405.

shared endeavor across racial boundaries. All policemen assessed situations together, or at least in parallel. Based on these assessments, German policemen decided on the appropriate course of action: to instruct or correct the employer on "proper treatment," and/or to chastise, verbally or physically, the employee. As a rule, regularized corporal punishments of workers were executed by an African police assistant with the German superior overseeing the operation.[794] But there were cases in which German policemen wielded the whip themselves.[795] What is more, both African and German policemen most likely did not restrict their educative violence to the standardized settings of legal penalty. We must assume that some of the policemen's everyday efforts to press both employees and employers into their concept of economically viable, "right" violence, happened outside of the archival record.

The idea of "proper treatment" was tightly linked to the concept of wage labor. "Right" violence had to coincide with sufficient board and lodging, and most importantly with a cash salary. Vice Governor Hintrager reminded all police stations in 1912 that when overseeing labor they had to "at any cost [*tunlichst*] press for payment of the wage in cash."[796] In a comprehensive report, also in 1912, Magistrate Vietsch from District Office Rehoboth claimed explicitly that the "proper treatment" of Africans had nothing to do with uncertainties about farmers' paternal right to chastise, or insufficient disciplining authority

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[794] Decree re: corporal punishment by Governor Friedrich von Lindequist (Gouv. SWA), 22.12.1905, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 20.
[795] See, for instance, patrol report by Sgt. Franitzek (Police Depot Waterberg), 10.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 112.
[796] "Auf Zahlung eines Lohnes in baar [sic] neben freier Verpflegung ist dabei tunlichst hinzuwirken." (Underscore in original) Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL and all police depots, 26.06.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2706, 6. Already in 1907, Undersecretary Lindequist had interpreted §7 of the "native ordinance" regarding labor relations in this direction naming insufficient lodging and boarding, no wages, deficient clothing, and negligence in case of sickness as the main reasons for which workers could leave their employer. Copy of letter by Undersecretary Lindequist, Gouv. SWA to District Office Swakopmund, 18.07.1907, NAN, BSW, 73 E.1.A.1, no page number. Cit. in Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 287.

from law enforcement officers, but was exclusively a matter of foodstuffs and pay.[797] He asserted that there was a direct correlation between escapes from work sites and insufficient food and payment, and that the cases in which workers did complain about chastisement, even a severe one, but had received enough food, especially meat, were extremely rare. African workers, he thus implicitly argued, did not care whether they were beaten, as long as they were provided for. Indeed, one could go as far as to suggest that in this colonial official's understanding chastisement was part and parcel of such care. As a solution, Magistrate Vietsch suggested two measures. First, he urged the government to forbid the so-called truck system by which workers were paid in goods only, or which forced employees to spend their salary at their employer's store. Second, he proposed a rule to standardize food supply on all work sites. Closing his report, the magistrate stressed how important it was to Africans to receive cash and noted that the state would show real proof of its will to take care of them if it introduced the standardized food supply.[798] The report prompted the government to send out a circular to all districts in November, 1912 asking for information about average pay and provisions.[799]

It is difficult to assess whether policemen tended to emphasize low or no pay over physical abuse in their reports because of these directives or whether they derived it from their own observation. Cases in which policemen noted that the salary was minimal or

[797] Report by Magistrate Wilhelm von Vietsch (District Office Rehoboth) to Gouv. SWA, 21.10.1912, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.A, 43-44.
[798] Ibid., 44.
[799] "Da nach Bericht eines District Offices das häufige Entlaufen der Eingeborenen vor allem auf schlechte ungenügende Ernährung, der häufige Viehdiebstahl auf direkten Fleischhunger zurückzuführen sein sollen, so bitte ich zu berichten, ob dort etwa die gleiche Erfahrung gemacht ist." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices and IdL, 12.11.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2591, 86.

nonexistent occurred already before 1912.[800] By and by, they became so numerous that I tend to believe that African workers realized that stressing the lack of pay or board played much more in their favor than evoking physical abuse.[801] Moreover, policemen probably did not want to hear from Africans themselves that their employers were violent. After all, policemen claimed exclusive authority over the definition of "right" and "wrong" violence. Another interpretation would be that only these reports (i.e. the ones registering insufficient wage and provision) came to the attention of the central government in Windhuk and have thus taken up a more prominent space in the colonial archive. In fact, I discovered entire lists of workers' statements giving the reasons for an escape which were carefully scrutinized by police headquarters and other bureaus in the colonial government, indicating that these were the ones the lower echelons thought would be of interest to the higher echelons. One of those lists was recorded by the police station in Epikuro after its policemen had captured several Herero in the eastern-most region of the colony. This collection of minutes was forwarded to Windhuk where several colonial officials provided commentary and underlined passages, specifically the overwhelmingly frequent reference to little or no pay and food.[802] Senior civil servant Kastl declared that "if this is true, [the

[800] Workers' depositions taken by Sgt. Karl Rudzinski and Sgt. Müller (Police Station Epikuro), 01.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 116-119.

[801] See, for instance, depositions of two African workers against farmer Lisse in which they first stressed that he did not give them enough to eat, and then, apparently only secondarily, noted that lately he had also beat them a lot. Statements taken by Sgt. Bruno Lippke (Police Station Gurumanas), 25.10.1912, NAN, BRE, 28 E.2.f, 69.

[802] Excerpt of the collection of depositions (underlinings were added later): "Gegenwärtig: Pol. Sergt. Rudzinski [...] Vorgeführt erscheint der Herero Langmann etwa 28 Jahre alt, Paßmarke No 2316 und gibt mit dem Gegenstand seiner Vernehmung bekannt gemacht und zur Aussage der Wahrheit ermahnt folgendes an: z.S. Etwa ein halbes Jahr stand ich im Dienste des Farmers Öhl am schwarzen Nossob, von wo ich Anfang April d.J. weggelaufen bin. Beim Farmer Öhl mußte ich schwer arbeiten, bekam aber keinen Lohn; Kost gab's genügend. Meine Frau mußte Vieh hüten. Ich lief von dort ins Sandfeld, hielt mich die ganze Zeit in Okonja auf, wo ich gefangen genommen wurde. Ich habe die Wahrheit gesagt. Vorgelesen genehmigt X X X unterkreuzt. Rudzinski. Als Dolmetscher: Pol.Diener Moses II [...] Herero Kahomewa Simon ohne Paßmarke [...] gibt [...] folgendes an: Etwa 2 Jahre stand ich im Dienste des Farmes v. Stetten in Okatjekori, von wo ich voriges Jahr

farmers] cannot complain about the escape of their natives."[803] I have already quoted Magistrate Fromm's reaction to the list in the beginning of this chapter. After suggesting the redistribution of workers, he remarked that

> some will maybe run away again. But this will most likely be the case for a long time still, or always remain that way. He who knows how to treat people well, will always have workers.[804]

In any case, despite my suspicion that the emphasis on wage labor in the definition of "proper treatment" might be skewed by the archival record, there is enough evidence that policemen did pay attention to proper pay in their evaluation of whether an employer was showing the "right treatment" to his workers.[805] Staff Sergeant Kratz, for instance, forwarded charges against employer Levy to the local court in Nama worker Samuel Rooi's

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entlaufen bin. Ich mußte dort sehr schwer arbeiten, sogar Mittag's [sic] gab's keine Ruhe, war immer beim Backsteinstreichen und Gartenarbeiten beschäftigt und bekam nur monatlich 4 Mark Lohn. Kost gab's genug. [...] Als Dolmetscher: Pol.Diener Moses II [...] Herero Kaugruro, Albert etwa 30 Jahre alt, ohne Paßmarke [...] gibt [...] zu Protokolle: ~~Ich war noch nie bei einem Weißen beschäftigt gewesen.~~ [struck through by Rudzinski; M.M.]Ich war etwa 2 Jahre bei dem Farmer Einbeck in Otjomango im Dienst. Bin weggelaufen, weil ich nur 4 Mark monatlich Lohn bekommen habe, mußte aber schwer arbeiten. Ich gebe zu [...] 2 Schlageisen welche dem Farmer Einbeck gehörten, mitgenommen zu haben [...]. Gegenwärtig Pol. Sgt. Müller I, Epikuro, den 1.IV.11. Vorgeführt erscheint der Herero Langmann [not the same as above, mm] und erklärt zur Sache folgendes: [...] 24 Jahre alt, ohne Paßmarke [...] Ich habe 1 Jahr bei Farmer Sommer [...] gearbeitet, habe regelmäßig meinen Monatslohn in Höhe von 6 Mark erhalten. Da ich aber nie Kost von meinem Dienstherrn bekommen habe und immer Feldkost sichern mußte, bin ich entlaufen [...]. Meine Paßmarke habe ich in meinem Pontok [...] zurückgelassen. [...] Als Dolmetscher X X X unterkreuzt Polizeidiener Petrus. [...] Herero August [...] [18 Jahre] erklärt folgendes: Bei dem Farmer Albe [...] habe ich 1 Jahr gearbeitet, ich habe dort stets Kost erhalten aber nie Geld. Da mich mein Dienstherr immer viel geschlagen hat und zwar ohne Grund, bin ich entlaufen. [...] Zacheirami [...] 42 Jahre [...] 1 Jahr [...] bei einem Buren Kominika [...] habe ich monatl. 6 Mark Lohn erhalten, aber niemals Kost, da ich auch viel Prügel bekam, bin ich entlaufen. Als Dolmetscher X X X unterkreuzt Polizeidiener Petrus." Workers' depositions taken by Sgt. Karl Rudzinski and Sgt. Müller (Police Station Epikuro), 01.06.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 116-119.

[803] "Wenn das war [sic] ist, können sich diese über das Weglaufen der Eingeborenen nicht beschweren." Internal note by Senior Civil Servant Kastl (Gouv. SWA), 03.08.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 114.

[804] "Es werden vielleicht wieder einige weglaufen. Das wird aber wohl noch lange, wenn nicht immer so bleiben. Wer Leute behandeln kann, hat immer Arbeiter. Wer Leute behandeln kann, hat immer Arbeiter." Internal note by Magistrate Fromm (Bezamt Windhuk) to IdL, 07.08.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 116.

[805] See, for example, the various cases recorded in the District Office Rehoboth files under the heading "Native Workers. Complaints" (1911-1914), in NAN, BRE, E.2.f; and those recorded in the District Office Keetmanshoop files under the headings "Native Workers. Complaints" (1912-1914) and "Board and Compensation of Natives (Farm Workers)" (1912-1913), in NAN, BKE, E.2.f (2 vols.) and E.2.m.

name. In his deposition Rooi not only stated that the Levy couple had beat him because he had not followed an order fast enough (which could have been simply construed as paternal chastisement), but also that they owed him 18 months worth of pay.[806] To policemen, as to their superiors, the material attention of employers ideally combined salary, means of subsistence, and physical "care," that is disciplining violence.

The police's definition of "proper treatment" distinguished furthermore between "white" and "not so white" employers, that is, between German (or European) and Boer or Baster employers. Perhaps in order to firm up indistinct racial boundaries, that is, precisely because they were perceived as racially close to the German colonizers, Boers and Basters were constantly suspected of cruelty.[807] In a way, they were qua race considered unable to "treat well." As a consequence, Boer settlers had their workers taken away much more quickly. With them, violence against workers was almost always interpreted as abuse. Reference to insufficient board or pay was not necessary. A patrol passing through farm Aurus in district Rehoboth noted that its workers had complained about physical abuse. The farm was owned by Boer settlers. Two days later, a patrol was sent out "to collect the natives of the Boers in Aurus."[808] And Magistrate Vietsch, who had been so crucial in associating "right treatment" with wage labor, was particularly keen on making a distinction when it pertained to Basters. In a 1913 circular to all his police stations he suggested that policemen work discretely to remove African workers from Baster farms. He instructed policemen to write the resignation notice themselves and repeated that only

[806] Statement Samuel Rooi taken by Staff Sgt. Hermann Kratz (Police Station Hasuur), 18.08.1910, NAN, DAR, 18 G.II.1, 48.
[807] Cf. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 198.
[808] Excerpt from patrol book by Inspection Officer Hollaender (Police Depot Kub), 01.01.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2707, 26.

the workers of the Basters should be reminded of their right to quit, not those of German employers.[809]

Thus, wage labor and productivity alone did not define "proper treatment." Racist ideology was equally decisive. For instance, Sergeant Nowakowsky reported that a farmer was treating his workers "very well," that they were receiving "enough food" and that they were also "paid fairly well." But "very well" did not mean "right" in this sergeant's statement. To the contrary, he made it immediately clear that the farmer was to blame when his workers ran away, because he had treated them "like equals," had sat with them at the evening fire and talked or preached to them, which had engendered laziness and willfulness.[810] In the sergeant's opinion, decent pay and board availed nothing if they were not complemented with a hierarchical racial order and the firm, chastising conduct towards Africans that was expected to come with it. Put simply, the absence of violence was as harmful as the wrong kind of violence in the minds of the police.

Finally, "proper treatment" was a pliable concept. It depended on the individual situation in which it was formed. The police's case-by-case approach allowed for a high degree of flexibility and adaptability, and their racially mixed composition widened the field of options for concerted action, helping to fine tune labor coercion. Local colonial officials encouraged and inculcated this form of productive police violence. They relied on

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[809] "Bei jeder Patrouille ist es dann insbesondere solchen Eingeborenen gegenüber, von denen bekannt oder anzunehmen ist daß sie zu Weißen wollen, in geschickter Weise Gelegenheit zur Kündigung in Anwesenheit der Patrouille zu geben." Circular by Magistrate Vietsch (District Office Rehoboth) to all police stations, 25.07.1913, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.A, 66.

[810] "So weit die Station feststellen konnte werden die Eingeborenen von Bayha sehr gut behandelt. Sie bekommen genügend Kost und werden auch ziemlich gut bezahlt. Das [sic] Bayha Leute geschlagen haben sollte ist hier nichts bekannt. In [sic] Gegenteil er behandelt sie wie seinesgleichen, sitzt mit ihnen Abends am Feuer und hält Vorträge oder Kirche ab. Die Leute arbeiten auf was sie gerade Lust haben." Report re: complaint farmer Bayha by Friedrich Nowakowsky (Police Station Ovikokorero) to District Office Okahandja, 19.04.1914, NAN, DOK, 27 E.2.f, 19-20.

their lower-rank representatives' on-site presence and their ability to assess each individual situation, asking them to combine (violent) action with (written) reasoning. The district chief of Rehoboth, for instance, attached an instruction sheet to the 1907 "native ordinances," circulated to all his police stations, in which he left the appraisal of "proper treatment" in the hands of policemen, but requested that a protocol be drafted which explained how they had come to their evaluation.[811] Thus introducing a bureaucratic means of oversight over his subalterns, he simultaneously impressed onto these policemen the notion that their judgment in matters of labor discipline counted. Further, relying again on field experience, superiors circulated precedent cases to instruct their subordinates on the right kind of calibrated police action.[812]

Increasingly, local administrators trusted (though probably reluctantly) in the effectiveness of policemen's accumulated experience and their improvised practices. More and more, the colonial government extended the authority to pronounce and execute penalties to policeman ranks. In 1911, disciplinary power over Africans employed in the *Landespolizei*, which had been reserved to magistrates and district chiefs only, was conferred upon inspection officers.[813] Towards the last years of German rule, policemen deciding on disciplinary *and* criminal penalties in their senior officials' stead became a progressively frequent practice. In 1913, the fact that Senior Staff Sergeant Schlink had repeatedly enforced disciplinary measures in his superior's name at police depot

[811] Circular regarding "native ordinances," by District Office Rehoboth to all police stations, 15.09.1908, NAN, BRE, 27 E.2.A, 16-17.
[812] See, for instance, the case of a small business owner who forced his worker's wife to also work for him, but without pay. The worker complained to the police. The police intervened, coaxing and threatening both worker and employer, insisting on a written contract and salary for the wife. The correspondence was sent to all police personnel in the Okahandja area for instruction. District Chief Fromm (District Office Okahandja) to business owner Weilbächer, 14.05.1908, NAN, DOK, 27 E.2.f, 3-4.
[813] Decree by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA), 05.08.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 5.

Spitzkoppe caused frowns at police headquarters in Windhuk, but was eventually tolerated.[814] In the same year, the fact that Sergeant Maletz, who was commanding senior at his station, had issued a penalty in a case dating one and a half years earlier, was not even commented on by his higher officials.[815] And again in fall 1913, the fact that Sergeant Böttcher executed a penalty on behalf of the magistrate of his district was noticed as an irregularity, but no consequences followed.[816] Senior civil servant Kelz, legal expert in the colonial government, commented on this last occurrence that it had happened "not quite in due form," but that it was "at least practical." Kelz added that, by then, "so and so many" policemen had already been given not only the authority to execute but also to pronounce corporal punishments anyway, implying that it was a well-established practice.[817] And, indeed, Magistrate Heiligenbrunner of District Office Keetmanshoop issued a decree in that regard in January, 1914, officially transferring to all commanding seniors of police stations "penal authority over natives." The mandate was limited to corporal punishments of up to ten blows with the birch or fifteen with the whip, and "in cases of special exigencies […] also to pecuniary penalties of up to 20 M[ark]."[818] Ultimately, in May, 1914, Governor Seitz

[814] Senior Civil Servant Hand Hensel (IdL) to Police Depot Spitzkoppe, 15.01.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 56; reply by Senior Staff Sgt. Schlink (District Office Warmbad), 11.02.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 56.
[815] Report by Sgt. Ludwig Maletz (Police Station Kalkfeld), 30.04.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 3226, 80-81; Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to District Chief Görgens (Distrikt Office Omaruru), 24.06.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 3226, 77. See also Maletz's embellished account above in which he very naturally assumed penal power in fn. 792.
[816] Senior Civil Servant Blumhagen (IdL) to District Office Grootfontein, 19.10.1913, NAN, ZBU, 692 F.5.d.2, 5.
[817] "Ordnungsgemäß ist der Strafvollzug ja nicht gewesen. [...] In solchen Fällen halte ich es wenigstens für [6r] praktisch zulässig, daß der Beamte einen vertretungswürdigen Beamten mit dem Vollzug der Prügelstr. beaufragt. Erhalten doch so u. soviel Polbeamte [sic] sogar das Recht zur Verfügung von Strafen." Internal note by Senior Civil Servant Wilhelm Kelz (Gouv. SWA), 10.11.1913, NAN, ZBU, 692 F.5.d.2, 6.
[818] "Dem Inspektions-Offizier der Landespolizei in Spitzkoppe und bei dessen Abwesenheit den dienstältesten Polizeiwachtmeister [...]. ferner den jeweiligen Stationsältesten der Polizeistationen [...] übertrage ich hiermit unter Aufhebung aller bisher ergangenen diesbezüglichen Verfügungen Strafbefugnis über Eingeborene in dem Umfang, daß sie zur Ahndung von Disziplinarvergehen (§17 der R.-Kanzlerverf. 22.4.96. [....]), Übertretungen und geringfügigen Vergehen und hierbei zur Verhängung körperlicher Züchtigung bis zu 10 Ruten- oder 15 Prügelschlägen und im Falle eines besonderen Bedürfnisses [...] auch zur Verhängung von

officially acknowledged the already existing common practice when he observed that the colonial regime could "for now" not forgo transferring penal power to "seasoned, proven, older policemen."[819]

Conclusion

Jürgen Zimmerer's observation that the colonial government's attempt to "curtail" employer abuses failed, due to the lower-rank's unwillingness to fulfill their "protective obligation" (*Aufsichtspflicht*) towards workers, is not wrong, but beside the point.[820] If we understand their work as defining the "right" kind of violence, not checking or limiting violence, policemen's role in the whole constellation becomes clearer. They defined what "proper treatment" was about – in words and in (violent) deeds. Their control of violence was about degree, scale, attitude, and meaning. They never suggested that violence in and of itself was morally reprehensible. Farmers were censured because they "immoderately [*über Gebühr*]" had made use of their paternal right of chastisement, because they were "partly too severe, partly too mild," not because they had used violence at all.[821]

Geldstrafen bis zu 20 M befugt sind." Decree by Magistrate Anton Heiligenbrunner (District Office Keetmanshoop), 07.01.1914, NAN, BKE, 32 L.2.e, 50.

[819] "Wenn auch zur Zeit von der Übertragung der Strafgewalt gegen Eingeborene in beschränktem Umfange auf bewährte, erprobte, ältere Polizeibeamte nicht wohl abgesehen werden kann, […]." Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices, 01.05.1914, NAN, ZBU, 692 F.5.d.1, 36; also in BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 61.

[820] "Grundsätzlich bleibt festzuhalten, daß sich das Gouvernement um eine Eindämmung der Mißhandlungen bemühte. Es scheiterte allerdings darin ebenso wie bei seinem Bestreben, neben den afrikanischen Arbeitern auch die Arbeitgeber zur Einhaltung der eingegangenen Verpflichtungen anzuhalten." Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft*, 210.

[821] Letter by Magistrate v. Vietsch to farmer Lisse, Rehoboth, 06.08.1911, NAN, BRE, 28 E.2.f, 1; Report by District Chief Walter Ahlhorn (District Office Okahandja) to IdL, 08.06.1914, NAN, DOK, 27 E.2.f, no page number.

To recap, policemen did not resist Dernburg's call for "heightened care [*erhöhte Fürsorge*]" towards colonized.[822] Nor were they entirely unable to enforce it. They adopted the notion of *Fürsorge* and inserted it into their routines of everyday violence. They intervened in order to teach and apply "right treatment" which implied racially motivated and defined, effective and disciplining violence in combination with food, shelter, and most importantly, a cash wage. Racism, capitalist impulses, and humanitarian motivations came together in this notion of everyday educative violence. Policemen's *"fürsorglich"* violence was a way of refining the colonial economic system. The kind of violence that the policemen applied or instructed others to apply rendered labor relations more fluid. The state's effort to form and educate its subjects – both European and African – , so that they would intuitively know their assigned place in society, was fostered by policemen's everyday violent practices. The improvised efforts of lower-rank policemen, their "self-will" (Lüdtke) and tactics (De Certeau) both contradicted and complemented official policy. Their ways of "making do" in the service of the "caring" colonial state contributed to a more viable but nonetheless highly exploitative economy.

Thus, the police's violent practices and practices of talking and writing about "proper" violence were a specific way of entering into contact with the policed population. In some sense, violence was a form of communication, a means to establish a relationship and to build a social order. The relationships it shaped were strongly hierarchical. Everyday police violence enacted racist ideologies and notions of honor and status. Furthermore, the particular form of "educative" violence that I have outlined in this chapter was for the

[822] Minutes of the meeting between State Secretary Dernburg, Governor Seitz, and high officials in the Windhuk Government, 06.08.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 191.

police a practice of identity formation. The violent technological tools with which policemen distinguished themselves are the object of inquiry of the final chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Violent Technologies:

The Materiality and Corporality of Policing

European empires in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries believed firmly in their technological superiority. The idea of progress was deeply fixed in Western peoples' minds and had found entry into the colonizing project under the heading of "civilizing mission."[823] Convinced that their ingenuity and productivity had assured their economic wealth, and supported by the faith that history was proving them right, Western Empires set out to force their innovations and technical inventions onto colonized societies.[824] Colonizers relied heavily, almost blindly, on their railroads, telegraphs, vaccines, and machine guns to seize and dominate foreign territories and populations. Unsurprisingly, they were at a loss when their machines did not produce the desired effect, when victory and welcoming awe failed to appear.

Some scholars blindly repeat the imperial discourse by attributing a determining, causal role to technology in imperial conquest. For instance, in *Tools of Empire*, Daniel Headrick boldly claims that "Western industrial technology has transformed the world

[823] On the idea of "civilizing mission," see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Boris Barth and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Zivilisierungsmissionen: Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Konstanz: UVK, 2005).

[824] On Western philosophy of history and its imperial undercurrents, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also the interesting re-interpretation of Marx's concept of progress and imperialism in Kolja Lindner, "Marx's Eurocentrism: Postcolonial Studies and Marx Scholarship," *Radical Philosophy* 161 (2010): 27-41.

more than any leader, religion, revolution, or war."[825] However, other scholars have tried to reverse this causal link, emphasizing the way in which imperialism itself was an important motivator for technological development and stressing the importance of racist and other ideologies in shaping and justifying the deployment of Western technologies.[826] Moreover, current studies on the history of technology stress the various forms in which historical actors used or consumed technological devices and the way in which these were embedded in discourses about race, gender, and class, thus refuting the notion that tools drive history.[827]

Based on these latter insights, this chapter looks at the technologies and techniques of police violence in German Southwest Africa to help us get a more minute understanding of how practices and ideologies operated in conjunction to create everyday state power. As with so much else, the policing technologies of German SWA emerged as improvised responses to contextual constraints, refining ideological discourses and official policy along the way. One constraint stands out above all others: the need to provide definitive and hierarchical social distinctions in an unstable situation of rule. While access to firearms, whips, and chains certainly did give the German colonizers an edge in some contexts of conflict, like many colonizers they were quick to overestimate their own ability to coerce

[825] Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 4. The argument of technological determinism can also be found, to a certain extent, in a more recent publication: William Kelleher Storey, *Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[826] For instance, John Ellis, *The Social History of the Machine Gun* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); idem, *Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).
[827] For instance, Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (eds.), *The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); Ruth Oldenziel, *Making Technology Masculine: Men, Women and Modern Machines in America, 1870-1945,* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999); David Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900* (London: Profile Books, 2006).

compliance to colonial rule. More importantly, technologies of violence helped establish and refine the system of (pseudo-consensual) status distinctions that defined colonial life: colonizer/colonized, white/black, police/settler, high/low rank, and so on. Symbolically, who used what tools in what situations clarified hierarchy – for instance in the general ban on Africans owning guns. Moreover, the expert or approved use of tools – professionalism – could also serve as a marker of social distinction that elevated the policeman (and by extension the colonial state) above other colonial actors (like settlers). Finally, the tools themselves ensured a physical distance, an immediate distinction between the bodies that did violence and the bodies that were violated.

For instance, in early 1909, the author of a short newspaper article entitled "Jujitsu in the Colonies" expressed his doubts regarding the introduction of that specialized fighting technique into the police force of German SWA.[828] The article closed:

> In addition to Jujitsu one will still need the rifle and the whip. For no bodily agility, no sleight of hand will help against a bullet. And once a thieving or robbing native has been apprehended, the whip will do.[829]

For the author of this article, elaborate fighting techniques (and potential bodily proximity to the colonized) were a distraction from the core technologies of colonial rule: the gun and the whip. To his list, I will add a third: restraints.

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[828] Class schedule for the first cohort at the police school in Windhuk, author unknown, 11.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2537, 49; Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to Senior Civil Servant Brüggemann, 17.03.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2537, 116-117; Hans Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland zum Ordnungsstaat: Geschichte der ehemaligen Kaiserlichen Landespolizei für Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Emil Wernitz, 1930), 99.

[829] "Zum Jiu-Jitsu in Südwestafrika wird man des Gewehres und der Peitsche bedürfen, denn gegen eine Kugel hilft keine körperliche Gewandtheit, hilft kein Kunstgriff und wenn man einen diebischen oder räuberischen Eingeborenen erst einmal gestellt hat, genügt die Peitsche." "Jiu-Jitsu in den Kolonien," *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* 11, 2 (06.01.1909): 6.

Hence, three tools (the whip, the shackle, the gun) were embedded in three technological practices, each central to the system of social distinction, including police professionalism: flogging, binding, and shooting. The first two, shorter sections outline some of the ways in which racial ideology, official policy, bureaucratic procedure, and everyday practice produced an effective regime of police violence. The third, longer section, examines in greater detail the material technologies, the training techniques, and the regulatory ideologies surrounding firearms.

The Unnamed Tool

The sjambok was a heavy, stiff leather whip, usually made of hippopotamus, giraffe, or rhinoceros hide. In 1905, the Governor of German Southwest Africa had chosen the sjambok[830] as the "approved" tool for corporal punishment,[831] describing it as follows:

> It has to be about 80-100 cm long, has to be round and smooth at the end with a diameter of one cm. Under no circumstances can it have knots or other bulges, and no wire or such similar may be sewn into the crease of the hide.[832]

[830] The etymology of the term "sjambok" is intriguing. Apparently derived from the Javanese word '*cambuk*,' meaning any kind of whip made of hide, the term, spelled in Dutch '*tjamboek*,' was imported to South Africa by Dutch colonizers and colonized. There, the transliteration '*sjambok*' or '*sjamboek*' entered the Afrikaans language.

[831] "Es ist verboten zur Vollziehung von Prügelstrafen ein anderes Instrument zu verwenden als den Schambock." Governor Lindequist (Gouv. SWA): "Runderlass des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika betreffend die Vollziehung von Prügelstrafen." 22.12.1905, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 20. See also the 1896 general directive: "Die Vollstreckung der Prügelstrafe erfolgt mit einem von dem Gouverneur genehmigten Züchtigungsinstrument […]." State Secretary v. Hohenlohe (Colonial Bureau, Foreign Office): "Verfügung wegen Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit und der Disziplinargewalt gegenüber den Eingeborenen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika." 22.04.1896, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 15.

[832] "[Der Schambock] muß etwa 80-100 cm lang, am Schlagende rund und glatt sein und dort einen Durchmesser von einem cm besitzen. Am Schlagende dürfen sich unter keinen Umständen Knoten oder sonstige Vorsprünge befinden, auch darf in die Rille der Haut kein Draht oder dergl. eingenäht sein." Governor Lindequist (Gouv. SWA): "Runderlass des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika betreffend die Vollziehung von Prügelstrafen." 22.12.1905, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 20.

Yet, beyond this decision and the round of policy discussion preceding it, it is striking that this apparently fundamental technology of rule – and a globally recognized "expression of white sovereignty"[833] – simply disappears from the official sources of the German administration. Just as African policemen were often written out of the archive, the whip was erased from official documentation, particularly at lower levels. This is even more true for other beating instruments such as birches or sticks. Police stations' inventories enumerate at length even the most insignificant items such as horse combs or shoelaces, but none record whether a police station was in possession of a sjambok.[834] It is possible that whips did not make it into the public record because they were privately rather than publicly owned tools. In any case, State Secretary Dernburg observed in a secret report in 1907 that "Nearly every white walks around with a whip," and public offices had them laying "on the table, […] directly next to the inkwell."[835] Contemporary literature suggests that the sjambok must have been omnipresent – carried at the belt or placed in convenient places, available at any time. Thus, they were quite visible in everyday colonial life, despite being almost invisible in the archive.

Another possible reason for the invisibility of whips in official records is the deep ambivalence the colonial regime exhibited about their usage. A quintessential symbol of

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[833] Stephen Peté and Annie Devenish, "Flogging, Fear and Food: Punishment and Race in Colonial Natal," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 31, 1 (2005): 12.

[834] See, for instance, inventories of police station Rehoboth, no date, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h.1, no page number; NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h.4, no page number; and police station Schlip, no date, NAN, BRE 75 L.2.h.2, no page number.

[835] "In Dar-es-Salam ging nahezu jeder Weiße mit einer Peitsche spazieren; auf dem Tische der Hauptkasse habe ich eine solche gefunden; im Stationsbüro der Usambarabahn lag sie direkt neben dem Tintenfaß, und so erlaubt sich fast jeder Weiße auf jedem beliebigen Schwarzen herumzuschlagen." Secret travel report by State Secretary Bernhard Dernburg, Berlin, Nov. 1907, BA-B, R 1001/ 300, 34-53. Cit. in Martin Schröder, *Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht in den deutschen Schutzgebieten Schwarzafrikas* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 1997), 90-91 and Fritz Ferdinand Müller, *Kolonien unter der Peitsche: Eine Dokumentation* (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1962), 29. Although Dernburg talked about German East Africa, the situation was most likely similar in German Southwest Africa.

white supremacy, a technology imported from other colonizers,[836] an item apparently owned by many settlers and German officials, and the instrument given official approval for corporal punishment, the sjambok was also deemed a lowly tool. "Officials entrusted with judiciary functions may never carry out the birching or flogging themselves," the general directive "regarding the application of corporal punishment" of 1907 ordered.[837] Although at least one German official, and if possible a doctor, had "always […] to be present" during punishment, it sullied a European man's honor to carry out punishment personally.[838] "It is beneath his dignity," *Schutztruppen* officer Heinrich Fonck wrote.[839]

It is possible that colonizers more or less consciously differentiated between floggings carried out within the framework of criminal or disciplinary justice (performed by Africans against Africans after a formal sentencing), and those carried out within the logic of paternal chastisement (performed by Europeans against Africans on the spot). But this reasoning fits only awkwardly into a code that disdained "dishonorable" punitive technology altogether. There was a certain shame attached to the act of punishing, no matter what kind.[840] Moreover, paternal chastisement was sometimes delegated to Africans, while official sentences were sometimes carried out by Europeans. Missionary

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[836] See fn. 830 above.
[837] "Prügel- und Rutenstrafen dürfen niemals durch den mit der Ausübung der Gerichtsbarkeit betrauten Beamten selbst vollstreckt werden." State Secretary Dernburg (RKA): "Verfügung betreffend die Anwendung körperlicher Züchtigung als Strafmittel gegen Eingeborene der afrikanischen Schutzgebiete." 12.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 22.
[838] "Der Vollstreckung der Prügel- und Ruthenstrafe hat stets ein von dem zur Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit befugten Beamten (§1) zu diesem Zweck bestimmter Europäer, desgleichen, wo ein solcher vorhanden, ein Arzt beizuwohnen." State Secretary v. Hohenlohe (Kol.Abt AA): "Verfügung wegen Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit und der Disziplinargewalt gegenüber den Eingeborenen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika." 22.04.1896, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 15. Cf. also State Secretary Dernburg (RKA): "Verfügung betreffend die Anwendung körperlicher Züchtigung als Strafmittel gegen Eingeborene der afrikanischen Schutzgebiete." 12.07.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 22. Cf. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 63ff., 72.
[839] Heinrich Fonck, *Deutsch-Ost-Afrika. Eine Schilderung deutscher Tropen nach 10 Wanderjahren* (Berlin: Vossische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1910), 70. Cit. in Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 72.
[840] Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 72.

Brockmann, for instance, asked the African teacher at his mission to chastise two domestics in his stead – in all probability with a cane or rod. "I had the teacher give the girls a proper beating [*ordentlich durchprügeln*]," he wrote to his superior in 1911.[841] And, notably in remote areas, it is likely that German policemen enforced their own sentences in person. Sergeant Franitzek, for example, reported that on patrol he sentenced a man to "15 blows with a stick," adding that "the sentence has been executed [*vollstreckt*] by the signatory."[842] In any case, it seems clear that the sjambok was often used by a variety of actors without much attention to the subtle distinctions of regulation.

The technique of whipping or beating is also hard to extract from the sources, but one rare testimony gives some insight into everyday practice. Herero Police Assistant Richard Kainazo stationed in Omaruru described the procedure as follows:

> Petty cases were dealt with summarily by the sergeant merely on verbal information by the white master. For instance, if a German brought his native servant to the sergeant and said the native had been idle or negligent or cheeky, the sergeant would immediately order me to take the native and prepare him for flogging. I and my assistant had then to take the native to the kraal near the police-station, strip him and make him lie over a tub or a box. We generally used a tub. The sergeant would then come along and in his presence and that of the German master I was ordered to give the native 15, 20, or 25 lashes with a heavy sjambok. The sergeant counted and generally told me when to stop beating. We nearly always kept on beating until the blood began to flow. I often had to beat men whom I knew well […].[843]

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[841] "Ich ließ die Mädchen durch den Lehrer ordentlich durchprügeln […]." Letter to Präses Olpp, 29.05.1911, Okombahe, cit. in: Heinrich Brockmann, *Haba Du Ta Gob: Lebenserinnerungen von Missionar Johann Heinrich Brockmann*, ed. by Jürgen Hofmann [reprint of orig. manuscript (1946)] (Berlin: Klaus Guhl, 1992), 164.
[842] "Buschmann […] dortselbst beschäftigt auf Verlangen des Farmers Schneider mit 15 Stockschlägen bestraft […]. […] Die Strafe ist durch den Unterzeichneten vollstreckt." Patrol report by Sgt. Franz Franitzek (Police Depot Waterberg), 10.06.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 112. It remains possible even here that Franitzek was using the term "executed" in its nominalized form (*Vollstreckung*) to imply that he merely read out the sentence while an African policeman dealt the blows. But particularly policemen who served in the marginal areas of the colony were not averse to "getting their hand dirty" by wielding the whip personally. On related contemporaneous forms of masculinity that insisted on hands-on action, see Michael Adas's compelling account of American engineers in *Dominance by Design*, 143-144.
[843] Jeremy Silvester and Jan-Bart Gewald (eds.), *Words Cannot Be Found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia. An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 236.

What meaning Kainazo ascribed to the floggings, whether he and his African colleagues endorsed them or not, remains unclear, especially since his testimony was collected for the sole purpose of discrediting the German colonial regime.

Moreover, it is difficult to identify what kind of "expertise" the agents of floggings had. Was there common knowledge about how to flog "properly," a shared practice of flogging? Schröder observes for the Togolese context that "individual 'specialists' were consigned to" the task of flogging.[844] But were these "specialists" chosen because they hit particularly hard, because they hit particularly accurately (striking the backside and no other parts of the body), or perhaps because they had a particularly low status? For many German policemen, meting out blows was a well rehearsed practice from their days as NCOs, however, the punishing device was not the same. For some of the African policemen, corporal punishment was probably quite foreign.[845] My sense is that both German and African policemen felt inexpert with respect to the sjambok and insecure about how to wield it. But there is only little evidential grounds on which to base speculation about the whipping technique of German SWA.

The infamous *Strafregister*, the books that record each punishment meted out by the colonial regime, are of little help in clarifying everyday practice, since they only indicate the number of blows, not how the whip was employed.[846] However we can get a little closer to practice by looking at the implications of regulations. The Berlin Colonial Office's 1896 decree on corporal punishment of natives focused on who could be punished by how many blows of what kind: only men (under the age of sixteen only with birching), and limited to

[844] Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 64.
[845] Cf. chapter 4.
[846] For instance, penal record for Jan.-March 1908 by Staff Sgt. Wilhelm Rickert (Police Depot Kupferberg), 02.04.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 3-4.

25 at once (20 for birching).[847] It moreover forbade corporal punishment against "natives of a better status."[848] And the overseeing official or physician was permitted to interrupt the flogging if he felt that the recipient's state of health demanded it. A further directive in 1905 urged those colonial officials who oversaw punishments to "pay heed that the body above the buttocks is protected by clothes, sacks, pillows or the like from blows that go astray."[849] Additionally, it reduced the number of permitted blows during "marches and other physical efforts" to 10 and 15 for birching and flogging respectively.

Hence, although colonial regulations provided no clear relationship between the degree of penalty and the nature of an offense, nor any clear indication of what offenses merited a flogging,[850] German colonizers did worry over the effects of using the sjambok. First, it was apparently as shameful to receive a whipping as to give one, hence the prohibition against corporal punishment of the "higher orders" of natives. Second, the differentiation of punishment according to body type (male/female, adult/youth) and environment (on the march or not), combined with some attention to where blows were struck (below the back) and the recommendation that a doctor be present to assess the health of the person being flogged, all indicate that flogging was a dangerous, potentially mortal activity.

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[847] Decree by Chancellor v. Hohenlohe: "Verfügung wegen Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit und der Disziplinargewalt gegenüber den Eingeborenen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika." Berlin, 08.11.1896, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 15-16. Cf. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 52f.; Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 110.

[848] "Gegen Eingeborene besseren Standes ist die Anwendung körperlicher Züchtigung als Strafmittel ausgeschlossen." Ibid. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 67. Cf. decree pertaining to the other African colonies which forbade corporal punishment against Arabs and Indians. Decree by Chancellor v. Hohenlohe: "Verfügung des Reichskanzlers wegen Ausübung der Strafgerichtsbarkeit und der Disziplinargewalt gegenüber den Eingeborenen in den deutschen Schutzgebieten von Ostafrika, Kamerun und Togo." Berlin, 22.04.1896, BA-B, R 1001/ 5498, 6. Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 51.

[849] "Bei Vollziehung einer körperlichen Züchtigung ist darauf zu achten, daß der Körper oberhalb des Gesäßes durch aufgelegte Kleider, Säcke, Kissen oder dergl. gegen fehlgehende Hiebe geschützt wird." Governor Lindequist (Gouv. SWA): "Runderlass des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika betreffend die Vollziehung von Prügelstrafen." 22.12.1905, BA-B, R 1002/ 2596, 20.

[850] As Schröder notes, "The decision...for what transgression it could be applied depended entirely on the colonial official in charge." Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 57. Cf. Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 114.

And one does learn more about the sjambok in those rare sources that describe its effect on victims' bodies. In 1907, governmental proponents of the sjambok (from Southwest Africa and East Africa) and proponents of the rope (from Cameroon and Togo) had a dispute about the "usefulness" of the two different tools which revolved primarily around the different wounds they caused.[851] These exchanges are an exception to the silence about the sjambok that otherwise reigned in official papers. They reveal that, above all, the sjambok quickly tore the skin.[852] The open wounds produced were susceptible to infectious diseases of all kind. And, despite the officials' declarations to the contrary, these lacerations could cause long-term damage through trauma to subcutaneous fat tissue.[853] The reality of corporal punishment was permanently mutilated bodies and grievously injured victims. Farmer Engelhard, for instance, complained to the local colonial authorities of Omaruru in 1913 that Karl, one of his African herders, had been punished excessively. The eleven gashes, he wrote, had been as deep and large as a finger. His "boy" had been unable to work for five days, and, even one-and-a-half years after the incident, one could still see the scars.[854]

The gruesomely cynical discussion between colonial officials about "appropriate" disciplining tools produced a racist medico-ethnographic discourse that justified the use of the sjambok in the context of local conditions, indigenous cultures, and African bodies.

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[851] For extensive documentation, see Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 76-78; Müller, *Kolonien unter der Peitsche*, 104-110.

[852] "Es muß allerdings zugegeben werden, daß die Nilpferdpeitsche leichter blutige Verletzung der Haut macht und daß solch blutigen Verletzungen unter Umständen große Geschwürbildungen, langwierige Eiterungen und möglicherweise sogar Blutvergiftung zur Folge haben können. In dieser Hinsicht muß man allerdings das Tauende als das humanere Werkzeug betrachten. Ganz anders aber liegen die Verhältnisse, wenn man die plötzlichen Todesfälle nach Möglichkeit verhüten will. Diese entstehen offenbar hauptsächlich durch Verletzung innerer Organe, besonders der Leber." Internal note RKA, Berlin, no date, R 1001/ 5378, 137. Cit. in Müller, *Kolonien unter der Peitsche*, 110.

[853] Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 78.

[854] Complaint by farmer Engelhard, 21.03.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 3226, 78.

Sergeant Maletz, who had ordered Karl's punishment, described the penalty as "vigorous" and "appropriate."[855] He claimed that beatings were indispensable for Africans he deemed "uncultivated [and] bereft of all sense of honor." Indeed, he continued, had the high politicians in the metropole – who, he intimated, were entirely unfamiliar with the conditions in the colony – abolished corporal punishment, "the natives themselves would have been highly astonished."[856] Moreover, colonial officials, German policemen included, complemented the notion that corporal punishment was part of indigenous tradition, rather than that of the *Kaiserreich*, with a discourse on the supposedly special texture of African skin.[857]

The skin of "black-colored natives," Governor Schuckmann declared, was "particularly hardened" and "not sensitive at all." Only maybe the "yellow skin" of the Nama, the governor added, was "more delicate."[858] Overall, he concluded, the sjambok had "no detrimental consequences."[859] In a contrary logic, Sergeant Maletz stated that he had instructed his Police Assistant Gustav

> explicitly not to beat too hard, […] not to hit the side, but, according to regulations, hit the backside. I do not wish to exclude the possibility that some blows hit the loins. The strokes

[855] Statement by Sgt. Ludwig Maletz (Police Station Kalkfeld), 30.04.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 3226, 80-81.
[856] "[…] wollte man sie von Deutschland, vom grünen Tisch aus, abschaffen. Aber in Afrika konnte und wollte man sie als Erziehungs- und Strafmittel gegen die unkultivierten, aller Ehrbegriffe baren, inländischen Farbigen nicht entbehren. Die Eingeborenen selbst würden höchlich verwundert darüber gewesen sein. Es ging eben aus vielen Gründen nicht ohne Prügel." Ludwig Maletz, "Aus meinem Dienstbuch. Auf Station Kalkfeld," in Rafalski, *Vom Niemandsland* 403.
[857] On the supposed African roots of corporal punishment, see also my discussion in chapter 4.
[858] "[…] daß der Eingeborene eine besonders abgehärtete, wenig empfindliche Haut. […] daß die gelbe Haut der Hottentotten weit empfindlicher ist, als die der schwarzfarbigen Eingeborenen." Report by Governor v. Schuckmann (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, 30.12.1907. R 1001/ 5379, 161-162. Cit. in Müller, *Kolonien unter der Peitsche*, 108.
[859] "Von keiner Seite ist von nachteiligen Folgen berichtet worden, welche die Prügelstrafe mit dem Schambock nach sich gezogen hätte." Ibid., 107.

> were such that some of them made the backside's skin crack up in fibers. […] The native 'Karl' seems to have delicate skin[860] […].

The doctor asked to examine the scars came to the conclusion that "the superficial lacerations were kept in a permanent state of irritation by means of […] pepper or similar," insinuating that some indigenous custom of scarification had prevented the proper healing of Karl's wounds.[861] Thus, whether African skin was too thick, too thin, or subject to superstitious native practice, the sjambok remained an appropriate tool of punishment. As inconsistent and contradictory as the ideas about African skins were, they nevertheless justified punishment on the body of the colonized.

Given the colonial regime's concern for economic productivity and the permanent shortage of African labor, it may seem hard to understand the extremity of floggings as practiced in German SWA. They were obviously counterproductive insofar as they regularly incapacitated laborers. Hence it is important to recall that corporal punishments were also performances, a *mise en scène* of the colonial order. According to Michel Foucault's now classic narrative, early modern European punishments were bloody spectacles focused on the committed crime that symbolically restored the social order, while modern penal systems were refined disciplinary systems focused on the individual body of the criminal.[862] Colonial floggings were clearly both. The description by African policeman Kainazo above indicates that punishments were carried out at the "kraal," that is, in an enclosed or secluded area. Though visible, they were not spectacles in the sense of

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[860] Statement by Sgt. Ludwig Maletz (Police Station Kalkfeld), 30.04.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 3226, 80-81.
[861] "[…] die oberflächlich etwas aufgesprungenen Striemen wurden durch Reizmittel, Pfeffer, oder ähnliches in dauernden Reizzustand erhalten […]." Medical report by Dr. Wohlgemuth, 20.05.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 3226, 79.
[862] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977). See also Richard van Dülmen (ed.), *Verbrechen, Strafen und soziale Kontrolle* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990).

being announced ahead of time or ritually enacted on specific days for spectators. However, other German colonial capitals (Cameroon and German East Africa) did have "beating days."[863] And postcards of dramatized flogging scenes fed the European imagination, illustrating the racial order in a crude and graphic manner.[864] At the same time, as evidenced above, the use of the sjambok was also ostensibly calibrated to the individual body and the individual crime of the punished person.[865]

To sum up, it seems that the sjambok was so self-evident that no one saw the necessity of itemizing or describing it in detail, much less discussing its usage in practical or legal terms. Probably, there was also a certain discomfort in addressing its existence and usage because corporal punishment was widely considered a degraded and degrading activity.[866] The sjambok was the dirty but open secret of the violent regime of German Southwest Africa.

Schröder observes that "the common practice of corporal punishment and 'paternal right of chastisement'" in the metropole had to be "adapted to the colonial situation."[867] This adaptation consisted in the colonial administration putting great effort into defining whippings as indigenous when in fact they were a quintessentially German institution. The great importance attributed to a very specific version of the whip – the sjambok – was designed to locate the instrument in a pre-colonial tradition and within the exigencies of

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[863] Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 58*;* Ulrike Schaper, *Koloniale Verhandlungen: Gerichtsbarkeit, Verwaltung und Herrschaft in Kamerun 1884 - 1916* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2012), 170.
[864] Two pictures of floggings are published in Gesine Krüger, "Koloniale Gewalt, Alltagserfahrungen und Überlebensstrategien," in *Namibia - Deutschland, Eine Geteilte Geschichte: Widerstand, Gewalt, Erinnerung*, ed. by Larissa Förster, Dag Henrichsen, and Michael Bollig (Köln: Minerva, 2004), 95.
[865] Historian Abby Schrader, working on Imperial Russia, has noted a similar disruption of the Foucaultian narrative. See *Languages of the Lash: Corporal Punishment and Identity in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003).
[866] Although international reputation and even public opinion in the metropole certainly also played a role in the culture of silence surrounding the sjambok. On the parliamentary debates in response to international and national discussion of excessive violence in the German colonies, see Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 110.
[867] Schröder, *Prügelstrafe*, 2.

the colony. With little professional culture to inform and form their own usage of the whip, German (and maybe even African) policemen espoused the rationale that made punishments with this particular tool a local affair which the remote bourgeois sensibilities of the metropole could not understand.[868]

An Improvised Restraining Regime

In January 1910, the Chief of Police sent out a circular to all districts to gather information about existing fetters (*"Schließzeug"*) – their properties, conditions, and quantities – and about practical experience with them.[869] The circular encouraged local authorities to make "recommendations with regard to altering the existing, or to acquiring new, practically tested chaining implements."[870] This invitation to participate in the refinement of the technologies and techniques of the colonial restraining regime was met with excitement. Detailed replies came from all levels of the administrative apparatus, and even low-ranking sergeants had something to say about restraining tools. The sheer mass of documentation hints at the significance policemen and local administrators assigned to this aspect of their job.[871] From the even larger documentation of reported escapes – not only from prisons and prisoner transports, but also from work places – it is fair to conclude that various forms of detaining and restraining were an everyday concern for the police. As I discuss in chapter four, the archives are filled with accounts of captures, escapes, and

[868] See also Zollmann who claims that this kind of rationale – i.e. the "obstinate standpoint of 'it is different here'," also affected the firearms usage debate. Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 173.
[869] Circular by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all District Offices and Police Depots, 22.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 5.
[870] "Vorschläge betreffend die Abänderung der vorhandenen oder die Anschaffung neuen praktisch erprobten Schließapparates bitte ich gleichfalls herzureichen." Ibid.
[871] Archival file entitled "Chaining Material [*Schließzeug*]" 1907-1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 3-107.

recaptures. From the perspective of the police, the colonial theater must have, at times, appeared like a big carousel in which the colonized were constantly moving into and out of their grasp. Hence, instead of being able to fix their colonial subjects into a firm order, the policemen were obliged to be mobile too.

Almost all the reports about fetter technologies stated that the shackles, cuffs, and chains were too large, too old, too heavy, and that they were quite easy to open or to slip out of.[872] District Offices Gibeon and Okahandja and Police Depots Spitzkoppe and Kupferberg reported that their police stations had no handcuffs or fetters at all.[873] Swakopmund, however, had about a hundred old leg irons, over fifty dysfunctional handcuffs, and about four hundred neck rings, a remainder of the concentration camp nearby.[874] Two reports observed that the construction of the cuffs was such that putting them on regularly resulted in struggles between policemen and arrested subjects.[875] The state and design of the bonds allow at least two remarks regarding the fate of those who had to wear them. While they probably provided more opportunities to free oneself than there would have been with less deficient material, they certainly must have caused more pain and injuries. The existing tools of detention thus engendered an unstable system of everyday violent practices.

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[872] "Die von den Ämtern eingegangenen Berichte über die vorhandenen Schließzeuge kommen sämmtlich [sic] dahin überein, daß, wo solche vorhanden sind, sich dieselben in einem völlig unbrauchbaren und nicht reparierbaren Zustand befinden. Sie sind sämmtlich veralteter Konstruktion und bieten in keiner Weise Sicherheit, da sie ohne Schwierigkeit mit einem Nagel oder ähnlichen Instrument zu öffnen sind." Report by Detective Sgt. Wilhelm Kelz (IdL), no date [may 1910], BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 35.

[873] Report by District Chief Weber (District Office Gobabis), 04.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 25-26; Report by District Office Okahandja, 02.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 9; Report by Inspection Officer Müller (Police Depot Spitzkoppe), 25.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 27; Report by Staff Sgt. Schuldt (Police Depot Kupferberg), 04.03.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 8.

[874] "Es sind hier im ganzen (für Gefängnis und Polizei) 92 Fuß-, 66 Hand- und 398 Halsfesseln aus Eisen vorrätig." Report by acting Magistrate Ernst Wellmann (District Office Swakopmund), 15.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 23.

[875] Ibid.; Inspection Officer Walther Fuhrmann (Police Depot Waterberg), 23.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 11.

Above all, such circumstances prompted the men at the police stations to improvise. Sources testify to the cruelly resourceful ways with which policemen tied up their victims. Some devised restraints out of rope, wood, wire, tendons, or intestines.[876] Often, they used simple chains to tie people to all kinds of objects: a cart, a tree, a post.[877] These methods were anything but regulated or standardized. There was no decree that prescribed what kind of implements were to be used and what procedures were to be followed regarding the detention of people.

However, as we will see was the case with firearms as well, policemen's written discourse indicated otherwise. In their reports, policemen emphasized that the restraining had been done according to regulation and in a professional way. One such instance was the case of the presumed cattle thief, Taweib, captured by some farmer's employees and delivered to the police. Sergeant Maywald had chained the man to a cart wheel, and, over night, Taweib died. The sergeant's superior, Magistrate Vietsch, asked for details about the incident. In his additional report the sergeant affirmed that he had

> personally examined the ties of the prisoner in the evening. At this occasion, I did not notice any signs which would have indicated that one should fear for the prisoner's demise. Otherwise I would have left the farmer's natives with the prisoner to watch over him. The chain with which the prisoner was attached to the cart wheel had so much leeway that it is impossible that the restriction could have caused the death. The cause of death must have been lack of solid food, for there were no external wounds on the body of the deceased who must have been about 16-18 years old.[878]

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[876] For instance: "Ein Schließzeug für berittene Beamte ist nicht vorhanden; zum Schließen wurden bisher Lederstrippen verwandt." Report by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Kub) to IdL, 22.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 6; see also report by District Office Lüderitzbucht, 16.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 17, and report by District Office Gibeon, 11.03.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 20.

[877] For instance, statement by Sgt. Paul Melzer (Police Station Kalkfontein), 10.12.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 1184, no page number; report by Sgt. Willy Maywald (Police Station Hornkranz) to District Office Rehoboth, 02.09.1912, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 5.

[878] "Abends die Fesselung des Gefangenen selbst untersucht, dabei aber an dem Gefangenen keine Anzeichen bemerkt, welche darauf schließen lassen konnten, daß ein Ableben des Gefangenen zu besorgen wäre, sonst hätte ich Eingeborene des Farmers Oestlund bei dem Gefangenen aufpassen lassen. Die Kette, womit der

Vietsch noted casually in the margins of the document that no incriminating act had been committed and that no further steps were necessary.[879] The magistrate's inquiries had not been about the death of a man, but about whether an imprisoned person had been restrained properly, in compliance with the rules. Thus, the police's improvised, and at times deadly violent technique was normalized through bureaucratic procedure.

All police stations asked for more modern, more reliable, and lighter fetters, drawing on an apparently broad knowledge of existing techniques. Policemen knew about the technologies used by prison guards and police forces in the *Kaiserreich* and about those deployed by the British police in South Africa.[880] Based on that knowledge, they proposed their own inventions, claiming that these would be more adapted to local requirements. Many even attached drawings to their reports.[881] Some police stations tried out new devices on test persons.[882] And others even designed their own prototypes, advertising their many advantages and asking for the material to produce a greater number of them.[883] To what extent police headquarters was influenced by its lower-rank's enthusiastic

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Gefangene an einem Wagenrad angeschlossen war, hatte so viel Spielraum, so daß es ausgeschlossen ist, daß die Fesselung den Tod verursacht haben könnte. Die Todesursache kann nur Mangel an fester Nahrung gewesen sein, da auch am Körper des Verstorbenen, welcher ca. 16-18 Jahre alt sein konnte, keine äußeren Verletzungen festgestellt werden konnten." Report by Sgt. Willy Maywald (Police Station Hornkranz) to District Office Rehoboth, 02.09.1912, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.f, 5.

[879] "Es kommt keine strafbare Handlung eines dritten in Betracht. Daher nichts zu veranlassen. Z.d.A." Marginal note by Magistrate Vietsch, 21.09.1912, NAN, BRE, 77 L.2.i, 3.

[880] Report by District Office Gibeon, 11.03.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 20; report by District Office Warmbad, 30.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 30; internal note by Detective Sgt. Wilhem Kelz (IdL), no date, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 4.

[881] Report by Magistrate Brill, (District Office Windhuk), 09.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 10; report by District Chief Fuhrmann, (Police Depot Waterberg), 23.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 11; report and sketch by Sgt. Belz, (District Office Warmbad), 30.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 30.

[882] Report by Inspection Officer Freytag (Police Depot Kub), 22.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 6; report by District Chief Vietsch (District Office Rehoboth), 20.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 24; report by District Chief Fuhrmann (Police Depot Waterberg), 23.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 11.

[883] Report by District Chief Fuhrmann (Police Depot Waterberg), 23.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 11-13.

inventiveness is unclear, but it did order some new cuffs and shackles in the homeland and asked the Windhoek police to test them.[884] Thus approved, it ordered more, creating a dynamic exchange between metropole and periphery. Manufacturers in the *Kaiserreich* offered their products to the colonial government, sending brochures and samples.[885] In this way, policemen contributed to the reciprocal influences and transfers of knowledge that made colonies into a "laboratory of modernity."[886]

As with the sjambok, policemen's experimental approach to restraining implements was framed by racial paradigms on the one hand and economic imperatives on the other. The belief that Africans' bodies were particularly difficult to restrain led policemen to opt for particularly severe binding methods.[887] "Moreover," District Chief Schwerin wrote in closing his request for more shackles, "the native hardly perceives imprisonment as punishment if he is not fettered."[888] Nonetheless, policemen were reminded that prisoners should still be able to work and not be hindered too much by their irons.[889] District Chief Beyer from Warmbad noted that the cuffs that one of his police sergeants had devised had

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[884] Internal note by Detective Sgt. Wilhelm Kelz (IdL), no date [may 1910], BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 35; invoice by Firm Skeyde, Breslau, 01.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 41; Chief of Police Bethe (IdL) to District Office Windhuk, 21.09.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 43; report by Magistrate Brill (District Office Windhuk), 18.01.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 53-54; order of shackles by IdL to Firm W.Wiehle, Ratibor, 31.01.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 57-58.

[885] Firm C.W. Moritz, Berlin to Gouv. SWA, 07.11.1907, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 107; firm Föhse to Gouv. SWA, 27.02.1911, 20.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 67-68.

[886] On colonies as a "laboratory of modernity," see Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 5. An attempt to refine their position, particularly by insisting on "cross-fading and reciprocal influence" between colony and metropole, see Dirk van Laak, "Kolonien Als 'Laboratorien der Moderne'?" in *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914*, ed. by Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 279.

[887] Report by Magistrate Brill, (District Office Windhuk), 09.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 10; report by District Chief Fuhrmann, (Police Depot Waterberg), 23.02.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 11-13.

[888] "Auch empfindet der Eingeborene, die Gefängnishaft, wenn er nicht gefesselt ist, kaum als Strafe." District Chief v. Schwerin (District Office Gobabis) to IdL, 16.02.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 102.

[889] Decree re: imprisonment by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 29.07.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2591, 76; Report by Magistrate Schmidt, (District Office Keetmanshoop), 21.02,1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 15; report by Magistrate Schmidt (District Office Keetmanshoop), 08.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 9-10.

"the advantage of causing […] no stiffening of the wrist."[890] It is hard to imagine that he had the comfort of his prisoners in mind. Rather, the new cuffs ensured that natives could promptly return to work after their incarceration.

In short, the poor quality of restraining technologies available to policemen in German SWA required extensive improvisation. While shackling of itself physically differentiated between groups – free and unfree, innocent and criminal – the specific improvised practices of shackling also helped shore up the economically exploitative racial order.

The Policeman and His Gun

By far the most well documented technology of colonial police violence in German SWA was the firearm. Symbolic of Western technological advantage in general, the use of guns in the colony was subject to extensive and anxiety-ridden policy debate, ideological confusion, sustained regulation, and practical improvisation. In what follows, I will analyze the practices of gun use in three parts: 1) equipment and training, 2) the contexts of shooting, and 3) the victims and agents of shooting.

Each German policeman of the *Landespolizei* was equipped with a military rifle. Most commonly, they received the 'Gewehr 98,' the Mauser system which was the standard service rifle of WWI. Its newer variant, the 'Karabiner 98,' as well as two older models, the 'M 71' and the 'Gewehr 88,' were also in use, but not as often. The rifle was carried in a holster on the saddle. In addition, policemen were armed with revolvers carried on their belt. The equipment and uniform regulations from 1905 stipulated that policemen should

[890] "[…] dasselbe [...] den Vorzug hat dem geschlossenen Gefangenen keine Versteifung im Handgelenk p.p. hervorzurufen." Report by District Chief Beyer (District Office Warmbad), 30.04.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2670, 30.

also carry a saber. However, after 1907, sabers were handed out only "after review."[891] From 1912 on, the *Landespolizei* also had one machine gun in its possession, stationed at the remote northernmost outpost Kuring-Kuru.[892] According to regulations, African policemen were equipped with a bayonet (*Seitengewehr*) only. The sources show, however, that these men were also quite often supplied with firearms for specific assignments and at the discretion of their superiors. I will come back to the arming of African policemen in the last part of this section.

Despite their prevalence and the assumption that as a technology of rule they automatically empowered Europeans, colonizers, and the police specifically, firearms were problematic. The revolvers caused concern, for many of them were defective or were not handled properly for lack of instruction.[893] The 'G98' was known to be a reliable, safe, and easy to use rifle. It had a long range and could fire up to 5 rounds. However, it was quite long and heavy and had a slow rate of fire. Furthermore, police mainly received old rifles discarded by the *Schutztruppe* and worn-out by the war against the Herero and Nama. As a result, they were seldom fully functional, the head of police observed in his yearly report from 1911:

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[891] Sven Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens: Auf Spuren der Kaiserlichen Landespolizei von Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2009), 233; *Dienstvorschrift für die berittene Landespolizei* (Breslau: Jungfer, 1910), 53; Gouv. SWA: "Bekleidungs-Vorschrift für die berittene Landespolizei in Südwest-Afrika." 01.10.1907, NAN, DAR, 20 P.II.1, 5; Rolf Selzer, "Der Säbel der Kaiserlichen Landespolizei von Deutsch-Südwest," *Mitteilungsblatt/ Traditionsverband ehemaliger Schutz- und Überseetruppen* 72 (1993): 105-111.

[892] Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 227. On the police station Kuring Kuru, see Jakob Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft und ihre Grenzen: Die Kolonialpolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1915* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010), 322.

[893] Report re: Roth-Sauer-Pistole by Senior Civil Servant Roebern (IdL) to District Office Rehoboth, 18.11.1909, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h, 15; circular by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL), 25.03.1911, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h, 31.

> Despite the policemen's good training, interest, and shooting skills, shooting performances were often wanting. This low accuracy is due to absolutely inadequate ammunition and to not fully functional carbines.[894]

The eagerness, or "interest" – as the report's author called it – among policemen to shoot their weapons certainly existed. "When it comes to shooting, nobody wants to stay home," Chief of Police Heydebreck remarked with regard to his policemen.[895] Policemen were often members of gun clubs.[896] As chapter one showed, both African and German policemen were imbued with martial values. Possession of a rifle and good marksmanship were crucial to every colonizer's self-understanding and functioned as markers of social distinction. But beyond even their military or police use, firearms were omnipresent in the colonial realm. Rarely did a settler festivity pass without some form of shooting competition or demonstration. Shooting was a "leisure activity [*Vergnügen*]," as missionary Brockmann called it. On Sundays, he followed mass in the morning with "proper (military)" shooting practice in the afternoon.[897] Social gatherings of policemen also included gunplay.[898]

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[894] "Trotz guter Ausbildung, Interesse und Schießfertigkeit der Beamten waren die Schußleistungen oft sehr gering. Diese geringe Treffsicherheit ist auf die gänzlich mangelhafte Munition und auf die nicht mehr volle Kriegsbrauchbarkeit der Karabiner zurückzuführen." Annual report by IdL, 14.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2672, 68.

[895] "Wenn es hier ans Schießen geht, will Niemand zu hause [sic] bleiben." Revision report by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL), 01.02.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2693, 11.

[896] For instance, Sergeant Bernhard Themm (Police Station Gibeon) to IdL, 23.07.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number. Cf. also file "Teilnahme an Vereinen und Versammlungen" (1906-1914), BA-B, R 1002/ 2471.

[897] "Den wenigen Farmleuten halte ich Gottesdienst, mit einer Taufe. Zum Vergnügen finden Schießübungen statt, was mir Herr Ewald richtig zeigt (militärisch)." Heinrich Brockmann, *Haba Du Ta Gob: Lebenserinnerungen von Missionar Johann Heinrich Brockmann*, ed. by Jürgen Hofmann (Berlin: Klaus Guhl, 1992), 136. On club activities in German Southwest Africa, see Birthe Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten: Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2003), 176-183; Daniel J. Walther, *Creating Germans Abroad: Cultural Policies and National Identity in Namibia* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), 90-91.

[898] Photograph: "Festivität im Polizeidepot Kub" (1911/1912), in Schepp, *Unter dem Kreuz des Südens*, 95.

Nevertheless, in 1910 Vice Governor Hintrager deplored that policemen were still not practicing enough and still not enthusiastic enough. He demanded that the "african policeman [a German man serving in Africa, M.M.] must be a perfect and passionate marksman, which so far cannot be said to be the case."[899] A look at the weekly schedules in the police depots, where policemen were trained before being deployed to the precincts, demonstrates that (alongside riding) shooting exercises were highly prioritized even before Hintrager's comment.[900] Thereafter, gun training was intensified.[901] What is more, the decision whether men were sufficiently prepared for police service lay entirely in the hands of the military men who were the inspection officers at the depots.[902] After being deployed to their stations, policemen continued to practice shooting three times a month.[903] Only at the police school in Windhuk can one observe a reverse trend. There,

[899] "Ferner wird Schiessdienst nicht mit der erforderlichen Passion betrieben. Ein afrikanischer Polizeibeamter sollte ein perfekter und passionierter Schütze sein, was bisher von vielen Polizeibeamten nicht gesagt werden kann." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 03.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2552, 4.

[900] "Der Zweck der Depots ist, in erster Linie die militairische Ausbildung der Landespolizei zu festigen." Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all police depots, 12.11.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 82. Class schedules for riding and shooting practice in files "Reit- und Schießdienst der Polizeibeamten" (1908-1914), BA-B, R 1002/ 2539, 2540. The only exception was Chief of Police Heydebreck's instruction to all police depots in August 1908 regarding a group of 31 trained policemen who had arrived directly from the *Kaiserreich*. For these, Heydebreck suggested an intensification of instruction, more "theoretical" lessons and less patrolling, riding, and shooting. One can only speculate on the reasons for this. Maybe the head of police wanted to train these men particularly for senior positions in the local district administrations. Maybe he believed that their experience as policemen in the homeland was sufficient to operate in the field, but that they needed an overview over the legal and administrational differences of the colony. Circular by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich (IdL) to all police depots, 08.08.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 61.

[901] According to the new decree all depots had to hold shooting practice once a week for at least two hours. Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all district offices and police depots, 03.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2489, 11. For an example of the weekly training schedule, see activity report by Senior Staff Sgt. Hubert Knoche (Police Depot Waterberg), 27.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2535, 40-41.

[902] Heydebreck, Joachim Friedrich (IdL) to Police Depot Spitzkoppe, 27.01.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2534, 12.

[903] "Regelung des Schießdienstes der berittenen Landespolizei," *Dienstvorschrift*, 43.

military training, particularly shooting, was progressively replaced by classes specializing in bureaucratic skills, notably in surveying and customs regulation.[904]

Shooting practice normally consisted in different aiming exercises during which the distance from the target or the position of the shooter (standing, kneeling, lying, on horseback, etc.) was altered.[905] Thus, policemen acquired kinesthetic skills. That is, repetition internalized discrete gestures into automatic muscle memory. The conditions surrounding the exercise always remained the same: the terrain was flat; no distractions or surprises were simulated to prepare the policemen to deal with unexpected attacks; seeking cover was not taught.[906] The self-defense or jujutsu classes, mocked in the newspaper article cited in the introduction, were in fact the only opportunity for policemen to learn defensive techniques. And these courses were at first only for those few policemen who had been recommended for further training and promotion. Police training, in the end, followed the military logic of forming disciplined soldiers who shot at an enemy almost automatically. Not surprisingly, shooting exercises were modeled on those given to the cavalry.[907] Such training is congruent with the more general observation that the *Landespolizei* was never really a civilian force but rather highly militarized in its structure, personnel, and organizational culture.[908]

Social scientists who analyze the phenomenon of tacit knowledge – what our bodies "know" how to do without us having to think consciously about it or being able to explain how the body learned it – suggest distinguishing between mimeomorphic and polimorphic

[904] Class schedules of the police school in Windhuk from 1909 and 1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2537, 195 and 185-186.
[905] "Regelung des Schießdienstes der berittenen Landespolizei," *Dienstvorschrift*, 44-47.
[906] No other exercise beyond shooting was mentioned in the *Dienstvorschrift* or elsewhere. Cf. ibid., 43-48.
[907] "Für die Ausbildung im Schießdienst ist im allgemeinen die Schießvorschrift für die Kavallerie vom 5. September 1906 maßgebend." Ibid., 43.
[908] Cf. chapter 3.

skills.[909] Mimeomorphic skills are inscribed into the body through repetition and mimicking. They change only through the decay and renewal of muscle memory. Polimorphic skills are acquired in relation to a social and physical environment. They adapt continuously to changing conditions. William Storey in his article on "Guns, Race, and Skill in Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa," notes that

> with respect to guns, mimeomorphic skills would include loading and firing a gun repeatedly at a target, day after day, until the shooter achieved proficiency. Polimorphic skills would include hunting animals; every shot fired will be loaded and aimed in different circumstances that must be interpreted by the shooter.[910]

The policemen of the *Landespolizei* did hunt game. Inspection Officer Hildebrandt at police depot Waterberg actively encouraged his men to get a hunting license.[911] Many of them owned private guns for this purpose, notably to supplement their diet with fresh meat.[912] Hence, one must assume that in addition to the first kind of skill, policemen also gained some proficiency of the second kind: they aimed at moving targets, taking into account the surroundings and the peculiarities of their weapon. In fact, at the turn of the year 1912/1913, Chief of Police Bethe envisioned allowing policemen to use twenty percent of their yearly ammunition supply for hunting.[913] "Hunting," his explanation went, was

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[909] Harry M. Collins and Robert Evans, *Rethinking Expertise* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 27.
[910] William K. Storey: "Guns, Race, and Skill in Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa," *Technology and Culture* 45, 4 (2004): 690.
[911] Report on extracurricular activity by Inspection Officer Hildebrandt (Police Depot Waterberg), 28.03.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2535, 135.
[912] Sgt. Friedrich Schmidt (Police Station Rietfontein) to District Office Gobabis, 30.03.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number.
[913] IdL to Gouv. SWA, 02.09.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number.

> the best means to foster shooting proficiency and good eyesight, confidence moving in the terrain and tracking down and following a trail, maintaining a fresh and flexible body, and much more.[914]

It was thought to provide a "substitute for combat training in the field."[915] In addition, the measure was aimed at preventing the use of privately bought, inappropriate ammunition with their service weapons. Incorrect ammunition would "ruin the weapon and impair the shooter's proficiency as well as his trust in his rifle."[916] Thus, the line between beneficial and detrimental effects on policemen's polimorphic tacit knowledge was actually quite thin. In the end, Vice Governor Hintrager did not approve of the idea, worrying about "unwelcome over-hunting."[917] And he was concerned not to upset the settler community for whom the policemen's hunting activity was yet another sign of their privileged position.[918] Consequently, the suggestion was never put into practice.[919] Instead, police headquarters issued a ban on privately owned rifles (not on shotguns), limiting policemen's hunting possibilities even further.[920]

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[914] "Jagd, die von allen maßgebenden Vorgesetzten, auch bei der Truppe, als das beste Mittel zur Förderung der Schießfertigkeit u. des Sehvermögens, der Sicherheit, sich im Gelände zu bewegen, Spuren zu suchen u. zu halten, den Körper frisch u. elastisch zu erhalten, u drgl. m., anerkannt wird." Ibid.
[915] "[...] als Ersatz für gefechtsmäßiges Schießen im Gelände […], weil die Abhaltung des letzteren auf Schwierigkeiten stößt." Marginal note by Chief of Police Bethe in a letter by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 26.03.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number.
[916] "[…] da dadurch die Waffe verdirbt und die Schußfertigkeit sowie das Vertrauen des Schützen zu seinem Gewehr geschädigt wird." Ibid.
[917] "Es ist nicht zu verkennen, daß hierdurch die Schießfertigkeit gefördert würde. Andererseits wird zu prüfen sein, ob diese Maßname nicht zu unerwünscht reichlicher Jagdausübung und sonstigen Unzuträglichkeiten führt." Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices, 28.12.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number.
[918] "Da Dienstmunition streng genommen für Jagdzwecke nicht geliefert wird und der Landrat wiederholt sich gegen das Jagen der Polizeibeamten ausgesprochen hat, dürften auch unliebsame Angriffe auf die Landespolizei zu erwarten sein." Ibid. "Über Polizeibeamten-Gehälter und Anderes," *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* 13, no. 15 (21.02.1911): 1-2.
[919] Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 26.03.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number.
[920] Decree IdL: "Verbot von Halten eigener Kugelgewehre und Verschießen von Munition 88 aus 'S' Gewehren." 09.05.1913, NAN, BRE, 75 L.2.h, 93. The decree was met with many objections and protests. Magistrate Schultze-Jena was particularly disturbed that the policemen's right to own private property was being curtailed. District Office Omaruru and a great number of rank and file policemen were primarily

The observations about equipment and training I have made so far can help us draw some conclusions about how policemen might have used their firearms. First, the bad condition of most guns suggests that firing accuracy was seriously limited. Evidence describing bullet wounds supports this assessment.[921] Controlled aiming at one particular body part was for most shooters simply out of the question, and even hitting a victim with a bullet at all seems to have been largely a matter of chance. Second, mimeomorphic military skills were rarely helpful on the beat. To be sure, policemen acquired basic shooting accuracy, but they almost never came into situations in which they had to take on battle formation, firing in a disciplined and concentrated manner at an enemy. Moreover, the specific features of the rifle they were using restricted the speed at which such an automatism could come into effect. Finally, if they had polimorphic shooting skills – having practiced hunting or having had combat training or experience in wartime – policemen still needed to modify that proficiency when implementing it toward human beings in peacetime.

The idea of substituting hunting practice for combat training indicates that these two different kinds of shooting skills were regarded as, first, to a certain extent interchangeable and, second, fully sufficient and appropriate for the work policemen had to do. Indeed, racist ideology often situated the colonized closer to animals than to humans, and, as

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concerned with the restriction the decree put on their food supply. Magistrate Schultze-Jena (District Office Outjo) to IdL, 27.05.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number; Magistrate Schultze-Jena (District Office Outjo) to IdL, 23.06.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number; District Office Omaruru to IdL, 27.08.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number; Police Station Keetmanshoop to IdL, 03.07.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number; Senior Staff Sgt. Max Ehrlich (Police Station Okahandja) to IdL, 25.07.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number; Sgt. Bernhard Themm (Police Station Gibeon) to IdL, 23.07.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2415, no page number.

[921] Patrol report by Sgt. Johannes Becker (Police Station Ramansdrift) to District Office Keetmanshoop, 22.11.1908, NAN, ZBU, 479 D.IV.o (vol.1), 126-128; Patrol report by Sgt. Xaver Hagner (Police Station Okaukwejo), 20.10.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 68-69; Patrol report by Staff Sgt. Heinrich Eggersglüß (District Office Maltahöhe), 24.03.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 14-15.

mentioned earlier, some police patrol reports read as if the policemen thought they were on a hunting expedition.[922] Moreover, post-war paranoia and police occupational culture often stigmatized the colonized collectively as criminal enemies rather than colonial subjects in need of protection.[923]

Thus, the ideological, legal, and cultural context is crucial if we want to understand the police's usage of technologies of violence. Understanding embodied tacit competencies as well as the specific physical properties of technologies can get us only so far. We now need to look more closely at the broader contexts of daily technological practices. What were the most common situations in which policemen were required to, wanted to, or did fire their weapon? What was their reasoning before and after that fact, and how did their practice influence policy?

In August 1908, the colonial official responsible for instructing higher ranking policemen at the police school in Windhuk reported to police headquarters that

> policemen were quite surprised when I told them that they were not allowed to shoot at fleeing subjects. After inquiry, I discovered that they were without exception of the opinion that it was their duty to use firearms against escaped prisoners. Some of them had even been so instructed.[924]

As a consequence, a month later Chief of Police Heydebreck issued a circular to all administration offices and depots ordering them to "instruct all policemen that they are allowed to use their weapon only in cases of self-defense" and not "against escaped white

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[922] See chapter 4.
[923] See chapters 2 and 4.
[924] "[…] die Beamten gewissermaßen in Erstaunen versetzt wurden, als ich ihnen mitteilte, daß auf fliehende nicht geschossen werden darf. Auf Erkundigungen hin habe ich von den Beamten erfahren, daß durchweg die Meinung unter diesen vorherrscht, daß es ihre Pflicht sei, gegen entsprungene Gefangene die Waffe zu gebrauchen, sogar teilweise so instruiert worden sind." Senior Civil Servant Wilhelm Kelz (Polizeischule) to IdL, 12.08.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 1.

prisoners" or against any fleeing person. In the case of Africans, the circular specified, one was permitted to shoot at them only "if they appear hostile, that is, if they themselves are shooting or their behavior leads one to believe with certainty that they want to open fire on the patrol."[925] This decree marked the beginning of a discussion among colonial officials regarding the rules of gun use that lasted until the end of the German colonial era. At that point, the police manual still stipulated that the use of one's firearm was permitted only in defense or if a subject caught in an act of crime resisted arrest.[926] Both the manual and the 1908 circular had as a reference point § 53 of the Imperial Penal Code (*Reichsstrafgesetzbuch*), basing colonial police policy on metropolitan norms.[927] Yet, along the way, restrictions were slowly but surely loosened. Police practice, framed by economic and ideological imperatives, drove the change.

In the 1908 decree one can already discern a distinction between the treatment of settlers and colonized subjects. Concerning the first group ("whites") the decree formulated a prohibition. Regarding the second group ("natives"), the decree formulated a permission granted in certain cases. Throughout the colonial period, this differentiation was developed further. The regulations on the use of weapons expressed and enabled the range of distinctions that defined colonial society: prominently those between policemen and settlers or between whites and non-whites.

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[925] "Ich ersuche ergebenst, sämtliche Polizeibeamte dahin zu belehren, dass sie von ihrer Waffe nur in den Fällen der Notwehr Gebrauch machen dürfen und dass gegen entsprungene weisse Gefangene die Waffe nicht gebraucht werden darf; ebenso ist das Schiessen auf einen Fliehenden verboten. […] Auch auf Eingeborene darf nur dann geschossen werden, wenn sie sich feindselig zeigen, das heisst, wenn sie selbst schiessen oder nach ihrem Verhalten mit Bestimmtheit anzunehmen ist, dass sie das Feuer auf die Patrouille pp. eröffnen wollen." Circular re: weapons usage by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all district offices, depots and police school, 17.09.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 4. See also Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 163-179.

[926] "Waffengebrauch" in *Dienstvorschrift*, 31.

[927] Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 164.

The surprise of policemen when they heard that they were not supposed to shoot at escapees shows that common practice was contrary to regulation. It is very likely that this was also the case after police headquarters released its reminder in September 1908. Although I have found no explicit proof, the ruthless seizure of Africans for the colonial economy may have involved quite a bit of shooting.[928] Moreover, reports describing settlements which were abandoned in a hurry, leaving valuable belongings behind, indicate that many colonized chose indeed to flee when they had the chance.[929] A number of accounts of shootings fail to mention any form of armed confrontation, suggesting that these were committed against unarmed victims.[930]

How often policemen shot at colonized for reasons other than what one might reasonably construe as self-defense I cannot assess. But by reading the statements carefully, one can detect recurring rationales and behavioral patterns. Here are some examples.

A 1906 template that served as an illustration of how to fill out the patrol book at the police station Hohewarte had as one of its entries the following statement:

> Camp of the thieves taken by surprise. 1 Herero shot. Rest escaped. 1 ox slaughtered. The second recovered.[931]

The district office in Rehoboth telegraphed in fall 1908:

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[928] See chapters 3 and 4.
[929] For instance, patrol report by Sgt. Dufring (Police Station Okahandja), 16.02.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2708, 19-37.
[930] For instance, patrol report by Sgt. Arthur Wegener (Police Station Altmaltahöhe), 12.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 169-171.
[931] "Lager der Diebe überrascht. 1 Herero erschossen. Rest entflohen. 1 Ochse geschlachtet. Der zweite eingebracht." Template of patrol book by Sgt. Kraus (Police Station Hohewarte), 12.03.1906, NAN, DAR, 20 P.II.1, 40.

> Patrol [constituted of] two police sergeants, 8 voluntary Basters, in area near [illegible] mountains caught cattle thieves unawares. One Bushman shot dead [*erschossen*]. Three men and sixteen women a[nd] children apprehended, three old rifles seized.[932]

In 1909, a police patrol led by Inspection Officer Trenk captured two San men. Further,

> 3 Bushmen, among them the murderer of cattle herder Zarus, were shot dead after they attempted escape.[933]

What is noteworthy in these citations is the surmised criminality of the victims, and that this criminality always pertained to the whole collective and not to one individual. The reports needed to imply the group posed an imminent danger in order to comply with the directive. It is striking that in all cases the police force had overwhelming power and tactical advantage. In the first two cases, the groups were "taken by surprise," and the numerical proportion was always in favor of the assailants. In my first and last examples, no firearms amongst the police's opponents were even mentioned, indicating most probably that they had none since the police was instructed to report all apprehended weapons.[934] Only within the framework of an ideology that perceived the colonized as collectively responsible for committed crimes and as dangerous qua their race could the police practice of shooting gain the meaning of self-defense.

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[932] "Patrouille zwei Polizeisergeanten, 8 freiwillige Bastards in Skanzberggegend Viehdiebe überrascht. ein Buschmann erschossen. drei Männer sechszehn Weiber u. Kinder gefangen, drei alte Gewehre abgenommen." Telegram by Magistrate Hoelscher (District Office Rehoboth) to IdL, 28.09.1908, NAN, ZBU 479 D.V.o, 46.
[933] "3 Buschleute, dabei der Mörder des Viehwächters auf Zarus, sind bei einem Fluchtversuch erschossen worden." Report by District Chief Seydel (District Office Maltahöhe) to IdL, 17.03.1909, NAN, ZBU, 479 D.IV.o (vol.1), 206.
[934] Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 68.

Furthermore, understanding shooting as a regulated act was crucial, for it established it as bureaucratized and professional. In this manner, the police distinguished their actions from those of other Europeans in the colonial realm. Although settlers using their guns were not necessarily punished, the police had a specific way of doing things, a police procedure.[935] People were shot, in the wording of the police, "according to regulations"[936] – even when the actual rules were ignored or unknown, and even when the actual shooting had been done in an irregular, hasty, or inconsiderate way.

Especially the idea that one could shoot if one had called out to an escapee persisted. It was the most common formulation used by police to indicate that they had proceeded in accordance with rules. Sergeant Becker, accompanied by the African policeman Abraham, for instance, pursued two armed African men who were suspected to have stolen a goat.[937] The policemen killed the first man in circumstances not specified. When they approached the second man a day later, Becker observed that, as the man was going to escape again into the hills,

> he was hailed. And since he did not stand, he was shot at. While running, he dropped a pot and a blanket, his rifle he kept in his hand until he was lethally hit by the fifth shot and fell to the ground.[938]

[935] Cf. chapter 3.
[936] See, for instance, report by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to RKA, Berlin, 30.10.1908, BA-B, R 1001/ 1914, 53.
[937] Patrol report by Sgt. Johannes Becker (Police Station Ramansdrift) to District Office Keetmanshoop, 22.11.1908, NAN, ZBU, 479 D.IV.o (vol.1), 126-128.
[938] "Die Patrouille versuchte ihn einzuholen, jedoch kam er den Bergen wieder zu nah und wurde infolgedessen angerufen. Da er nicht stand, wurde auf ihn geschossen. Er ließ beim Laufen einen Fleischtopf und Schlafdecke fallen, seinen Karabiener hielt er in der Hand bis er durch den 5. Schuß tötlich verletzt zu Boden fiel. Erbeutet wurde 1 Karabiener M 98 und keine Patrone, er führte nur 2 leere Ladestreifen bei sich." Ibid., 128.

When the bodies were examined, it turned out that the first victim had had only two bullets of which one was a misfire, and the second victim had had no ammunition at all.[939]

The bureaucratic practice of inscribing shootings into a specific narrative formula (suspected criminal were hailed, then shot) eventually gave the formula such inertia that it was accepted as regulated practice. In regulations issued in October 1911 and February 1914, the formulation was formally institutionalized by headquarters, retroactively justifying what was common practice.[940] A police practice generated out of misunderstanding the rules had became a new rule. Considerations of state reputation and authority were decisive in this development.

Reacting to the 1908 reminder that weapons were only to be used in self-defense, Magistrate Schmidt had entreated the colonial government that the little authority policemen possessed towards prisoners could only be upheld if they were allowed to shoot, no matter what. "As an official speaking from experience," he argued, policemen would be "degraded to the laughable role of an extra" if they were not allowed to make use of their weapon when a prisoner under his guard tried to flee. Their "official reputation" was at stake.[941] And, in fact, in the summer of 1909, the *Landespolizei's* reputation suffered a real blow. Four policemen became notorious for having tried to arrest about forty Herero and having utterly failed. The four men had hidden in an empty settlement and, upon the

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[939] Ibid.

[940] Circular by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices and Police Depots, 24.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 48-49; circular by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA), 04.02.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, no page number. I discuss these two circulars in more detail below.

[941] "Ich erlaube mir als ein in der Praxis stehender Verwaltungsbeamter, […]. Ein Polizeibeamter, der ein Dutzend Gefangener, Weisser oder Eingeborener, bei der Arbeit beaufsichtigen soll sinkt zur lächerlichen Figur eines Statisten herab, wenn er das Entweichen derselben nicht, wenn notwendig, mit der Schusswaffe zu verhüten berechtigt ist. Im Interesse der Sicherheit des Landes und des erforderlichen amtlichen Ansehens der Polizeibeamten halte ich es für unumgänglich erforderlich, diesen die Befugnis zum Gebrauche ihrer Waffen gegen fliehende Gefangene […] zu übertragen." Magistrate Karl Schmidt (District Office Keetmanshoop) to Gouv. SWA, 08.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 9-10.

inhabitants' return, had endeavored to apprehend them all. A brawl ensued. One policeman was wrestled to the ground, the others had to come to his rescue. In the end only one or two Africans had been captured. The *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* asked why policemen were armed at all if they were not allowed to use their guns.[942] The worst, the article claimed, was the fact that "policemen [were] not even allowed to shoot at wandering, work-shy riff raff."[943]

Chief of Police Heydebreck wrote two texts in response to the newspaper article, giving interesting insights into his understanding of policing and the use of force.[944] In a letter to the newspaper, and thus addressed to the settler community, Heydebreck stressed that "the *Landespolizei* […] possesses exactly the same means of protection [*Schutzmittel*] as the police at home," and that the policemen in question would have been legally entitled to use their weapon in self-defense. Several times he reiterated the term "self-defense" and its legal grounding.[945] Moreover, the Chief of Police made clear that no cultivated state's [*Kulturstaat*] law permitted killing people just because of vagabondage or laziness. He differentiated himself and his men from the settlers by indicating that the police defined

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[942] "Die wehrlose Polizei," *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* 11, 68 (25.08.1909): 2.
[943] "Das Schlimmste aber ist, daß, wie es heißt, der Polizeisergeant auf umherschweifendes, arbeitsscheues Gesindel nicht einmal schießen darf." Ibid.
[944] Letter by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to the *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, no date [Aug. 1909], BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 25-26; circular re: weapons use by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all district offices and depots, 14.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 19-29.
[945] "Die Landespolizei des Deutsch-Südwestafrikanischen Schutzgebietes hat genau dieselben Schutzmittel wie die Polizei in der Heimat. Sicherlich war der betreffende Polizeibeamte nach seiner Dienstinstruktion in diesem Spezialfall befugt von seiner Waffe Gebrauch zu machen, da er sich in Notwehr befand. Auch als dieser Beamte sich mit dem baumlangen Herero im Handgemenge befand, von mehreren anderen Hereros zu Boden geworfen war und Hilfe verlangte, wären die anderen Beamten zum Gebrauch der Waffe berechtigt gewesen, da die Notwehr nach dem Gesetz diejenige Verteidigung ist, welche erforderlich ist, um einen gegenwärtigen rechtswidrigen Angriff von sich oder einem anderen abzuwenden. [….] Notwehr lag also hier auf alle Fälle vor; infolgedessen war der Gebrauch der Waffe gesetzlich gestattet." Letter by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung*, no date [Aug. 19090, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 25.

itself through the rule of law and culture; its use of weapons was lawful and cultivated.[946] In his second letter, addressed to all his subordinates, Heydebreck characterized the four men's attempt to arrest forty people as "futile." He noted that such behavior exhibited lack of both experience and knowledge of the pertinent regulations.[947] Above all, he emphasized that policemen really only had two options regarding their firearms: either they should abstain from using them at all, or they should use them decisively. "Only negotiation with the settlement using suitable natives would have led to success," he claimed.[948] But since African resistance had been provoked, "this opposition had to be broken by all means to preserve the policemen's authority." For that, the policemen in question should absolutely have fired their guns.[949]

Besides, the head of police expressed strong discomfort regarding physical contact between colonizers and colonized. He commanded that in the unfortunate case that a physical, hands-on fight had been entered, the police's reputation had to be restored immediately through the use of weapons.[950] Magistrate Schmidt echoed this worry in a directive when he explained:

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[946] "[…] daß nach keinem rechtskräftigen Gesetz irgend eines Kulturstaates in Friedenszeiten ohne weiteres ein Schießen auf umherstreichendes oder arbeitsscheues Gesindel aus dem alleinigen Grunde des Vagabondierens oder der Arbeitsscheu gestattet ist." Ibid., 26

[947] Circular re: weapons use by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all district offices and depots, 14.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 19-20.

[948] "Lediglich ein Verhandeln mit der Werft durch ~~eingeb. Polizeidiener~~ geeignete Eingeborene konnte zum Ziele führen." Ibid., 20.

[949] "Wenn die Polizeibeamten einen anderen Auftrag erhalten hatten, als den Versuch zu machen auf dem Wege der Unterhandlung die Werft einzubringen, so waren sie fehlerhaft instruiert. Nachdem dieser Fehler aber einmal gemacht war und die 4 Polizeisergeanten den Widerstand der Hereros hervorgerufen hatten, mußte dieser Widerstand zur Wahrung der Autorität der Polizei unter allen Umständen gebrochen werden. Bei hinreichender Bekanntschaft mit §50 5a (Waffengebrauch) der Dienstvorschrift konnten die 4 Polizeisergeanten darüber nicht im Zweifel sein, daß sie zum Gebrauch ihrer Waffe berechtigt waren." Ibid, 29.

[950] Circular re: weapons' usage by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck to all administration offices and depots, 14.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 19-24.

> Besides the calamitous collision such a beating of natives by police officials could entail, it is also prone to harm the reputation of the civil servants who have been appointed to uphold peace and order, when they want to chastise natives by themselves; too easily a brawl can ensue if the pummeled native resists; this must be avoided at all costs.[951]

Although these colonial administrators were primarily concerned with bodily integrity and honor, they also sensed the way in which such small physical man-to-man encounters could reveal the brittleness of this very system of belief.

Assimilating the colonial regime's reputation to the bodies of the policemen, Chief of Police Heydebreck formulated the correct response to collective resistance in terms of personal self-defense. In essence, he had found an answer to Magistrate Schmidt's complaint about the embarrassing possibility that policemen would become "extras" in the drama of colonial rule. Rather than waiting for their bodies to be in danger in order to defend the authority of the regime, policemen should consider resistance to the authority of the regime as a threat to their bodies. As already discussed, many policemen had themselves come to this solution insofar as self-defense became the standardized post facto justification for having shot a weapon.

An ancillary benefit of explaining events in a formula of self-defense was that is lent an air of standardization to police actions: it reinforced police's professionalism. Policemen were supposed to use their weapon in a professional way, appropriate for the situation at hand. They were asked to be decisive, but their inadequate training and the bad state of their firearms hindered their performance. Hunting game and preparing for war did not

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[951] "Abgesehen von folgeschweren Collisionen zu denen ein Schlagen der Eingeborenen durch Polizeibeamte führen kann, ist dasselbe auch geeignet, das Ansehen dieser zur Aufrechterhaltung der Ruhe und Ordnung berufenen Beamten zu schädigen, wenn sie ungehorsame Eingeborenen selbst züchtigen wollen; es entsteht leicht dadurch, wenn sich der geschlagene Eingeborene zur Wehr setzt, eine Prügelei, was unter allen Umständen vermieden werden muss." Magistrate Karl Schmidt (District Office Keetmanshoop) to Police Station Hasuur, 16.03.1908, NAN, DAR, 20 P.II.1, 19.

prepare the men of the *Landespolizei* to use their guns when making an arrest. They had not learned how and when to threaten, how and when to shoot, or how to handle their guns in non-combat contact. One of the strategies they acquired to cover over their ignorance and to justify their tendency to shoot first and ask questions later was to deploy bureaucratic formulae that gave their actions a professional and honorable quality.

The self-defense argument shored up both police identity and the colonizer's authority by defining the regulatory and customary conditions under which a shooting was considered professional and authoritative. But a final question of firearms practice remains: who was shooting at whom? A more viciously racist ideology guided this aspect of social distinction.

The African group of San was a source of special anxiety, even paranoia, amongst the German colonizers, and consequently they were targets of disproportionate gun violence. Their poisoned arrows, perhaps because they called into question the technological dominance of the colonizer, made them seem exceptionally dangerous. And, as already discussed,[952] the San were singled out as incapable of being integrated into a modern wage economy. They were believed to be unable to perform disciplined, regular labor. More than this, they were perceived as less than human, as closer to wild animals, and as such an active danger to the economy.

Often, they were the group blamed for cattle thefts or for attacking the economically vital group of Ovambo migrant workers. A farmer's letter published at length in an article entitled "Bushmen Plight" related several cattle thefts from his farm, presumably committed by San. "The Bushmen," the farmer concluded, "are a through and through

[952] See Chapter 4.

uncultivable, untamable element, and they can only be kept in check with strict penalties."[953] Magistrate Schultze-Jena alerted police headquarters in May 1911 that "attacks by Bushmen on Ovambo increase alarmingly [*bedenklich*]," and that "this rabble" had no respect for the local police.[954] Then, in October 1911, Sergeant Josef Alefelder was injured by a poisoned arrow during a patrol.[955] He died shortly after.[956] Patrol reports show that, thereafter, when policemen encountered San, or believed that they had, often their immediate response was to shoot at them.[957] In these situations, policemen reverted to the simple logic of warfare: shoot at the enemy.

Hence, agitation by farmers, combined with the above mentioned racism and a primacy of economic demands led policemen to shoot specifically at San people: as a measure of preemptive self-defense so to speak. This practice, and the police sergeant's death, moved the government in October 1911 to make a rule expressly for San.[958] This decree regarding "weapon use against Bushmen" combined many elements I have addressed earlier. It stipulated showing the "greatest attention and caution" and instructed policemen to "always hold their firearm ready for instantaneous use" when approaching San

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[953] "[…] die Buschleute sind zudem ein durch und durch unkultivierbares, unzähmbares Element und sie können nur durch strenge Strafen in Schranken gehalten werden." Article "Buschmannsnot in Südwestafrika" *Deutsch-Südwestafrikanische Zeitung* 28 (1911), quoted in report by Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to Gouv. SWA, 14.04.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2710, 91.

[954] "Überfälle von Buschleuten auf Ovambos mehren sich bedenklich." "Bereits am 29.4. unternahmen an derselben Wasserstelle mehrere Buschleute erneut einen Überfall auf Ovambo und den Postboten von Outjo: Ein Beweis dafür, welchen Respekt dies Gesindel vor der Polizei hat." Telegram by Magistrate Schultze-Jena (District Office Outjo) to IdL, 07.05.1911, and report by Magistrate Schultze-Jena (District Office Outjo) to IdL, 09.05.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2507, 39-40.

[955] Patrol report by Staff Sgt. Wilhelm Schweizer (Police Station Grootfontein), 05.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2793, 59-62; report by Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to Gouv. SWA, 04.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2793, 53.

[956] Medical report by Dr. Zachlehner (Grootfontein), 11.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2793, 57-58; letter of condolence by Chief of Police Bethe (IdL) to widow Bertha Alefelder, 19.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2793, 49.

[957] For instance, patrol reports by Staff Sgt. Heinrich Eggersglüß (District Office Maltahöhe), 24.03.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 14-1, and by Sgt. Xaver Hagner (Police Station Okaukwejo), 20.10.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2711, 68-69.

[958] Decree by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA): "Rundverfügung, betr. Waffengebrauch gegen Buschleute." 24.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 48-49.

settlements.[959] The decree furthermore elaborated on some "principles" for the "behavior of all administrations against Bushmen." Despite the overall hostile attitude the decree conveyed, it nevertheless reminded local authorities that "it is desirable, as difficult as this may be, that even the Bushmen be brought to work," and that this had to happen "firstly in an amicable way." Nonetheless, if even one member of a San community could be construed in any way as suspected of "cattle theft or other robberies," the whole collective had to be arrested with force.[960] Finally, the decree stipulated that policemen were to use their weapon "upon the least resistance" and "when criminals who have been discovered in the act or tracked down do not stand upon hailing, but instead try to escape arrest through flight."[961] Thus, policemen's use of their rifles was codified according to what was already their customary practice and their ersatz bureaucratic formula: escapees could be shot at if called out to.[962]

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[959] "Die zur Absuchung des Geländes, zur Aufhebung von Werften im Felde oder zur Verfolgung von Viehdieben und Räuberbanden auf Patrouille befindlichen Beamten der Landespolizei haben unter Anwendung größter Aufmerksamkeit und Vorsicht ihre Schußwaffe stets zum sofortigen Gebrauch bereit zu halten." Ibid., 48.

[960] "Für das Verhalten sämtlicher Verwaltungsbehörden gegen die Buschleute sind folgende Grundsätze maßgebend. Es muß danach gestrebt werden, auch die Buschleute, so schwer es halten mag, zur Arbeit heranzuziehen, und zwar zunächst auf gütlichem Wege. Ein gewaltsames Aufheben von Buschmannswerften hat nur dann stattzufinden, wenn die Buschleute Viehdiebstähle oder sonstige Räubereien begangen oder gar Europäer oder ihre eingeborenen Arbeiter angegriffen haben. Die Bezirks- und Distriktsämter haben, wenn infolge derartiger Vorfälle größere Streifen stattfinden müssen, stets möglichst genau die Gegend in welcher die Buschmannswerften, gegen welche die Streife vorzunehemen ist, zu bezeichnen. Handelt es sich um größere Streifen, bei welchen der nächst garnisonierende Teil der Schutztruppe um Mitwirkung ersucht wird, so ist der Zweck und Umfang der Streife dem Führer der betreffenden Abteilung der Schutztruppe möglichst genau zu bezeichnen. Festzunehmen und einzubringen sind immer nur die Angehörigen solcher Werften, gegen die aus einem der oben bezeichneten Gründe eingeschritten werden muß. Befinden sich unter eingebrachten Buschleuten kräftige zur Arbeit taugliche Männer, so sind dieselben dem District Office Lüderitzbucht zur Verwendung auf den Diamantfeldern zu überweisen. Über die Verwendung hierfür ungeeigneter Leute und ihren weiteren Verbleib sind mir von Fall zu Fall Vorschläge zu machen Dem Kommando der Schutztruppe habe ich von Vorstehendem Kenntnis gegeben. Von der Truppe eingebrachte Buschleute werden dem nächstgelegenen Bezirks- bezw. Distriktsamt überwiesen." Ibid., 48-49.

[961] Die Schußwaffe ist anzuwenden: a.) bei der geringsten Widersetzlichkeit den Beamten gegenüber, b.) wenn auf der Tat entdeckte oder auf der Spur verfolgte Verbrecher auf Anruf nicht stehen, sondern sich ihrer Festnahme durch Flucht entziehen wollen." Ibid.

[962] For Magistrate Schultze-Jena, the decree against San from Oct. 1911 did not go far enough. In January 1913 he wrote that "in order to effectively thwart the Bushmen-threat, all apprehended Bushmen need to be

In the following years, higher colonial officials in Windhuk and Berlin continued to debate the right usage of firearms. In December 1912, Vice Governor Hintrager proposed a new regulation. It stipulated that policemen could shoot at escapees after shouting out a warning "several times." Somewhat vaguely, it added that the rifle should be the last resort if "other weapons" had failed.[963] In January 1913, Senior Civil Servant Hensel in police headquarters suggested to the Vice Governor to include the terms "criminals, thieves, etc." in the regulation in order to define who the police should be allowed to shoot at. He added:

> The Inspection [of the *Landespolizei*] deems it necessary that pol[ice]men are granted if possible the same rights as the military. […] The Inspection is very well aware that the expression 'criminal, thieves, etc.' is not altogether clear, but since it figures in all regulations re[garding] the use of weapons by gendarmes [in the *Kaiserreich*; M.M.], the inspection has no qualms to incorporate it into its own directives.[964]

Hintrager's draft and Hensel's proposition did not go into effect immediately. For a year, policemen continued to operate in the field with two distinct regulations, one allowing them to shoot at the San almost with impunity and the other prohibiting them from shooting at other African groups without a clear self-defense argument. However, given

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removed from the district and transplanted toarea where they can neither hunt nor rob, but have to make a living through work. A good opportunity for this is the diamond fields in Lüderitzbucht." Der Buschmanns-Gefahr wirksam entgegen zu treten, gibt es nur ein Mittel: Sämtliche Buschleute, deren wir habhaft werden können aus dem [59r] Bezirk zu entfernen, und sie in eine Gegend zu verpflanzen, wo sie weder jagen, noch räubern können, sondern durch Arbeit ihren Lebensunterhalt verdienen müssen. Gelegenheit hierzu bieten die Lüderitzbuchter Diamantfelder." Magistrate Schultze-Jena (District Office Outjo) to Gouv. SWA, 20.01.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 59.

[963] Draft of decree re: weapons usage by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to IdL, 24.12.1912, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 51-52.

[964] "Die Inspektion hält es für erforderlich, den Pol.beamten möglichst dieselben Rechte einzuräumen wie dem Militär. […] Die Inspektion ist sich wohl bewußt, daß der Ausdruck "Verbrecher, Diebe usw" nicht ganz klar ist, da er jedoch in allen Verordnungen den Waffengebrauch die Gendarmen betr enthalten ist, so sieht die Insp. keine Bedenken, ihn auch in die hiesigen Vorschriften aufzunehmen." Senior Civil Servant Hans Hensel (IdL) to Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA), 07.01.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 53-54.

that they had never respected the initial limits on their right to fire at Africans, it is all but inconceivable that they noticed the new distinction.[965]

In the beginning of 1914, a new rule was finally established. Paragraph 50.5 of the *Dienstvorschrift*[966] was replaced by a decree which more or less incorporated all the gradually loosened restrictions into one document that finally reflected what had been customary police practice all along. Henceforth, policemen were authorized to shoot at "fleeing, caught in the act murderers, robbers, and cattle thieves, who despite being ordered to, do not stop." They were also permitted to shoot at "natives" in general if they were on a special patrol and the colonized tried to run away, though, again, they had to call out first. And, finally, policemen were invited to resort first to "other means" and "other weapons" with no explanation what these might actually be.[967]

This last clause might have been a concealed or disavowed appeal to use African subalterns to handle arrests and prisoner recoveries in the German policemen's stead. Recall Chief of Police Heydebreck's suggestion that "only negotiation with the settlement

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[965] For an interesting discussion of the different legal interpretations regarding the use of firearms on the upper levels of the colonial administration in Windhuk and Berlin, see Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 168-179.

[966] "Waffengebrauch," *Dienstvorschrift*, 31.

[967] "§ 1. Die Polizeibeamten sind bei Ausübung ihres Dienstes befugt, von der Waffe in folgenden Fällen Gebrauch zu machen: […] e. gegen entfliehende, auf der Tat betretene Mörder, Räuber und Viehdiebe, die trotz Aufforderung nicht stehen, f. gegen Eingeborene auf einer vom Gouverneur oder dem Bezirks-(Distrikts-)amt besonders angeordnete Streife, wenn sich ein Eingeborener trotz der Aufforderung zum Stehen der Ergreifung durch die Flucht zu entziehen sucht. § 2. Von der Waffe darf nur insoweit Gebrauch gemacht werden, als es erforderlich ist und andere Mittel nicht anwendbar sind. Die Schusswaffe darf nur gebraucht werden, wenn andere zur Verfügung stehende Waffen nicht ausreichen. Dem Gebrauch der Schusswaffe soll von dem Falle der persönlichen Abwehr abgesehen, eine Warnung vorausgehen. Die Warnung hat bei dem Zusammenwirken mehrerer Beamten vom Führer auszugehen. Festgenommene sind tunlichst in Gegenwart eines Zeugen darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dass im Falle eines Fluchtversuchs auf sie geschossen wird.§ 3. Beamte müssen, wenn sie sich der Waffe bedienen, in Uniform sich befinden oder mit einem amtlichen Abzeichen oder Ausweis versehen sein. § 4. Den durch die Schusswaffe Verletzten ist Beistand zu leisten, soweit die Umstände es gestatten. § 5. Beamte dürfen nur amtliche oder amtlich zugelassene Waffen gebrauchen." Decree by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA): "Dienstanweisung über den Waffengebrauch der Polizeibeamten des deutsch-südwestafrikanischen Schutzgebiets." 04.02.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, no page number.

using suitable natives would have led to success" in the case of the four embarrassingly incompetent policemen. In his initial draft he had even more specifically suggested that "native police servants" should undertake negotiations.[968] The possibility that Africans were more competent intermediaries, more expert gunman, and more professional police haunted the German policing regime, destabilizing the colony's otherwise monolithic racial hierarchy.

As I already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, African police assistants were not supposed to carry firearms, presumably because doing so would have compromised the racist order.[969] However, when it came to the handling of weapons, Africans were sometimes construed as superior to Germans. Vice Governor Hintrager noted in a personal letter to a magistrate, that

> One cartridge in the hands of a native equals at least ten cartridges in the hands of the white man.[970]

In the characteristically confused logic of racial hierarchy, Africans were perceived as "naturally" superior in the use of a complex technology. The police handbook alerted its members that "natives […] were, due to their natural predispositions, in some proficiencies superior to civilized men."[971]

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[968] "Lediglich ein Verhandeln mit der Werft durch ~~eingeb. Polizeidiener~~ geeignete Eingeborene konnte zum Ziele führen." Circular re: weapons use by Chief of Police Joachim Friedrich Heydebreck (IdL) to all district offices and depots, 14.09.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 20.
[969] Circular by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all district offices, 03.07.1907, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 172; Circular by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all district offices, 10.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 83.
[970] "Eine Patrone in der Hand eines Eingeborenen ist mindestens gleich zehn Patronen in der Hand des weißen Mannes." Personal letter by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein), 10.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 83.
[971] *Dienstvorschrift*, 14.

Notwithstanding anxieties about disrupting racial hierarchy, and perhaps seeking to take advantage of their supposedly superior skills, African policemen were quite often equipped with rifles or revolvers. Both local administrators as well as rank-and-file policemen endorsed the idea.[972] Chief of Police Bethe begrudgingly acknowledged this reality in 1910 when he noted in a circular that African policemen should be trained so that they would at least use their rifles properly.[973] Moreover, most regulations on weapons use conceded to arming police assistants in exceptional cases, if their superiors deemed it necessary.[974] Interestingly, African policemen's training was more adapted to local conditions. They exclusively practiced in the "standing position, freehand," since "in the terrain of the thick bush any other aiming position is hardly in question."[975] It is possible

[972] For instance, District Chief Wasserfall (District Office Bethanien) to District Office Keetmanshoop, 21.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 9-10; Magistrate Karl Schmidt (District Office Keetmanshoop) to IdL, 08.10.1908, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 9-10; Magistrate Karl Schmidt (District Office Keetmanshoop) to IdL, 20.01.1911, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 68; report by Magistrate Berengar Zastrow (District Office Grootfontein) to Police Depot Waterberg, 08.05.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 77-79; Magistrate Rudolf Böhmer (District Office Lüderitzbucht) to IdL, 05.07.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 98. See also, Zollmann, *Koloniale Herrschaft*, 69.

[973] "Da es hin und wieder erforderlich werden kann, daß die eingeborenen Polizeidiener von ihrer Waffe Gebrauch machen, so ist auch mit den Polizeidienern Übungsschießen abzuhalten." Circular re: training of African police assistants by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all district offices and depots, 08.11.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2604, 2; extension to prior circular by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to all district offices and depots, 17.03.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2604, 5.

[974] "Den Patrouillen zur Begleitung oder als Führer beigegebene eingeborene Polizeidiener können in Bezirken mit Buschmannsbevölkerung unter persönlicher Verantwortung des Verwaltungschefs mit Gewehren Modell 71 für die Dauer der Patrouillenritte bewaffnet werden." Decree by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA): "Rundverfügung, betr. Waffengebrauch gegen Buschleute." 24.10.1911, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 49. And: "Dem Polizeibeamten sind alle Angestellten bezüglich des Waffengebrauchs gleichgestellt, welche zufolge besonderen Auftrages Polizeidienste versehen. Eingeborene dürfen jedoch nur gegenüber Eingeborenen die Waffe gebrauchen." Decree by Governor Seitz (Gouv. SWA): "Dienstanweisung über den Waffengebrauch der Polizeibeamten des deutsch-südwestafrikanischen Schutzgebiets." 04.02.1914, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, no page number. Even the *Dienstvorschrift* permitted to arm African policemen, although hidden in its section on police equipment: "Die Reservewaffen dienen als Ersatz für unbrauchbar gewordene Waffen, sowie zur Bewaffnung anderer Gouvernementsbeamten und eingeborener Polizeidiener oder Führer, sofern die Ämter eine Bewaffnung für notwendig erachten." "Bestimmungen für die Haltung der Pferde, Waffen, Munition und Ausrüstungstücke bei der berittenen Landespolizei," *Dienstvorschrift*, 31.

[975] "Zu Schießen ist auf Ring-Scheibe 100, 150 u. 200 m. stehend [3v] freihändig, da in dem dichten Buschgelände ein anderer Anschlag kaum in frage kommt." Specifications by Chief of Police Heinrich Bethe (IdL) to Senior Staff Sgt. Paul Urner (District Office Grootfontein), 24.08.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2604, 4.

that more appropriate training really had made them better marksmen than their German colleagues.

Irrespective of whether or not their superior expertise was a reality,[976] the belief in African's more accomplished skills had ambivalent implications for the police. On the one hand, it made wary higher colonial officials repeatedly forbid police assistants from having firearms.[977] On the other hand, it disposed other colonial officials, especially those with experience on the ground, to issue rifles to their African police assistants, expecting better results.[978] Like in so many other cases, practice contradicted official policy in such a way that the state was nonetheless strengthened. Unofficially distributing guns to African policemen was yet another form of improvised, informal state activity.

Conclusion

For the formal state and its representatives, like Vice Governor Hintrager or Senior Civil Servant Hensel, Africans carrying guns remained a point of anxiety. Hintrager noted that for African policemen "the bayonet is perfectly sufficient." "For guarding tasks," he continued, "they can, if necessary, be handed out a sjambok."[979] And Hensel claimed to represent police headquarter's opinion when he stated that "it would certainly be best to

[976] For a thorough discussion of weapon expertise and race in another colonial context, see William Kelleher Storey, *Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[977] Explicit proscriptions: Circular by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices, 03.07.1907, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 172; decree bu Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA): "Waffenverbot für eingeborene Polizeidiener." 10.06.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 83. An exception was Vice Governor Brückner who permitted African policemen to carry a rifle and five bullets in the Outjo district to defend themselves against lions. Vice Governor Brückner (Gouv. SWA) to District Office Outjo, 17.08.1910, BA-B, R 1002/ 2709, 115.
[978] See fn. 1039.
[979] "Das Seitengewehr genügt hier vollständig, zu Aufsichtszwecken kann ihnen erforderlichenfalls ein Schambock verabfolgt werden." Circular by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA) to all District Offices, 03.07.1907, NAN, BKE, 201 B.II.66.c (vol.1), 172.

take away all firearms from police servants and to hand them a strong sjambok instead."[980] Hence, to return to my opening thoughts, the violent technologies of policing were parceled out according to the system of status hierarchy that defined colonial order. Who carried what weapons and under what circumstances they were used was more important as a matter of social distinction than efficient practice.

In point of fact, both German and African policemen of the *Landespolizei* used technological tools when they exerted their power onto the policed. As the case of jujitsu training exemplifies, policemen applying bare hands was viewed with disfavor, both by the settler community as well as by some parts of the colonial administration. Replying to an invitation from the Chief of Police to have his policemen participate in the police school's boxing classes, the Magistrate of Windhuk noted:

> I would like to desist from letting my policemen participate in boxing lessons... [T]he average policeman is easily tempted to apply these arts in wrong places, that is, it might too easily result in cases of assault.[981]

Whereas the risk of bare-handed assault was apparently too high, the dangers of flogging, injurious shackling techniques, and sometimes wanton shootings were widely accepted and even codified. The often instrumentally counterproductive uses of technologies of rule become understandable when viewed as complex cultural practices that functioned as

[980] "Nach Ansicht der Inspektion wäre es allerdings am besten, diesen Pol.Dienern jede Schußwaffe zu nehmen und ihn dafür einen kräftigen Schambock in die Hand zu geben." Senior Civil Servant Hans Hensel (IdL) to Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. SWA), 07.01.1913, BA-B, R 1002/ 2560, 56.
[981] "Von einer Beteiligung der diesseitigen Polizeibeamten an dem Unterricht im Boxen pp möchte ich mit Rücksicht darauf absehen, dass der Durschnittsbeamte durch die Kenntnis solcher Künste sehr leicht dazu geführt wird, sie am unrichtigen Ort anzuwenden d.h. dass zu leicht Fälle von Körperverletzung im Amt sich daraus entwickeln werden." Magistrate Alex Brill (District Office Windhuk) to IdL, 07.04.1909, BA-B, R 1002/ 2537, 112.

markers and rituals of status distinction. Distinguishing in different moments between colonizer and colonized, between white and black, between professional and civilian, or between different ranks within the police, technologies of violence contributed to colonial state power by giving clear contours to the new social order. Although European technologies of themselves explain little, the specific improvised practices of the police illuminate how the technologies of violence helped the German regime maintained rule over Southwest Africa.

CONCLUSION

Colonial Law and Law Enforcement

In my conclusion I should briefly address an element of colonial rule that throughout the dissertation has remained implicit: colonial law. In June 1908, a manager from a remote stud farm wrote an angry letter to the police in which he waxed nostalgic about the "good old days" when vigilante justice reigned:

> In the past, when stock was stolen, a well-armed patrol of two whites and four natives would ride out that same evening to track down the thieves. They were almost always successful. The thieves were usually shot down and the stolen cattle recovered.[982]

But now, he complained, "these tasks are solely for the police!" Chief of Police Heydebreck reacted to the letter stating that the police "by no means follows the principle that every cattle theft is their exclusive concern. Rather, it would be grateful for any support."[983]

Policemen operated within a state aspiring to claim the monopoly of legitimate force. This included that they lay claim to being the sole keepers of the law. However, as the source above strikingly illustrates, policemen also operated within a social system of multiple alliances and dependencies. Moreover, with the main complex of governmental decrees aiming at regulating Africans, the so-called "Native Ordinances" of 1907, the

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[982] "Früher wenn Vieh in der Gegend gestohlen war, so ritt am selbem Abend noch eine Patrouille von etwa zwei Weißen und vier Eingeborenen gut bewaffnet und gut beritten los, und zwar auf der Spur der Diebe. Der Erfolg blieb selten aus. Die Diebe wurden meist abgeschossen und das gestohlene Vieh wieder eingebracht; wenigstens zum Teil!" Letter of complaint by stud farm manager Clavé, Nauchas, 11.06.1908, BA-B, 2708, 127.

[983] "Solche Aufgaben sind allein Polizeisache!" Marginalia by Heidebreck "Die Landespolizei verfolgt durchaus nicht den Grundsatz, daß jeder Viehdiebstahl ihre allereigenste Angelegenheit ist, sondern wird für jede Unterstützung dankbar sein." Ibid.

colonial government had instigated a racially bifurcated legal system with a highly diffuse jurisdictional principle. The "pass ordinance" dictated, for instance, that all colonized had to carry a "pass" in the form of a tag with a number on it.[984] The police were supposed to register all colonized and hand out these passes.[985] But *all* Europeans were allowed to check the passes, investing them with policing authority.[986] As Helmut Bley notes, after the war, the "Native Ordinances" provided the "legal basis" for white dominion: "the rule of 'whites' had thereby become a reality all the way down to the level of individual policing power."[987]

The scholarship on law in colonial Africa has developed recently into a vibrant and independent subfield bringing scholars of law, anthropology and history together.[988] It shows that colonial law – whether in its European or its ostensibly customary implementations – did not aim at limiting inequalities or eliminating arbitrariness, but was intended to uphold racial inequality. Only little, however, has been written on the relationship between law and law enforcement in colonial Africa. Historian David Anderson, whose analyses are the rare exception, writes that basically "all agents of

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984 "Verordnung des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika, betr. die Paßpflicht der Eingeborenen," 18.08.1907, *Deutsches Kolonialblatt* 18, 24 (1907): 1183-1184.

985 Circular regarding the logistics for implementing the "pass ordinance" by Vice Governor Oscar Hintrager (Gouv. DSWA) to all district offices 13.05.1907, BA-B, 2597, 1-2.

986 "§16 Jeder paßpflichtige Eingeborene kann von jedem Weißen angehalten und, wenn er ohne gültigen Paß betroffen wird, dem nächsten Polizeibeamten übergeben werden." "Verordnung des Gouverneurs von Deutsch-Südwestafrika, betr. die Paßpflicht der Eingeborenen," 18.08.1907, *Deutsches Kolonialblatt* 18, 24 (1907): 1184.

987 Helmut Bley, *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894 - 1914* (Hamburg: Leibniz-Verlag, 1968), 213.

988 The beginning of studying Law and Anthropology in Africa was made by John Comaroff and Simon Robert with *Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute inAfrican Context* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). For two recent examples of the high quality of this field, see Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1998); Kristin Mann and Richard L. Roberts, (eds.), *Law in Colonial Africa* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1991).

colonialism […] were, in some senses, involved in policing."[989] He argues that policing needs to be studied as part of one single mechanism which included police, judiciary, and the law.[990] Indeed, particularly judiciary and police work were so tightly linked together in everyday colonial rule that it makes little sense to isolate them as two different practices. Although Anderson worked on British colonialism, his interpretation rings true for the *Landespolizei* in German Southwest Africa as well. There, policemen acted as prosecutors, as executory officers, as scribes and witnesses in courts. They were often the first to identify a crime and to make the decision whether it should be prosecuted or not. I suggest that we think of colonial policemen also as legislators who made law in the larger sense of the term, even though, or maybe especially because their knowledge of the written law and of local customs was on the whole quite flawed. As shown in chapter four, in executing their disciplinary authority, policemen increasingly practiced a form of "summary law" on site – at the farms, mines, and businesses they passed through on their patrols. Their everyday practices of state formation included making law.

Violence, as I argue throughout this study, was the daily business of policemen. Therefore, the relationship between the law and law enforcement as violence needs to be scrutinized more carefully. In his study of colonial law in German Southwest Africa, Harry Schwirck argues convincingly that colonial violence was not the result of inexistent or incomplete law. To the contrary, he claims, "the brutal exercise of power may prove most

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[989] David Anderson, "Policing, Prosecution and the Law in Colonial Kenya, c.1905-39," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940*, ed. by David M. Anderson and David Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 183. See also idem, "Stock Theft and Moral Economy in Colonial Kenya," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 56, 4 (1986): 399-416; idem, "Master and Servant in Colonial Kenya," *The Journal of African History* 41, 3 (2000): 459-485.

[990] David Anderson, "Policing, Prosecution and the Law," 198.

effective when attended by law."[991] In their daily practices, policemen made law on the beat. Sometimes that involved following regulations and law by the letter. But often it meant that policemen found abbreviated means of law enforcement. Instead of having courts judge over issues of workers' discipline, for instance, they often passed that judgment themselves at the farm, claiming that it was in the farmers' interest not to lose their labor force to the justice and penitentiary system. Thus, the policemen's personalized legal regime was at times at odds with what policemen perceived as an aloof judiciary in the colonial courts of the district towns. However, both policemen's and the courts' legal practices contributed to a refinement of everyday colonial violence. As Schwirck notes,

> law does not merely respond to violence in an effort to diminish it but also determines and reflects what might be termed an economy of violence. Law plays a central role in defining what a society will recognize as violence and in allocating the ability to legitimately act in a violent manner.[992]

Policemen's qualitative delineation of violent behavior, notably defining the "right treatment" of Africans, made them "law makers." Their daily practices "legalized" violence, both within and outside of the written law. Oscillating between violence as punishment on the one side and as education on the other, policemen produced a moral economy of violence that can be called improvised, and that might be even seen as the preliminary rudiments of a new customary law.

The law-making power of the police was hardly the "rule of law" espoused as one of the grand achievements of modern, Western political forms. But, entangled in the processes

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[991] Harry Schwirck, *Violence, Race, and the Law in German South West Africa, 1884-1914* (PhD Diss., Cornell University, 1998), 13.
[992] Harry Schwirck, "Law's Violence and the Boundary Between Corporal Discipline and Physical Abuse in German South West Africa," *Akron Law Review* 36 (2002): 82.

that restructured life, these police practices produced a viable peacetime social order in German Southwest Africa, one that allowed people to live out their lives, however mutilated by violence. Hence, everyday violence committed or orchestrated by the colonial policemen produced an order. Severly lacking legitimacy and almost entirely bereft of more formal sources of power, the colonial state rested on the improvised, functional violent practices of its ground-level representatives. Those are the major conclusions of my work. They go against the widespread historiographical assumption that colonial violence was an indicator for the weakness of colonial regimes, that colonial states betrayed their lack of strength notably in their inability to control and limit rampant settler brutality. Moreover, the claim that everyday, normalized, and accepted forms of violence are constructive asks that we reconsider our basic ideas about what state violence consists of and about what the foundations of modern state power are.

Let me recapitulate the main findings of my research that support these theses.

A Colonial History of Everyday Violence

Coming from multiple cultural groups, the African and German men of the *Landespolizei* nevertheless shared a host of moral codes which can best be subsumed under the heading of honor. This study reveals significant similarities between policemen from Europe and those from Southern Africa. Out of the *Landespolizei's* distinctive racial and social composition unfolded a dynamic that made the police decidedly efficacious.

At first glance, the African and German policemen of the *Landespolizei* occupied an intermediary position between ruler and population. But, partly because of their

composition, partly because of their violent improvisation, they became the center of colonial power. Thus, more precise examination reveals that the policemen were *not*, in fact, intermediaries. They *were* the state – at least, the improvised colonial state. This insight might offer a corrective to the thriving research on colonial intermediaries which characterizes colonial soldiers, policemen, scribes, interpreters, etc. as brokers and negotiators of power rather than as sources of it. Moreover, my study insists on the ways in which colonial power structures often developed within a logic of (contingent) overlap or reciprocity, rather than of translation or mediation. The drawback of my approach lies in the danger of effacing crucial differences, particularly racial ones. But I have tried to account for both similarities and differences, stressing repeatedly the asymmetric power relations that also existed within the group of the colonial police force.

Furthermore, African and German policemen were at one and the same time soldiers and bureaucrats. Thus, besides being an inter-racial organization, the police force was a semi-civilian, semi-military, that is, yet another form of hybrid institution. The policemen's identities and their organizational culture were significantly shaped by martial values and ways of proceeding. Policemen held on tightly to military notions of etiquette, proper appearance, comradeship, and loyalty. Most importantly, they believed that their access to lethal force was a crucial foundation for their authority. Yet, nonmilitary administrational modes of functioning gained importance in the police force's creation of a distinct professional culture. To the policemen, it mattered – both to their identity as well as to the understanding of their work – that tasks were executed in a bureaucratically correct manner. Thus, added to their self-understanding as wielders of disciplined, martial violence was that of an official administrator. In the process, contrary to the Weberian teleology of

rationalizing bureaucratization, policemen did not abandon violence as a means of policing. Rather they redefined what kind of violent acts belonged to their profession and, by extension, defined what modern state violence consisted in.

My analyses of the police force's social and cultural make-up, as well as of its members' core values – regarding especially social status, masculinity, martial and bureaucratic professionalism – shows that the *Landespolizei's* hallmarks were a congruence of cultural codes, a hybrid composition, and a complex web of mutual obligations and client relationships. It was in part due to these features that the police was so effective despite constraining material conditions and chronic understaffing.

But the main reason why the police quite successfully imposed its version of state rule can be found in its practices. My detailed study of the everyday routines and procedures of the *Landespolizei* shows that police work was make-do (De Certeau) and *eigensinnig* (Lüdtke) in nature. In a period in which a cameralist concept of *policey* prevailed, the police's virtually limitless responsibilities opened up room for maneuver, combining security with welfare, reactive with proactive, repressive with supportive measures. It also made policemen feel the need to act, to do something, in almost every situation. As a rule, policemen acted on the spot, relying on prior experiences, on habit, and on affective states. Out of these practices emerged a notion of common sense and a valorization of pragmatism, combined with idiosyncratic bureaucratic procedure.

The police's daily deeds constituted a form of state action that did not meet the concepts of statehood conceived of by contemporary leaders and state theorists. What is more, this form of improvised statecraft does not tally with present-day theories of the

modern state: unable to account for improvised state activity, too many narratives of the (post)-colonial state are inevitably those of the "failed state."

As I demonstrate by way of the example of labor regulation, the improvised practices of the *Landespolizei* involved a multitude of violent behaviors. With their violent acts, the police mobilized alliances, included some while excluding others, created dependencies, and generated or reinforced racial and social hierarchies. Moreover, the policemen's violent practices were accepted and normalized as acts of administration, education, communication, or even paternalistic protection. With these everyday practices, the police refined the existing economy of violence.

Examining in detail the everyday workings of violent interactions, this dissertation answers Frederick Cooper's call to reassess the "ways in which power is engaged, contested, deflected, and appropriated."[993] It demonstrates, for instance, that modern bureaucracy, administration, market economy, and knowledge production did not gradually replace direct physical repression, but rather reshaped when, how, and by whom violence was practiced. It also readjusts the Weberian dictum about the state's monopoly on the use of lethal force by showing the manifold and intertwined ways in which lower state actors had recourse to other than lethal violence and invited non-state actors to participate in the violent enterprises of the project of colonial rule.

Finally, inquiring into the policemen's usage of violent technologies – notably whips, shackles, and firearms – this project draws out the many ways in which everyday violent practices were culturally determined. My discussion of the different manipulations of violent tools reveals that often violent practices were undertaken with the object to

[993] Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *The American Historical Review* 99, 5 (1994): 1517.

establish social distinction, rather than a result of technological possibility or efficient practicality. As such, they culturally produced colonial order and state power.

Based on my findings, several new lines of inquiry open up. The dissertation sheds light on the police's relationship to other parts of the colonial state, but more can be done. Notably an analysis of the role of legal staff, civic representatives, school teachers, etc., and of their internal (inter-racial?) group dynamics could be promising in the goal to historically reassess colonial statehood. Likewise, although to a degree already accounted for in this study, one could focus even more on state actors' interactions with key civilian actors, with African political elites, missionaries, or settler dignitaries, for instance. Lastly, this study offers the possibility to contextualize policing and state power by broadening the scope, both in temporal as well as in geographical terms. What continuities, legacies, and patterns of violent police practices can be traced in Southwest Africa beyond the German colonial era? How can this specifically Afro-German history of colonial police violence inform our understanding of other European states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?

To be sure, Southwest Africa is, perhaps, an unusual example of European colonialism. Extremely sparsely populated, even more so after the genocide, it had an economy that was never profitable to the German motherland or even anybody living there. Moreover, the period of German rule was short in comparison with the more "classical" modern colonial regimes of Britain and France. Despite these limitations as a source of comparisons, the small scale of this colonial regime allowed me to do a micro-analysis of everyday violent practices that would simply not have been possible for larger Empires like colonial India, for instance. The German authorities of Southwest Africa were assiduous record keepers,

producing a wealth of source documents that nonetheless remain manageable for an individual researcher to process and interpret. Even if my case of colonialism is small, my insights about the micro-level mechanisms of colonial rule may be relevant to other colonial regimes or contexts of violent social order that are less easily studied at that level. My case can help reconceptualize state power and state violence in modern history as fundamentally reliant on everyday practices, as reliant on stateliness and estate as much as on statecraft, and, most importantly, as reliant on common, petty acts of everyday violence not on the claim to legitimate lethal force. In closing, I would like to share my thoughts on the relationship between my story and the global one.

A History of Violence

"Believe it or not […] violence has declined over long stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species' existence," psychologist Steven Pinker writes in the opening to his best-selling opus *The Better Angels of Our Nature*.[994] Over 800 pages, densely packed with data and graphs, Pinker builds a case for his provocative thesis of the decline of violence in history. His widely acclaimed book flatly contradicts the historiography that describes the modern world as an exceptionally violent era. "The twentieth century is increasingly characterized […] in terms of its historically unprecedented levels of bloodshed," observes Mark Mazower in his review of scholarship on "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century."[995] Eric Hobsbawm, for example,

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[994] Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), xxi.
[995] Mark Mazower, "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century," *The American Historical Review* 107, 4 (2002): 1158.

wrote about the twentieth century that "More human beings had been killed or allowed to die by human decision than ever before in human history."[996]

The question whether there is more or less violence over historical time seems to me a moot point. This kind of endeavor assumes that violence can be somehow quantified, as if it happened in discrete units. Body counts can sometimes seem like a plausible starting point, as Hobsbawm's quote suggests, but even they are often impossible to realistically calculate.[997] Moreover, many studies of violence are, in fact, studies of extreme violence, of mass killings during war or under bloody regimes.[998] But it is hard to find macro-historical accounts of accepted or tolerated violence. Neither Pinker nor the histories of extreme violence pay much attention to official, run-of-the-mill violence. And neither spend much time on the individual fates of people who faced the everyday decisions of living in a violent regime.

Instead of a grand narrative of quantified violence, I wanted to draw out the lives of people getting by, living with violence in the everyday. I have tried to uncover how the dynamics of violence were inscribed into a moral economy of the accepted and normal. And my most basic, and unsettling, finding is that violence is not necessarily antithetical to community or social order, that it can be constructive. The daily brutality of modern colonialism was a horrific injustice. But it was also a way of life with its own rules and regularities.

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[996] Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (London : Michael Joseph , 1994), 12.

[997] "The statistical problems appear to be overwhelming," Mazower observes for the calculation of deaths caused by political violence alone. Mazower, "Violence and the State," 1158, fn. 1. Pinker claims to quantitatively document and compare numbers regarding death, assault, torture, abuse, disease, etc. over the span of all of history. Pinker, *The Better Angels*.

[998] Mazower's review article is an example for this. The "violence" in his title refers mostly to scholarship on war and mass murder. Mazower, "Violence and the State."

My work on the documentary remnants of German colonialism has not produced an appealing story of oppression and resistance, and I have tried to avoid moralizing about the past. But by giving more defined contours to the lives and practices of the people who produced and put up with the regularized violence of colonial life in German Southwest Africa, I hope to have done them justice.

APPENDIX

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1913 Erlaß gesundheitspolizeilicher Vorschriften in Südwestafrika, 1907

1917 Ausstellung polizeilicher Führungsatteste in Südwestafrika, 1924-1939

1920 Ausstellung von Reisepässen. –Südwestafrika, 1924-1939

1918-1919 Ausweisungen aus Südwestafrika, 1906-1939

2183-2184 Militär- und Polizeistationen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika. –Einrichtung und Tätigkeit, 1894-1913

2235 Verwaltungsangelegenheiten der Eingeborenen in Deutsch-Südwestafrika, 1906-1913

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Zentralverwaltung. Gouvernement in Windhuk.

Personalakten

91 Vollziehungsbeamter Paul Altscher, 1905-1915

92 Vollziehungsbeamter Paul Altscher, 1914

154 Polizeisergeant Becker, 1906

220 Zivilpolizist Böhme, 1902-1903

224 Polizeirat [und Bezirksamtmann] Boesel, 1904-1909

225 Polizeirat Boesel, 1905-1909

249 Polizeisergeant Brandt, 1906-1907

274 Zivilpolizist Brock, 1902-1905

281 Polizeisergeant Brumme, 1906

325 Polizeisergeant Czarnetzki, 1906

378 Gefängnisaufseher [Polizeisergeant] Ebel, 1910-1913

388 Zollassistent Effmert, 1910-1915

433 Polizeisergeant Feige, 1905-1907

443 Zivilpolizist Feyerabend, 1903-1906

450 Zivilpolizist Ficke, 1903-1904

511 Hilfspolizeisergeant Frommelt, 1906

529 Zivilpolizist Gellhoff, 1904

533 Gouv. Assistant II.Kl. [Polizeiwachtmeister] George, 1906-1913

569 Polizeisergeant Göbl, 1906-1910

580 Zivilpolizist und Wegewärter Goltz, 1903-1909

593 Polizeisergeant Grober, 1906

607 Polizeisergeant Grothkopf, 1906

629 Polizeisergeant Günther, 1905-1910

907 Bezirksrichter Ludwig Kastl, 1907-1915

908 Regierungsrat Ludwig Kastl, 1910-1914

1184 Polizeisergeant Melzer, 1907-1914

Inspektion der Landespolizei SWA

Sachakten

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2422 Entlassung der zur Probedienstleisung angestellten Schutztruppenangehörigen, 1908-1913

2424 Kündigung der Dienstverträge, Entlassungsbestimmungen, Berichterstattung. Gen., 1909-1913

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2443 Heimaturlaub der Beamten. Gen., 1907-1915

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2465 Beschwerden gegen Beamte, 1909-1914

2466 Gerichtliche Strafverfahren, Zwangsvollstreckungen gegen Beamte, 1909-1914

2467 Disziplinar-Verfahren und Bestrafungen, 1908-1912

2468 Strafanträge wegen Beamtenbeleidigung, 1909-1915

2484 Personal-Verzeichnisse, Berichte und Akten. Allgemeines, 17. Jan. 1911-21. Juli 1914

2485 Beamtenverzeichnis, 16. März 1909-1. April 1913

2489 Monatsrapporte. Gen., 1909-1914

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2491 Monatsrapporte. Spec., 1915

2492 Qualifikationsberichte. 1909-1915

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2498 Gesuche von Schutztruppenangehörigen um Einstellung bei der Landespolizei. Bd. I, 1907-1911

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2536 Vorschläge und Kommandierungen pp. für den Ausbildungskursus in Windhuk, 1908-1915

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2596 Verfügung von Disziplinarstrafen gegen Eingeborene, 1908-1915

2597 Eingeborenen-Verordnungen, 1907-1914

2598 Eingeborene der Inspektion, Bd. 1, 1907-1912

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2600 Eingeborene des Depots Waterberg, 1908-1912

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2602 Eingeborene des Depots Kupferberg, 1908-1913

2604 Schiessdienst der Polizeidiener, 1910-1914

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2725 Rechtsangelegenheiten, 1908-1914

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2783 Geheimakten betr. Beamte pers., 1907-1911

2790 Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der unteren Beamten der Landespolizei

Personalakten

2792 Polizeisergeant Agge, 1908-1905

2793 Polizei Sgt. Alefelder, 1907-1909

2794 Polizei Sgt. Adloff, 1907-1914

2795 Pol. Sgt. Albes, 1907-1918

2796 Polizei Wachtmeister Albrecht, 1905-1919

2797 Polizei Wachtm. Arnhold, 1908-1915

2798 Polizei Sgt. Allmich, 1908-1911

2799 Polizei Sgt. Arnold, 1908-1910

2800 Polizist Albertyn, 1909-1913

2801 Polizist Ahrens, 1905-1911

2802 Polizei Sgt. Aschmann, 1910-1914

2803 Polizei Sgt. Aschmann, 1911-1914

2804 Polizei Sgt. Abt, 1907-1910

2805 Pol. Sergt. Boll, 1904-1919

2806 Polizei-Sergeant Johannes Boll, 1907-1915

2907 Polizist Ernst Derday, 1909-1911

2964 Polizei Sergt. Fahrig, 1910-1918

2976 Pol. Sergt. Karl Geffke, 1907-1910

3041 Pol. Sgt. Henke, 1908-1918

3033 Pol. Sergt. Johann Höning, 1908-1913

3102 Polizeiwachtmeister Wilhelm Kups, 1907-1918

3131 Kriminalbeamter Wilhelm Kelz, 1906-1912

3215 Polizeisergeant Magerkurth, 1906-1914

3216 Pol. Wachtm. Friedr. Meier, 1908-1918

3217 Polizeisergeant Mutschke, 1903-1918

3218 Polizeisergeant Meyer, 1906-1918

3219 Polizei Wachtmeister Makosch, 1907-1919

3220 Polizeisergeant Magdeburg, 1908-1914

3222 Polizeisergeant Mangold, 1907-1913

3221 Polizeisergeant Maslowski, 1907-1918

3223 Polizei Wachtm. Mathias, 1907-1914

3224 Polizeisergeant Otto Müller, 1907-1914

3225 Polizeisergeant [Wachtmeister] Möhring, 1906-1914

3226 Polizeisergeant Maletz, 1907-1914

3227 Polizeisergeant Mattukat, 1907-1918

3228 Polizeisergeant Melzer, 1907-1914

3229 Polizeisergeant Mierzwa, 1908-1910

3230 Polizeisergeant Maywald, 1908-1914

3231 Polizeisergeant Meyer, 1908-1914

3232 Polizeisergeant Malsch, 1908-1919

3233 Polizeisergeant Maletzki, 1908-1910

3234 Polizeisergeant Emil Müller, 1908-1918

3235 Polizeisergeant Ernst Müller, 1907-1911

3236 Polizeisergeant Mahler, 1908-1914

3237 Polizeisergeant Mehnert, 1908-1918

3238 Polizeisergeant Makowski, 1909-1914

3239 Polizist Alfred Müller, 1909-1911

3240 Polizeisergeant Mohr, 1909-1919

3241 Polizist Richard Müller, 1909-1918

3242 Polizeisergeant Milz, 1909-1914

3243 Polizeisergeant Milz, 1909-1914

3244 Polizeisergeant Paul Müller, 1909-1915

3245 Polizei Sgt. Manson, 1909-1914

3246 Polizeisergeant Meister, 1909-1918

3247 Polizei Sgt. Heinrich Müller, 1910-1915

3248 Polizeisergeant Minge, 1910-1914

3249 Polizei Sgt. Münzberg, 1910-1914

3250 Polizeisergeant Manthei, 1910-1918

3251 Polizeisergeant Alois Müller, 1910-1915

3252 Polizeisergeant Merkel, 1910-1918

3253 Polizeisergeant Maurer, 1911-1919

3254 Polizeisergeant Mücke, 1911-1918

3255 Polizeisergeant Josef Meier, 1911-1914

3256 Polizeisergeant Karl Müller, 1911-1914

3257 Polizist Marschall, 1909

3322 Polizei-Wachtm. Max Rößler, 1905-1918

3323 Geheimakte Rößler

3415 Polizeiwachtmeister Schweizer, 1907-1918

3483 Pol.Sergt. Johann Sterzenbach, 1908-1919

3501 Pol. Wachtmeister Wilhelm Tetzlaff, 1906-1915

3502 Pol. Sergt. Bernhard Themm, 1908-1918

3503 Pol. Sergt. Anton Thelen, 1908-1917

3504 Polizeisergeant Wilhelm Templin, 1908-1914

3505 Pol. Sergt. Franz Tuluweit, 1908-1914

3506 Pol. Sergt. Otto Taenzer, 1908-1912

3507 Pol. Sergt. Emil Tetzner, 1908-1913

3508 Pol. Sergt. Friedrich Thein, 1908-1918

3509 Pol. Sergt. Rudolf Tänzer, 1908-1914

3510 Pol. Sergt. Rudolf Thielemann, 1908-1914

3511 Polizeisergeant Willy Trommler, 1909-1914

3512 Polizei-Sergeant Friedrich Thiele, 1910-1914

3513 Polizist Georg Türk, 1910-1914

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692 F.V.D.1	Disziplinarbefugnisse gegenüber Eingeborenen. Generalia (1903-1914)
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694 F.V.F.1	Vollzug der Prügel- und Rutenstrafe. Generalia (1900-1909)
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694 F.V.F.2	Vollzug der Prügel- und Rutenstrafe. Specialia (1898-1914)
747 G.I.B.1	Angelgenheiten der Beamten der Landespolizei. Generalia (1907-1915)
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750 G.I.E.2	Eingeborenes Personal der Landespolizei. Specialia. (1912-1914)
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BRE Bezirksamt Rehoboth

9 B.5.B	Zwangs- und Strafbefugnisse der Behörden (1908)
13 B.9.B	Beschwerden über Beamte (1909-1913)

13 B.9.A	Beschwerden in Verwaltungsangelegenheiten (1906-1910)
27 E.2.B (vol.2)	Kontrolle der eingeborenen Arbeiter, Recherche nach Entlaufenen und Zugelaufenen (1911-1914)
27 E.2.B (vol.3)	Ebd.
27 E.2.E (vol.2)	Anträge auf Zuweisung von eingeborenen Arbeitern (1914-1915)
28 E.2.F	Eingeborene Arbeiter. Beschwerden (1911-1914)
28 E.2.D	Eingeborene Arbeiter. Dienstverträge, Schriftverkehr. (1912-1913)
28 E.2.L	Anträge auf Zuweisung von eingeborenen Arbeitern (1914-1915)
30 E.IV.D (vol.1)	Eingeborenen Strafakten. (1911-1912)
30 E.IV.D (vol.2)	Ebd. (1912-1914)
30 E.IV.F	Eingeborenengefängnis. Specialia. Gefängnisbuch (1910-1913)
34 E.5.E	Klagen Eingeborener gegen Weisse (1907-1912)
34 E.5.E (vol.2)	Ebd. Prozessakten (1912-1914)
34 E.5.E (vol.3)	Ebd. (1909-1913)
34 E.IV.5	Ebd. (1907-1912)
73 L.2.e.1	Dienstt. Wachtmeister Karl Dietrich (1907-1914)
73 L.2.e.3	Pol.Sgt. Bülow
73 L.2.e.4	Pol.Wachtm. Bilewski (1908-1914); Pol.Sgt. Diener
73 L.2.e.5	Pol.Sgt. Ebermann
73 L.2.e.7	Polizeisergeant Karl Hofmann (1907-1914)
73 L.2.e.8	Pol.Sgt. Richard Neumann
75 L.2.F	Polizeidiener und Feldkornets (1910-1914)
75 L.2.H	Bekleidung, Ausrüstung, Bewaffnung allgemein (1909-1915)
77 L.2.I	Patrouillendienst und Ritte (1910-1914)

DAR Distriktsamt Aroab

3 E.1.D	Passpflicht der Eingeborenen (1906-1913)
4 E.4.A	Eingeborenen Strafgerichtsbarkeit. Allgemeines (1896-1914)
4 E.4.D	Eingeborenen Strafakten (1912-1914)
18 E.II.5	Eingeborene Strafsachen (1909-1912)
18 E.II.6	Entlaufene Eingeborene (1908-1912)

18 G.II.1	Gerichtswesen (1907-1912)
20 P.II.1	Landespolizei (1907-1911)
20 P.II.1 (vol.2)	Ebd. (1911-1913)

BSW Bezirksamt Swakopmund

85 L.2.c	Landespolizei: Dienstbeschädigungen, Ansprüche, Beihilfen (1902-1913)
85 L.2.d	Polizeistation Empfängnisbucht (1909-1914)
85 L.2.e	Landespolizei: Schiessdienst, Waffen und Munition (1908-1914)
125 UA.26/5	Landespolizei: Befehlsbuch (1904-1905)
125 UA.26/6	Ebd., Tagesbefehle (1906-1907)
125 UA.26/7	Ebd. (1906-1907)
126 UA.26/8	Bekleidung der Polizeidiener
125 UA.26/9	Eingeborene Polizisten (1900-1903)
125 UA.26/10	Lohnnachweisung der Polizeidiener (1909-1914)

BOM Bezirksamt Omaruru

32 C.15	Streitigkeiten zwischen Eingeborenen und Weissen (1908-1912)
53 28	Polizei. Verschiedenes

DOK Distriktsamt Okahandja

16 B.9.B	Beschwerden über Beamte (1908-1914)
27 E.2.E	Eingeborene Arbeiter. Anträge auf Zuweisung (1904-1914)
27 E.2.F	Eingeborene Arbeiter. Beschwerden (1908-1914)

BKE Bezirksamt Keetmanshoop

32 L.2.e	Polizeibeamte, Dienstinstruktionen, Versetzungen (1912-1915)
32 L.2.e.25	Pol. Sgt. Wandrei (1912-1913)
32 L.2.f	Polizeidiener (1912-1914)
129 B.II.36.e (vol.1)	Distriktsamt Hasuur
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